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Abstract      
 
     This research aims to address the rhetorical claims about transparency and access to 
information (ATI) by asking questions like: Why they are important, and if they are, are they 
worth of constitutional protection? The study engages in a doctrinal research with two 
dimensions, a conceptual and a normative one. The conceptual dimension includes the 
understanding of the meaning, perceptions, dynamics, tensions and values assigned to 
transparency and ATI. This dimension is explored through the study of two main jurisdictions 
(Canada and the EU) and two case studies (Ontario and Albania). The normative dimension in 
concerned with how the conceptual grounds shape the legal status and protection of ATI, and 
provides a framework that enables the recognition of ATI as a constitutional right. My analysis 
focuses on the users of the ATI process, and their practices.  
 
    The conceptual dimension views transparency and access rights as political and societal 
constructs. They heavily depend on the political system at place, and their analysis should not 
start from expectations based on ideals, but potentials. The societal approach focuses on the 
public space and looks at transparency and ATI as having multiple functions. The thesis provides 
a set of standards against which the main rhetorical claims about transparency and the actual 
practice of ATI can be measured.  
 
     The normative dimension takes a human rights perspective that focuses on the substance and 
the form. From a substance approach ATI rights are considered necessary and important in 
Canada. From a form approach Canada has a gap on how rights transform into positive law and 
penetrate the constitutional structure. This thesis offers a bridge to reconcile the substance and 
form approach. My argument points to a fundamental dichotomy of a human rights-based 
approach as found in the difference between an instrumentalist and an intrinsic approach. It 
argues that the right of ATI deserves recognition from both approaches. However, the thesis 
argues for the value of the intrinsic approach because it lends itself to a discussion of rights that 
have the potential to generate and shape ideas, create knowledge and enable engagement and 
participation.  
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PART I 
 BUILDING FUNDAMENTAL BLOCKS 
 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION AND DISSERTATION OVERVIEW  
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
     In the literature, there is a conceptual and definitional muddle with respect to transparency 
and its relationship with access to information (ATI). From a legal perspective transparency 
manifests itself as a general principle of law and ATI as a right which enables disclosure of 
government information to individuals and groups on the basis of request. Viewed in a simplified 
way, there is clearly a principle-right relationship between transparency and ATI. However, the 
nature and the dynamics of this relationship are informed by many legal, political, social, 
historical and cultural factors.  
 
     This research aims to address the rhetorical claims about transparency and ATI by asking 
questions like: Why they are important, and if they are, are they worth of constitutional 
protection? To answer these questions this study engages in a doctrinal research with two 
dimensions, a conceptual and a normative one. The conceptual dimension includes the 
understanding of the meaning, perceptions, dynamics, tensions and values assigned to 
transparency and ATI. To better understand what the terminology means and how the 
transparency-ATI relationship develops conceptually and materializes in practice, this research 
studied the situation in two main jurisdictions (Canada and the EU) and two case studies 
(Ontario and Albania). The normative dimension in concerned with how the conceptual grounds 
shape the legal status and protection of the two variables, and provides a framework that enables 
the recognition of access to information as a constitutional right. My analysis emphasizes the 
legal, political, and institutional framework in each case, and focuses on the users of the ATI 
process, and their practices.  
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    The conceptual dimension views transparency and access rights as political and societal 
constructs. From a political perspective this research demonstrates that transparency heavily 
depends on the political system at place and its weaknesses are structural – transparency is a 
recent introduction to most political systems that were not designed to be transparent from the 
inception. The analysis of transparency should not start from expectations based on ideals, but 
potentials that address the information and power asymmetry.  
 
     The societal approach focuses on the public space and looks at transparency and access as 
having three functions. First, they bring issues to the public’s attention. Second, they enhance 
public’s education, social learning, rational thinking, and political and social consciousness. 
Third, they strengthen the idea of citizenship (especially in the EU). The thesis provides a set of 
standards (using theories of Pateman and Habermas) against which the main rhetorical claims 
about transparency and the actual practice of ATI can be measured.  
 
     The normative dimension is concerned with how the law is and how it ought to be. 
Transparency often becomes a political tool, which in absence of pressure from civil society, will 
stretch its applications to the extreme edges of its legal meaning, or will distort its system of 
access rights by subjugating them to political will. The way transparency is perceived by the 
government will dictate how it is engrained in the legal system of a country, and how access 
rights are protected and implemented, in part through ATI. The normative dimension takes a 
human rights perspective that focuses on the substance and the form which are distinct but also 
dependent to one another. The substance approach deals with what rights are necessary and 
important. There is a general agreement that ATI is an important right. The form approach deals 
with how can rights transform into positive law and penetrate the constitutional structure. This is 
where the Canadian experience lacks activism and success. This thesis offers a bridge to close 
the gap between the substance and form approach. My argument points to a fundamental 
dichotomy of a human rights-based approach as evidenced in the literature and in the practices in 
various jurisdictions – as found in the difference between an instrumentalist and an intrinsic 
approach. It argues that the right of ATI deserves recognition from both approaches. However, 
the thesis argues for the value of the intrinsic approach because it lends itself to a discussion of 
rights that comes closest to meeting the standards it has outlined. The value of an intrinsic 
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approach (as explained by the Habermas’s discourse theory of law) lies with the potential of 
access rights to generate and shape ideas, create knowledge and enable engagement and 
participation, thereby meeting the standards identified above. This approach allows for 
overcoming limitations of an instrumental recognition. 
 
     This research allows for an enrichment of the two dimensions it studied, conceptual and 
normative. The thesis offers a definition and a conceptual framework that differentiates between 
transparency and ATI. An essential part of this conceptual framework is a typology of 
information access/delivery that helps explain the behavior of the actors involved in access to 
information processes. In addition, the thesis offers models of transparency for each of the 
jurisdictions in study, ones that are based on the value assigned to transparency processes.   
 
     Finally, an analysis of the grounds for and limitations of a rights-based approach is offered, 
both in general and in terms of the various jurisdictions studied. Using the EU as an example of 
how access rights have evolved over time and granted constitutional status, the thesis proposes a 
recognition of such status in Canada. This recognition could be achieved through courts as a 
venue to avoid at a certain extent the political and procedural hindrances. While courts are not 
immune from political interference, they are in a much better position to make decisions that are 
independent, innovative and reformative. The involvement of the courts would allow for an 
interpretative stretching of access rights on the basis of their value and the place they deserve in 
the constitutional structure.  
 
1.2 Description and Dissertation Overview   
1.2.1 Description  
     This research started as an investigation of the access rights that Canadians have in relation to 
their government, mainly the federal government in this case. In trying to make sense of the legal 
framework, I found myself immersed into a rich and diverse body of literature on ATI that was 
closely related to transparency. Although there is some level of agreement in the literature that 
transparency is important for the functioning of every democratic society, the terminology that is 
used to describe the term is complex, if not frustrating. I noticed a conceptual muddle 
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surrounding the notion of transparency. It was described variously as a process, as a principle, as 
a goal, and so on. The difficulty in conceptualization made this research challenging, but at the 
same time worth pursuing in an attempt to close the gap in the existing literature.  
 
     From a legal perspective, transparency is better understood as a general principle, which is 
expressed in practice through access to information laws, among other things. Canada passed an 
Access to Information Act (ATIA) in 1982, and many other countries in the world have done so as 
well. These laws protect a right to access to information by individuals on information held by 
their governments. When I compared the federal Canadian right to ATI with the same rights in 
several other jurisdictions, I noticed differences. Hence, I decided to engage in a comparative 
exercise, which could help explain these differences. I chose the European Union (EU) as a 
jurisdiction for comparison because it represents interesting patterns of how transparency and 
access to information have developed. I explain the reason for this choice in section 1.3 below. I 
chose the Canadian federal level because that is the most problematic jurisdiction in Canada, 
where the ATI law is in immediate need for reform, according to the literature. In addition, 
studying all provinces would have been a difficult undertaking considering the limited time and 
resources available for the completion of this thesis. Needless to say, there are political, legal and 
institutional differences between the EU and Canada, but my comparison was apt because they 
also share similarities.  
 
     The comparison between Canada and the EU offers interesting insights since they are 
complex multilevel governance systems where authority is dispersed between different levels of 
government - local, regional, provincial, national and supranational - as well as across spheres 
and sectors including markets, and citizens. Both Canada and the EU, share some features of 
federalism, where federalism has to be understood as a system which ensures a large measure of 
self-rule for the constituent units. With a bit of attention in the political systems, one can find 
similarity in the practices and conceptions of transparency and ATI rules in Canada and the EU. 
As Hix argues “from the point of view of comparative politics, there are many things the EU 
shares with other multi-level polities.”1 In the EU, member states jointly decide the common 
                                                          
1 Simon Hix, The political system of the European Union, 2nd ed (London: Palgrave MacMillan Press Ltd, 2005) at 
574 [Hix, “The political system of the EU”].  
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purposes of the Union. In Canada, with some important exceptions where the government of 
Canada alone gets to define the common purposes of the federation, the same practice prevails 
with the provinces.   
 
     In addition, in both jurisdictions the need for more transparency and ATI has originated from 
the idea of a weak Parliament and democratic deficit. According to Birkinshaw “Transparency 
…. gained popular appeal within the European Community from the early 1990s when it was 
seen as a useful device to combat claims of democratic deficit and complexity in the operations 
of the EC.”2 Both Canada and the EU are political systems with a very strong executive branch 
which undermines legitimacy and popular vote. As such, in both Canada and the EU, 
transparency has developed as a necessity to control the government and its bureaucracy and 
protect the citizens from misuse of government power. Héritier argues that “transparency and 
access to information play a straightforward supportive role. They function as a prerequisite for 
exercising popular control over government activities.”3  
 
    The European Parliament has not been a strong legislature. Hix states that at the EU level 
“Legislative power is shared between two institutions: the legislative meetings of the Council 
and the EP.”4 Although the role of the European Parliament has increased with the introduction 
of the so-called co-decision procedure, its role is still shadowed by that of the Council. In 
Canada, the Westminster parliamentary system fuses the executive and legislature. In practice, 
executives dominate parliaments and get them to do their bidding. The only time executives may 
have to bargain with Canadian parliaments and accept a compromise on their legislative 
proposals is in the event of a minority government. This is the reason Roberts argues that “The 
urge to regulate the flow of information may be stronger in a governmental system such as 
Canada’s, in which authority is already more highly concentrated within the executive branch.”5 
                                                          
2 Patrick Birkinshaw, “Freedom of Information and Openness: Fundamental Human Rights?” (2006) 58:1 
Administrative Law Review 177 at 189 [Birkinshaw, “FOI and Openness”]. 
3 Adrienne Héritier, “Composite democracy in Europe: the role of transparency and access to information” (2003) 
10:5 Journal of European Public Policy 814 at 824 [Héritier, “Composite democracy in Europe”].  
4 Hix, “The political system of the EU”, supra note 1 at 582. 
5 Alasdair Roberts, “Administrative discretion and the Access to Information Act: An “internal law” on open 
government?” (2002) 45:2 Canadian Public Administration 175 at 179 [Roberts, “Administrative discretion and 
ATIA].  
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     I also looked at the situation in Albania (a country where I was a lawyer, and which is a 
candidate country for membership in the EU) and in Ontario, with a more friendly access regime, 
just to bet some perspective on the main comparison I was making. The research on the legal 
framework in the two jurisdictions showed striking differences on how transparency and access 
to information were viewed and protected. As a result, I decided to pay further attention to why 
these differences existed, and factors to which they could be attributed.   
 
1.2.2 Collection of data  
     I study transparency and access to information in Canada and the EU using two lenses, an 
institutional and a user perspective. The institutional lens looks at four types of institutions, the 
government (giving political directions), public administration (managing the everyday 
administration of ATI system), oversight institutions (advocating for the right of ATI), and 
courts (impartial decision-makers). Each of these types of institutions informs how access to 
information is perceived by different actors and how their mindsets shapes the environment in 
which ATI operates and the responses to public demands.  
 
     One of the main challenges on the institutional study is the role of bureaucratic discretion on 
transparency and ATI. One of the central problems with the access laws is that many important 
exemptions are discretionary. This means that the government ‘may’ disclose the information 
that falls under such exemptions, but does not have to. In theory, this permits more disclosure 
than mandatory exemptions, but the problem lies with who exercises the discretion to disclose. 
Dealing with discretion will be a challenge in my research, and its study has limitations. To 
address this challenge I will try to address questions like: What are the implications of a statutory 
right being shaped through the exercise of administrative discretion and what can be a solution to 
this problem?  How can the ATI law work better in practice?  Does this require a change of the 
statutory law or even this intervention is not enough considering the inherited culture of 
bureaucracy? To give answers to these questions I designed a questionnaire addressed to some of 
the Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) Coordinators in Canada and the main institutions 
at the EU. 
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     In addition, I inspect the oversight institutions on ATI which include the Information 
Commissioner/Ombudsman6 and the Courts. This dissertation compares the oversight institutions 
in both jurisdictions and analyzes their role and influence in the ATI regime. It looks at their 
status, competences, mandate and enforcement power to highlight the similarities and differences 
among them. I complement the questionnaire used for the Information Coordinators with 
exploratory interviews with some public officials from the Information Commissioners. These 
interviews were conducted throughout a period of six months, from March to August 2015. The 
purpose of the interviews was to understand the process in which ATI requests are made and 
handled, the attitudes of the actors involved and the challenges they are confronted with. All the 
participants were asked about the value of ATI and their approach to promote that value.  
 
    Furthermore, I look at how the courts interpret transparency and ATI provisions. I use case 
law as a method to understand the approach of the courts focusing on the main cases from the 
Supreme Court of Canada and the Court of Justice of the EU. I also look at the contribution of 
the Federal Court of Appeal and the European Court of Human Rights on transparency and ATI. 
The case law offers an advantage on research because many court decisions are published, hence 
it is very convenient to track them systematically.  
 
     From a user’s perspective, I examine how ATI users have adopted and benefited from its 
provisions in their activities. I have chosen NGOs and media/journalists amongst many users 
such as businesses, political parties, academics and individuals. My choice was based on two 
reasons: first, a study of a wider user group was practically impossible for lack of funding, time 
and other resources. Second, these are the groups of users who most work with ATI to protect 
public interests, in many cases advancing human rights. I chose both groups since in many cases 
organizations of journalists are considered to be NGOs, and many journalists also work for 
NGOs. As such, in many cases it is hard to make a distinction between the two groups. The role 
of the media in shaping transparency and access to information has close attention in my thesis. 
There are claims that the information requested by the media may be used not in the interest of 
                                                          
6 Note that the federal institution in Canada with oversight on Access to Information Act is the Information 
Commissioner, in Ontario is the Information Commissioner and Privacy of Ontario, in the EU is the European 
Ombudsman, and in Albania is the Commissioner of the Right to Information and the Protection of Personal Data. 
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the citizens, but that of mass media and interest groups. This could undermine the public interest 
if it results in the latter exerting disproportional influence through selective use of governmental 
material. In addition, I keep in mind that not all NGOs serve the public interest because some of 
them are captured by political or business interests. This is a weakness I consider when I draw 
conclusions based on the information and data gathered from NGOs and media.  
 
     This research employs qualitative (historical, legislative and case-law analysis, survey, 
interviews,) and quantitative methods (data drawn from the Treasury Board Secretariat [TBS] 
and Office of Information Commissioner [OIC] websites). I provide a preliminary historical 
overview of the development of the access to information legislation in both Canada and in the 
EU. This allows me to better understand what caused this development and what the 
consequences were. Drawing on the insights of historical development, my dissertation aims to 
explain why the ATI legislation was passed at a particular point in time and why it took the 
particular form it did. The two case studies are introduced shortly for comparison. Furthermore, 
this research makes an analysis of the ATI legislative framework in Canada and the EU. It 
particularly focuses on the implications that derive from the place ATI acts hold in the hierarchy 
of the legal framework and means by which it is implemented and becomes obligatory.  I 
investigate how and why Canada, the EU and the two cases studies have adopted their models.  I 
also examine their achievements, challenges, problems and their solutions.  The Canadian and 
the EU model are put in front of each other and are compared in search of differences and 
similarities and the rationale for them. This comparison helps me to draw important conclusions 
for my research.  
 
     My field qualitative methodology consists of two tools: questionnaires and interviews. The 
questionnaire was sent via emails to 113 Access to Information and Privacy coordinators in 
Canada. The questionnaires were sent in May with responses coming back throughout a period 
of two months. All email contacts are provided by the Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada in 
its website, together with the names and other contact information for these coordinators. There 
are 260 institutions listed at the Treasury Board Secretariat webpage. I sent the questionnaire to 
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1137, out of 260 contacts and made the choice based on the importance of the institutions. It was 
very easy to access the contacts since they were all contained in one webpage and listed in 
alphabetical order. Several reminders were sent via email waiting for a response. I had some 
communication with some of them, and could really notice the frustration of completing the 
questionnaire. Only a handful of coordinators showed interest in the research and only four of 
them actually completed the questionnaire. My expectation was that I would get the response of 
at least a quarter of the number (about thirty). However, the results were far more disappointing 
than expected. Of course, this result is very limited to draw conclusions from. However, the 
frustration showed by the ATIP coordinators was a sign of a centralized system that is politically 
steered.   
 
     For the EU, the questionnaires were sent in June with responses coming back throughout a 
period of two months. The questionnaire was the same as that sent in Canada. It was sent via 
email to the three main EU institutions, the Parliament, the Commission and the Council, and I 
only got completed questionnaires from two of them. Although several reminders were sent to 
the EU Parliament I never had any response. I am not sure if the mail ever reached the EP, but I 
assume the email was correct. I also sent the questionnaire via email to 23 out of the 40 EU 
central agencies. This number choice was made on the email contacts I could find. It was very 
difficult to find the contacts of the departments at the EU institutions, including the three main 
ones (although it took less time to find their contact). The contacts could not be found in one 
webpage as in Canada - they were scattered. It took me some time to track the contacts of the 
offices or persons charged with handling access to documents (ATD) requests. The emails were 
sent in July with answers coming till the end of August. The response rate was better than 
Canada, but nonetheless low. Only 7 out of 26 responded. However, I had more communication 
with people at the EU, and they seemed interested in the research. A handful of them wrote to 
request time extensions due to lack of people because of the holiday season (August). However, 
even with an extension to the first week of September, no one responded after August.  
 
                                                          
7 Note that the numbers of ATIP Coordinators is smaller than 260, which is the number of the institutions since in 
many cases one coordinator covers more than one institution.  
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     The second tool of data collection are the interviews. I conducted a total of seventeen 
interviews. Letters of invitation were sent to each of the persons who agreed to be interviewed in 
advance, before the interview date. Informed consent was obtained by either signing the letter or 
by email confirmation. Interviews were semi-structured, with an interview guide to ensure that 
certain topics were covered. I chose this structure of interview because it was important that I 
asked every interviewee about their approach to the value of transparency and ATI. Also, I asked 
them to bring examples from their work that demonstrated this approach, especially focusing on 
human rights. I had four interviews with people working at the Office of the Information 
Commissioner and Privacy in Ontario, two interviews with people at the Office of the 
Information Commissioner of Canada, one interview at the Information Commissioner and 
Protection of Personal Data in Albania. These people volunteered to be interviewed after I sent a 
formal request to their respective institutions. In addition, I had seven interviews with people 
from NGOs and media in Canada (two of which are also academics) and three interviews in 
Europe (two of which in Albania). These participants were chosen based of their significant 
contribution or that of the organizations they worked for in the field of transparency. I have sent 
requests to five more NGOs in Europe, but was not able to finalize an interview with them. I had 
an excellent experience, especially with some of the interviewees, who found my research very 
interesting, gave me their insights on the topic and even inspired me in furthering my arguments 
for a human right claim on ATI. There were no financial incentives for any of the interviewees.  
 
     The qualitative research methods are very useful in identifying dominant themes occurring 
repeatedly in the ATI environment. However, they do not provide a full picture of what happens 
on the ground. Therefore, I use triangulation as a method of validating my findings because 
multiple sources shed different light on the same phenomenon. To complement my qualitative 
research I used data from the Treasury Board Secretariat website which contains plenty of 
information over the years regarding the implementation of ATIA, such as the categories of 
requesters with respective numbers of requests, including their percentages compared to the total 
number, the number of requests made to each institution, the numbers completed and rejected, 
the cost of processing requests and the money paid from requesters. Questions like: how many 
requests were fully accepted, processed and replied by the specific institution and if they were 
they handled on time (within 30 days legal limit); how many of the requests were delayed 
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(beyond 30 days) and for how much time; what are the reasons for the delay (did the institution 
give any reason or not); how many requests were accepted; how many were totally denied and on 
what grounds – got answers from analyzing the Treasury Board Secretariat data. Moreover, this 
data gives some information about the economic impact of the ATI regime, such as how much it 
costs to the institution to handle information requests, and how much revenue the institution 
collects from the information requests fees. Of course, I always considered the limitation of the 
data on revealing the truth about the ATI administration. Access of that data was a good start and 
was validated employing other methods.   
 
     In addition, the Office of the Information Commissioner produces statistical reports which 
were used to assess government performance. They were a valuable source especially when 
compared to other data using triangulation.  
 
     Further research evidenced that transparency and ATI have a close relationship, each 
affecting the other in meaningful ways, depending on the value assigned to each of them. The 
approach towards transparency and ATI is grounded on the perceptions of these variables as 
social and political constructs. To understand the approach taken in each of the jurisdictions I 
examined how transparency and ATI developed historically, how they were played politically, 
how they were managed administratively, how they were used practically, how they were 
supervised institutionally and how they were interpreted and protected judicially. 
 
     My main concern while doing the research has been on examining how the value assigned to 
ATI informed and prescribed its level of legal protection and status. For example, the EU 
recognizes ATI as a constitutional right, while Canada is still far from granting such status. 
Hence, my preoccupation was to provide a framework that enables the recognition of a 
constitutional status of ATI in Canada. In order to do so, I employed two theories of democracy, 
the deliberative theory by Habermas and the participation theory of Pateman. They provide 
standards against which the rhetoric of transparency and ATI can be measured.  
 
     While transparency has many meanings, trying to make sense of its practical value, I 
approached the term from the perspective offered by Rawlins. He provides a more complete 
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description, one that captures best an understanding of transparency not just as an information 
provision, but also introduces a public discourse aspect related to information as knowledge that 
affects reasoning and the capacity to react in response to that knowledge. Rawlins stated that 
“Transparency is the deliberate attempt to make available all legally releasable information – 
whether positive or negative in nature – in a manner that is accurate, timely, balanced and 
unequivocal, for the purpose of enhancing the reasoning ability of publics and holding 
organizations accountable for their actions, policies, and practices.”8  This definition reflects a 
more inclusive approach on transparency, one that is good-willed and not accidental, one that 
considers limitations, but only allows for restraints outlined in law, one that does not selectively 
releases only “good” but also “negative” information, one that is simple and prompt, one that 
considers all interests in play, one that is made of a clear objective to transmit knowledge for the 
enrichment of understanding public issues. This definition and the theories that I employ for this 
research, provided a solid conceptual foundation that allowed me to advance human rights 
claims.  
 
     Although transparency is often equated with ATI, the two concepts are very much 
distinguished – the latter is regarded much narrowly, and the former has a much wider meaning. 
Transparency as a principle is realized by a number of legal instruments, with ATI being one of 
them. For this research I referred to ATI as “access by individuals as a presumptive right to 
information held by public authorities”9, as described by Birkinshaw. This definition 
distinguishes ATI as an individual right which is positive in nature. This means that it is the duty 
of the public authorities to make this right possible by securing the ATI required. .  
 
     Democratic participation has been thinned to the point that most citizens exercise their 
presumed sovereignty only through periodic elections of representatives, and thus have 
extremely limited input into other political processes. This fact stands as an irony of our modern 
times considering that “political participation is the lifeblood of democratic regimes.”10 To 
revive the democratic principles, I found it useful to rediscover the notions of a participatory 
                                                          
8 Brad Rawlins, “Give the emperor a mirror. Toward developing a stakeholder measurement of organizational 
transparency” (2009) 21:1 Journal of Public Relations Research 71 at 75 [Rawlins, “Give the emperor a mirror”].  
9 Birkinshaw, “FOI and Openness”, supra note 2 at 188.  
10 Gianfranco Pasquino, Prima lezione di scienza politica. (Roma: Laterza, 2008) [Pasquino, “Prima lezione”]. 
13 
 
political system, like the one offered by Pateman in her participatory democratic theory. In 
addition, for the participatory democracy to be present a vigorous public discourse must take 
place in the public domain which acts as precursory of participation and leads to it. This process 
is facilitated by providing public ATI. In this context, the public discourse theory developed by 
Habermas helped me explain the process of participation as an active engagement of citizens. 
The participatory democratic theory and the public discourse theory served as a theoretical 
background of this dissertation and helped in advancing the human right claims for ATI.   
 
     My work fits into the ongoing conversation about the significance of transparency and ATI. 
My contribution lies in helping to fill a gap in the literature by examining the importance of 
access laws on human rights and as human rights. In developing my argument, I build upon the 
work of scholars such as Birkinshaw and Roberts to argue that ATI is a fundamental human right 
intrinsically and instrumentally. Birkinshaw defined ATI as an individual presumptive right11, 
while Roberts suggested that it is logical to claim “that access right is better understood as a 
corollary of basic political participation rights.”12 I thus make a claim for the recognition of ATI 
as a fundamental right by looking at the value it upholds in a modern democracy and by drawing 
a connection between information and knowledge. I argue that this relationship creates better 
capacities, opportunities and venues for the citizens to exercise their social, economic and 
political rights. I envisage ATI as being in the centre of a triangle in which knowledge, power 
and control are its vertices. In this typology information can increase knowledge; knowledge can 
create opportunities to have more power, and power, if exercised properly, could translate to 
more control.  
 
     The shift to the recognition of ATI as a human right has deeper roots in changing notions of 
the importance of information in society and the very concept of democracy as an ongoing 
participation in decision-making. Certainly, looking at transparency and ATI from this 
perspective, means that they have the potential to bind governments and empower citizens.  ATI 
about government rules, decisions, and activities empowers citizens, enables journalists, and as a 
                                                          
11 Birkinshaw, “FOI and Openness”, supra note 2.   
12 Alasdair Roberts, “Structural Pluralism and the Right to Know” (2001) 51 University of Toronto Law Journal 243 
at 262 [Roberts, “Structural Pluralism”]. 
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result, constrains politicians, and exposes corruption. Yet for precisely these reasons, ATI is 
considered to be highly political, and therefore, highly contentious. It poses substantial costs for 
political actors - it impedes their capability to keep secrets, to mystify, to profit from the control 
of private information, and above all to use public office for private gain. What transparency ATI 
do is make information a matter of public domain.   
 
     There is growing appreciation of the need to view any ATI law from the perspective of the 
anticipated user. The literature is fresh and abundant to support the argument of ATI as a human 
right. Indeed, we are well beyond the point at which it can disputed that a properly defined right 
of ATI is essential to good governance. The time has passed that one could downgrade access 
rights reform to the taciturn exile of further study. The time is ripe to move forward towards the 
recognition of ATI as a human right.  
 
1.2.3 Research questions  
     The purpose of this research is twofold: first, to provide some clarity to the conceptualization 
and practicability of transparency and ATI, and second, to provide a framework for the 
recognition of ATI as a fundamental human right. The research was guided by several questions.  
The main question is: What is the nature and value of transparency and access to information in 
Canada and the European Union from a human right perspective?   
 
     To understand the real value of transparency and ATI or answer the question of whether ATI 
should be considered a fundamental human right, I considered these subsidiary questions: 
- Why transparency and ATI laws are important?  
- Who uses ATI laws? 
- How are they considered by different actors?  
- What type of information do different actors usually seek? 
- What do actors usually do with the information they acquire? 
- Are the values that ATI laws uphold worth promoting despite substantial processing 
costs? 
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     I argue that transparency and ATI are values that enable the shaping of ideas and enrichment 
of public discourse, and as such they create, enhance and advance human rights. The design, the 
authority of the legal provisions, and the institutional approaches towards transparency and ATI 
should recognize the value of ATI as a human right. This recognition should not be based upon 
an expectation that transparency and ATII will make governments more accountable, or that it 
will increase the trust in governments, or that it will make the corruption disappear, or that it 
make people participate more in public decision-making. Instead, a human right approach is 
based on the necessity of protecting individuals against the wrongdoings of their governments. 
Governments should appreciate the value of access rights for individuals in their private and 
public lives.  By approaching ATI from this perspective, one can appreciate what it can do for 
participation, corruption, trust, accountability, and better governance. 
 
1.3 Outline of the Dissertation 
 
     This dissertation is structured in four parts. Part one sets the foundations of this research and 
paves the road for what is coming in the next chapters. This part clarifies to the reader what are 
the concerns in the research and what needs to be done to address these concerns. Part one 
includes two chapters, and explores the conceptual and theoretical foundations of transparency 
and ATI. Chapter one describes the story of the research and the arguments. It provides an 
overview of the dissertation and lays out the main research question together with subsidiary 
questions, the concerns of the research, and its purpose. This chapter also describes the 
methodology employed for carrying out the research explaining what research has been done 
(interviews, doctrinal research, case law analysis) to address the research questions. This chapter 
also emphasizes the significance of the research in terms of social, legal, and policy perspectives. 
Chapter two is a definitional chapter and serves to set up the problem that I am investigating, the 
conceptual muddle that exist in the literature on transparency and ATI. In this chapter I go back 
to the roots of the concept of transparency, and follow how the concept has evolved over time, 
and how it has gradually given rise to the right of ATI.  Chapter two also introduces the two 
main theories that shape the arguments of this research.  
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     Part two begins the discussion of the research findings. The purpose is to have a better 
understanding of how the two terms are used, the way they have developed historically, how 
they are protected legally, and where they stand in comparison with other values and rights (such 
as privacy). For this purpose, this part looks at the existing theoretical debates on both 
transparency and ATI, exploring them from a historical and legal perspective, and balancing 
them privacy. Part two contains three chapters. Chapter three analyzes the historical development 
of transparency and ATI in Canada and the EU, and compares them with the international 
developments in the field. This chapter tries to answer questions like: How did transparency and 
ATI emerge and in response to what? What values did they endorse initially? How did they 
develop and change and why? Has there been a shift on the way they were perceived and valued? 
Why has Canada not responded to the advancements in transparency and ATI all around the 
world? What explains the variation in historical development between Canada and the EU? I 
look at the rationale behind the adoption of ATI laws at the first place, the drive of the 
governments to pass those laws, the value governments and advocates saw in ATI when drafted 
these laws. Chapter four looks at the design of the existing legal framework on transparency and 
ATI, the legal rights they protect, their restrictions and limitations, the constitutional status of 
ATI rights and the ramifications of the constitutional recognition. The study has a special focus 
on ATI legislation on the federal level and its constitutional protection. It compares Canada and 
the EU and then more broadly compares both of them with the international legal framework. 
Chapter five makes a careful analysis of ATI and privacy, as values that may come into conflict 
with each other. Privacy and ATI have a close relationship because they are complementary 
right, but that occasionally clash with each other. This chapter explores the conceptual and legal 
analysis of ATI and privacy and their implications for the implementation of such rights in 
practice. It draws comparisons between the two jurisdictions and lessons to be learned from one 
another.  
 
     Part three sheds some light on the dynamics of transparency and ATI. Because their 
understanding, and the way they are legally protected is informed by many factors and actors 
involved, it was important to investigate what those factors and actors were, and how they affect 
the implementation of laws in practice. Hence, part three is preoccupied with investigating the 
dynamics of transparency and ATI from an actor’s perspective. This part contains four chapters. 
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It looks at transparency and ATI as occupying three spaces: a) government institutions - they are 
the producers of information records; it is there where deliberations happen and decision-making 
takes place; it is them who manage the information dissemination by exercising a great amount 
of power and control; b) supervising/reviewing bodies – they are the Information Commissioner 
(in case of Canada) or the Ombudsman (in case of the EU) acting as a first step of complaints, 
and the Courts, being the next step of the review process. Both steps serve as a bridge between 
citizens and institutions; 3) the public - who is the receiver or the user of the information. I focus 
in two groups of users for the purpose of this research, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
and the media. I dedicate one chapter to each of these actors occupying these three spaces and 
draw comparisons between Canada and the EU at the end of each of the four chapters. 
 
     Chapter six examines the administrative management system of ATI by focusing on the role 
of the government and the public administration. The study of government and administration is 
important to understand the political tension that exits in implementing the law and the risk that 
this implementation is captured by political agenda. Chapter seven looks at the perspectives of 
oversight institutions and their role in improving the general climate of transparency in 
government and protecting ATI rights. Chapter eight focuses on the interpretation of ATI rights 
by the courts and their role in safeguarding, expanding and transforming their legal protection 
and status. This chapter becomes essential for this research because it considers courts as the best 
venue that can advance human rights claims of ATI by engaging in an expansive interpretative 
exercise to give life to the constitutional principle of the “living tree”. The Charter can 
accommodate the constitutional recognition of ATI if courts expand its meaning to allow for 
essential changes that are commanded by the growing importance of information in society. 
Chapter nine observes transparency and ATI from a user’s perspective focusing on how and why 
the two chosen groups (NGOs and media) exploit ATI requests. This chapter is important to 
answer questions on who uses ATI, for what purposes, and what they do with the information 
acquired.  
 
     Part four provides the analysis and conclusions. It is focused on the value of transparency and 
ATI from a human right perspective. This is the culminating portion of the research which is 
mainly concerned with providing answers to the questions of conceptualizations of transparency 
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and the constitutional recognition of ATI. Part four consists of two chapters. Chapter ten offers 
definitions for transparency and ATI, by departing from a value-based approach. In addition, this 
chapter provides a framework for measuring transparency and ATI against some set of standards 
- it develops a typology of information access/delivery by using standards assessed from a user’s 
perspective. Chapter eleven offers transparency models by exploring the challenges and tensions 
around transparency and the government behaviour in response to these tensions. In addition, 
this chapter makes a careful analysis of ATI as a human right from an instrumental and intrinsic 
perspective. The Chapter culminates with a framework to establish a fundamental right of ATI in 
Canada based on an interpretative and comparative intervention. This Chapter is important to 
answer the main question of this research and other questions as well, such as what is the value 
of transparency and ATI and if they are worth promoting despite substantial processing costs. 
Chapter eleven wraps up the dissertation highlighting some of the empirical findings brought by 
this research, how this research contributes to the literature on transparency and ATI, and what it 
advances compared to what others have done in the field. In addition, this last chapter 
summarizes some of the conclusions about the value of transparency and ATI in Canada and the 
EU, and more broadly, and what they mean for future developments.   
 
1.4 Significance of the Research 
 
     This dissertation contributes to the literature by bringing together Canada and the EU under 
the umbrella of transparency. It builds upon the existing scholarship by evaluating whether the 
legal framework in the two jurisdictions of study promotes human rights. This research explores 
the value of transparency and ATI and advances its recognition as a fundamental human right.  
 
       My research aims to make a scholarly contribution to the Canadian and European Legal 
Studies. The significance of this research stems from the fact that a comparative analysis allows 
for lesson-drawing on the design and status of transparency and ATI. The comparison also 
permits for a better understanding of the long-term developmental trajectories for the 
improvement of the status of ATI and its role in the broader picture of human rights as it is 
affected by government transparency. This research has a practical value and engages a broad 
19 
 
range of actors such as legislators by providing them a model for upgrading legal provisions and 
ensuring better protection for ATI rights; policy-makers in facilitating their implementation of 
access rights, in understanding the tensions underlying processes of handling information 
requests and prioritizing the interests at stake; scholars in assisting them to engage in ongoing 
conversations around transparency and encouraging them to use access to information requests 
for research purposes; and NGOs in making a better use of access rights to promote human rights 
while complying with their missions.  
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CHAPTER 2:  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK   
 
     This chapter explores the definitional muddle that exists around the concepts of transparency 
and ATI. Its purpose is to lay out the conceptual problem I am investigating by illuminating the 
work that has been done previously in the field.  
 
     The chapter looks at the conceptual framework on transparency and ATIn by keeping a 
special focus on how they are perceived and analyzed. The previous literature is carefully 
examined in an attempt to elucidate the definitional problem, and introduce an explanation of 
how this problem affects the practice in the areas of transparency and ATI rights. Transparency 
is a multidimensional term, and therefore requires a multidisciplinary analysis. This chapter 
engages in a dialogue and interaction with work in various disciplines such as law, political and 
social science. This approach helps capturing and depicting the many faces of transparency. 
 
2.1   Exploring the conceptual framework  
 
2.1.1 Early foundations  
     The term “transparency” became widely used at the end of the twentieth century. However, 
its roots extend far back in time. The origin of transparency as an idea can be traced in Europe at 
least since the eighteenth century. The incorporation of transparency in the works of Rousseau, 
Bentham, Kant and Constant is a testimony of this early origin. However, back in the eighteenth 
century, the term “transparency” was rarely used and the idea of ATI was still a nascent concept. 
Transparency was often used interchangeably with the term “publicity” which indicated that 
being transparent meant conducting affairs openly in public. In the second half of the eighteenth 
century, the pursuit of transparency was closely linked to the idea of representative governments. 
By then, transparency transcended to a higher status with claims about its normativity in the 
realm of public law. As a result, a normative discourse articulated around the norm of 
transparency was truly developed in Europe at the end of the eighteen century. In this context, 
the rich philosophical contributions of Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel Kant, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, and Benjamin Constant are valuable, because they each featured a different appeal for 
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transparency and they established the foundations for today’s normative approach towards 
transparency.  
 
     Jeremy Bentham, the British philosopher and jurist, examined transparency both from a 
philosophical and a legal perspective bringing into play his significant theory on the Philosophy 
of Law, with the principle of legality at the core of his theory. In his work, Bentham observed the 
evils that affect public life, and opacity and lack of transparency were amongst them13. For 
Bentham, secrecy was considered an evil and something unacceptable in conducting public 
affairs. He elaborated on the requirement of legality in the practice of public authorities. 
According to Bentham, the principle of legality becomes a measure against the misuse of 
authority; publicity happens through surveillance, and this facilitates and promotes integrity in 
both the legal and political domains. Bentham argues that “Publicity is the very soul of justice. It 
is the keenest spur to exertion, and the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the judge 
himself, while trying, under trial.”14 This claim about justice as the most important legal 
principle is enhanced by transparency. Therefore, for Bentham there is no justice without 
transparency because visibility of procedures does not only guarantee legal security, but it also 
offers an advantage since, just like in a theatre stage, morality is put into practice and observed 
by all.  
 
     In addition, Bentham associates opacity and ignorance more radically with arbitrary power. 
Bentham’s notion of transparency is most often thought of in the literature as the exercise of an 
‘all-seeing’, and therefore omnipotent power15. However, Bentham also sees transparency as an 
instrument that limits power and that checks misuse of authority. Bentham states: “The partisan 
of arbitrary power does not think thus: he does not wish that the people should be enlightened, 
and he despises them because they are not enlightened. You are not able to judge, he says, 
because you are ignorant; and you shall always be kept ignorant, that you may not be capable of 
                                                          
13 Jeremy Bentham, eds, First Principles Preparatory to Constitutional Code, Edited by Philip Schofield, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989) [Bentham, First Principles]. 
14 Jeremy Bentham, “Principles of Penal Law” in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the 
superintendence of ... John Bowring, vol.1, (Edinburgh: Tait, 1843) at 316 [Bentham, “Principles of Penal Law”]. 
15 See Michel Foucault, “The eye of power” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977 
(Colin Gordon ed.) (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980) at 153 [Foucault, “The eye of power”]. 
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judging.”16 This contribution is very powerful and goes to the core of my arguments for 
transparency and access to information – the idea of information as knowledge with the potential 
to create capacities for rational judgment, and thus engagement in public space, and further 
participation in public affairs. According to Bentham’s understanding, not only secrecy keeps 
people away from knowing what is happening in the public realm, but the lack of knowledge 
affects their good judgment, making them incapable of thinking rationally. Ignorance takes away 
the opportunity to develop intellectually and further to reason rationally.   
 
     Furthermore, responding to the argument that transparency hinders trust in public authorities, 
Bentham extrapolates that making decisions secretly and mysteriously does not necessarily lead 
to a good reputation because hiding is not a good strategy to gain trust. To Bentham, secrecy is 
never profitable to reputation, for it encourages doubt and allow misrepresentation. Publicity, 
rather than affecting honour, more often preserves it, of course, given that good behavior and 
honest intentions are in place. This correlation of transparency and trust is very often discussed 
nowadays as one of the drivers that makes governments not very keen to publicity. The fear of 
failing to deliver what has been promised, makes governments contemplate they will fail 
people’s trust and will be defeated. However, Bentham argues that this is not the case because 
transparency will act like a check mechanism which keeps governments on track and not allow 
them to fail. For him, transparency represents the most effective source of control, as it helps to 
curb infringing behaviors. When Bentham mentions the publicity that must surround legal 
procedures, he emphasizes its superiority: “Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient in 
comparison with publicity, all other checks are of small account.”17 
 
     Bentham lists twelve means of diminishing abuses of power and five of them are directly 
linked to the requirement of publicity.  These measures involve: 1) acceptability of secret 
information; 2) freedom of press, 3) publication of the reasons and facts that have motivated the 
development of laws or other acts of government, 4) exercise of power that respects rules and 
forms, 5) recognition of citizens’ right to associate, allowing them to express their feelings and 
                                                          
16 Bentham, “Principles of Penal Law”, supra note 14 at 575.  
17 Jeremy Bentham, “Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Specially Applied to English Practice” in The Works of Jeremy 
Bentham, published under the superintendence of ... John Bowring, vol. 4, (Edinburgh: Tait, 1843) at 335 [Bentham, 
“Rationale of Judicial Evidence”]. 
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their desires with regards to government’s public measures18. All these measures are 
fundamental for transparency to work and their application represents a challenge for the 
implementation of transparency and access to information regime.  Especially the last measure is 
important for this research because it links citizens and governments in a relationship that works 
both ways in exchanging information. Although Bentham talks about citizen’s right to associate, 
(which is a fundamental human right in both Canada and the EU today, distinguished from ATI) 
he looks at this right from another angle – that of giving feedback on government’s public 
measures. That is the approach that the EU has taken when it upgraded the right of access to 
documents into a constitutional right using a broader interpretation of the freedom of expression.  
 
     Bentham’s contribution in the transparency literature is significant because he raises very 
important claims about publicity, legality, justice, limits of authority, hindrance of rationality and 
public trust, which are at the heart of debates around transparency. They constitute legal 
principles that give rise to a normative dimension of transparency which facilitates its 
applicability to the working of a state as a complex body of institutions. These principles assist in 
understanding different aspects of transparency, but not transparency as a unified concept.  
 
     Publicity, as a dimension of transparency has been elaborated by another scholar, the German 
philosopher Immanuel Kant. Publicity for Kant represents a special criterion to evaluate the legal 
nature of a norm; it provides this norm with other dimensions – those of ‘legality’ and 
‘legitimacy’. Kant writes that “Every claim of right must have this capacity for publicity, and 
since one can easily judge whether or not it is present in a particular case.”19 In his approach 
Kant looks deeper on the effects of publicity of norms and makes important claims on their 
legitimacy. He makes his claim very simple – every legal norm should be published not only for 
people to know it exists, but also to make a good judgment based on it. Publicity, in this 
philosopher’s work, similarly as in Bentham’s work, rises to the level of a mystical formula in 
public law: “All actions that affect the rights of other men are wrong if their maxim is not 
                                                          
18 Bentham, “Principles of Penal Law”, supra note 14 at 570 -578. 
19 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Moral, translated with an 
introduction by Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1983), at 135 [Kant, Perpetual Peace].  
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consistent with publicity.”20 When one employs Kant’s work, it becomes obvious that publicity 
takes on an ethical and legal dimension, most fully developed in “Perpetual Peace”.  
 
     Kant considers that publicity warrants a political and moral unity. As a result, if a political 
action or statement cannot be exposed to the public it is morally harmful. Using Kant’s moral 
ethics, Habermas argues that public opinion, which comes as a result of publicity is indeed 
“aimed at rationalizing politics in the name of morality.”21 As a result, if a political action or a 
maxim cannot be revealed or ‘divulged’ it is detrimental. In Kant’s view therefore, 
transparency’s virtuous dimension is always linked to an absence of duplicity and to the 
requirement of truthfulness. Hence, in Kant’s view transparency’s ethical dimension is always 
linked to deception and honesty. From this perspective, transparency constitutes a method or a 
standard for the control of the legal nature of norms and rules. Of course, publicizing does not 
always guarantee the legal character of rules, but an absence of the publicity of norms provides 
some ground for questioning of their legal nature. In other words, Kant suggest that transparency 
is a condition that if present gives norms their legal dimension and makes them legitimate. 
Otherwise, they lose their status of enforcement, for they are not considered to be legal. 
Transparency, in Kant’s understanding, focuses on the normative rule with a regard for how it is 
respected, as well as its accessibility. The lack of publicity is arbitrary, and goes against a 
constitutional regime, that of a juridical State which is based on a specific idea of freedom from 
arbitrariness. Hence, in a juridical State people are free to reject any unpublished norms. The 
conceivable nature of the law and its application, embodied by the stability of the legal system, 
originate in a particular conception of transparency, which in turn refers to the necessity of a 
codification that is accurate, rational, and above all, public. This particular dimension of Kant’s 
work and its application today certainly needs to be revisited since it touches upon the 
foreseeable nature of the law and the stability of the legal systems.  
 
     Kant’s understanding of transparency focuses more on the publicity requirement, meaning the 
publishing of norms. This is a limited view for two reasons. First, it only includes a one way 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 
21 See Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society (MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.: 1991), at 102 [Habermas, The Structural Transformation]. 
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communication between governments and citizens, and second, it focuses more on the 
publications of final forms of norms, such as an act passed by parliament. This view leaves out 
the possibility of early engagement of the citizens before norms become finalized. Kant’s 
normative dimension of transparency is very compelling today and that is the reason why so 
many legislatures in the world, including Canada and the EU, have made transparency a 
governing principle and have passed laws on FOI. However, this legal approach of 
understanding transparency is (as I will analyze later on) challenged by another approach - the 
political one. This means that how the legislation works in reality depends on the will of the 
politicians in power and of the bureaucrats who are the ones responsible for the dissemination of 
information. Just having laws on books and publishing them does not guarantee the successful 
application of those laws, but it is a good start in a democratic state where the principles of 
legality and justice are cared for.  This tension between the normative and the political dimension 
of transparency is one of the main preoccupations in this research, and to which I commit lots of 
attention.  
 
     Benjamin Constant, a French politician, is another important contributor in early discussions 
on transparency. Just as Bentham, he argues that publicity is important in the workings of the 
government because any attempt to operate in secrecy will be detrimental and lead to suspicions 
and mistrust. According to Constant, the public opinion of the people’s representatives depends 
heavily on their attitudes towards publicity, meaning that the more openly they behave, the less 
suspicious their actions will appear in public’s view. Constant contends that this kind of 
behaviour will save the representatives from all accusations made against them. He brings the 
example of ministers in government and argues that if they are opened and transparent they do 
not have to fear about their honour. Constant maintains that “A full public explanation, in which 
the representative bodies of the nation enlightened the entire nation on the conduct of accused 
ministers, would prove perhaps both their moderation and his innocence.”22 The idea is that 
public officials are not immune of making mistakes, they are people, and as such they may act 
wrongfully. Being perfect is not what is expected from, instead they are required to be honest 
and opened about their public affairs.  
                                                          
22 Benjamin Constant, eds, “Principles of politics applicable to all representative governments” in Political Writings 
(ed.Biancamaria Fontana), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 171 at 233 [Constant, “Principles of 
politics”]. 
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     Constant’s understanding of transparency is mainly focused on official’s behaviour, which is 
a simplified view of the complexity of bureaucracy nowadays. This behavior is shaped by 
political and hierarchical constraints, and is not simply one person’s response, but that of the 
whole bureaucratic machinery. Constant’s approach towards transparency holds an important 
message - public officials should not fear the public’s scrutiny, even in cases of wrongfulness. 
However, truth be told, this is easier said than done. Revealing cases of wrongfulness is one of 
the biggest challenges of transparency nowadays. Governments, being threatened by information 
that could reveal their maladministration practices, try to hide any piece of information that 
could lead to blaming and shaming. This way, they distance themselves even further from the 
public and cover their activities with a secrecy veil. This is probably the most complex matter in 
this the study of transparency because issues of hiding information are difficult to research. This 
kind of study involves concerns of institutional behaviours, bureaucratic hierarchy, political 
culture, legal norms, social construct, and many others. Especially for jurisdictions with multiple 
levels of governments, such as Canada and the EU, where diverse legal, political, social and 
culture norms are intertwined, the challenges of shaping governments responses to transparency 
become even more complex. For this reason, I will return to Constant’s theory of principles of 
politics later on in my research.  
 
     An early advocate who has left his mark on the doctrine of transparency is Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, a Swiss philosopher. He shares the ideas of Bentham and Kant about the importance 
of transparency, but from another perspective. Rousseau is not much concerned about the legal 
aspect of transparency, but looks at it more broadly. He focuses at transparency in society as a 
whole and a sum of relationships with the selves and with the others. When Rousseau speaks of 
transparency, he seldom discusses publicity. Looking at Rousseau’s theory of human association 
Hill explains that transparency is prized “as an instrumental good, being, among other things, the 
social condition necessary for civic cooperation… and regarded opaque relations as the breeding 
ground for many vices.”23 For Rousseau, the absence of transparency is linked to the question of 
evil and a transparent political society, visible and readable in all its parts, displays honours at 
                                                          
23 Greg Hill, Rousseau’s Theory of Human Association: Transparent and Opaque Communities (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2006) at 2 [Hill, Rousseau’s Theory].  
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the outside world and prevents the anonymous status which monitors both vice and virtue24. 
According to Starobinski, Rousseau’s ideal world is one where “nothing comes between one 
mind and another, and each individual is fully and openly to the other.”25 
 
     The application of Rousseau’s theory today may seem idealistic, to say the least, if not 
impossible because his model of a transparent society is very obviously that of mutual 
surveillance and universal visibility. To speak in realistic terms, Rousseau’s theory cannot apply 
to certain public institutions, and not exactly according to the model he proposes. We are all 
aware that some aspect of government workings are excluded from public scrutiny and 
transparency rules. However, Rousseau’s theory of transparency raises important questions about 
the benefits of being transparent; how much transparency is good transparency; how privacy and 
human interaction play out in rules of transparency, and so on.    
 
     The rich philosophical contributions of Bentham, Kant, Constant and Rousseau are a very 
valuable asset in understanding transparency today. They represent different approaches on 
transparency, mainly in terms of far-reaching principles such as justice, legality, ethics, publicity, 
morality, legitimacy, trust or honour. As such, these early works constitute a solid foundation for 
developments of transparency as a moral, social, legal and political project. The principles and 
philosophical analysis developed by these authors have created a doctrinal corpus which 
developed over centuries, and has certainly informed debates on transparency and access to 
information today.   
 
2.1.2 Exploring the definitional problem of transparency 
 
A. Defining transparency  
     As I described above, the work of some of the early philosophers prepared the stage for the 
development of transparency as a term and a process. Later, the contemporary scholars enriched 
                                                          
24 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Government of Poland” in The Social Contract and other Later Political Writings 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 227-228 [Rousseau, “Government of Poland”]. He says: “I 
should like that all grades, all employments, all honorific awards be marked by external signs, that no public figure 
be allowed ever to move about incognito.”  
25 Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jacque Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago : 
University of Chicago Press, 1988) at 23 [Starobinski, Jean-Jacque Rousseau]. 
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its understanding with novel ideas. However, even though the literature on transparency is rich 
and diverse, nowadays, there is no agreement between scholars on what constitutes 
“transparency”. While transparency has been widely prescribed as a cure-all for better 
government, the term exists in a conceptual muddle, and is “more often referred to than 
defined”26, as Hood advises. Although many scholars and advocates have offered their insights, 
the ultimate description of transparency has not yet been found. Florini argues that “[a]lthough 
the word 'transparency' is widely used, it is rarely well defined. There is no consensus on what 
the definition should be or how transparency should be measured.”27 Indeed, the study of 
transparency is significantly challenged by the absence of a single, generally accepted definition 
across disciplines that now make extensive use of the term, including law. In the meantime, 
transparency brings together all these disciplines, and offers an excellent opportunity to examine 
the rational and practical interrelations between law and social sciences.  
  
     In recent years, transparency in governance has attracted increasing attention among various 
academic disciplines28 leading to a wide debate on the nature of transparency. In the EU, “This 
debate has developed along three central dimensions that may be described as the definitional, 
the ethical and the implemental.”29 An important part of the definitional debate focuses on what 
transparency entails and what not30. On the one hand, transparency proponents tend to favor an 
expansive scope for transparency, which allows for a more definitional leeway and a broad 
application. On the other hand, transparency sceptics see it as a form of government 
communication, simply as what documents governments decide to make available. They view it 
with a more ‘real’ lens focusing in perverse costs and effects. Therefore, transparency advocates 
                                                          
26 Christopher Hood, “Transparency in Historical Perspective” in Christopher Hood and David Heald, eds. 
Transparency: The Key to Better Governance? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) 3 at 3 [Hood, 
“Transparency in Historical Perspective”]. 
27 Ann Florini, “Introduction: The Battle over Transparency” in Ann Florini The right to know: transparency for an 
open world (New York: Columbia UP, 2007) at 3 [Florini, “Introduction”].  
28 Albert Meijer, Deirdre Curtin & Maarten Hillebrandt, “Open Government: Connecting Vision and Voice” (2012) 
78 International Review of Administrative Sciences 10 [Meijer et al, “Open government”]. 
29 Maarten Zbigniew Hillebrandt, Deirdre Curtin & Albert Meijer, “Transparency in the EU Council of Ministers: 
An Institutional Analysis” (2014) 20:1 European Law Journal 1 at 4 [Hillebrandt et al, “Transparency in the EU”].  
30 See Meijer et al, “Open Government”, supra note 28; Martial Pasquier & Jean-Patrique Villeneuve, 
“Organizational Barriers to Transparency: A Typology and Analysis of Organizational Behaviour Tending to 
Prevent or Restrict Access to Information” (2007) 73 International Review of Administrative Sciences at 147 
[Pasquier & Villeneuve, “Organizational Barriers”]. 
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are frequently misjudged as looking at transparency solely as an end in itself31. While 
transparency sceptics identify serious tradeoffs between transparency and other public values, 
advocates see such relations as less problematic.32 Critics identify inherent tensions between 
transparency and privacy, effective decision making, national autonomy, and efficient 
administration, which leads to arguments that administrations must strive for optimal rather than 
maximal transparency33. In the EU, some authors warn about the pitfalls of considering 
transparency as a panacea for legitimacy problems pointing that this association is weak.34 That 
is because of various factors, such as information overload, proceduralization, or the risk that the 
media cherry-picks only information that highlights policy failures.35  
 
     There are many definitions on the term transparency, depending on the chosen perspective. 
This demonstrates a craving for “maturity” within the academic discourse. One can notice that 
the inclination for a definition of transparency has improved over time. The earlier definitions 
tend to be simple. For instance, at the early 90s transparency was mostly defined as “lifting the 
veil of secrecy”36, “the ability to look clearly through the windows of an institution”37 or as a 
contrast “with opaque policy measures, where it is hard to discover who takes the decisions, 
what they are, and who gains and who loses.”38 The general idea behind these definitions can be 
pictured as something happening behind curtains and once these curtains are removed, 
everything is open and can be scrutinized. Put simply, common sense understanding associates 
                                                          
31 Tinne Heremans, “Public Access to Documents: Jurisprudence between Principle and Practice (Between 
Jurisprudence and Recast)”, (2011) Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations Working Paper 50 at 12-13 
[Heremans, “Public Access to Documents”].  
32 Stefan G. van Grimmelikhuijsen, “Transparency and Trust: An Experimental Study of Online Disclosure and 
Trust in Government” (2012) PhD thesis, Utrecht University at 69–75 [Grimmelikhuijsen, “Transparency and 
Trust”]. 
33 Heremans, “Public Access to Documents”, supra note 31 at 89–90. 
34 Thorsten Huller, “Assessing EU strategies for publicity” (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy at 563; 
Deirdre Curtin and Albert J. Meijer, “Does Transparency Strengthen Legitimacy?” (2006) 11 Information Polity at 
109 [Huller, “Assessing EU strategies”].  
35 Deirdre Curtin & Albert J. Meijer, “Does Transparency Strengthen Legitimacy?” (2006) 11 Information Polity 
109 [Curtin & Meijer, “Does Transparency Strengthen Legitimacy?”].  
36 J Davis, “Access to and Transmission of Information: Position of the media” in Veerle Deckmyn and Ian 
Thompson, eds, Openness and Transparency in the European Union (Maastricht: European Institute of Public 
Administration, 1998) 121 at 121. 
37 M. Den Boer, “Steamy Windows: Transparency and Openness in Justice and Home Affairs” in Veere Deckmyn 
and Ian Thompson, eds, Openness and Transparency in the European Union (Maastricht: European Institute of 
Public Administration, 1998) 91 at 105 [Boer, “Steamy Windows”].  
38 Julia Black, “Transparent Policy Measures”, Oxford Dictionary of Economics. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997) at 456. 
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transparency with unlimited visibility, openness and insight.39 From such perspective, the 
disclosure of information in itself is significant, but it reduces transparency to a question of 
information provision. At the end of the 90s, long-time advocate of transparency, the European 
Ombudsman Jacob Söderman, gave a more complete description of transparency as: “the process 
through which public authorities make decisions should be understandable and open; the 
decisions themselves should be reasoned; as far as possible, the information on which the 
decisions are based should be available to the public.”40 
 
     Entering in the new millennium, the conceptualization of transparency became more 
sophisticated moving beyond the idea of seeing through. For instance, Luna refers to 
transparency as “the ability of the citizenry to observe and scrutinize policy choices and to have a 
direct say in the formation and reformulation of these decisions…. transparency requires not only 
visibility of policy choices but a publicly declared rationale for these decisions’.”41 Williams 
introduces a market perspective in defining transparency “as the extent to which the organization 
provides relevant, timely, and reliable information, in written and verbal form, to investors, 
regulators, and market intermediaries.”42 Likewise, Millar et al, describe institutional 
transparency as “the extent to which there is available clear, accurate information, formal and 
informal, covering practices related to capital markets, including the legal and juridical 
system.”43 Oliver examines transparency as a process with participants. He indicates that 
transparency can be described through three elements: an observer, something available to be 
observed and a means or method for observation.44 This type of definition builds upon the 
principal agent theory in which a principal requires information about the agent to check whether 
                                                          
39 See Adrian Henriques, Corporate truth. The limits to transparency (London: Earthscan, 2007). 
40 Jacob Söderman, “The citizen, the Administration and Community Law” General report for the 1998 FIDE 
Congress, Stockholm, June 3-6, 1998, at 6, online: <http://edz.bib.uni-mannheim.de/daten/edz-b/omb/07/fide-1-
eng.pdf> [Söderman]. 
41 Erik Luna, “Transparent Policing” 85 Iowa L. Rev. (2000) 1107 at 1164 [Luna]. 
42 Cynthia Clark Williams, “Trust diffusion: the effect of interpersonal trust on structure, function, and 
organizational transparency” (2005) 44:3 Business and Society 357 at 361 [Williams, “Trust diffusion”]. 
43 Carla CJM Millar, Eldiomaty, T., Hilton, B.J. & Choi J Chong, “Corporate governance and institutional strategic 
transparency in emerging markets” (2005) 59:1/2 Journal of Business Ethics 163 at 166 [Millar et al, “Corporate 
governance”].  
44 Richard W. Oliver What is Transparency? (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004) at 2 [Oliver].  
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the agent sticks to the ‘contract’45. An actor’s perspective definition on transparency is also 
offered by Florini who identifies transparency as “the degree to which information is available to 
the outsiders that enables them to have informed voice in decisions and/or to assess the decisions 
made by insiders.”46  
 
     At a more general meaning, transparency is described as an arena of communication47, and as 
such, it is not an innocent phenomenon. Transparency is about where lines are drawn, about 
inclusion and exclusion, about legal and illegal, about approval and disapproval, about an 
everyday or an honorary execution. Transparency is also a phenomenon that clarifies, explains, 
makes accessible, and provides guidance. At the same time, information which has been made 
transparent is also selective and exclusive, emphasizes one thing rather than another, draws lines, 
and obscures.48 Being so many things at the same time, Fenster describes transparency as having 
an aspirational goal: full openness to the public49 assuming that it is more like a work in progress 
which improves over time, but it can never be ideal. Of course, depending on circumstances, this 
ideal goal becomes a moving target. This is a conclusion in which Fenster arrived from earlier 
work. He advises that transparency's goals require a context-specific definition of transparency, 
viewed in terms of specific policy objectives, system constraints, and the costs and benefits of 
open government requirements, rather than an approach that regulates secrecy based on the 
presumed motivations of officials in the abstract.50 
 
     Among legal professionals transparency is referred to as a normative concept, as a set of 
standards for the evaluation of the behavior of public actors51  Using legal lens Hood suggests 
that transparency denotes “government according to fixed and published rules, on the basis of 
                                                          
45 See for instance, Andrea Prat, “The More Closely We Are Watched, the Better We Behave?” in Christopher Hood 
& David Heald, eds. Transparency: The Key to Better Governance?, 91-107 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006) at 92 [Prat, “The More Closely”].  
46 Florini, “Introduction”, supra note 27 at 5.  
47 Mikkel Flyverbom, Lars T. Christensen & Hans K. Hansen, Disentangling the power-transparency nexus, Paper 
presented at the 1st Global Conference on Transparency (2011), Newark [Flyerbom et al]. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Mark Fenster, “Seeing the State: Transparency as a Metaphor” (2010) 62 Admin. L. Rev. 617 at 620 [Fenster, 
“Seeing the State”]. 
50 See Mark Fenster, “The Opacity of Transparency” (2006) 91 Iowa L. Rev. 885 at 936 [Fenster, “The Opacity”]. 
51 See for instance, Mark Bovens, “Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and as a 
Mechanism” (2010) 33:5 West European Politics 946 at 946 [Bovens, “Two Concepts”].  
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information and procedures that are accessible to the public, and (in some usages) within clearly 
demarcated fields of activity.”52  
 
     All these definitions of transparency inform and speak about the conceptual muddle in which 
transparency is situated. To add to the difficulty of understanding the term, transparency is often 
used interchangeably with openness. To avoid any misinterpretation and confusion in this 
research, I am providing some definitional background on openness which I encountered while 
reviewing the transparency literature.  
 
B. Openness  
     Another term that will continuously surface in the research alongside with transparency is that 
of “openness”. Some scholars make no difference between transparency and “openness”.53 Some 
others do, for instance, according to Birkinshaw54 and Larsson55 if in the concept of 
“transparency” the accent is put on simplicity and comprehensibility, “openness” has to do with 
a mentality.56 In addition, Birkinshaw argues that “Openness covers such items as opening up the 
processes and meetings of public bodies.”57 In fact, transparency is more often used in academic 
discourse. Although in some cases it is expressed in legislation and derived by jurisprudence, the 
word “transparency” is not often used in legislation. Instead, openness is used, especially in the 
European legal framework. For instance, Article 1 of the Treaty of the EU contains the openness 
principle: “This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as 
                                                          
52 Hood, “Transparency in Historical Perspective”, supra note 26 at 4. 
53 Michael O’Neill, “The rights of access to community-held documentation as a general principle of EC law” 
(1998) 4:3 European Public Law 403 [O’Neill, “The rights of access”].; Pierpaolo Settembari, “Transparency and 
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l’administration de l’Union Européenne” (2011) 137-138 Revue française d’administration publique at 103 [Curtin 
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54 Birkinshaw, “FOI and Openness”, supra note 2 at 190. 
55 T. Larsson, “How Open Can a Government Be? The Swedish Experience”, in Veere Deckmyn and Ian Thomson, 
eds, Openness and Transparency in the European Union (Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration, 
1998) at 40-42 [Larsson]. 
56 David Heald, “Varieties of Transparency”, in Christopher Hood & David Heald, eds, Transparency: The key to 
better governance? (London, Oxford University Press, 2006) at 26 [Heald, “Varieties of Transparency”]. 
57 Birkinshaw, “FOI and Openness”, supra note 2 at 190.  
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possible to the citizen.”58 In this context, the two terms have similar meaning, and it is inevitable 
that I use openness in this research in any case that refers to a legal framework.  
 
C. Access to Information 
     While transparency is often equated with access to information, the latter should be regarded 
much narrowly. While it is true that transparency has a much wider meaning, and ATI is a 
component of transparency, the latter also entails conducting affairs in the open or subject to 
public scrutiny59, according to Birkinshaw. Their relationship is obvious: the transparency 
principle is realized by a number of legal instruments, with ATI being one of them.  
 
     The terms “access to information” (ATI), “access to documents” (ATD) and “freedom of 
information” (FOI) are being used interchangeably in this research. They have the same or 
similar meaning depending on the jurisdiction. ATI has been defined by Access Info Europe as 
“a fundamental right that has been recognized as such by international human rights tribunals 
and at least fifty constitutions around the world. This right has been linked to the fundamental 
right to freedom of expression, and is essential to protect other human rights.”60 
 
    Birkinshaw describes FOI as “access by individuals as a presumptive right to information held 
by public authorities.”61 In this context, FOI, just like ATI is a component of transparency. This 
definition distinguishes access as an individual right which is positive in nature, and obliges 
public authorities to provide access to the information required. 
 
     The Canadian legal framework uses the term ATI at the federal level since the Act that 
regulates the public access to government-held documents uses this terminology.62 However, 
                                                          
58 Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
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most of the provinces in Canada use the term FOI in their respective statutes.63 In addition, FOI 
is used in other jurisdictions such as the US, Australia, New Zealand, etc. Furthermore, FOI is a 
generic term that has been used as an umbrella in discussions about access rights and may imply 
a broader meaning than simply the right of access to public information. The EU refers to the 
same right as ATD since the Regulation64 that contains the European provisions of this right uses 
the term “documents” as opposed to “information”. 
      
     Making sense of the conceptual muddle that surrounds the concept of transparency is a 
difficult, but necessary exercise if ones need to penetrate to the core of the problems for this 
concept. This exercise could be facilitated by looking at the recurring topics that are closely 
associated to transparency, and often surface in the literature when discussions about 
transparency are made. To better understand the concept of transparency, I have made a 
classification of these topics under some main themes, and will engage with them in the section 
that follows. These themes not only assist to disentangle the conceptual muddle, but also will 
assist on making connections between transparency and ATI. In addition, these main themes will 
act as pillars for constructing arguments on the nature and value of transparency and ATI in this 
research.  
 
2.2   Making sense of the conceptual muddle of transparency - Main themes   
 
     A careful analysis of the literature on the conceptual framework reveals some main themes 
and ideas around which debates on transparency and ATI are developed over time with 
proponents and critics for each of these themes. 
 
A. Democracy, good governance and accountability   
     Democracy, good governance and accountability are broad umbrella ideas under which other 
matters such as legality, corruption, trust, effectiveness, security, emerge in scholarly debates.  
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    Legality and legitimacy are two of transparency’s most prominent dimensions today. The 
aspiration for legality has greatly increased over the past two decades, probably as a result of the 
growing influence of the rule of law and democratic governance. Following the path of Bentham 
and Kant, the importance of the principle of legality has been recognized and emphasized by 
many twentieth-century theoreticians of the State. For instance, Hans Kelsen as a jurist and a 
legal philosopher has paid particular attention to transparency. For him, in democracy, the 
legality of state activities is best guaranteed by publicity. He argues that “Since democracy is 
concerned with legal security, and thus with lawfulness and accountability in the workings of 
government, there is a strong inclination here to control mechanisms, as a guarantee for the 
legality required. And the principle of publicity is therefore paramount, as the most effective 
guarantee.”65 Using a legal argument, transparency tends to be introduced as a precondition for 
administrative or legislative legality or the rule of law. In public administration, according to 
Lessig, without appropriate access to government information it will be very difficult to enable 
citizens to control the legality of the administration and its actions.66 In addition, referring to 
transparency of the legislative procedures Curtin and Meijers claim that legal rights of access to 
documents may be viewed in their broader democratic context.67 The quest for transparency from 
a legalistic perspective is probably the most convincing one in the literature since it goes to the 
core of transparency debates with foundations laid down three centuries ago. The legal 
arguments are also the most difficult to bypass or oppose.  
 
     Regarding debates over issues of democratic governance, transparency has gained a wide 
application to explain processes of accountability and deliberations68 or as a means of ensuring 
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that public authorities, are responsive, efficient and effective in the formulation and execution of 
policies.69 Because of this wide applicability Hood describes transparency as it “has attained 
quasi-religious significance”70 while Florini speaks in highly enthusiastic terms and noting that 
transparency “holds great promise for improving the state of the world.”71 Florini explains that 
transparency can contribute to efficient and effective governance by providing feedback 
channels, enabling officials and citizens to evaluate policies and adjust them accordingly. It 
provides a means of detecting, and correcting errors in the policies of governmental institutions. 
Pasquier and Villeneuve are more realistic in their prospects when arguing that “transparency in 
state activities becomes a sine qua non condition of good governance.”72 
 
     Transparency is also debated in terms of its connection to government accountability and the 
potential to hold public officials responsible for their wrongdoings. Fox argues that “The 
concepts of transparency and accountability are closely linked: transparency is supposed to 
generate accountability.”73 That is made possible only if information becomes available to the 
public. According to Lindstedt and Naurin, this is the publicity condition. Furthermore, “if the 
release of information to the public is to affect the behavior of potentially corrupt government 
officials, the public must possess some sanctioning mechanism. This is the accountability 
condition.”74 However, the accountability processes are not by any means simple and easy 
applicable. One has to be naïve to think that having transparency measures in place will 
automatically make public officials more accountable. As I have mentioned previously, this 
tension is present throughout this research and many of my arguments will be dedicated to better 
understand this tension.   
                                                          
69 See Ann Florini, “The End of Secrecy” (1998) 111 Foreign Policy 50 at 53-56 [Florini, “The End of Secrecy”].; 
Neal Finkelstein, “Introduction: Transparency in Public Policy”, in Neal Finkelstein, eds, Transparency in Public 
Policy: Great Britain and the United States, 1-9 (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000) at 6-7 [Finkelstein, 
“Introduction”].; David Heald, eds, “Transparency as an Instrumental Value”, in Transparency: A key to Better 
Governance? 59-74 (London: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 64 [Heald, “Transparency as an Instrumental 
Value”].  
70 Hood, “Transparency in Historical Perspective”, supra note 26 at 20. 
71 Ann Florini, “Behind Closed Doors: Government transparency gives way to secrecy” (Spring 2004) Harvard 
International Review at 18 [Florini, “Behind Closed Doors]. 
72 Pasquier & Villeneuve, “Organizational barriers”, supra note 30 at 149.  
73 Jonathan Fox, “The uncertain relationship between transparency and accountability” (2007) 17:4-5 Development 
in Practice [Fox, “The uncertain relationship”].  
74 Catharina Lindstedt & Daniel Naurin, “Transparency is not Enough: Making Transparency Effective in Reducing 
Corruption” (2010) 31:3 International Political Science Review 301 at 302 [Lindstedt & Naurin, “Transparency is 
not Enough”].   
37 
 
 
     Many scholars argue about the undesirable consequences of transparency on governance. For 
instance, Heald explains that the necessity to account may lead to the quest for blame-
avoidance.75 Hood reflects upon the blame-conscious bureaucratic culture that underlies the 
futility, jeopardy and perversity effects that transparency produces. He explores what happens 
when the much-discussed doctrine of transparency, as a key to good governance, meets the 
widely observed behavioral tendency of blame-avoidance in politics and public administration. 
Hood recognizes three common types of blame-avoidance strategy, namely agency strategies, 
presentational strategies and policy strategies.76  In addition, he investigates what can happen 
when a widely promoted governance doctrine meets a commonly observed type of behaviour. 
Hood identifies ways in which that combination can produce nil effects, side-effects and reverse-
effects in the pursuit of transparency. He refers to the work of Roberts in arguing about the side-
effects or reverse effects of transparency. Hood admits that “Alasdair Roberts’ (2006) 
comparative work on governmental adaptation to freedom of information regimes suggests that 
the achievement of ‘a new culture of openness’ tends to be elusive, to say the least.”77 Hood 
advances similar arguments as Roberts when talking about this “new culture” emerging because 
of transparency. He states that “More presentational responses to transparency measures …. 
include the avoidance of record-keeping (or the keeping of records in such a form as to be 
unintelligible to outsiders), perhaps combined with the tactic of producing so much data that only 
the most pertinacious and initiated individuals can effectively distinguish signal from noise.”78 
Hood stresses the fact that the tension between the pursuit of transparency and the avoidance of 
blame is at the heart of some commonly observed problems in public management, and 
recommends that something other than the “bureaucratic” strain of transparency may be called 
for when those problems are encountered. Hood’s claim is a very significant one and has very 
serious implications on the way transparency works in practice. Hood’s idea is not a new one, 
and the problem is not a new phenomenon. The same argument was made by Constant some 
three centuries ago who responded to this problem by encouraging government officials to be 
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transparent even in the face of mistakes since this gives them the possibility of defending 
themselves and explaining their decisions.  
 
     Other perverse effects of transparency could also be noticed. For Aucoin transparency causes 
“the temptation of public servants to commit less to paper, to fail to keep appropriate records, 
and to participate in efforts to restrict what is made public.”79 This is indeed, a growing problem 
in today’s administration which is more technologically advanced than it ever used to be and 
very close to being paperless. In addition, O’Neill writes that “those who know that everything 
they say or write is to be made public may massage the truth.”80 Producing less documents, 
choosing to disclose some documents instead of others, deliberating in closed meetings are some 
of the techniques used by bureaucracy today to give another perception of the truth. I pay 
particular attention to this aspect of transparency and develop a typology of transparency to 
describe and make sense of this challenge.  
 
     Many critics of transparency argue about the negative effect of transparency on the behavior 
of politicians and bureaucrats. Heald talks about the perverse effects of over-exposure as “a 
feeling of suffocation.”81 Other critics argue that closed deliberations allow policymakers to 
make more thoughtful consideration of the available choices, to engage in more fulsome and 
substantive debate over the most popular and unpopular alternatives on public issues, and to 
bargain openly in order to reach a widely acceptable and optimal result, without the inevitable 
pressure that accompanies public scrutiny82. From an economic perspective, Andrea Prat has 
shown that there are some significant theoretical exceptions to the famous dictum by Bentham 
that “the more closely we are watched, the better we behave.” For Prat, even from a principal-
agent perspective in economics, “it is not always in the interest of the principal to have access to 
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all available information of activities of the agent”83 because an information overload can create 
more confusion and make the understanding of public issues more complex than it would be 
otherwise.  
 
     In “Blacked out” Roberts spends several chapters showing how the structure and practices of 
governance have direct implications for ATI. First, access depends on a professional civil service 
and well organized records. Where these are absent, access and transparency are severely 
truncated. Second, governments are increasingly outsourcing functions to the private sector, 
which is generally not covered by access legislation.84 The era of the New Public Management 
brought new anxieties on transparency since the idea of public institutions and their services 
became a moving target. This spurred more criticism against transparency.  
 
     Roberts observes that “In the last decade, ….there has been an increasingly articulate 
backlash against transparency measures.”85 He mentions transparency critics such as Grumet86, 
Frum87 and Fukuyama88 who all argue that the problem with American government is too much 
transparency. Roberts responds to them by saying that most critics of excessive transparency 
assume that it serves exclusively as a tool for oversight of politicians and bureaucrats. Roberts 
admits that transparency - conceived in this particular way - aggravates governmental 
dysfunction by reducing the capacity of policymakers to deliberate candidly and make the 
compromises that are essential for legislation to be adopted. Transparency also makes it easier 
for outsider groups to intrude in negotiations, and it is assumed that negotiations become more 
difficult as the number of involved groups increases.89 However, Roberts explains that despite 
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these constraints, blaming transparency for problems in government affairs does not have any 
foundation. These complaints, in Roberts’ view, are misguided for two reasons. They depend 
upon a misconception about the purposes served by transparency in government, and about the 
role of transparency reforms within the larger pattern of administrative development.90 Hood and 
Heald also respond to this misperception of transparency saying that “it is logically problematic 
to argue that transparency measure or any other policy measure could simultaneously produce 
futility, jeopardy, and perversity.”91 I agree with Roberts, Hoods and Heald and argue that 
despite challenges that accompany transparency, it also upholds values that are worth fighting 
for. The main problem with the critics of transparency is that they approach its value looking at 
its failures and not its promises. I will further the arguments in support of the value of 
transparency by taking a human right approach.  
 
     The issue of public trust on government institutions and how it is affected by transparency, 
has also produced lots of discussions among scholars. This issue has been the focus of many 
studies, especially by scholars of public administration and political science, which have 
generated controversial results.  
 
     On the one hand, transparency optimists argue that transparency is as an important instrument 
to increase citizen trust in government92 and there are findings in some studies that support the 
idea that transparency and trust play a substantial role, as moderator and mediator respectively, 
in curtailing corruption and enhancing citizen satisfaction.93 Citizen satisfaction is not equated 
with trust, even though may affect trust positively. There are more direct studies that have shown 
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small positive effects of transparency on trust-related measures.94 Other studies show that 
government transparency may contribute to greater trust in government.95 However, empirical 
research has not been able to demonstrate a clear positive relationship between transparency and 
public decision-acceptance and trust.96  
 
     On the other hand, transparency pessimists question whether showing citizens the results of 
government policies will actually boost their trust.97 These pessimists argue that results of the 
exposure of wrongdoing in public affairs by means of transparency may lead to politics of 
scandal and even demystification of government. For instance, Lord98, Bernard and Kristin99 and 
Hubbard100 believe that transparency makes conflicts worse more and casts doubt on the idea that 
transparency is one possible explanation of the democratic peace. Their key argument is that 
government policies and democratic processes are so complex that they cannot be easily 
communicated and explained to the public through a set of standard performance indicators. 
Also, according to critics of transparency, attempts to try simplifying complex government 
policies will have adverse effects and result in a further decline in trust. People may become 
dissatisfied to see that governments do not operate as fast as they imagined and wished them to, 
and accomplish less than they expect. For instance O’Neill argues that transparency erodes trust 
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and undermines governance.101 In addition, O’Neill contests that transparency measures without 
an effective ethic of two way communication can be a cure that is worse than the disease.102 
However, she is not against transparency if the process happens through an effective two-way 
communication. According to her, this can produce real transparency.103  
 
     Between optimists and pessimists of a relationship between transparency and trust stands a 
third group of scholars who are sceptic that such a relationship exists after all. According to this 
group, trust in government is a general attitude that can hardly be expected to be changed by 
encountering information on one specific topic and this form of trust is affected by many other 
factors.104 Some studies have been carried out105 which indicate that neither optimists nor 
pessimist are right. The sceptical position argues that transparency seems to have hardly any 
effect on trust. De Fine Licht uses procedural fairness (justice) theory to test that increased 
transparency does not increase trust in decision-making. Her argument is that “People are, …. 
quite uninterested in politics, and therefore the simple belief —or assumption—that information 
is there, if they would take the time and effort to engage in it, is enough to create a perception of 
transparency.”106 However, only the perception of transparency is not enough to establish its 
relationship with trust. Other studies have also shown null results.107  
 
     Roberts belongs to this third group of scholars, and has elaborated on the relationship between 
trust and transparency. He brings evidence from democracies with long experience of FOI, 
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particularly Canada, to show how governments resist moves to greater transparency. They do so 
partly through aggressive legal defence of the public-interest exemptions allowed in all freedom 
of information laws, and also through informal adjustment of record-keeping and other 
documentation in order to avoid disclosure of potentially embarrassing information. Roberts 
doubts that freedom of information promotes trust or culture change. He rightly points out that 
“In practice, the probability that the adoption of a FOI law will lead to cultural change or 
improve trust is small.”108 The reason for this sceptical view is that the existence of freedom of 
information laws are not sufficient for governments to be open. Governments deploy deceitful 
tricks to resist while formally complying, and Roberts outlines numerous methods by which a 
bureaucracy that intends on keeping information out of the public domain may actually do so. 
Roberts illustrates with concrete examples the capacity of the bureaucratic system to adapt to 
transparency rules using many techniques that actually decrease transparency. These range from 
changes in record-keeping practices, to restructuring government services, to not keeping records 
at all. This explains the underlying pessimism that suggests that greater transparency in the form 
of simply making files, data and information available will probably have the perverse effect of 
reducing actual transparency. It becomes clear that freedom of information laws do not equate 
with “openness” even when “openness” is the stated aim of such laws.  
 
     Looking at all the debates about the relationship between transparency and trust, I see a real 
challenge to establish a positive or negative effect. I would agree with the third group of scholars 
- ‘the sceptics’ - who find it hard to see any effect of transparency and trust. However, I do find 
O’Neill’s idea of a two-way communication as essential for the establishment of trust-
transparency relationship. I will return to it later in this research.  
 
     Another idea that often emerges on discussions around transparency and ATI is national 
security. Roberts argues that ideas of transparency have little to no traction is the area of national 
security.109 In the post 9/11 era the scope of information falling under the umbrella of national 
security has grown considerably and includes information that was previously available. Roberts 
also points out that the trend toward greater networking of security agencies increases the 
                                                          
108 Roberts, “Dashed Expectations”, supra note 104 at 108.  
109 Roberts, Blacked Out, supra note 84.  
44 
 
amount of information shared between agencies, while also reducing the amount of information 
shared to the public. While there is an undeniable tension between national security and the right 
to information, there is no evidence to suggest that legitimate national security interests are 
necessarily better served in practice when governments operate in total secrecy. 
 
B. The implications of technology  
 
     The last decade has seen the booming of the information technology which has had major 
implications in record keeping and dissemination of information. Many authors hold a very 
optimistic view of technology as presenting great promises for transparency. Noveck introduces 
a very optimistic view of technology by making a plea for “wiki government”. She argues that 
technology will help to overcome limitations to transparency and open government.110 Similarly, 
Lathrop and Ruma give a promising perspective of the value of technology for transparency.111 
However, authors like Pasquier  and Villeneuve draw attention about the dangers of new 
technologies by challenging existing values and raising new institutional uncertainties.112 
 
     Roberts explores the implications of vast stores of digitized information for openness and 
transparency and argues that the advancement in technology represent opportunities and risks. 
While information and communication technologies can significantly improve the conditions for 
openness by capturing more in writing and facilitating dissemination, they also can create 
problems. The massive amount of data can be overwhelming. In addition, much of the data is 
unstructured, scattered and diffuse. Compared with paper-based bureaucracies which create more 
limited types of documents, in a digital environment information appears in all sorts of forms, 
from databases to emails and spreadsheets to presentation files, stored idiosyncratically on 
personal computers and  communication devices. Roberts points out that the practical barriers to 
transparency that existed in a paper-based world are being displaced by new practical barriers of 
a digitized environment. The sheer volume of emails used in government is so huge that one 
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study demonstrated that “in 2002 Canada’s 150,000 federal public servants exchanged about 6 
million e-mails every working day.”113 This is more than a decade ago. The situation is much 
worse now that information technology has usurped almost every government activity.  
 
C. The empowerment of citizens      
 
     The empowerment of citizens is also a big umbrella theme which hosts other themes such as 
participation, knowledge gaining, and human rights.   
 
     The empowerment of citizens is unquestionably a very compelling aspect of transparency and 
ATI. There are authors who argue that “There can be no doubt that states should enact 
fundamental rights of access to information to empower citizens.”114 In support of this idea, 
Florini states that “transparency is seen as an essential element of democracy, part of 
empowerment of ordinary citizens so that they can take meaningful part in shaping the decisions 
that affect their lives.”115 However, there are some theorists who argue that a certain degree of 
“virtuous ignorance” may strengthen rather than undermine representative democracy.116 This 
scepticism about democratic governing goes all the way back to Plato’s hierarchical Republic117, 
where there have been those who hold the notion that the job of governing needs to be left in the 
hands of those who know best – the philosophers. The ship needs a captain; even the guardians 
are just to act on the philosophers’ rulings; wise leadership is essential because important matters 
cannot be left in the hands of the many.  The corresponding argument is that citizens are 
incompetent and reluctant to deal with abundant and complex goals, processes and information 
and this is why they trust the leader to do this job better in their behalf. However, this claim 
depicts a very simplistic if not distorted picture of reality. Our society is not divided into 
‘philosophers’ and citizens.  As a result, such claims have no plausible foundation and 
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justification, especially in the twenty first century, when it is generally accepted that information 
is power. In defense of this idiom, Cane argues that knowledge is necessary for accountability, 
and hence for democracy. Cane explains that “a precondition of effectively holding public 
administrators accountable is knowledge and information about their activity. Secret government 
is unaccountable government.”118 However, Hood referring to transparency analysis note “it 
would seem that the optimistic view about the effects of transparency provision is far from 
proven and the most important element in that view - citizen knowledge - is probably not 
provable.”119 I would agree that knowledge is difficult to measure and an empirical study of how 
citizens’ knowledge affects transparency is difficult to undertake.  
 
    This dissertation is not engaging in any empirical research that proves that a relationship exists 
between knowledge and transparency. However, one can depart from an assumption of a lack of 
knowledge to realize its value for transparency. Without first knowing what is going on in 
government, nobody can take any action. Getting to know is the first step, it is like a key to the 
gates of a city. Where you want to go next once you entered the city depends on many factors.    
   
     In simplistic terms knowledge is generated through continuous information about a certain 
topic. As such, transparency is understood as information delivery. Rawlins urges organizations 
voluntarily to “share information that is inclusive, auditable (verifiable), complete, relevant, 
accurate, neutral, comparable, clear, timely, accessible, reliable, honest, and holds the 
organization accountable.”120 However, as argued by O’Neill, this optimistic view of the effects 
of information on transparency is “one-sided” because it “encourages us to think of information 
as detachable from communication, and of informing as a process of “transferring’ content.”121 
In contrast, O’Neill calls for a more “complete view” of transparency, which recognizes the 
importance of the reception and use of information, and of the process of communication. Even 
if organizations were able to supply all the types of information prescribed by Rawlins and 
others, such understanding reduces transparency to a feature of the sender without considering 
the abilities of receivers to actually handle the information made available. Pasquier and 
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Villeneuve share a similar view with O’Neill, arguig that transparency is essential to the process 
of information exchange.122 This perspective recognizes that information does not travel in one 
way, but both ways from institutions to the public and then vice versa. Viewing transparency as 
communication rather than the transmission of information reminds us of the interpretive and 
relational complexities involved in transparency practices.  
 
     Indeed, there may be complications arising by reducing transparency to a mere information 
delivery. This view ignores many factors that have to do with the sender and the receiver of 
information. The senders - namely public institutions - may sway the use of language to provide 
a certain context and to fit the purpose they want to achieve by disseminating a certain type of 
information. It is widely accepted that people tend to selectively chose a specific language to 
convey a message across audiences – a message which may not necessarily be the truth. O’Neill 
calls this “massaging the truth.”123 What we might get as a result may be a different version of 
the “truth” which may influence the public towards a distorted understanding of the public 
issues. In addition, there are claims against transparency that look at the receiver of the 
information – namely the public – and examine its capacity in absorbing, elaborating and using 
information. Not all people are able to process amounts of information at the same speed and 
depth. More transparency may benefit the most those who are relatively more capable of taking 
advantage of increased available information, reinforcing already existing social inequalities. 
The danger is that the opportunities created by transparency and its companion mechanisms be 
appropriated by the more educated and skilled sectors of society, in detriment of the less well off. 
For instance, the information may be used not only by interested citizens but by mass media and 
interest groups, which are different from ordinary citizens because of their power and influence. 
This may undermine the public interest in exerting disproportional influence through selective 
use and misuse of government information. O’Neill argues that “Transparency is useful to the 
media and to campaigning organizations who can discover information that bears on others’ 
performance.”124 It is indeed very interesting to look at people’s capacity to absorb and respond 
to the information they get. I will analyse the tension that information delivery creates for 
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different categories of people in society and respond to the claims that dismiss the value of 
transparency as detrimental for social justice by using capacity arguments.  
 
     Closely related to the idea of capacity on using knowledge, is the theme of participation, 
which has drawn lots of attention amongst scholars because of its effects on transparency. 
Pasquier and Villeneuve argue that “transparency in state activities becomes a sine qua non 
condition ….active participation of citizens…. [it] is a tool that encourages the involvement of 
the people in the development and implementation of public policies.”125 Participation and 
democracy is viewed as a symbiotic relationship for many scholars. Levy calls transparency the 
“key feature of the democracy of the future.”126 By referring to Kant’s theory on the need for 
transparency in the public sphere, he comes up with a “public use” of transparency – which 
includes accountability and participation. Some authors state that a government with transparent 
decision making processes can vastly increase citizen participation and, ultimately, improve 
democracy127. In fact, Habermas maintains that “Democracies satisfy the necessary ‘procedural 
minimum’ to the extent that they guarantee the political participation of as many interested 
citizens as possible.”128 Other authors claim that at the core of democracy is the ability of the 
people to participate, and influence government through openly expressed public opinion. 
Calland and Tilley argue that without access to information, there can be no discussion of a 
range of available options, no voting in accordance with one’s best interests and beliefs, no 
meaningful public policy discussions, and no informed political debate.129 Stiglitz looks at 
transparency and information from a democratic participation perspective and views them as a 
prerequisite for citizen participation. He argues that “meaningful participation in democratic 
processes requires informed participants.”130 Noveck131 and Lathrop and Ruma132 introduce a 
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promising view of transparency from a technological perspective by connecting ATI to new 
forms of citizen participation.  
 
     Rowe and Frewer133categorize three different levels of citizen participation: 1) citizen 
communication, where information is conveyed from the government body to the public; 2) 
citizen consultation, where information flows from the public to the government; and 3) citizen 
participation, where information is exchanged between the public and the government and some 
degree of dialogue takes place. This categorization is a simpler presentation of the Arnstein’s 
ladder of participation134 which includes eights levels of participation, from manipulation, being 
the lowest level, to citizen control being the highest level, and this is where real participation 
happens.  
 
     Pateman has developed the “Participation and democratic theory” which elaborates on 
transparency in an indirect way. Pateman looks at democracy as involving the active 
participation of citizens in decision-making at all levels of society. For Pateman, participation 
plays a crucial educative role “gaining of practice in democratic skills and procedures.”135 
According to her “people learn to participate by participating, and that feelings of political 
efficacy are more likely to be developed in a participatory environment.”136  I borrow Pateman’s 
idea of learning and skill-formation through the process of participation, and develop it further 
by applying it to transparency processes. From a user’s perspective Pateman’s theory offers 
standards towards which information exchange can be measured.  
 
     Despite the promising opportunities that transparency holds for citizen empowerment and 
participation, there are arguments that challenge this optimistic view. Some scholars have 
questioned the value of transparency for citizens, with some of them being highly critical. For 
instance, Grumet states that “the supposition that transparency uniquely empowers regular folks 
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is quaint fantasy.”137 Yeager argues that the “notion of liberal democratic pluralism – that the 
‘public’ benefits from the disclosure of government information – is merely false advertising.”138 
A more critical view of the value of transparency comes from Fukuyama, who, decrying the 
recent dysfunction of the democratic processes in the US, concludes: “The obvious solution to 
this problem would be to roll back some of the would-be democratizing reforms, but no one 
dares suggest that what the country needs is a bit less participation and transparency.”139 
Fukuyama represents a dramatic perspective of transparency by blaming it for the state of 
government affairs. He proposes to turn back to the times when states governed in secrecy, and 
portrays this as an acceptable type of governance even for democratic states.  
 
     Fukuyma’s approach to transparency is a very limited one. Blaming transparency for 
government’s failures, falls short of recognizing many other factors that can contribute to those 
failures. A response to Fukuyama’s assumptions comes from Bass, Brian and Eisen who explain 
that “information obtained through open government is on occasion used as ammunition in 
political battles, but transparency is neither the cause of the systemic problems, nor would 
secrecy be the cure.”140 Although, reality demonstrates that some information will remain secret 
for the general public due to their sensitive nature, exclusions have to be legal and not arbitrary. 
Secrecy applies as an exception, not as the default practice. Thompson debates that “Secrecy is 
justifiable, only if it is actually justified in a process that itself is not secret. First-order secrecy 
(in a process or about a policy) requires second-order publicity (about the decision to make the 
process or policy secret).”141  
     As it is the case with other transparency-related themes, between optimistic and pessimistic 
views on the citizen participation continuum, there are authors who establish themselves 
somewhere in the middle of the continuum. They remain sceptic about any effect of transparency 
in participation. This groups of scholars find it difficult to establish a direct relationship between 
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transparency and participation. For instance Lessig argues that “Giving amounts of information 
produced and disclosed, available capacity for processing it, and attention span issues, there is no 
way to assume that it produces better citizen choice, and the available evidence suggest its 
impact is actually both low and slow.”142 Indeed, the effects that transparency may have on 
participation have been little explored.143 Some empirical research has been done with the 
purpose of studying the transparency-participation relationship, and they have generated no 
positive results. Researchers tend to agree that people are, in general, quite uninterested and 
unknowledgeable about politics, and careless about most of the information they actually 
receive. Earlier research have demonstrated a sort of apathy of citizens in political matters.144  
     While these results draw attention to a very complex aspect of transparency, they certainly do 
not deny the great promise that transparency holds for those citizens who are interested in 
participating in public discussions. These studies are a warning for researchers that participation 
heavily depends on subjective factors, but also on the circumstances surrounding individual 
cases. Pateman’s and Habermas’s theories serve as a good theoretical background to understand 
the challenges and limitations of transparency and access to information and to explain the 
variations in the existing research.  
 
     A last emerging topic in transparency debates is the consideration of ATI as a human right. 
This is the core concern, and the culmination of my arguments in this research. There is an 
existing body of literature that recognizes ATI as a human right, with groups of scholars debating 
around the values of access rights from three perspectives: an instrumental perspective, an 
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intrinsic perspective, or both. This research aims to be part of this body of literature by furthering 
the arguments in favour of the recognition of a human right status of ATI. 
 
     The view of ATI as a human right is welcomed on a wide range of broadly democratic 
grounds, including the protection and realisation of individual rights145. For instance, Roberts 
favours the recognition of a separate right to access to information. He argues: “the logic 
suggests that access right is better understood as a corollary of basic political participation rights, 
rather than the right to freedom of expression alone.”146 Roberts recognises an instrumentalist 
basis for a right to information when he suggests that political participation rights “have little 
meaning if government’s information monopoly is not regulated.”147 Some non-governmental 
organizations with a dedicated work in transparency also promote the instrumental approach of 
access rights, such as Access Info Europe and Article 19. Access Info Europe’s mission is 
“dedicated to promoting and protecting the right of access to information in Europe as a tool for 
defending civil liberties and human rights.”148 Article 19 promotes that “The right to access 
public information about one’s economic, social and cultural rights is not only related to these 
rights - it is a precondition for their realisation.”149  
 
     Florini supports both approaches in recognizing ATI as a human right. She takes an 
instrumentalist approach when she argues for a right to information deriving from the 
recognition of democratic rights. Florini states that “a broad right of access to information is 
fundamental to the functioning of a democratic society. The essence of representative democracy 
is informed consent, which requires that information about political practices and policies be 
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disclosed.”150 However, Florini also argued that access to information is not only “a necessary 
concomitant of the realization of all other rights” but is also “a fundamental human right.”151 Just 
like Florini, Stiglitz supported both approaches.  Stiglitz reinforced the existence of an intrinsic 
ATI right acknowledging that greater openness could be justified on instrumental grounds as a 
means to an end. He also believed that greater openness has an intrinsic value simply because 
citizens have a basic right to know.152  
 
     Birkinshaw makes a bold and daring argument about access rights – he advocates for ATI as a 
human right arguing that it is “fundamental to all other human rights”, to one’s “membership as a 
full member of the human race”, and to one’s “position as a citizen and a human being.”153 This 
is a morally based approach, one that is usually used to justify the existence of all other human 
rights. This approach cannot easily be associated to other scholars and Birkinshaw’s approach is 
unique in this regard. Birkinshaw states that “The argument for human rights is based upon 
protection for individuals against inefficient, oppressive, or even bullying government. They are 
rights that are necessary for our individual integrity, for our acceptance by the state and civil 
society as full members of that community, for our right to belong.”154 Birkinshaw talks about 
FOI as a human right that can be applied universally, without making any difference on which 
jurisdiction. He speaks generally about the nature that FOI ought to have, and not necessarily 
has. Birkinshaw’s claims about human rights are certainly very challenging and will be very 
important for this research. The claims that he makes about a universal recognition of ATI as a 
human right, raise important questions about the applicability of this approach in the two 
jurisdictions in focus.  
 
     The arguments brought by Roberts, Florini and Birkinshaw are very important for this 
research because they provide the foundations for the recognition of ATI as a human right. I 
build on their work to see how transparency and access rights are considered in Canada and the 
EU and how these considerations affect their practicability.  
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     The three themes that I analyzed above are important in understanding transparency and assist 
on making sense of the conceptual muddle found in the literature. These themes contribute to the 
unpacking of the complexity of transparency as a term, and channel its conceptualization into 
venues that will guide this research in the next chapters. Outside of the three main themes that I 
discussed above, there are other debates about the nature of transparency and ATI that inform 
about the tensions that accompany these two terms. The section below illuminates these tensions.  
 
2.3    Tensions in the meaning of transparency and access to information 
      
     The three themes outlined above raise questions and doubts about the meaning of 
transparency. They examine the limitations and advantages of transparency and identify its use 
as a means of rhetoric. Critical remarks are often complemented by the observation that 
empirical knowledge on the actual workings of transparency is, unfortunately, rather scarce to 
prove the real consequences of transparency. These findings are very significant because they 
provide different perspectives on analyzing the ways transparency and ATI work in practice.  
They signal that the study of transparency is an unfinished project that deserves further study and 
is a moving target. The best way to approach the study of transparency is by addressing both its 
positive and negatives consequences in an attempt to find the optimal balance between the two.   
 
     The bifurcation of transparency consequences into negative and positive is worth scrutinising. 
Hood openly and skeptically questioned the often unspoken assumption that more transparency 
is a good thing in itself. Hood warns that transparency is more than openness, just as governance 
is more than government.155 He advises that one should be aware of the pitfalls of having 
transparency in place and analyze both positive and negative sides of transparency. This kind of 
approach is important to understand the conceptual and practical challenges of transparency.   
 
     Just like Hood, Florini tries to comprehend and illuminate the consequences of transparency. 
She recognizes that transparency is good and necessary but explores it with a certain degree of 
practicality. Florini admits that transparency needs to be balanced and optimized because neither 
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too little nor too much transparency are desirable. In order to understand this tension Florini asks 
a timely and compelling vital question: What information should governments ….disclose?156 
and, of course, assuming what should be kept secret. She argues that excessive secrecy corrodes 
democracy, facilitates corruption, and undermines good public policymaking, but keeping a lid 
on military strategies, personal data, and trade secrets is also essential to the protection of the 
public interest. Florini provides lessons from many nations’ bitter experience and provides a 
careful analysis of transparency's impact on governance, business regulation, environmental 
protection, and national security. As government interests clash with citizen insistence over the 
growing demand for public scrutiny, they both need a better understanding and new insights into 
how greater transparency can serve the public interest while, at the same time, protecting 
valuable sensitive information. In continuing to answer her question about how much 
transparency is worthy, Florini engages in a simple depiction of transparency as the opposite of 
secrecy.157 Secrecy means deliberately hiding your actions; transparency means deliberately 
revealing them. Florini argues that transparency is a choice, revitalised by changing attitudes 
about what constitutes appropriate behavior. According to Florini, secrecy and transparency are 
not conditions but ideals, as such, they represent two ends of a continuum. What we are seeing 
now is a rapidly evolving shift of consensus about where states should be on that continuum.158  
 
     Regarding the “good” and the “bad” of transparency, Etzioni also argues that transparency is 
overrated and by no means able to produce the expected benefits.159 Because the concept of 
transparency refers to a variety of ideas, behind it there are various expectations. Fung, Graham 
and Weil also argue that there are both positive and negative consequences from transparency. 
While in principle it creates more options, it is not clear if and how transparency produces 
engagement or participation. The same goes for promoting better, more effective and efficient, or 
more egalitarian policy and law making or better outcomes.160 Any attempt to dismiss such a 
complex and conflicting nature will lead to a handicapped regulation of transparency as a 
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phenomenon. Indeed, the notion of transparency is not neutral, because it responds to deep 
aspirations of people. Transparency is a moving target which is constructed and continuously 
reconstructed through social and political developments. According to O’Neill, powerful actors 
will generally be able to define transparency in specific ways and to steer developments in a 
certain direction.161 However, Roberts makes the opposite argument that the rules of power 
games change through transparency.162 In other words, transparency is affected by social and 
political advancements and affects social and political constructs as well.   
 
     The questions raised by Hood, Florini, Roberts and others are indeed very important 
questions. There is a tension between a need to disclose information and the need to protect from 
such disclosure based on claims of privacy, national security, public interest etc. I analyze this 
tension in my research trying to understand when claims of protection from disclosure are 
justified. I build on the work of these scholars, explore further the pressures on transparency, and 
pay attention to the benefits that transparency can create.  
 
    One of the most complex and difficult areas of transparency is its institutional culture which is 
historically embedded in secrecy. Curtin and Dekker argue that the lack of transparency is 
structural; resulting from incremental changes in the constitutional fabric of a system that was 
not designed to be open from the outset.163 Indeed, today’s democratic institutions were not 
fashioned with transparency in mind, or at least not with the modern understanding of 
institutional openness. These institutions started out as secretive bureaucracies and continued to 
conduct public affairs as far as possible from the public eye. Hence, secrecy is an inherited 
feature of government. Roberts has continuously raised the secrecy concern in his work164 and 
studied how it has gradually been carved to give way to transparency. However, according to 
Roberts, the spill-over of passing access laws is not in itself an indicator of a new paradigm in 
democratic governance that has replaced the old culture of bureaucratic secrecy. The global trend 
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toward enacting access to information legislation would seem to imply a distinct shift toward 
openness, so Roberts asks a simple question: “Has the old presumption of secrecy really been 
overthrown in favour of a new presumption of openness?”165 His answer is “no”, and he shows 
that legislation alone is not sufficient to counter histories and practices of secrecy.  
 
     Similarly, Pasquier and Villeneuve argue that secrecy has deep roots in institutions. 
According to them, institutional rules and culture result from historical trajectories. Pasquier and 
Villeneuve highlight that “cultures of transparency and secrecy are rooted in historical traditions 
and traditional state-society relations.”166 Generally, those in power tend to consider public 
information their own property and not of the citizen and therefore they will be cautious to make 
these documents accessible to the public. Furthermore, bureaucratic organizations are by nature 
hierarchic, reclusive and risk-adverse and “public service organizations are little inclined to 
disclose the information at their disposal.”167 
 
     The study of institutions adds another layer of difficulty to the analysis of transparency. If one 
focuses on achieving transparency by simply implementing legal provisions, not only will get 
superficial results, but these results will vary from one institution to another. Indeed, the road to 
transparency through access laws can be a snaky and shaky one because of the force of dynamic 
conservatism in institutions. The trajectory of this road will heavily depend on the political 
system of a country. For instance, according to Roberts, “Experience has shown that the 
governing institutions in the Westminster systems are particularly resilient and capable of 
rejecting alien transplantation such as FOI laws or of developing new routines designed to 
minimize the disruptive effect of these new laws.”168 In Westminster countries like Canada and 
the UK, the culture of bureaucracy is deeply embedded in secrecy and the attitudes of those in 
power are hard to change, becoming a big impediment to transparency. It is hard for 
governments in these systems to adopt to legal changes that challenge their style of governing by 
allowing their decision-making to be questioned and errors exposed.  
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     The behaviour of public service providers is studied more in depth by Roberts who scrutinizes 
the highly centralized structures for controlling the communications activity of the government 
departments. He illustrates this with the Canadian experience and the ATIA which was intended 
to constrain executive authority, but officials developed internal routines and technologies to 
minimize its disruptive potential169. These practices restrict the right to information for certain 
types of stakeholders, such as journalists or representatives of political parties. Roberts labels 
these practices as “internal law” and examines them through empirical research. He uses an 
econometric analysis of 2,120 requests handled by Human Resources Development Canada in 
1999-2001 to suggest that some politically sensitive requests - often filed by journalists or 
political parties - are given differential treatment, with longer delays and tougher decisions on 
disclosure.170 The analysis of these practices illustrates that internal bureaucratic procedures play 
an important role in defining what the right to information means in practice. Roberts admits that 
this analysis demonstrates how a statutory right can be shaped through the exercise of 
administrative discretion.171 Robert’s study indicates that the implementation of the access legal 
provisions highly depends on the willing of the public officials. He argues that:  
 
Whether a freedom of information law succeeds in securing the right to information depends 
heavily on the predispositions of the political executives and officials who are required to 
administer it. Statutory entitlements could be undermined if government institutions refuse to 
commit adequate resources for implementation or consistently exercise discretionary powers 
granted by the law in ways that are inimical to aims of the legislation.172  
 
     This conflict between the law and the practice is an ongoing tension for transparency and 
Roberts spends a considerable time in his work demonstrating how the structure and practices of 
governance have direct implications for access to information. To examine these implications he 
makes three arguments. First, access depends on a professional civil service and well organized 
records. Where these are absent, access and transparency are severely reduced. Second, 
governments are increasingly outsourcing functions to the private sector, which is generally not 
covered by access legislation. Therefore, what might once have been subject to access legislation 
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becomes exempt. Finally, Roberts examines the implications of technology173 which adds new 
strains on transparency and access rights.  In addressing access rights’ implications Roberts also 
argues that transparency can only become a reality if people would act upon it. He calls for an 
engaged citizenry by posing a fundamental question: “Do we have a right to information? 
Certainly. But we also have a responsibility to act on it.”174  This question goes to the core of the 
arguments made by many critics that people do not use access rights because they are not 
interested in doing so. Robert’s provocative question and answer certainly deserve closer 
attention and I am going to expand on Roberts’ work in this research.  
 
     Just like Roberts, Hood makes some provocative claims when making a distinction between 
access to information and transparency and warning about their legal nature. He says that 
transparency in the public sector is not simply access to information and passive compliance is 
not enough.175 Another warning comes from Hood when he notes in this quotation of Rousseau: 
“Books and auditing of accounts, instead of exposing frauds, only conceal them; for prudence is 
never so ready to conceive new precautions as knavery is to elude them.”176 One should be 
cautious on taking into consideration the fact that the study of transparency should not only be 
focused on what is on the books, what are the legal rules and what documents are produced in 
the name of transparency, for they can be deceiving. Transparency is more than that - it has a 
much broader meaning.  
 
     The sections of this chapter provided a solid foundation for studying transparency and ATI 
and unpacking the complexity and conceptual muddle that surrounds them. Themes such as 
democratic legitimacy, legality, accountability, good governance, information asymmetry, 
participation and human rights have been occupying the scholarly debates for about two decades. 
Different scholars argue about different facets of transparency, how they can be measured and 
what are their consequences. However, almost all discussions lead to a common understanding 
of transparency – its complexity and its continuous inherently battle with secrecy. All these 
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discussions are very informative and shed light on some complex issues of transparency, to 
which this research pays particular attention. I am aware that the gap between the law and the 
practice will be the most challenging aspect in my research in terms of detecting when such gap 
exists, investigating political and bureaucratic behaviour in complying with transparency 
measures and measuring its consequences. This divide between law and practice really affects 
the recognition of ATI as a human right. I build on the work of Roberts and Birkinshaw when 
arguing about the law-practice divide and the constitutional recognition of an ATI right.  
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CHAPTER 3:  THEORETICAL APPROACHES    
 
     This chapter outlines the two theories I employ for this research with the purpose of setting up 
the standards against which the rhetoric of transparency and access to information will be 
measured. The chapter includes an explanation of the choices I made in using these two theories 
and the reasons behind these choices.  
 
     The Habermas’s discourse theory of law and Pateman’s participation and democractic theory 
will provide not only the theoretical foundations for this research, but also some practical 
perspectives on how to make sense of transparency developments using these theories.  They 
will both assist me in furthering the arguments about how access to information works in 
practice and how it can be recognized and protected.  
 
3.1    Pateman’s Participation and Democratic Theory  
      
     Carol Pateman, a very famous British political theorist is not a transparency scholar. 
However, one of her early books “Participation and democratic theory”177 conveys a very 
significant message on how transparency can be transformed in a tool to achieve a model of 
democracy where participation of citizens in public affairs is crucial. To my knowledge, I am the 
first to adopt her work on transparency and ATI. I use Pateman’s theory because it provides 
some standards of citizen participation based on acquiring skills and knowledge, social training, 
psychological attitudinal responses, and learning experiences.    
 
     Patemans’ theory performs a deep analysis of the concept of democracy and participation, and 
touches upon some of the contentious relationships in this research such as that between 
transparency, democracy and participation. Pateman’s theory found a wide application in the 
wake of the “participatory revolution” in the 1960s178 when participatory democracy included the 
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participation of NGOs and other organizations. More recently, the term participatory democracy 
is increasingly used together with participatory governance, referring to the participation of 
collective actors of the organized civil society.179  
 
     The two jurisdictions in focus, namely Canada and the EU, are liberal democracies where 
there has been considerable attention on a broad range of institutional innovations aimed at 
encouraging public participation. The general contemporary concern in these liberal 
democracies, particularly in the EU, is about declining citizens’ participation in voting and other 
political activities.  This decline could be explained, in part, by a lack of a two-way relationship 
between the government and the public, a lack of communication, and a lack of attention to the 
public needs and concerns. One other explanation is related to the workplace democracy, 
although there has been little discussion of this kind of democracy. The term “workplace 
democracy” goes back to the work of Pateman. Several of the leading advocates of participatory 
democracy have specifically emphasized the importance of democratizing the workplace. In 
particular, Pateman has made a significant contribution in emphasizing this importance by 
introducing a new concept – that of a “spillover process” of democratization. She has argued that 
participation in workplace decision-making will spill over into wider society by increasing the 
probability of participation in politics beyond the workplace. She explains that the resemblance 
between the workplace and government experience in terms of the type, intensity and quality of 
participation suggests that the most efficient and effective way of increasing participation in 
government is to increase participation in the workplace. This creates a kind of culture that will 
be then implanted in other forms and types of communications such as that between government 
and the public. The workplace democracy educates people in a way that makes them feel 
comfortable to debate over a wide range of issues. Thus, in the light of the current concern for 
institutional approaches to the “crisis of participation”, the spillover theory has much to offer. 
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     Pateman makes a connection between workplace democratization, political efficacy and 
public participation by focusing primarily on worker co-operatives.180 She critiques the work of 
theorists, such as Schumpeter and Sartori, who had regarded democracy as a popular contest for 
the votes, that this was an elitist project that prevented mass participation in both political and 
workplace decision-making. The elitist project systematically refuted people the developmental 
opportunities that arise through mature systems of participation. Pateman opposes the narrow 
definition of these elitist theorists, and demonstrates how the workplace is the central to any 
future project to democratize society.  
 
     Pateman strongly critiques liberal democracy as a very “thin” form of democracy which 
bypasses regular and active participation by all citizens. For Pateman, participation, apart from 
being a good thing in itself, also plays a crucial educative role. Hence, participation has both an 
intrinsic and an instrumental value. In my view, this is the most important facet in Pateman’s 
theory and directly relates to my argument of transparency and access to information, as values 
that are good in themselves and also promote other values. 
 
     The educative feature of Pateman’s theory brings her spillover process to another dimension - 
that of a state as an entity comprised by a number of institutions. Following Rousseau and Mill, 
she argued that individual attitudes and behavior are shaped by the institutions within which they 
act. In this context, if individuals actively engage in democratic institutions – debating and 
deliberating – they are more likely to develop the necessary attitudes, skills and psychological 
qualities that contribute to individual political efficacy, and which in turn will increase political 
participation. Therefore, the act of participation is itself educative “Educative in the very widest 
sense, including both the psychological aspect and the gaining of practice in democratic skills 
and procedures….Participation develops and fosters the very qualities necessary for it; the more 
individuals participate the better able they become to do so.”181   
  
     Pateman’s key contribution to democratic theory was to notice that bureaucratic organizations 
typical of capitalist liberal democracies give people little opportunity to improve their democratic 
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skills. Pateman introduces knowledge to explain participatory attitudes of individuals - by 
democratizing the workplace individuals will be able to participate in routine decision-making 
affecting their immediate work environment, because they already have knowledge in this field. 
This quote from Pateman carries an important message: “people learn to participate by 
participating, and that feelings of political efficacy are more likely to be developed in a 
participatory environment.”182  If people practice this, their attitudes will also escalate beyond 
the work environment to civic and political institutions. Moreover, having learnt to participate at 
work people will have acquired the confidence, skills and desire to participate in civic society.  
 
     This idea of “learning to participate by participating” is very important for this research 
because it has applicability in many aspects of transparency. One of the goals of having 
transparency in place, is to facilitate and encourage participation. But, participation cannot be 
realized without governments being transparent and citizens being informed of the working of 
their governments. Just having representative institutions at the legislative level is not enough. 
As Pateman puts it “Democracy must take place in other spheres in order that the necessary 
individual attitudes and psychological qualities can be developed.”183 In this context, she talks 
about “social training” which is a process that happens through an extensive interaction between 
citizens and their government.  
 
     A central part of Pateman’s explanation for low public participation was that if the 
experiences and perceptions of the operation of the political system leave citizens with a sense of 
frustration and powerlessness, then “apathy is a realistic response, it does not seem worthwhile to 
participate.”184 This, she argued, is a cognitive rather than a psychological response. As such, 
Pateman’s democratic theory offers important insights on issues of democratic deficit, decrease 
of trust on governments or lack of transparency. Pateman’s idea of democracy is much broader 
and colorful than just a competitive struggle for people’s votes.  She puts emphasis on 
participation as a key element of democracy. This is fundamental for understanding the 
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functioning of democracy and its relation with transparency considering that transparency is 
considered to be one of democracy’s pillars.  
 
    I will build on Pateman’s work by arguing that transparency is a requirement for participation 
which leads to more democratic processes in government affairs. Without transparency and 
access to information, participation will not be realized in its full potential and democratic 
principles will be undermined. In addition, Pateman’s idea of “learning to participate by 
participating” undergirds many transparency issues. People become more knowledgeable and 
informed every time they participate, and by mastering their knowledge from the information 
they get, they participate better in the future.  
 
     Participation can also lead to better transparency practices from government since the same 
repetitive process will have its effect not only on people, but also on bureaucratic organizations. 
Practice dealing with public participation, will make bureaucracies respond better to public’s 
input. Therefore, Pateman’s theory of democratic participation proposes a clear guiding path for 
both the government and the public. It provides with both a theoretical and practical perspective 
on the central issues of transparency and participation.   
  
3.2.  Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Law  
      
     Habermas’s discourse theory of law gives answers to many concerns in this dissertation. This 
theory will help me to evaluate the conditions of transparency and ATI in Canada and the EU. 
The discourse theory of law provides a good foundation for explaining the processes that shape 
the public discourse and space. It also offers standards for the recognition of a constitutional 
status of the right of ATI, and how this recognition can be achieved through a process of 
constitutional stretching.  
 
      Habermas has consistently been preoccupied with human rights and democracy in his work, 
trying to make sense how individual rights and public law can be reconciled. His theory of 
discourse of law is not a theory of transparency, but his concern about human rights and 
democracy lead him to address and respond to some of the tensions that exist in the public space, 
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which are also concerns for transparency. For Habermas, addressing these problems starts with 
“reconciling private and public autonomy at a fundamental conceptual level, as is evident from 
the unclarified relation between individual rights and public law in the field of jurisprudence, as 
well as from the unresolved competition between human rights and popular sovereignty in 
social-contract theory.”185 Habermas borrows Hobbs’s idea of a social contract to find grounds 
for human rights as deriving from a consensual agreement between individuals and the 
sovereign. He argues that this is based on a principle of morality and democracy. As such “The 
human rights grounded in the moral autonomy of individuals acquire a positive shape solely 
through the citizens' political autonomy.”186 The political autonomy is exercised in a democratic 
setting through discussions, communicative freedom, and agreement. 
 
     What really attracted me from Habermas’s theory is that he looks at law as a system of 
knowledge and a system of action187 which is shaped through a discursive process of “opinion 
and will-formation”. By law, he does not mean only statutes, but norms in general. Habermas 
makes a great analysis in his theory in relating knowledge to public sphere. Habermas looks at 
the public sphere as “a network for communicating information and points of view”188, which 
has a great potential as a source of knowledge. This can serve as “a suitable bridge for 
connecting the deliberative structures of the constitutionally organized political system with 
deeper processes of social reproduction.”189 He argues that in modern societies knowledge is a 
scarce resource and it is desirable and which can create paternalistic monopolies on knowledge 
and hinder the democratic process. This is a good explanation for why government and 
bureaucracies are not usually very receptive to transparency and access to information reforms. 
They tend to keep the information they possess for themselves so they create a monopoly of 
information. This creates a new system of paternalism.  
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     Habermas reponds to Dahl's190 concern about the risks brought by the specialization of the 
technical steering knowledge used in policymaking and administration. Such specialization 
keeps citizens from taking advantage of politically necessary expertise in forming their own 
opinions and creates a monopolization of knowledge. Habermas explains that “because the 
administration does not, for the most part, itself produce the relevant knowledge but draws it 
from the knowledge system or other intermediaries, it does not enjoy a natural monopoly on such 
knowledge.”191 It is thus, in the benefit of the bureaucracy to develop a bridge with public 
deliberative structures to obtain the knowledge required for political supervision or steering. This 
is a missing link in today’s relationship between administration and the public, or at least this 
link is not fully understood and developed. Both parties in this relationship will suffer because 
they lack the proper knowledge to understand what is happening at the other side.  As a 
consequence, “individual private rights cannot even be adequately formulated, let alone 
politically implemented, if those affected have not first engaged in public discussions to clarify 
which features are relevant in treating typical cases as alike or different, and then mobilized 
communicative power for the consideration of their newly interpreted needs.”192 
 
     Further, Habermas examined the public use of public discourse as an unhindered 
communicative freedom in cognitive terms, as enabling rational opinion-and will-formation: the 
free processing of information and reasons. He drew attention to mobilizing citizens' 
communicative freedom for the formation of political beliefs that in turn influence the 
production of legitimate law,193 and warned public administrators about the value of public 
discourse These are very powerful ideas that describe how the legal realm, and democracy at a 
much broader sense, works.  
 
     I borrow this logic to argue about the value of transparency. The system of knowledge, the 
discursive process and the system of action, taken together in a close relationship, and can be 
used to explain why transparency is significant. People gain knowledge from the information 
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made available to them, use that knowledge to debate on public matters (and in the discursive 
process enhance their knowledge) and then take action based a tempered “opinion and will-
formation”. This process initiates with a single human ability, which according to Habermas is 
“the cognitive sense of filtering reasons and information.”194 
 
     Furthermore, Habermas relates human rights to the legitimacy of law, with ideas that are 
beyond “publicity” as explained by Bentham and Kant. He argues that the legitimacy of law 
ultimately depends on whether a contested norm meets with the agreement of all those possibly 
affected. He then relates legitimacy with human rights by saying “The substance of human rights 
then resides in the formal conditions for the legal institutionalization of those discursive 
processes of opinion-and will-formation in which the sovereignty of the people assumes a 
binding character.”195 This prerequisite of legitimacy is, in fact, part of the democratic principle 
which requires that all laws must meet a certain condition: the agreement of all citizens stated in 
a discursive process of opinion-and-will-formation which provides for an effective participation 
and takes place in forms of communication that are themselves legally guaranteed.196 Habermas 
offers a solution to the question of how citizens can judge whether the law they make is 
legitimate: the conditions to engage in the public discourse must be legally guaranteed by the 
basic political rights to participate in processes that form the legislator's opinion and will.197 
 
     According to Habermas, there are five categories of basic rights, with the fourth being “the 
basic rights to equal opportunities to participate in processes of opinion-and will-formation”. He 
argues that only this category enables legal subjects to become authors of their legal order, and 
further emphasizes that “this category of rights is reflexively applied to the constitutional 
interpretation and the further political development or elaboration of the basic rights.”198  
 
     The idea of communication as a freedom for individuals, which should be part of the political 
rights, is a very stimulating facet in Habermas’s theory. He claims that these political rights 
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should enable every person to have equal chances to exercise the communicative freedom in all 
deliberative and decisional processes. Habermas articulates this as follows: 
 
Equal opportunities for the political use of communicative freedoms require a legally 
structured deliberative praxis in which the discourse principle is applied. Just as 
communicative freedom prior to any institutionalization refers to appropriate occasions for 
the use of language oriented toward mutual understanding, so also do political rights in 
particular, entitlements to the public use of communicative freedom-call for the legal 
institutionalization of various forms of communication and the implementation of democratic 
procedures.199  
 
     As one can notice, rights of equal participation are crucially important to Habermas, just like 
they were to Pateman, because they are important for the legitimacy of law. Rights of equal 
participation, however, cannot easily be achieved. The only way is the recognition of a 
symmetrical juridification of the communicative freedom of all citizens by means of political 
autonomy in accordance with political rights. Habermas advices that it is important to introduce 
the system of rights in this way,200 and argues that in this model of democracy “the citizens 
themselves become those who deliberate and, acting as a constitutional assembly, decide how 
they must fashion the rights that give the discourse principle legal shape as a principle of 
democracy.”201  
 
     The most intriguing idea in Habermas’s discursive principle for the purpose of this research, 
is the explanation of how human rights become part of the constitutional fabric of a country. 
Again, he uses claims of communicative freedom in the form of freedom of opinion and 
information which make their way to the legal system slowly over time. Habermas extrapolates 
that “This system of rights, however, is not given to the framers of a constitution in advance as a 
natural law. Only in a particular constitutional interpretation do these rights first enter into 
consciousness at all....every constitution is a living project that can endure only as an ongoing 
interpretation continually carried forward at all levels of the production of law.”202 On the same 
argument Habermas disputes that “the constitutional state does not represent a finished structure 
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but a delicate and sensitive-above all fallible and revisable-enterprise, whose purpose is to realize 
the system of rights anew in changing circumstances, that is, to interpret the system of rights 
better, to institutionalize it more appropriately, and to draw out its contents more radically.”203  
 
     This generalization that Habermas makes about the living constitution that changes over time 
through interpretation finds applicability in the “living tree doctrine” in the Canadian law. This 
doctrine allows for Canada’s Constitution to change and evolve over time, and provides flexible 
interpretation that accommodates the realities of changing modern life. If the Constitution could 
not be interpreted this way, it would be frozen in time and become more obsolete than useful. 
This understanding of constitutional interpretation becomes central for my arguments on the 
recognition of the access rights. I claim constitutional status of the ATI rights even though I am 
not able to find such status in the Canadian Charter.  
 
      Moreover, Habermas responds to major concern in this research that originates from critics 
of transparency and access rights: the use of these rights. Many critics argue that since people do 
not make a good use of these rights, there should be no preoccupation for their recognition. 
Habermas explains that there are basic political rights that institutionalize the public use of 
communicative freedom in the form of individual rights, but they provide a right, rather than an 
obligation to the individuals. Habermas argues that: 
 
The legal code leaves no other alternative; communicative and participatory rights must be 
formulated in a language that leaves it up to autonomous legal subjects whether, and if 
necessary how, they want to make use of such rights. It is left to the addressees' free choice: 
whether or not they want to engage their free will as authors, shift their perspective from 
their own interests and success to mutual understanding over norms acceptable to all, and 
make public use of their communicative freedom.204 
 
     According to Sossin, in Habermas’s theory of communicative action “the system through 
which we administer ourselves have become estranged from the social relations by which we 
define ourselves and reproduce our culture. This has resulted in a peculiar form of apathy and 
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disenchantment” 205 which he calls the “refeudalization of the public sphere”. This form of 
apathy noticed by Sossin is, in fact, what many other scholars notice when looking for a 
relationship between transparency and trust. However, the existence of citizen apathy should not 
be used as an argument against the recognition of access to information as a human right. 
Habermas responds to these claims with the free will – people are free to use their rights to 
which they are entitled, but they are not obligated to do so. This free will characterizes human 
rights generally. Habermas’s discourse theory of law touches upon many concerns in this 
dissertation and gives answers to many tensions of transparency. He elaborates on many 
concepts through a careful analysis of democratic processes and with a special focus on human 
rights. For this reason, this theory will assist me to weave together many arguments and advance 
my claim for the recognition of access to information as a human right. 
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PART II 
 THE NATURE OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION  
 
CHAPTER 4: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS 
TO INFORMATION 
 
     This chapter makes an analysis of the history of transparency and ATI in Canada and the EU, 
and explores their origin and development. It is compelling to know how and why transparency 
has become so normalized that we no longer question its existence or relevance.  The chapter 
engages with the historical dynamics of transparency, but focuses more on the ATI legislation in 
both jurisdictions because statutory advancements are easier to track and study.  
     The purpose of this chapter is to understand the how and why access laws came to be. It is 
important to discern how these laws came to life, what were the initial aspirations, how they 
progressed and in what environment, who pushed for them, and what was the rationale. The 
answers to all these questions inform about the intended nature and value of existent access laws 
and the state of transparency.  
 
4.1 Tracing back transparency and ATI at the international level 
     Many scholars have engaged with the study of origins of transparency, and argue whether it is 
a modern construct or has discernible origins in an earlier period. For instance, while mapping 
out the different strains and meanings of transparency, Hood traces its use back to the Chinese 
legalists and classical Greeks.206 Others have traced transparency in religious texts in Christianity 
and Islam. The following verse in the Bible demonstrate a close relationship between position, 
trust and accountability: “Everyone to whom much was given, of him much will be required, and 
from him to whom they entrusted much, they will demand the more.”207 Something similar can 
be found in Islam: “Each one of you is a guardian and each guardian is accountable to everything 
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under his care.”208 In addition, both religions remind believers that they are accountable to God 
for their deeds. The Bible says: “But I tell you that every careless word that people speak, they 
shall give an accounting for it in the Day of Judgment.”209 Islam has similar provisions, 
emphasizing the duty of those in power to honestly serve people: “If any ruler having the 
authority to rule Muslim subjects dies while he is deceiving them, Allah will forbid Paradise for 
him.”210 A story told about the second Caliph (leader) in Islam, Umar al-Khatthab, who asked the 
permission from his people to use medicine from the storehouse when he got sick211, implies a 
quest for transparency in Islamic governance.  
 
     Despite these earlier occurrences, Harlow suggests that the concept was only shaped in the 
seventeenth century. She advised that, at that time, access to the political process had been a 
central distinguishing characteristic of citizenship in western political thought.212 The so-called 
“Enlightenment” in Europe certainly affected this development. Lathrop and Ruma argued that 
the ideal of open government, as one context for transparency, and the public’s right to 
“scrutinize and participate in government dates back at least to the Enlightenment.”213 The first 
FOI law was passed in Sweden in 1766, requiring that official documents be made available to 
anyone making a request214. The importance of transparency and openness was recognized in the 
Declaration of Independence of the United States. Patrick Henry railed against the secrecy of the 
Constitutional Congress, saying: “The liberties of a people never were, nor ever will be, secure, 
when the transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them.”215 
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     Although the term transparency was used earlier, the modern idea was truly developed after 
World War II. Anthropologists West and Sanders admitted that the term was born out of the self-
reflexivity of a larger historical moment, namely modernity. Transparency constitutes a 
fashionable buzzword that inflects ideas with a long historical legacy.216 
 
     Just after the War, the term FOI emerged under the United Nations (UN) legal framework. In 
its first meeting in 1946, the UN General Assembly issued a declaration calling for a recognition 
and protection of the FOI as a fundamental touchstone human right, and defined it as it “implies 
the right to gather, transmit and publish news anywhere and everywhere without fetters.”217 Two 
years later, a Draft Convention of FOI, that failed to garner sufficient support, defined the term 
as “the free interchange of information and opinions, both in the national and in the international 
sphere.”218 In its very first session in 1946, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 59(I), 
stating that “Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and ….the touchstone of all 
the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.”219 
     In the period following WWII, after a long war that brought destruction and questioned the 
status of leadership, trust on democratic institutions was gradually being re-established. To 
accelerate this process, a whole machinery of political indoctrination was implemented in 
Western democracies teaching average citizens what democracy was and why it was superior to 
other forms of government.220 However, the high trust on government started to decline rapidly 
in the 1960s, which marked a significant turn in politics.221 In the1970s the situation deteriorated, 
and data indicated a general decline in trust towards all kinds of socio-political institutions.222 
There was also a decline of trust in elites – in Canada, Europe and elsewhere – influenced by 
Watergate and more robust investigative journalism. The 1970s came to be perceived as a time 
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of permanent political crisis with respect to the crisis of legitimacy or governability.223 New 
questions were raised regarding the future of the democratic process.224 The post-war political 
indoctrination had its consequences. The elitist theories of democracy were being highly 
criticized, and some of them overthrown. New theories of democracy emerged radicalizing the 
way of thinking about democracy. They highlighted the inherent right of citizens to participate to 
the fullest, not only on symbolic politics, but also in actual decision making in politics and other 
sectors of the society. Pateman’s Participation and Democratic theory was one of them. Bell 
postulated that “the axial principle of the modern polity is participation.”225 However, Dahl 
challenged this view by saying that there was simply no way that citizens in large states could 
participate in all political decisions.226 
     The demand for transparency and ATI overlapped with the rise of the modern administrative 
state that was established after World War II. In the 60s and 70s, the crisis of legitimacy lead to 
an acceptance in western democracies that more had to be done to restore the trust on 
government. One such way was to be more transparent and provide the public with an effective 
ATI. After Sweden updated its Freedom of the Press Act, and included it in the Constitution in 
1949227, Finland (in 1951), Denmark and Norway (in 1970), US (in 1966) and France (in 1978), 
all passed ATI laws. They were considered to be the first wave of countries passing such laws. 
After a few years, a second wave of countries introduced ATI legislation. Canada belonged to 
this group of countries. These developments led to the recognition in Canada of the need for 
special protections for ATI.228 Canada, Australia and New Zealand introduced FOI laws in the 
early 80s, being the second wave of an ATI revolution. In 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell down 
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there were just twelve FOI laws in the world, to be found mainly in longer-established 
democracies.229  
     In the 90s and 2000s there has been an expansion of FOI laws all around the world. In the 
1990’s a third wave of countries implemented access laws and with the entrance in the new 
millennium, most of the countries in the world had ATI laws as part of their legal framework. 
Many of them, especially in Europe, had introduced an access right in their constitutions, 
granting this right a higher status, that of a fundamental right. The late 90s and early 2000 signed 
a race of the Eastern Europe countries towards embracing FOI laws.230 Today, most of the 
countries in the world have FOI laws in place. Paraguay became the 100th nation in the world to 
have adopted such law in September of 2014,231 a year in which three other countries passed FOI 
laws, Maldives, Afghanistan and Mozambique.232 
     Despite the widespread of FOI legislation the process has not gone very smoothly. I bring 
here two significant examples from the US and the UK, which demonstrate the controversy and 
resistance that have accompanied FOI laws during their passage, and afterwards. The US passed 
the FOI Act in Congress in 1966233 after a decade of congressional hearings. The executive 
branch opposed the bill - in 1965 all 27 federal agencies and departments that presented 
testimony were opposed to it - and so did the President.234 Although President Johnson was 
eventually convinced by key staff members, Congressional leaders, and journalists who 
advocated the bill, Bill Moyers (then a White House aide) wrote: “I knew that LBJ [referring to 
the president] had to be dragged kicking and screaming to the signing. He hated the very idea of 
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the FOI Act; hated the thought of journalists rummaging in government closets and opening 
government files; hated them challenging the official view of reality.”235 
     In the United Kingdom, after a civil society campaign, dating back to 1984, the Labour party 
made passage of a FOI law a campaign promise in the 1997 election. The law was not passed 
until 2000, and did not come fully into effect until 2005.236 And yet, former Prime Minister Tony 
Blair called the passage of the law his greatest regret from his time in office, due to its frequent 
use by journalists. He wrote in his memoir: “Freedom of Information. Three harmless words. I 
look at those words as I write them, and feel like shaking my head till it drops off  my shoulders. 
You idiot. You naive, foolish, irresponsible nincompoop. There is really no description of 
stupidity, no matter how vivid, that is adequate. I quake at the imbecility of it.”237   
     The period after 2000s marked a bold move towards international recognition of a right to 
ATI. On June 18, 2009, 12 members of the Council of Europe signed the Convention on Access 
to Official Documents,238 making history as the first binding legal instrument that recognizes a 
general right of access to official documents. Other international organizations have also taken 
steps towards this recognition by adopting their own rules on ATI. For instance, in 2010 the 
World Bank adopted an Access to Information Policy.239 Also, the International Monetary Fund 
has a Transparency Policy in which it recognizes the right to information.240 The UN Sustainable 
Development Goals have set as a target that every nation in the world will by 2030 “ensure 
public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national 
legislation and international agreements.”241  
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     Looking back at FOI laws, one can notice that at the early stages (60s, 70s and 80s) these 
laws were created with an understanding that FOI was part of the freedom of expression, which 
was perceived as a right that only affects journalists and political activists. However, there has 
been a paradigm change in the new millennium. FOI is now considered as a multi-dimensional 
human right that can affect people and their governments in many ways, and which is protected 
by many international legal instruments. In many countries, FOI is regarded as critical to the 
realization of the constitutional socio-economic rights, such as the rights to adequate health care, 
education and clean environment. Many NGOs are pushing for such recognition. For instance, 
Open Democracy Advice Centre promotes that if a person wants to find out information about 
pollution in a particular area, because of an unusual number of illnesses in the locality, a right of 
ATI can assist to get this kind of knowledge.242 
 
4.2 Historical path of access to information in Canada 
 
4.2.1 Milestones leading to the Access to Information Act 
     In Canada, the term transparency is generally not present, at least not within the ATIA legal 
provisions. This section will mainly focus on ATI legislation. The first time Canada recognized a 
right to ATI is in the context of the UN framework. Rankin explained that the Canadian 
government reported at a 1948 UN Conference on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
that “Freedom of Information in Canada is inherent in the Canadian Constitution, but it is not 
specifically enacted.”243 
      At the federal level, the first legislative recognition of a right to ATI came within the context 
of the Canadian Human Rights Act244, where Part IV entitled individuals to have access to their 
personal information contained in government records. This provision was in fact a precursor of 
the Privacy Act which replaced Part IV of the Canadian Human Rights Act when it came into 
effect.   
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     However, the actual Canadian commitment to ATI was a specific legislation – the ATIA. An 
ATI law in Canada was not pioneered at the federal level, but instead originated in the provinces. 
In 1977 Nova Scotia became the first Canadian jurisdiction to pass such legislation245 followed 
by New Brunswick in 1978, Newfoundland in 1981 and Quebec in 1982. Table 3 gives a 
summary of the dates when ATI legislation was introduced provincially and federally. 
     The path to the ATIA’s adoption at the federal level in Canada was long and rocky. It was 
paved by private Members’ bills. The first efforts began a bit prior to the adoption of the FOIA 
in the US in 1966. According to McCamus, this development has influenced Canadian interest in 
similar legislation.246 In 1965 NDP Member of Parliament (MP) Barry Mather, introduced the 
first ATI Bill in the House of Commons as a private member’s bill.247 Mather was a columnist 
and a journalist by profession and an MP in British Columbia.248 His Members’ Bill249 died on 
the Order Paper. In each parliamentary session, for six years, between 1968 and his retirement in 
1974, Mather reintroduced identical legislation. Four times it reached Second Reading, but went 
no further. It died on the House of Commons Order Paper. Considering that bills go through 
three readings at the House of Commons250, this was a relatively short life.   
     Progressive Conservative MP, Gerald Baldwin, recognized as the father of FOI in Canada251, 
tried the same technique. He introduced a private member’s bill each year between 1969 and 
1974, but they also never made it past second reading. Baldwin created ACCESS, a Canadian 
Committee for the Right to Public Information, and Ottawa’s first effective lobby group for ATI. 
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Referring to this contribution, Canada’s Information Commissioner has called Baldwin an 
irresistible force which inspired Canada’s ATI law. The ATIA was his enduring moment.252  
 
     At the time that these bills were introduced, the political situation in Canada was boiling from 
social rights movements. Women, aboriginal, LGBT and separatists movements were rising in 
Canada in the 60s.  The late 1960s in Canada, as throughout the Western world, saw the 
emergence of a new women's movement253. In addition, the year following Prime Minister’s 
Trudeau rise to power in 1968, his government issued a White Paper254 on Aboriginal policy. 
Aboriginals responded with their own document, named Citizens Plus, in 1970 or known as the 
Red Paper255 which countered all of the proposals of the White Paper, and successfully 
convinced the government to radically change its policies and positions. Furthermore, the LGBT 
movement started in 1965256. Lastly, the separatist movement was taking place in Quebec in the 
60s and 70s. All these social movements contributed to the enhancement of understanding of 
societal politics and its interaction in democracy.  
 
     Certainly, these movements prepared the environment in which ATI arouse and discussed. At 
that time Canadians complained about the emergence of a class of “super-bureaucrats”257 whose 
influence over everyday life seemed contrary to democratic principles. Worries about the 
expansion of governmental authority were fueled by the 1976 Lambert Royal Commission, 
which described “a grave weakening, and in some cases an almost total breakdown, in the chain 
of accountability”258 within the Canadian federal government. This concern about government 
legitimacy influenced the public support for an ATI law in Canada. Smith criticized the 
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Canadian government for resembling a “thinly-disguised Presidential system”, without the 
benefit of a strong legislature to balance presidential power.259 This environment created the 
background for the introduction of an ATI law. Roberts argued that “The timing of the debate 
that led to the ATIA is significant”260 pointing to the political battle that was happening in the 
US at the early 70s. In October 1974 the US Congress, responding to the secretiveness of the 
Nixon administration following his resignation earlier in August, passed amendments that 
substantially improved the 1966 US FOIA. President Ford then vetoed the amendments, arguing 
that they would erode presidential powers. Congress overrode the veto in November 1974 and 
gave the Americans the law they still have today.261 Beyond the American continent, two other 
Commonwealth countries presented and adopted similar legislation, namely Australia262, and 
New Zealand263, which both passed an ATI law in 1982.  
     As a culmination of all these developments in Canada was the discussion of the Charter of the 
Rights and Freedoms which was passed by the Parliament the same year as the ATIA. The 
debates surrounding the Charter and all the other events happening in late 70s, early 80s put the 
government under heavy pressure to consider ATI as a means to re-establish its legitimacy. The 
Canadian government took a long time to reflect that the adoption of an ATI law was 
inescapable. As Rubin explains “It took nearly 10 years of public campaigning for access 
….rights before the acts’ June 1982 passage.”264 He was referring to both the ATIA and the 
Privacy Act. This hesitation is explained with the common law tradition in Canada which was 
not concerned with giving access rights to individuals, except in very special circumstances of 
litigation. This tradition was mainly concerned with the publication of law and with legal 
certainty, setting limits to arbitrary actions that undermined individual security.265 Certainly, the 
adoption of an ATI law meant changing this transition. According to Roberts, this represented 
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“for administrations and citizens, a significant cultural transformation away from traditional and 
historical administrative privileges”266 
 
     A series of government enterprises preceded the adoption of the ATIA. In June 1977, 
Trudeau’s Liberal government released a Green Paper called “Legislation on Public Access to 
Government Documents.”267 The Green Paper was issued by the Secretary of State, and 
examined policy options for creating Canada’s federal legislation on ATI.268 It observed that 
Canada began seriously contemplating the enactment of FOI legislation in the 1970s269, although 
prior attempts were made earlier in the 60s. The Green Paper deliberated on the challenge of 
balancing the need for ATI in government records to enable effective participation of citizens in 
public decision-making with situations in which government operations required confidentiality. 
The Green Paper rejected the option of allowing direct appeals to the Federal Court explaining 
that “There is no way that a judicial officer can be properly made aware of all the political, 
economic, social and security factors that may have led to the decision in issue. Nor should the 
courts be allowed to usurp the constitutional role that Parliament plays in making a Minister 
answerable to it for his actions.”270 This way of thinking tells a lot about the law we have today.  
 
     In October 1979, the Progressive Conservative Government led by Joe Clark introduced Bill 
C-15, the proposed FOI Act, fulfilling a promise made during his election campaign. Before 
coming to power Clark gained public support for the ATIA. In 1978 he referred to ATI as:  
What we are talking about is power – political power. We are talking about the reality that 
real power is limited to those who have facts. In a democracy that power and that information 
should be shared broadly. In Canada today they are not, and to that degree we are no longer a 
democracy in any sensible sense of that word. There is excessive power concentrated in the 
hands of those who hide public information from the people and Parliament of Canada.271  
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     The approach taken by the Progressive Conservatives in Bill C-15 was virtually identical to 
one that had been taken when US FOI Act was amended in 1976272. It is important to emphasize 
that the Liberal party has been in power all the time from the first introduction of the ATI bill in 
1965 by Mather. This is the first party change in Canada after 16 years of Liberal rule and 
represented a break for ATI proponents. However, the Progressive Conservative government fell 
shortly, after losing confidence in the House of Commons, just after the Bill made it to second 
reading.  
     Following public pressure, Trudeau’s newly elected Liberal government announced that an 
ATI legislation would be introduced273. Bill C-43 was first presented in Parliament in 1980 by 
the Honorable Francis Fox, Secretary of state who predicted that the “legislation will, over time, 
become one of the cornerstones of Canadian democracy ….and bring about a very major change 
of thinking within government….Under this legislation, access to information becomes a matter 
of public right, with the burden of proof on the Government to establish that information need 
not be released.”274 The bill was anticipated to reverse the then-present situation whereby ATI 
was a matter of government discretion. Government departments and agencies were instructed 
by a letter from the Prime Minister (PM) Trudeau to abide by “the spirit of the legislation.”275 
However, despite the positive attitudes and high hopes, Bill C-43 was later changed preceded by 
a long debate and the tabling of multiple bills. Rees explains that “the passage of the ATIA into 
law was delayed for a year until the governing Liberal Party of Trudeau secured the exclusion of 
cabinet from ATIA jurisdiction (section 69).”276 On November 4, 1981 the Honorable Francis 
Fox, tabled certain amendments to the Bill in the Justice and Legal Affairs Committee of the 
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House of Commons.277 The final Bill C-43 contrasted with Bill C-15 in that it included exclusion 
for Cabinet confidences, not merely an exemption as found in other legislation.  
     McCamus has strongly criticized the Bill C-43 as “a rather pale imitation of the American 
Freedom of Information Act” and as having “the appearance of a freedom of information law 
drafted by individuals who have little sympathy for the basic objectives of such a scheme.”278 All 
these changes happened in the final stages of the legislation. This later version of the bill became 
law in 1982. PM Trudeau promised that the law would promote “effective participation of 
citizens and organizations in the taking of public decisions.”279 The ATIA received Royal Assent 
in July, 1982, and came into effect on Canada Day on July 1, 1983. The Act was proclaimed in 
the final months of Trudeau’s Liberal Government and it was considered to be Trudeau’s gift to 
PM Mulroney because it was Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative regime that had to deal with 
its effects.280 The ATIA created the Office of the Information Commissioner. At the same time, 
Parliament also adopted the Privacy Act281, which provided for the protection of personal 
information under the control of government institutions. 
     The passage of the ATIA was considered a big success at the time, because it meant a move 
away from the secretive bureaucratic and political culture of a Westminster model of 
government. The Information Commissioner Legault has characterized the Act as 
‘groundbreaking’ explaining that Canada was one of the first countries to enact such a law in a 
Westminster style parliamentary model of government.282 However, the credit for the ATIA’s 
adoption, according to McCamus goes to the American influence and pressure from opposition 
parties, business, labor and NGO groups, associations of academics, public interest groups and 
the press.283 The optimism accompanying the ATIA’s passage, however, would not last long. A 
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look at the after-passage period gives a better idea on the tensions and implications that were yet 
to come. 
4.2.2 Post-Access to Information Act environment   
     Soon after the adoption of the ATIA, not only the enthusiasm began to fade, but signs of 
resistance and hostility began to appear. Considering the long history of secrecy within 
government, this reaction did not come as a surprise. Savoie argued that “Secrecy and 
confidentiality have [historically]….permeated government operations at Canada. They begin at 
the top: members of the Privy Council swear: ‘….I shall keep secret all matters committed or 
revealed to me in this capacity, or that shall secretly treated of in Council.”284 This swearing still 
exists today. As a result of this historical pledge to secrecy, declarations such as the one made by 
John Crosbie, the first Justice Minister to be responsible for the Act, were not surprising. He 
dismissed the act as a tool that “gives the media and other mischief-makers the ability to ferret 
our snippets of information with which to embarrass political leaders and to titillate the public.” 
According to him, “In the vast majority of instances, embarrassment and titillation are the only 
objects of access to information requests.”285 This declaration meant that the system would be 
flooding from requests aiming at embarrassing the government. However, in 1985, two years 
after the Act came into force, J. Thomas Babcock wrote: “Federal agencies and departments 
received only 475 requests for information during the firsts three months the Access to 
Information law was in effect, far below the 15,000 in governmental plans.”286 This indicated 
that the Act was not being used as much as expected, which meant that there were problems 
either with the law itself or its implementation.  
     In 1986, three years after the ATIA came into force an in-depth review of the provisions and 
the operations of the act was conducted by the House of Commons Standing Committee on 
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Justice287 and the Solicitor General. The Committee asserted that the Act was of “similar 
significance” to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms288. Its report “Open and Shut: 
Enhancing the right to know and the right to privacy”289 was unanimously tabled in Parliament in 
March 1987. The Justice Committee proposed that the exclusion of Cabinet records from the 
operation of the Act be deleted and replaced with an exemption that would not be subject to an 
injury test.290 Exempting rather than excluding these documents would have allowed the 
Commissioner or the Court to investigate the government’s determinations that such documents 
should not be released291. The report listed a series of recommendations for amending the 
ATIA.292 Some of the findings indicated that the act was not well-understood by the public and 
public service and that the Act needed to modernize some provisions and clarify some others. As 
a result calls for law improvement emerged soon after the report. In response to “Open and Shut” 
the government issued “Access and Privacy: the steps ahead”293 later the same year. However, 
none of the legislative recommendations were taken into consideration.294 
     Amendments to the ATIA were made later on in a span of 10 years. In fact, the ATIA was 
amended four times since its enactment in 1983, but none of them were actually substantial. In 
1992, the Act was first amended to deal with the provisions of records in alternative formats to 
individuals with sensory disabilities.295 In 1998, the Somalia Affair and the “tainted blood 
scandal”296 lead to the introduction of a private member’s bill which amended the ATIA in 1999 
with a new section 67.1297. This section made it a criminal offence for anyone to intentionally 
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destroy, falsify or conceal a record, or to counsel anyone else to do so. The offence is punishable 
by a maximum of two years in prison or a fine up to $10,000. This can be considered as a 
positive development with a potential to improve the ATIA implementation. The third 
amendment was made in 2001, following September 11, which added another exclusion for 
documents containing national security or foreign intelligence information.298 Bill C-36, the 
Anti-terrorism Act299 provided that a certificate by the Attorney General prohibiting the 
disclosure of information for the purpose of protecting national defense or national security 
would override the provisions of the ATIA. The Anti-Terrorism Act, added section 69.1 to the 
ATIA to exclude from the operation of the Act any documents that are prohibited from disclosure 
by certificates issued under the Canada Evidence Act.300 This amendment was considered a step 
back to the ATI regime in Canada with negative consequences to the rights of Canadians. It 
concentrates so much power in the hands of one person – the Attorney General - which can 
downplay the importance of ATI in favour of matters of national security. This has been a 
concern for many of the authors in the literature review since matters of security can often be 
misused to justify violations of ATI rights. 
 
     Amendments of the ATIA for the fourth time were a promise during the electoral campaign of 
Harper’s Conservative Party which came to power in 2006. As a response to the Gomery 
Commission301 in 2006, the government introduced the Federal Accountability Act 302(FAA). At 
the same time, in April 2006, the government tabled a discussion paper entitled “Strengthening 
the Access to Information Act – A Discussion of Ideas Intrinsic to the Reform of the Access to 
Information Act”303. This discussion paper offered comments on some of the 2005 Information 
Commissioner’s proposals (in the “Open Government Act”) and some alternate approaches to 
consider for reform.304 
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     The FAA amended the ATIA in three ways. First, it introduced a legislated “duty to assist” 
applicants, which required institutions to make every reasonable effort to help applicants receive 
complete, accurate and timely responses to requests, without regards to their identity. It offered 
applicants reasonable assistance throughout the request process, informing them when their 
requests needed to be clarified applying limited and specific exemptions. Second, the FAA 
extended the range of the subjects under the ATIA’s access regime by adding several new 
institutions to be covered by ATI legislation. It also amended the regulatory powers under 
section 77 of the ATIA to allow for additional bodies to be added to the Act in the future. Under 
this new provision, Cabinet now has the power to make regulations prescribing criteria for 
adding a body or office to Schedule I of the Act.305 This is certainly one of the most positive 
achievements in enhancing ATI regime in Canada so far. The range of institutions covered by the 
Act has always been criticized by ATI advocates (see Chapter 8 and 9). However, many public 
bodies are currently outside its purview, including Parliament, some Officers of Parliament, and 
other organizations performing public functions or spending public money. This has been the 
subject of significant debate. These first two amendments were considered positive to the 
strengthening of ATI, but were still less than what was promised during the electoral campaign. 
What really disappointed the ATI advocates was the third type of amendment brought by the 
FAA which added a number of institution-specific exemptions and exclusions related to some 
Officers’ functions which are not available to other entities already covered by the ATIA. The 
FAA also granted new mandatory class exemptions.  
 
     These four amendments were attempts that became finalized in actual changes to the Act. 
However, these were not the only attempts that occupied the post-ATIA environment. The 90s 
can be considered to be “silent years” in terms of ATI activism. Entering in the new millennium, 
signaled a real shift in the political and social action toward improving ATI regime in Canada. 
However, every attempt in achieving this goal failed in face of political indifference and 
resistance. The 2000s was a busy time for ATI proponents. A private member’s bill introduced in 
the House of Commons in 2000 by Liberal MP John Bryden306 to overhaul the ATIA, was 
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defeated at second reading. John Bryden continued pressuring the government and together with 
a group of MPs from various parties formed their own ad hoc Committee on ATI in summer 
2001, pushing for changes to the ATI system. This Committee, chaired by Bryden, produced a 
report in November 2001, “A Call for Openness”307, containing eleven recommendations for 
improving the provisions and operation of the Act. One of the recommendations was that section 
69 exclusion of Cabinet records be replaced by an injury-based discretionary exemption. 
     As a response to the pressure from the MPs, the Ministry of Justice and the president of the 
Treasury Board launched an ATI task force with a mandate to review both the legislative and 
administrative issues relative to the ATI regime, including the Act, regulations, policies and 
procedures. The Review Task Force, set up in early 2001, consisting of government officials and 
chaired by Andrée Delagrave, created advisory committees, published a consultation paper, 
commissioned and published research papers, and held consultations. In 12 June 2002, it released 
a lengthy report, “Access to Information: Making it Work for Canadians”, containing 139 
recommendations for change.308 The Task Force recognized a need to modernize some aspects of 
the ATIA.309 For many ATI proponents this report was considered a milestone event. The report 
found “a crisis in information management” within government and called for an amendment of 
the ATIA that would include a “public interest override”310. The Task Force noticed that 
Canadians were making a relatively modest, but increasing, and more sophisticated, use of the 
ATIA. It emphasized the role of knowledge in a democratic society by saying: “In a knowledge-
based society, information is a public resource and essential for collective learning. If Canada is 
to thrive and compete, government information must be made available as widely and easily as 
possible.”311 The report recognized that after 20 years, the Act was still not well-understood by 
the public, requesters, third parties who supply information to government, or even the public 
service. It pointed out that the public servants did not have the training, tools and support they 
needed. The work done on ATI was not often perceived as “valued” work or part of their “real” 
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job. The principles of access had not yet been successfully integrated into the core values of the 
public service and embedded in its routines. The report concluded that there was a pressing need 
for more education on ATI. Another finding was that the journalistic use of ATI had grown in 
number and focus - requests were sharper and to the point.312 
     The Task Force made many proposals concerning an array of issues in the ATI system. They 
included expanding the scope of the Act by extending coverage to most Officers of Parliament, 
as well as to Parliament, granting order power to the OIC, limiting discretion by a proof of harm 
test or public interest override, introducing penalties for noncompliance and lowering fees. The 
Review Task Force, referred to some of the OIC proposals for legislative change in its report, 
and included them as Appendix A, the “Blueprint for Reform” reprinted from the 2000–2001 
annual report of the OIC.313 The federal government failed to act on the report. Instead, while the 
work on the task force was still ongoing, in late 2001 the government proposed the Anti-
terrorism Act with more provisions for secrecy. 
     In response to the findings of the Review Task Force, in October 2002, the Information 
Commissioner John Reid tabled a special report in Parliament. He was critical of both the 
process and the results of the Task Force’s review.314 In addition, following the report of the 
Task Force, in 2002, the Liberal MP John Bryden introduced another private member bill which 
had the same fate as previous bills. However, he continued to introduce private members bills in 
the years to come. In the fall of 2003, he attempted to initiate a comprehensive overhaul of the 
Act through Bill C-462 which had its first reading in October 28, 2003315, and died on the Order 
Paper with the dissolution of the 37th Parliament in May 2004. The bill would have changed the 
name of the ATIA to the “Open Government Act”. It would have expanded the scope of the Act 
by adding new institutions to Schedule I, which lists the institutions under the Act. The bill 
would have broadened the purpose section of the Act, adding a reference to the federal 
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government’s obligation to release information to assist Canadians in assessing government 
effectiveness and compliance with the Charter.316 
     A similar bill was introduced by the NDP MP Pat Martin as Bill C-201, which had its first 
reading on October 7, 2004.317 Martin withdrew it later after taking a pledge from then-Justice 
Minister Irwin Cotler to introduce a government bill. That promise was later broken. Instead, in 
April 2005, Cotler introduced a discussion paper entitled “A Comprehensive Framework for 
Access to Information Reform”318 asking the House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics for input on a range of policy questions before the 
introduction of legislation. Many areas were left open for consideration by the Committee, but in 
some areas government positions were indicated.319 The Minister indicated that while he agreed 
that reform of the ATIA was required, he believed it was important that a parliamentary 
committee first study the major issues before draft legislation was developed.320 By motion 
passed in the House of Commons on 15 November 2005, Members of the Committee agreed that 
the ATIA should be amended to expand coverage of the Act to all Crown corporations, all 
Officers of Parliament, all foundations and to all organizations that spend taxpayers’ dollars or 
perform public functions; establish a Cabinet-confidence exclusion; establish a duty to create the 
records; provide a general public interest override for all exemptions or make all exemptions 
discretionary and subject to an injury test.321 Rather than embarking on a study of the matters 
raised in the Framework, the Committee asked Information Commissioner John Reid to develop 
a bill that would amend the Act. The Commissioner accepted this request and worked on 
accomplishing it with the help of the Legislative Counsel of the House of Commons. His 
proposal, in the form of a bill amending the ATIA, went substantially further in promoting 
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openness than any of the previous reform proposals.322 A primary objective was to address 
concerns about a “culture of secrecy” within political and bureaucratic environments. Like Bills 
C-462 and C-201, the Commissioner’s proposed bill was entitled the “Open Government Act”, 
and expanded the number of institutions to be covered by the ATIA, reduced the scope of secrecy 
permitted by the Act, expanded the powers of oversight by the Commissioner and the courts, and 
increased incentives for compliance and penalties for non-compliance.  
     The Commissioner’s proposed “Open Government Act” Bill was endorsed by Justice John 
Gomery in his 2006 Phase 2 report for the Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program 
and Advertising Activities, Restoring Accountability323. In 2005, the Gomery Commission was 
created to investigate the scandal, and found that senior officials and Ministers failed to respect 
the spirit of the ATIA – they often delayed responding to information request and failed to 
document decisions. All of the elements of the Commissioner’s proposal were supported in the 
Gomery report, which also specifically urged the government to adopt legislation requiring 
public servants to document decisions and recommendations, and made it an offence to fail to do 
so or to destroy documentation recording government decisions, or the advice and deliberations 
leading up to decisions.324 Contrary to other proposals before, the Commissioner did not 
recommend that his Office be changed from an ombudsman to that of a quasi-judicial, order-
making body.325 
 
    In April 2006, in response to the Gomery Commission’s findings, the government introduced 
the Federal Accountability Act (FAA).326 At the same time, the government tabled a discussion 
paper entitled “Strengthening the Access to Information Act – A Discussion of Ideas Intrinsic to 
the Reform of the Access to Information Act”.327 The FAA became law in December of 2006.328 
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However, what the FAA delivered in terms of strengthening the ATIA, was not what the 
Conservatives promised as part of their election campaign. The 2006 election platform of the 
Conservative Party of Canada included a framework that proposed to: “Ensure that all 
exemptions from the disclosure of government are justified only on the basis of the harm or 
injury that would result from disclosure, not blanket exemption rules.”329 The break of this 
promise brought the reaction of many ATI advocates, including the ad hoc Committee of MPs in 
the House of Commons. As a result, in October 2006, a House of Commons Committee passed a 
resolution on to the federal Justice Minister to introduce a bill keeping the Conservatives election 
promises. Nothing came out of this resolution and the introduction of a bill on ATI kept being 
pushed back.  
     On April 1, 2008, the Harper’s government shut down CAIRS (Coordination of Access to 
Information Request System) - the ATI database which had catalogued requests made to the 
federal government since 1989. Until May, 2008, the Treasury Board, through policy, required 
government institutions to register their requests in the system. Summaries of requests were 
logged into the system and disclosed on a monthly basis. The government announced that as a 
cost-saving measure, this initiative had been cancelled. Harper explained that CAIRS was 
“deemed expensive, [and] deemed to slow down the access to information.”330 In 
response, Stéphane Dion, who was then the leader of the opposition, reacted by saying that “The 
registry made it possible to know who asked for what through access to information.”331 He 
described Harper's government as the most secretive government in Canada’s history. 
     In the spring of 2008 two MPs introduced bills, very similar to each other, aimed at amending 
the ATIA to implement the reforms proposed by ICC John Reid in 2005. Pat Martin introduced 
Bill C-554332, An Act to amend the Access to Information Act (open government) on 29 May 
2008. A few days later, on 2 June, Bloc Québécois MP Carole Lavallée introduced Bill C-556333, 
An Act to amend the ATIA (improved access). Both bills died on the Order Paper with the 
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dissolution of the 39th Parliament in September 2008. Martin re-introduced his bill in the 40th 
Parliament on 25 February 2009334, and again in the 41st Parliament on 29 September 2011.335 
 
    In February 2009, ICC Robert Marleau released 12 recommendations for strengthening the 
ATIA and its enforcement system. Some of recommendations included extending the right of ATI 
to all persons; granting OIC with order-making powers; extending the application of the ATIA to 
Parliament and the courts; applying the ATIA to Cabinet confidences, etc. In March 2009, in the 
wake of the publication of his special report on systemic issues affecting ATI, he presented these 
recommendations at the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, 
Privacy and Ethics. The Committee studied these recommendations and endorsed most of them. 
However, the Committee did not support the Commissioner’s recommendation that the ATIA 
apply to Cabinet confidences. It heard from various witnesses, and in June 2009, the Committee 
tabled a report to Parliament. It suggested that the Minister of Justice consider amending the 
ATIA to implement the Commissioner’s recommendations.336 No steps further were taken from 
the government to amend the ATIA. The Conservatives rejected all recommendations in 
December 2009337 and limited its action to a review of policies and guidelines on ATI. In the 
Government’s response to the Committee’s report, the Minister of Justice, Rob Nicholson, 
indicated the following:  
The Access to Information Act is a strong piece of legislation. It is crucial that careful 
consideration be given to the impact changes to the legislation may have on the operations of 
the ATI program. Legislative amendments must be examined in the context of administrative 
alternatives, such as enhanced guidance and training that can be equally effective to realize 
continued improvements.338 
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     On March 18, 2011, the Government announced its commitment to an open government 
initiative along three main streams: open information, open data, and open dialogue. The 
Government of Canada first launched its Open Government strategy in March 2011, and then 
further enhanced its commitment by announcing its intention to join the “Open Government 
Partnership” in September 2011. However, the Open Government strategy did not include any 
plans for amending the ATIA. Canada’s information and privacy commissioners suggested that 
the Action Plan on Open Government represented a missed opportunity for a comprehensive 
reform of the ATIA. In January 2012, a letter to Minister Clement on behalf of Canada’s 
information and privacy commissioners, the ICC Suzanne Legault, offered to assist the 
government in developing the Action Plan. The letter suggested that the government recognize 
and support the relationship between open government and a modernized ATIA.339 
     In the 1st Session of the 41st Parliament, on 17 April 2012, the Honourable Tony Clement, 
President of the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) announced Canada’s membership in the 
international “Open Government Partnership”340 (OGP). At the Annual General Meeting of the 
Partnership held in Brazil, Minister Clement presented Canada’s “Open Government Action 
Plan” and endorsed the Partnership’s declaration of principles as Canada’s final steps toward 
membership in the Partnership.341 
     The OGP strategy brought some progress regarding the online publication of information 
requests. By 2012 all departments were publishing summaries of completed ATI requests 
monthly on their websites. Almost a year after, on April 9, 2013, Clement announced the launch 
of a new pilot project that enabled Canadians to submit ATI and privacy requests online. This 
pilot made it easier to submit ATI and privacy requests to the three departments participating in 
the project: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the Treasury Board Secretariat, and Shared 
Services Canada. This initiative was part of the modernization of the administration of ATI, one 
of the commitments of Canada’s Open Government Action Plan.342   
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     MP Pat Martin continued his efforts for statutory change of the ATIA, despite his prior several 
defeats. He introduced the Bill C-567343 in January 2014, which was defeated in May 2014.344 
The Bill proposed seven amendments, amongst which, to give the ICC order-making powers, 
expand the coverage of the act to all crown corporations, officers of Parliament, and foundations 
and organizations that spend taxpayers' money or perform public functions, subject the 
exclusions of cabinet confidences to the review of the ICC, oblige public officials to create and 
retain documents, provide a general public interest override for all exemptions, and ensure that 
all exemptions from the disclosure of government information are justified only on the basis of 
harm or injury test.345  
 
     A new name appeared in the House of Commons in 2014 as a supporter of an ATIA overhaul, 
the Liberal leader, Justin Trudeau. Following the legacy of his father Pierre Trudeau, who holds 
the signature for the ATIA in 1982 (but not necessarily the merit), Justin Trudeau introduced a 
Bill in 2014.346 In the House of Commons debate, Trudeau highlighted four ways his Bill would 
change the ATIA: making data “open by default and easily accessible”, ATI requests to cost no 
more than $5.00, giving the ICC enforcement powers, and making it mandatory to review the 
ATIA every five years.347 Trudeau explained the principle of being opened by default as “when 
civil servants are uncertain as to whether or not something falls under the exceptions or whether 
it’s a bit of a grey area, their default position will be to release it.”348 In addition, Trudeau 
emphasized the underlying purpose of his Bill saying that ATIA is “stuck in the 1980s and needs 
to be overhauled to rebuild the trust between citizens and their government.”349 Trudeau’s Bill 
had the support of the NDP leader Tom Mulcair who said that “his party would support anything 
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that would make the government more open.”350 Although the Bill was innovative, it faced some 
criticism for not doing enough, soon after it had its first reading in Parliament. Ken Rubin, a 
long-time ATI advocate emphasized that for the Bill to improve transparency “Trudeau must do 
more than move the secrecy yard line slightly.”351 The debates on the Bill did not last long since 
it was defeated in the House of Commons on April 1st, 2015 with a result of 122 in favor and 139 
against.352 On October 19, 2015, Justin Trudeau became the PM of Canada, and pledged to make 
transparency one his government priorities. In the Liberal Party’s website it is pledged that “open 
government is a sweeping agenda for change”353, and greater openness and transparency are 
viewed as means to restore trust in Canadian democracy.354 We will be witnessing if the Liberals 
will be able to keep that promise.  
 
     As all these developments demonstrate, the ATI regime in Canada has been characterized by 
the resistance of the political leadership. Its history has witnessed the obstinacy and indifference 
of those in power to take serious steps in modernizing the ATIA. Although the world has changed 
so much in terms of information delivery, nearly forty years later, the ATI environment in 
Canada lingers almost unchanged. As Rankin noticed “the citizen's access to government records 
remains subject to the whims of the government of the day.”355 
 
     While the word “transparency” was somewhat alien to the ATI regime in Canada at its early 
years, its recognition has grown over time. From the 2000 and on, ATI is more associated with 
the notions of transparency and open government. At this period, attempts to change the law are 
intensified and there is recognition that ATI and government transparency go hand in hand 
together. Some of the bills introduced (by Bryden, Reid, Martin and Trudeau) after the 2000s go 
even further in proposing to change the name of the Act from the ATIA to “Open government 
Act”. These developments demonstrate some level of maturity in understanding the issues 
related to the ATI regime, and trying to see ATI embedded in a much broader context. The 
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international advancements in ideas of open government, and the worldwide recognition of the 
role that government transparency plays in better governance, seems to have influenced the 
Canadian ATI proponents and part of its political class. Although attempts to modernize the 
ATIA have failed so far, the idea of open government is embraced. This trend opens up new 
perspectives in appreciating the potential of ATI in achieving government transparency goals.  
 
4.3 History of transparency and access to documents in the EU    
 
4.3.1 Roots of transparency and access to documents  
     Transparency in Europe has much deeper roots than in Canada. This is comprehensible 
considering Europe’s long history and experience with political institutions. It is well known for 
scholars of transparency that Sweden has the oldest access law in Europe and in the world, 
dating back to 1766356. The Freedom of the Press Act was largely motivated by the parliament's 
interest in information held by the King.357 It granted public access to government documents, 
and became an integral part of the Swedish Constitution. This is the first ever piece of FOI 
legislation in the world.  
 
     Transparency established its legitimacy in Europe during the second half of the eighteenth 
century. The Enlightenment challenged the authority of institutions that were deeply rooted in 
society. It was a time when cultural and intellectual forces in Western Europe emphasized 
reason, analysis, and individualism rather than traditional lines of authority. Representative 
governments began to emerge in Europe, and a discourse articulated around transparency was 
truly developed. Transparency began to transform from a concept to a political, legal and moral 
project. The 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man recognized an ATI in articles 14 and 
15. Article 14 stated: “All the citizens have a right to decide, either personally or by their 
representatives, as to the necessity of the public contribution; to grant this freely; to know to 
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what uses it is put.”358 A similar declaration adopted in Netherlands in 1795 stated that 
“everyone has the right to help to demand accountability from every Officer of public 
administration for the execution of his office.”359   
 
     The nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century signed a step back to 
Europe’s history on transparency. The period between 1815 and 1944 witnessed so many events 
that changed the face of Europe. To mention just a few, some of these developments include the 
Industrial Revolution, territorial claims, redefining of state boundaries, de-colonialism and many 
independence wars, two World Wars, the rise, clash and demise of empires (Ottoman, Prussian, 
Austro-Hungarian, etc) and ideologies (such as communism, capitalism, fascism, Nazism), and 
political unrest.  
 
     It was only after World War two that Europe achieved political stability. The European Coal 
and Steel Community360 began to unite European countries economically and politically. The six 
founders were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.361 In 1957, 
the Treaty of Rome created the European Economic Community (ECC).362 Neither of these 
founding treaties included any provisions on transparency. Transparency gained popular appeal 
within the European Community from the early 1990s when it was seen as a useful device to 
combat claims of democratic deficit and complexity in the operations of the ECC.363 However, 
on the state level, the situation was different. Sweden started a revolution of on ATI by 
modernizing its 1766 law in 1949364. Soon after, Finland followed with an autonomous 
regulation that was introduced in 1951, then Norway, Netherlands, and Austria passed legislation 
before the 90s.  
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4.3.2 EU integration and transparency – Pre-Regulation environment 
     In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the EU institutions were born out of a deep crisis of 
legitimacy that confronted the project of European integration.365 As a response to the crisis, the 
European Parliament (EP) was among the first of the EU institutions to attempt to put 
transparency on the political agenda. Curtin and Meijers argue that on two occasions (1984, 
1988), it called for “legislation on openness of government.”366 Despite these attempts, the 
principle of openness was only officially introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.367 
Declaration No 17 “On the Right of Access to Information”368 was attached to the Treaty with a 
view to “strengthening the democratic nature of the EU institutions and the public’s confidence 
in the administration.”369 Accordingly, it was recommended that the Commission submit to the 
Council a report on measures designed to improve public ATI available to the institutions. The 
Maastricht Treaty also signed the creation of an important EU institution, which would later 
become an advocate of transparency, the European Ombudsman. The Ombudsman can only 
make recommendations and, as a last resort, draw political attention to a case by making a 
special report to the EP. The effectiveness of the Ombudsman thus depends on moral authority.  
     Following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, a series of political developments compelled 
the European politicians into action in the field of transparency. The Danish voters rejected370 the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU)371 in the June 1992 referendum372 and a ratification vote in 
France, in September 1992, almost produced a second defeat.373 The process of ratification of the 
TEU by the UK Parliament was prolonged and difficult,374 while in Germany ratification was 
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delayed for a year by an unsuccessful court challenge that claimed that the delegation of 
authority to EU institutions violated guarantees of democratic government in the German Basic 
Law.375 In response to the Danish vote the EU promised in 1992 to “make the Community more 
open, to ensure a better informed public debate on its activities.”376  
     As the history demonstrates, at the EU level, the need for transparency came as a response to 
a prevailing culture of secrecy in European politics, and the democratic deficit whose criticism 
had become commonplace.377 As Héritier argues “The debate about transparency and access to 
information came about because of the perceived lack of transparency and openness in the 
complicated European decision-making processes.”378 A number of initiatives were taken to 
address the culture of secrecy. In the so-called Birmingham Declaration379 on “A Community 
closer to its citizens”, the Council engaged to more openness in the decision-making process. 
The Commission carried out a survey of national laws and practices. Subsequently, at the request 
of the European Ombudsman, other Community institutions and agencies introduced rules on 
access to documents (ATD).380  
     Pressure for transparency commitments increased in 1993 as negotiations for accession to the 
EU began with Sweden and Finland, two nations with strong traditions of governmental 
openness.381 On the basis of Declaration No 17, the Commission and the Council adopted a 
“Code of Conduct on Access to Documents”382, in which the two institutions committed 
themselves to providing “the widest possible access to documents”383 - the Council384 and the 
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Commission.385 Later, the EP established new detailed procedures for obtaining ATD.386 
However, they pledged to provide public ATD for their documents, but not to the documents 
they received from other institutions. These decisions acknowledged that the Code of Conduct 
should be adopted and lay down more specific and detailed rules on access.387 This move 
indicated that all three EU institutions were on the same page regarding their commitment to 
transparency and ATD.  
     The accession of Sweden and Finland in the EU in January 1995 added two voices for greater 
transparency.388 Harden argues that “The entry of Sweden and Finland to the European Union in 
1995 increased the pressure for greater transparency.”389 It is not accidental that with the 
accession of Sweden and Finland the debate on open decision-making in the EU gained 
momentum.390 The potential for an erosion of Sweden's historic commitment to open 
government had been a major issue during the Swedish national debate on accession.391 Both 
governments of Sweden and Finland added declarations to their accession agreements stating 
that access to official documents was a matter of “fundamental” importance.392 In addition, 
Netherlands and Denmark increasingly objected to the secrecy surrounding the Council of 
Ministers, and were dissatisfied with the steps which the Council had taken393 because “Meetings 
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of the Council were secretive and minutes were not published. The Commission was perceived 
as a distant and remote bureaucracy.’394 All four countries, Sweden, Finland, Netherlands and 
Denmark “formed an advocacy coalition pushing for more transparency”, and they were referred 
to as “the Gang of four.”395 Upon accession, this Gang sought strategic and diplomatic ways to 
facilitate the emergence of transparency using preferences and persuasive power derived from 
their long experience with transparency practices. They proactively shaped the agenda, giving 
more visibility to transparency, despite many Member States’ reluctance to increase 
transparency. The attitude among transparency-sceptic Member States was that “transparency 
and all that is for the birds, but if [the pro-transparent members] want it, they can have it.”396 
Indeed, the pro-transparency coalition faced little opposition. The former EU Ombudsman, Jacob 
Söderman, argued that advocates for openness were aided by the plasticity of the concept in the 
EU. The legal recognition of a right to information was regarded as a corollary of the concept of 
“European citizenship.”397 Therefore, the capacity of EU member states to resist calls for 
transparency  was restricted by their acknowledgement that citizens of member states were also 
“citizens of the Union.” According to Roberts, the situation was ripen in the EU for the 
recognition of the right to ATD because:  
Europhiles could use the legal recognition of such right as evidence that the European 
citizenship has become more than an abstraction. Pragmatists …could promote 
transparency as a device for maintaining [economic] accountability….And 
Europhobes…could support a right to information as a check on the power of the decision-
makers.398 
     Transparency in the EU advanced even more with the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty399 in 
1997 which acknowledged a right of ATD.400 It also embedded the right of ATD in the Article 
255 of the EC Treaty. This article called for an adoption of an implementing regulation within 
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two years of its entry into force which would give public ATD to the EP, the Commission and 
the Council.  
     It is important to mention that at the time of the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty, ten of 
fifteen Member States (see Table 5) had laws acknowledging a right of ATD.401 The Advocate 
General of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has observed a strong convergence in national 
laws402, which made agreement on a comparable policy for the EU institutions more probable. 
Roberts argued that the national attitudes towards transparency could be circumvented by the 
“availability of well-established procedures for delegated rule-making.”403 He noticed that the 
delegation of rule-making increased the chances for better transparency.  
     While preparing for the draft of the Regulation, pursuant to the Article 255 of the EC Treaty, 
the Commission proposed several provisions intended to limit ATD, such as the exclusion of 
texts for internal use, deliberations that could undermine the effective functioning of the Union 
or ‘authorship rule’. In January 2001, the negotiations entered the last months before the official 
deadline laid down in the Amsterdam Treaty. The pro-transparency coalition occupied a 
relatively powerful position. Harden explains that “Sweden held the presidency, while the EP, 
the media and civil society were on its side, pressurizing negotiating parties to honor the 
commitment made in the Treaty.”404 In addition, the European Ombudsman and some national 
governments criticized the breadth and vagueness of the new exemptions.405 As a result, most of 
the exclusions were eliminated. Regulation 1049/2001406 was passed slightly after the deadline, 
on 30 May 2001.407 The Regulation was preceded by 18 months of complicated negotiations.  
     Since the early 1990s, the EU institutions had started to develop independent transparency 
approaches, which included both formal rules and soft approaches. According to Bignami, it 
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took almost ten years to decide on Regulation 1049 “after a long, bitter set of negotiations”408 
which marked a substantial enhancement of the right of ATD held by the EU institutions. After 
the adoption of the Regulation 1049, all three EU institutions adopted their Rules of 
Procedures409 according to the provisions of the Regulation.  
     At the same time that negotiations on the Regulation 1049 were taking place, The EU’s 
history marked another milestone, the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union.410 Article 42 of the Charter provides that the right of ATD belongs to any EU 
citizen or resident. This makes ATD a fundamental Treaty right (pending the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty) since the TEU recognizes this status for all Charter rights411. The Charter 
represented an explicit attempt to elaborate upon the implications of European citizenship412 
which included the recognition of the ATD.   
 
     4.3.3 Post-Regulation environment 
     By enacting Regulation 1049, the EP and the Council had implemented the provisions of 
Article 255 of the EC Treaty. The legal basis did not extend to other institutions and bodies other 
than the EP, the Commission and the Council. Considering this as a weakness, the Council made 
the executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community 
programs subject to Regulation 1049.413 Prior to that, the EP, the Commission and the Council 
adopted a Joint Declaration414 in which they undertook to make the regulation applicable to 
agencies and similar bodies, and appealed to the other institutions and bodies to adopt similar 
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rules voluntarily. Many institutions and bodies modified their internal rules to include the same 
elements as Regulation 1049. For instance, the European Central Bank (ECB), adopted a 
Decision on public access to ECB documents.415 In addition, the Commission adopted a White 
Paper on Governance which initiated a second stage in the evolution of openness416 because it 
placed “openness” alongside other “principles of good governance” (Article II), such as 
accountability and participation.  
     The EU was faced with another challenge when the French and Dutch rejected the proposed 
European Constitution417 in hotly contested referenda in 2005.418 The rejection demonstrated that 
the so-debated “democratic deficit” was deepened, meaning that the disconnection between the 
EU and its citizens had grown. As it was the case previously, the European Commission turned 
to accountability measures for relief. Thus, discussions on transparency in decision-making 
assumed greater salience. In March 2005, the EU Commission proposed the European 
Transparency Initiative (ETI) trying to address issues of lobbying and transparency in the EU 
decision-making. A Green Paper consultation on ETI was launched in May 2005 to discuss a 
reporting system that would apply to the Commission, EP and Council, and be easily accessed 
online by the public. The Green Paper began by stating that “The Commission believes that high 
standards of transparency are part of the legitimacy of any modern administration.”419 The ETI 
communication was published in March 2007 and the Commission announced a voluntary 
lobbying register in 2008.420  
     The recognition of ATD as a fundamental right in the EU was finally sanctioned by the 
Lisbon Treaty.421 This treaty placed a new emphasis on transparency. Transparency was 
                                                          
415 European Central Bank, Decision of the European Central Bank of 4 March 2004 on public access to European 
Central Bank documents (ECB/2004/3) (2004/258/EC), OJ L 80/42, 18.03.2004. 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/l_08020040318en00420044.pdf 
416 White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001) 0428 final, OJ C 287, 12.10.2001. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52001DC0428 
417 See: A Constitution for Europe, http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/introduction_en.htm 
418 Lionel Beehner, European Union: The French & Dutch Referendums, Council on Foreign Relations, June 1, 
2005. http://www.cfr.org/france/european-union-french-dutch-referendums/p8148 
419 Europa. (2012a). Green Paper: The European Transparency Initiative. Retrieved March 2, 2012, from 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/eti/docs/gp_en.pdf 
420Alter-EU, The European Transparency Initiative and ALTER-EU. http://alter-eu.org/about/coalition 
421 Treaty of Lisbon, 13.12.2007, OJ C 306 of 17.12.2007. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=uriserv:xy0026 
See also: P. Birkinshaw, “Transparency and Access to Documents” in P. Birkinshaw & M. Varney (eds), The 
European Union Legal Order after Lisbon, (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2010), at 252. 
107 
 
considered ancillary both to representative and participatory democracy (articles 10(3) and 11(2) 
TEU) and was, as such, at the democratic foundations of the Union. In addition, Article 15 of the 
TEU established that “in order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil 
society, the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as 
possible”, and reiterated that “any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing 
or having its registered office in a member state, shall have a right of access to documents of the 
Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever their medium.”. This recognition 
gave the right of ATD a new dimension. Not only it was considered a fundamental human right, 
but it stood at the core of the principles of good governance and participatory democracy.  
     As part of its ETI, the Commission also started a review of Regulation 1049, and adopted a 
proposal for a new regulation in April 2008.422 The purpose was at achieving more transparency 
in legislation, and bringing the EU provisions into alignment with the Århus Convention.423 The 
proposal triggered an intense debate amongst the EU institutions and advocates since it was 
considered controversial, and became mired in what had been referred to an “an institutional 
impasse.”424 The EP opposed the choice of a recast procedure of the regulation as well as some 
other amendments. It decided not to adopt a legislative resolution, as it considered that the 
dossier should be referred to the next parliamentary term. Hence, there was no formal position of 
the EP at first reading. Some of the most controversial issues of the proposal concerned: the 
definition of a ‘document’ [Article 3(a)] and the scope of application [Article 2(5),(6)]; the 
exception of legal advice provided by the legal services of the EU institutions [Article 4(2c)]; 
relation between the right of ATD and the right to personal data protection [Article 4(5)]; and 
Members States’ documents and Member States’ rights to restrict access [Article 5(2)].425   
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     There has been some controversy over the proposed regulation and an ongoing disagreement 
between the Council and the EP.  The latter has sought to make changes increasing rights of 
access, and the Council blocked them. Being “far from a ‘marginal’ political dossier,” the recast 
of Regulation 1049 had attracted considerable political attention.426 With the coming into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, a central objective of the ongoing revision procedure had become 
to align the regulation with its requirements.427 Some Member States used this process to re-
evaluate the status quo, and to advocate a revised law that gives greater weight to other values, 
such as privacy and effective decision making. A Council minority, led by Sweden, did not 
tolerate a reform outcome that “rolled back” the existing arrangements.428 With two groups of 
Member States advocating change in opposite directions, the process stagnated, and eventually 
led to a deadlock. Pending resolution of this matter, the Commission published an interim 
proposal in March 2011 to extend the scope of the Regulation to cover a range of other EU 
institutions.429 This was the last action taken regarding the proposal. Regulation 1049/2001 is 
still under review.  
     To make the citizen’s rights of ATD as effective as possible, the EU institutions obliged to 
provide public access in electronic form to a register of documents. The EP established a public 
register of EP documents in 1996, the Council launched such register in 1998430, and the EU 
Commission in 2008. In the course of the ETI both, the European Commission and the EP, 
emphasized the possibility of a common register for all three European institutions. 
Consequently, an inter-institutional working group between the Commission and the EP was 
formed at the end of 2008 to prepare a joint register.431 After a long period of negotiations, a 
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compromise was found, so that an inter-institutional agreement was signed on 23 June 2011, 
which was also the starting point of the common “Transparency Register”432. This is a voluntary 
system, where individuals and organizations can register and then automatically sign a code of 
conduct. The goal is to improve citizen participation practices, and monitor organizations and 
individuals engaged in the EU policy making and implementation.433 Building upon the existing 
registration systems, the Transparency Register provides citizens with a “one-stop shop” to help 
them exercise their right to know.434 The Register enables the registrants to commit themselves 
to provide accurate and updated information on the entity they represent.435 However, the 
voluntary nature of the Register has drawn considerable criticism as being ineffective and 
providing only selective information. 
     The right of ATD of the EU citizens was enhanced by the introduction of the European 
Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) expanding the scope of participation rights.436 ECI’s legal basis is 
found at the Article 11(4) TEU.437 This initiative was adopted by the EP and the Council on 
February 16, 2011. It allows EU citizens to participate directly in the development of EU policies 
by calling on the European Commission to draft legislative proposals. Alemmano referred to ECI 
as the first transnational, direct democratic tool in history that clearly provides civil society with 
a new venue of access to EU action.438 
     It is evident that the EU institutions have played a major role on the establishment, 
development and consolidation of a transparency principle and a right of ATD in the EU. 
Roberts argued that three institutions are important to the building of the EU’s architecture of 
transparency: the Parliament, the Office of the Ombudsman (EO), and the CJEU.439 However, 
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they have been part of a larger coalition that has pushed for institutional and policy changes on 
openness and transparency. I will scrutinize the role of the EO and the CJEU in the next 
chapters. Three EU institutions have been important in the debates around transparency in the 
EU – all subjects to the Regulation 1049 - the EP, the Council and the Commission.  
     The EP has been from the start, one of the main catalysts for transparency, emphasizing the 
need for transparency in addressing the “democratic deficit”. The authority of the Parliament has 
grown substantially after the adoption of the TEU and Amsterdam Treaty. As important as the 
growth in formal powers has been the emergence of an institutional culture that emphasizes 
Parliament's role as a counterweight440 or a “watchdog” over the Council and the Commission.441 
The EP has lobbied for the introduction of legal safeguards on transparency for years. Indeed, the 
debate on lobbying and transparency began in the EP in 1989442 with a regulation of financial 
interests of Members of the EP.  In 1991, the EP introduced a proposal for a code of conduct, 
which failed.443 It re-introduced it again three years later, and finally established a code of 
conduct and a voluntary lobbyist register in 1996, which got a de facto mandatory character later 
on.444 The Council and the Commission followed suit.  
     The European Council has traditionally been “cloaked in secrecy.”445 However, the crisis of 
legitimacy in the early 90s and the co-decision procedure played a role in changing this tradition. 
The “Declaration on the Right of Access to Information” (annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht in 
1992) was the first explicit link between transparency and democracy on the part of the European 
Council. Maastricht introduced the co-decision procedure, according to which the EP and the 
Council shared the responsibility of lawmaking in the EU. The co-decision meant that the 
Council was bound in its decisions by the position of the EP which was a proponent of 
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transparency. In an attempt to respond to the concerns raised in the Danish rejection of 
Maastricht 446 , the European Council re-iterated its dedication to ensure a better informed public 
debate on EC activities. However, a more serious attempt on acknowledging and addressing a  
“democratic deficit” in the EU was only made in 2005. The Council announced that it would 
open its meetings to a wider audience on all the issues that were decided under the co-decision 
procedure. This move was criticized by the European Ombudsman, who urged the Council to 
open its doors to all meetings that deal with concrete policy measures.447  
     The recast of the Regulation 1049, marked a step backwards in the Council’s attitude towards 
transparency. The Council was criticized of restricting the right of the ATD while the EP tried to 
block its proposal. The recast procedure revealed a strong opposition on transparency between 
the EP and the Council, which is to date keeping the Regulation at a stalemate. The EU treaties 
altered at some degree the legal and political parameters of Council transparency policies448, 
however, the Council’s tolerance towards transparency is declining. A majority has formed in 
favor of a more conservative policy (supported by the UK, France), and opposed by the “Gang of 
Four” (Sweden, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands).449 This development shows that the initial 
usage of a language that brought forward the normative dimension of transparency has subsided 
to a more narrow conception of transparency. It demonstrates that the historical traditions on 
transparency, and institutional culture deeply affect transparency trajectories.   
     The European Commission’s initial position on transparency was similar to that of the 
Council. However, under the influence of the Treaty of Maastricht, the Commission seriously 
engaged with the Council in the formulation of the common Code of Conduct about 
transparency. Later on, in the 2000 Discussion Paper, the importance of transparency and a 
better information policy was underlined in order “to improve and strengthen the existing 
relationship between the Commission and the NGOs”450, with the purpose to foster participatory 
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democracy.451 In 2002, the Commission published a communication452 to “encourage more 
involvement of interested parties through a more transparent consultation process.”453 The ETI 
454 announced in 2005 by the Commissioner Kallas, introduced the “interest representation” with 
which the Commission eliminated the negative connotation of lobbyism and simultaneously 
broadened the participatory concept. Interest representation now includes all “activities carried 
out with the objective of influencing the policy formulation and decision-making processes of 
the European institutions.”455 These developments show a progress in the Commission’s position 
towards transparency. It has given special consideration to the issues of participatory rights and 
accountability, which stand at the core of the transparency principle.  
 
4.4 Comparisons and conclusions 
     Looking back at how transparency and the right of ATI/ATD have developed over the years 
in Canada and the EU, one can notice a few common themes, but also some differences. First, 
the introduction of an ATI/ATD legislation in both jurisdictions has originated in the provinces 
/members states, and was later picked by the federation/Union. By the time Canada introduced 
its ATIA, three other provinces (New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Quebec) had already done so. 
In the EU, before the adoption of Regulation 1049, nineteen of the countries which are now 
members on the EU, had previously passed laws on ATD. Therefore, one can argue that the right 
of ATI was born out of national aspirations and then travelled to the federal level. The public 
was already informed and somehow familiarized about the importance of such laws by the 
national experiences, achievements and failures on ATI systems. The terrain was already 
explored by the advocates to bring the discussions on ATI at the forefront of the political battles, 
and push for changes at federal/Union level. The national debates on ATI had broken the taboo 
of government secrecy and paved the way to the introduction of an ATI legislation beyond 
national/provincial borders. The national experiences seem to have facilitated the discussions and 
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prepared the terrain for a broader ATI system. This is the case especially at the EU, where 
national experiences of the Nordic countries played a crucial role in the shaping of an ambitious 
agenda about transparency and ATD. It is not accidental that with the accession of Sweden and 
Finland in the EU in 1995, the principle of transparency was further developed and the 
recognition of a right to ATD entered a new dimension.  
     Second, the developments in both jurisdictions demonstrate that the culture of the government 
and historical traditions have a major influence in approaches towards transparency. The 
introduction of an ATI legislation, but especially its implementation strongly relates to the 
institutional culture of those responsible for giving life to an ATI right. Pasquier and Villeneuve 
highlighted that cultures of transparency and secrecy are rooted in historical traditions and 
traditional state-society relations. Institutional rules result from historical trajectories456. In 
Canada, the history demonstrated a persistent culture of secrecy which has played a crucial role 
in the drafting of the law (changing it at the last phases), the designing of the legal requirements 
and coverage (leaving out many institutions), the implementation (constant undermining of the 
rights it upholds) and the improvements of the law (leaving the ATIA unchanged for more than 
three decades). The political system in Canada, which is rooted in the principle of ministerial 
responsibility, allows for little oversight on government actions. Especially in the case of a 
majority government, which occupies most of the seats in Parliament, the legislature transforms 
into a tool in the hands of the government of the day. Having no strong political opposition, and 
controlling two branches of the government (legislature and executive) with a strong party 
discipline, breeds a culture of secrecy.  As Savoie argued “The government of Canada has stood 
firm on the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, the anonymity of career officials, and the 
traditional bargain between politicians and career officials.”457  
     In the EU, the situation is more complicated since there is a mix of political cultures and 
traditions. The introduction of Regulation 1049 confirmed the existence of such diversity and 
revealed a clash of political cultures between member states. The approach adopted in 
Regulation 1049 corresponded to the Nordic concept of public ATD. A coalition of Nordic 
countries, the so-called “Gang of four”, made ATD one of the conditions for their accession in 
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the EU, and pushed strongly for it after the accession, bringing with them their home traditions 
of transparent government. Some scholars spoke about a demarcation between the “protestant 
North” – Nordic countries with strong traditions of governmental openness – and the “Catholic 
South” – nations with étatist political cultures in which political executives and bureaucrats are 
accustomed to greater power and secrecy.458 A survey conducted by Statewatch459 in 2000 
looked at the refusals of the EU governments to give ATD. The survey showed a clear divide: 
Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Luxembourg and Greece consistently 
opposed the release of EU documents, while Denmark, Sweden and Finland have consistently 
supported access on appeal. Three other member states, Netherlands, UK and Ireland have 
supported them in some appeals. As the survey determined there was a clear split between the 
EU countries on their approach to ATD. However, this diversity created a positive atmosphere 
for a healthy discourse on transparency and led to the incorporation of transparency rules in 
treaty provisions. 
   Third, circumstances were important for the timing of the ATI legislation in both jurisdictions. 
This means that the debates on ATI emerged and developed as a result of other forces outside the 
government, and not because of government inspired policies. The reasons for adopting an ATI 
law at a specific point in time are related to both national and international developments. In 
Canada at the time that the idea of ATI was emerging, there were many social movements 
dominating the Canadian political arena, all raising concerns about the workings of the 
government and demanding participatory rights. The ATIA was a promise made at an electoral 
campaign, which meant it had a highly political connotation. In addition, when the debate on 
ATI was heating, there was a similar bill adopted in the US, and later in Australia and New 
Zealand. The Canadian ATIA was strongly influenced by the introduction of a FOIA in the 
neighboring country, and other countries in the Commonwealth. Some scholars attribute ATIA’s 
success to the American influence, among other things.  
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     In the EU, the timing was very important for an elaboration of the principle of transparency 
and the establishment of a right of ATD. Transparency and ATD in the EU were born out of a 
serious crisis of legitimacy. The EU was initially established as an elitist project, with six 
powerful countries deciding to join an economic partnership. For many years, the European 
integration failed to raise the basic question of its policy legitimacy. Popular resistance to 
integration was often expressed as a complaint about the secretiveness of the EU institutions. To 
address this culture of secrecy the Maastricht Treaty emphasized transparency as an important 
value.460 Persistent claims of a democratic deficit in the EU, fueled by the initial rejection of the 
Maastricht Treaty in the 90's and of the European Constitution in 2005, placed the goal of 
increasing transparency on top of the EU agenda as a solution to the “democratic deficit” 
problem. Subsequent treaty provisions (such as Amsterdam and Lisbon), Charter status 
recognition, and Regulation 1049 were a response to the EU crisis of legitimacy.  
     Fourth, there is recognition for a need to change the legal framework on transparency and 
ATI, but political compromise seems impossible in both jurisdictions. This means that beside the 
recognition of a right of ATI, it still remains a highly contested area which heavily depends on 
government politics. Both the ATIA and Regulation 1049 have been lingering for years in 
government offices or parliamentary Committees without any success. However, the situation is 
worse in Canada which had problems with the law from the beginning. Proposal for change were 
made for the ATIA soon after its adoption. From 1982, the year the ATIA was passed, it has not 
changed significantly. There have been numerous parliamentary studies and reports analyzing 
the ATIA and its requirements, all of which have reached the same conclusion: the law is 
outdated and badly in need of an overhaul. Unfortunately, all of these calls for reform have been 
ignored by federal administrations. Indeed, apart from a few minor changes, some of which 
actually served to further limit the disclosures required by the ATIA, the law remains very similar 
to what it was 30 years ago.  
     Regarding Regulation 1049, proposals for change started in 2008, soon after the adoption of 
the Lisbon Treaty to align the Regulation with the Treaty requirements. Strong positions between 
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the EP and the Council have caused stagnation in legislative advancements. The recast procedure 
of the Regulation is stuck in a political deadlock with no progress for almost ten years with a 
highly polarized political environment. On the one side, the EP advocates for more transparency, 
and on the other side, the Council and the Commision ask for sacrifices on the right of ATD in 
favour of other rights (such as data protection).  
     Fifth, while paying attention to the language used in the debates that preceded, accompanied, 
and followed the introduction of the ATI laws in Canada and the EU, I notice some differences. 
First, in Canada, the terms “transparency” and “openness” have been somehow foreign to the 
legal framework on ATI. The discussions at the initial phase of the ATIA’s adoption, and later in 
the proposals for amendments, seem to have bypassed transparency as a notion and as a 
principle. Only after 2000, transparency and openness appear in the debates of ATI proponents in 
Canada. The ICC Reid and some of the private Member bills (Bryden, Martin and Trudeau) have 
included transparency in the language of their proposed ATIA. The transparency vocabulary was 
then picked up by the government which in 2011 announced its commitment to transparency and 
openness. Part of this commitment was the OGP membership.  
     At the EU, the discourse on ATI was more focused on transparency as a value, and as a 
panacea in addressing the democratic deficit. The need for transparency came as response to a 
prevailing culture of secrecy in European politics. However, there has been a shift in the politics 
of transparency in the EU. From an internally regulated “transparency as communication”,461 the 
policy has shifted in the direction of “transparency as access”462, as enforced not only by the pro-
transparent Member States, but also by external actors, such as the EP, the CJEU and the EO. 
This is the second difference between the Canadian and the European framework - transparency 
is closely related to the right of ATD. This right is viewed as a way of connecting the citizens 
and the EU institutions and a means of stimulating a more informed and involved debate on 
European policy. Therefore, because of the importance of the right of ATD, it gradually gained a 
constitutional status. Hence, at the EU we have a fundamental right discourse, which is not 
existent in the Canadian legal debates. In Canada, the debate is still focused on ATI as a means 
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to ensure information, and not as a right worth of Charter protection. This difference is my 
preoccupation throughout this project. 
     Sixth, another difference noticed in the historical development of ATI relates to the different 
actors engaged in the deliberations and decision-making. While government institutions in both 
jurisdictions have initially been hostile towards the idea of transparency, the Canadian 
counterparts have been more persistent in their opposition. The executive branch of the Canadian 
government has been more inclined to resist openness and transparency. In fact, the adoption of 
the ATIA was the result of decades of discussion and attempts, going back to 1960s, when a 
private member’s bill seeking to recognize the public’s right to access government records was 
read for the first time. This bill provided the catalyst for further passionate debates that led to 
other persistent attempts in a span of twenty years to the adoption of the ATIA. All those Bills 
were private members bills, which means the Parliament of Canada was amongst the early 
advocates who prepared the ground and pushed for the adoption of the ATIA. Later, reports from 
the Standing Committee of Ethics were supportive of statutory changes. In 2004 a new 
Parliamentary Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics was formed and held 
hearings. In 2006, the Commission investigating the “sponsorship scandal” also recommended 
many changes based on the ICCs recommendations.463 However, changes in the ATIA have not 
been substantial because of the opposition of the government of the day. One can say that the 
right of ATI emerged and developed as an outsider of the government. It only made it to the 
political agenda, not because the government was fond of the idea - it only came as an electoral 
promise and the perseverance of the MPs and other actors. I would label the Canadian approach 
to ATI a bottom-up approach.  
     In the EU, the situation looks a bit different. Although the EU institutions have been accused 
for acting in secrecy, debates around transparency and ATD seems to have engaged them 
actively. All three main institutions in the EU have been preoccupied with addressing the 
democratic deficit in the EU, and have compromised to promote transparency and ATD as a 
mean to solve legitimacy problems. This does not mean that all three institution were active 
supporters of the idea of transparency, but they recognized its necessity and value for the 
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realization of the EU project – the EU integration. Three EU treaties altered the legal and 
political parameters of Council transparency policies464, the Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Lisbon. 
Frequent treaty amendment processes can be regarded as a type of institutional catalyst. 
Changing institutional structures in the EU meant that the Council in its internal negotiations 
increasingly had to anticipate the preferences of other institutions.  
     Just like in Canada, the EP has played the most important role to uphold, promote and expand 
a right of ATD in the EU. The strengthened role of the EP that resulted from the Maastricht and 
the Amsterdam Treaties meant that it could increasingly exert political pressure on the Council. 
During the negotiations leading up to Regulation 1049, the EP for the first time acted as a co-
legislator with direct influence on the Council’s internal transparency rules. Again, the EP’s role 
was evident in the recast procedure of Regulation 1049. The Commission proposed several 
provisions intended to limit the right of ATD, but was faced with the opposition of the EP, and 
other supporters. In the EU, attempts to limit ATD were unsuccessful due to the persistence from 
EU institutions, national government and NGOs. Such opposition was weak or absent in Canada. 
     Below are the two tables that provide dates regarding ATI legislation enactment in Canada 
and the EU in both provincial/Member states and federal/Union level. 
 
Table 1: Canadian statutes on ATI/FOI at the federal and provincial level.  
Jurisdiction  Name of statutes  Dates  
Federal  Access to Information Act /  
Privacy Act  
1983 /  
1983 
1.Alberta  Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act/  
Personal Information Protection Act  
1996 /  
2003  
2.British 
Columbia 
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act/  
Personal Information Protection Act  
1993 /  
2003  
3.Manitoba Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act 1997 
4.New Brunswick Right to Information Act /  1978 /  
                                                          
464 Maiani, Pasquier & Villeneuve, “Less Is More”, supra note 426.  
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Protection of Personal Information Act  1998 
5.Newfoundland 
and Labrador  
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act 2002  
6.Northwest 
Territories 
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act 1994 
7.Nova Scotia  Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act 1977, 1993 
8.Nunavut Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act  1994 
9.Ontario  Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act 1988 
10.Quebec Act Respecting Access to Documents Held by Public 
Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information  
1982 
11.Saskatchewan Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act 2002 
12.Yukon 
Territory 
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act 1996 
13.Prince Eduard 
Island  
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act  2001 
Source : Table drawn by the author with information from the Department of Justice 
http://justice.gc.ca/eng/trans/atip-aiprp/provincial.html, Right2Info. http://www.right2info.org/laws/#section-13 and 
websites from the Access to Information and Privacy Commissioners. 
 
Table 2: The EU and the Member State legislation on ATI/FOI  
Jurisdiction  Name of legislation  Dates  
EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights  
Regulation 1049  
Data Protection Regulation 
 
2001 /  
1995 
1. Austria  
(member 1995465) 
Federal Law on the Duty to Furnish Information  /  
Data Protection Act  
1987 /  
2000 
2. Belgium  
(member 1958) 
Constitution  
1994, 2000/  
                                                          
465 Note that the information about accession dates is drawn from: European Union, EU member countries. 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/ 
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Law on the right of access to administrative documents 
held by federal Public Authorities  
Act on the Protection of Privacy in Relation to the 
Processing of Personal Data  
1992, 1998 
3. Bulgaria  
(member 2007) 
Constitution 
Access to Public Information Act /  
Personal Data Protection Act  
 
2000/ 
2002, 2006 
4. Croatia 
(member 2013) 
Constitution 
Act of the Right of Access to Information  
2003, 2013 
5. Cyprus  
(member 2004) 
 
Draft Bill on Access to Information 
2013 
6. Czech 
Republic  
(member 2004) 
Charter of the Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 
Law on Free Access to Information / 
On Protection of Personal Data  
 
1999 / 
2000 
7. Denmark  
(member 1973) 
Access to Public Administration Files  
Act on Processing on Personal Data  
1985 / 
2000 
8. Estonia  
(member 2004) 
Constitution  
Public Information Act / 
Protection Data Protection Act 
 
2000/ 
2007 
9. Finland  
(member 1995) 
Constitution  
Act on the Openness of Government Activities / 
Personal Data Act  
 
1951,1999/ 
1999 
10. France  
(member 1958) 
Law on Access to Administrative Documents / 
Data Protection Act  
1978 /  
1978 
11. Germany 
(member 1958) 
Federal Freedom of Information Act  2005 
12. Greece 
(member 1981) 
Constitution 
Law regulating the relationship between state and 
citizens 
Law on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data 
1986/ 
1997 
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13. Hungary  
(member 2004) 
Constitution  
Act on the Freedom of Information by Electronic Means 
Act on the Protection of Personal Data and the Publicity 
of Data of Public Interest 
2005 / 
1992 
14. Ireland 
(member 1973) 
Freedom of Information Act    
Data Protection Act 
1997/ 
1998 
15. Italy  
(member 1958) 
Law on Access to Administrative Documents / 
Data Protection Act  
1990 / 
1996 
16. Latvia 
(member 2004) 
Constitution 
Law on Freedom of Information  
Personal Data Protection Law  
 
1998 / 
2000 
17. Lithuania  
(member 2004) 
Constitution 
Law on Provision of Information to the Public / 
The Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data  
 
1996, 2000/ 
2003 
18. Luxembourg 
(member 1958) 
Draft Law on Access to Information 1999-2000 
19. Malta 
(member 2004) 
Freedom of Information Act 2008 
20. Netherlands 
(member 1958) 
Constitution  
Act on Public Access to Government Information  
Personal Data Protection Act  
 
1978 / 
2000 
21. Poland  
(member 2004) 
Constitution 
Law on Access to Public Information  
Act on the Protection of Personal Data  
 
2001 / 
1997 
22. Portugal  
(member 1986) 
Constitution 
Law of Access to Administrative Documents 
Act on the Protection of Personal Data  
 
1993 
1998 
23. Romania 
(member 2007) 
Constitution 
The Law Regarding the Free Access to the Information 
of Public Interest 
 
2001 
 
2001 
122 
 
Law for the Protection of Persons Concerning the 
Processing of Personal Data and Free Circulation of 
Such Data  
24. Slovakia 
(member 2004) 
Constitution 
Act on Free Access to Information / 
Act on Personal Data Protection 
 
2000 
2002 
25. Slovenia 
(member 2004) 
Act of Access to Information on Public Character /  
Personal Data Protection Act  
2005 
2004 
26. Spain 
(member 1986) 
Constitution  
Law on Transparency, Access to Information and Good 
Governance 
Law on the Protection of Personal Data  
 
2013 
 
1999 
27. Sweden  
(member 1995) 
Constitution 
Freedom of the Press Act,  
Personal Data Act  
 
1949, 1999 
1998 
28. The UK  
(member 1973) 
Freedom of Information Act / 
Data Protection Act   
2000 / 
1998 
Source: Table drawn by the author with information from the ‘Global Network of Freedom of Information 
Advocates, <http://www.freedominfo.org/regions/europe/united-kingdom/>, Legislation on line. 
http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/53/topic/3, Right2Info http://www.right2info.org/laws/#section-13, 
and websites from the Member States.  
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CHAPTER 5: LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS TO 
INFORMATION  
 
     It is essential to analyze the access to information laws in Canada and the EU to understand 
their purpose, requirements, principles and exemptions. Legal provisions have direct 
consequences on the application of a right to ATI in practice. Many scholars have argued that 
while the law itself does not fully determine the availability of information, access laws are 
nonetheless an important contributor to transparency. Kasuya provides a comparison - having a 
legal guarantee to ATD is analogous to installing a fire alarm. The device’s usefulness is only 
realized when there is a fire. At normal times, the value of the fire alarms is not noticed, so as the 
transparency instruments.466 Therefore, the study of  ATI could not be complete without the  
assessment of the law itself. 
 
     Both Canada and the EU have passed legislation to protect the right of ATI. This chapter 
explores the law passed in both jurisdictions with a special attention to the implications of the 
principles they endorse, and the place they hold in the hierarchy of a broader legal framework. It 
also looks at two case studies, one in each jurisdiction, namely Ontario as one of the provinces in 
Canada, and Albania as one of the prospective members in the EU. These case studies are chosen 
because of their contrast in legal provisions with the constituency to which they belong. 
National-federal contrasts on ATI legal requirements demonstrate the dynamics of ATI rights 
and the factors that contribute to those dynamics. I look especially at the purposive sections of 
the acts in the two jurisdictions and case studies to understand what they imply, what the 
connection is between ATI and broader principles like transparency and openness, what they say 
about the intentions of the legislatures and inspirations of the acts, and what are the shortcomings 
of legal requirements.  
     Before exploring ATI laws in the jurisdictions of study, I first have a look at the international 
legal framework on transparency and ATI. The purpose is to understand the international status 
                                                          
466 Yuko Kasuya, “Democracy and Transparency: Enacting the Freedom of Information Acts around the World”, 
Paper prepared for delivery at the International Transparency Conference, June 10-12, 2012, Utrecht, the 
Netherlands, at 7. 
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of the right of ATI and the principles that guarantee such status, and study how Canada and the 
EU are upholding international obligations.   
 
5.1 International legal framework on transparency and access to information 
     Internationally, ATI is considered a fundamental human right. Many countries in the world 
explicitly protect ATI in their constitutions.467 According to Darbishire, 89 of the world’s 98 ATI 
laws recognize that the right may be exercised by “everyone”.468 However, there are countries 
that limit this right to citizens and residents only, such as Canada, Malta, and Turkey.469 
     Under the UN legal framework the right of ATI is protected as part of the wider right of 
freedom of expression. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights470 recognizes the 
freedom of expression and the right to information in article 19. This article identifies ATI as the 
right “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers.” Similarly, the International Covenant on the Civil and Political Rights471 (ICCPR) in 
paragraph 2 of article 19 recognizes the right to information as freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds and by any means, but with limitations for privacy and 
national security. Canada signed the International Covenant on the Civil and Political Rights in 
1976, while Albania did so in 1991472.  
     The UN Human Rights Committee has specifically confirmed473 that ATI is part of an 
obligation which falls upon: all branches of the State (executive, legislative and judicial) and 
other public or governmental authorities, at whatever level that– national, regional or local – are 
                                                          
467 See Right2Info, Constitutional Protection of the Right to Information. <http://www.right2info.org/constitutional-
protections-of-the-right-to>. According to it 59 countries include a right to ATI in their constitutions. 
468 Helen Darbishire, “Is Transparency Working”, In Tarlach McGonagle and Yvonne Donders, Ten Challenges for 
the Right to Information in the Era of Mega-Leaks (ed.). Chapter prepared for and published in:  The United Nations 
and Freedom of Expression and Information Critical Perspectives, June 2015 at 13. 
469 Global Right to Information Rating, ‘Country data’, <http://www.rti-rating.org/country-data>. Even Malta and 
Turkey allow for some limited rights for non-citizens.  
470 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly Resolution 217A, 10 December, 
1948. <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf>. 
471 Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI), 16 December, 1966. 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx>. 
472 Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Status of Ratification’, <http://indicators.ohchr.org/> 
473 Committee’s general comment No. 31 (2004) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States 
parties to the Covenant, para. 4, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 40, 
vol. I (A/59/40 (Vol. I)), annex III 
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in a position to engage the responsibility of the State party.474 In 1999, the UN Human Rights 
Committee expressed the view in Gauthier v Canada that Article 19, read together with Article 
25475 of the ICCPR “implies that citizens, in particular through the media, shall have wide access 
to information and the opportunity to disseminate information and opinions about the activities 
of elected bodies and their members.”476 
     The UN framework conceptualizes ATI as a right to exchange ideas, not simply information, 
which is a much broader understanding. This conception gives the right of ATI another 
dimension, beyond the traditional legal understanding. This dimension of ATI is elaborated in 
the Habermas discursive theory of law, and to a certain degree in the Pateman’s theory of 
participatory democracy. I expand on this conception of ATI because it provides strong 
arguments to consider ATI a fundamental human right.  
 
     Part of the UN legal framework on ATI is also the so-called Aarhus Convention.477 It 
prescribes the sharing and free public access to environmental information amongst 47 parties478 
in Europe and Central Asia. Most of the 46 signatory countries in this Convention fulfill their 
Aarhus obligations through national FOI laws. Albania ratified the Convention on 27 June 2001, 
and the EU ratified it on 17 February 2005479. Yet, there is no North American equivalent to such 
a treaty, so Canada is not a Convention party.  
 
     Internationally, the process of consecration of ATI as a fundamental right culminated in the 
Convention on Access to Official Documents480. This Convention, adopted by the Council of 
                                                          
474 UN Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 34, 12 September 2011, CCPR/C/GC/34, para. 7.   
475 This article states: ‘Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions 
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:  
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;  
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall 
be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;  
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.’ 
476 Gauthier v Canada (633/1995), Merits, CCPR/C/65/D633/1995 (1999).  
477 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), Convention on Access to Informormation, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 25 June 1998.  
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf 
478 UNECE, ‘Parties to the Aarhus Convention and their dates of ratification’. 
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/aarhus/map.html 
479 Ibid.  
480 Council of Europe, Convention on Access to Official Documents, CETS No. 205, 18.06.2009. 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680084826 
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Europe, represents the first internationally binding instrument recognizing a general right of 
access to official documents held by public authorities. The Convention sets forth the minimum 
standards to be applied in the processing of requests for access to official documents. It provides 
in Article 2, that parties shall “guarantee the right of everyone, without discrimination on any 
ground, to have access, on request to official documents held by public authorities.” None of the 
countries in study has signed or ratified this Convention. However, Robert Marleau, then-ICC 
supported the Convention by saying that it “is an important initiative aimed at developing an 
international treaty on the right to information.”481  
5.2 The Canadian legal framework on transparency and access to information  
     In Canada, there is no specific legislation that deals with transparency, but separate provisions 
directly or indirectly linked with transparency can be traced in many laws, especially those that 
regulate the functioning of government bodies. In 2006, the Parliament passed the Federal 
Accountability Act (FAA)482 that deals among others with “conflict of interest rules, restrictions 
on election financing and measures respecting administrative transparency, oversight and 
accountability.”483 FAA is important because not only is an attempt to keep the government 
accountable, but also because it amended some parts of the ATIA in a significant way.  
 
     Another statute, the Canada Evidence Act484 (CEA) limits the application of the ATIA since it 
constitutes the statutory means for safeguarding Cabinet confidentiality. CEA enables the 
Cabinet to establish a regime which prevents the disclosure of information consisting of 
confidences of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada. Section 39 of CEA sets out a definition of 
“a confidence” and outlines a list of documents that can be considered as such.  
      
                                                          
481 Information Commissioner supports the Council of Europe's Convention on Access to Official Documents, 
Ottawa, November 25, 2008 http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/rtk-mov_mov-rtk_int-eff_eff-int-2008-
information_commissioner_supports_the_council_of_europes_convention_on_access_to_official_documents.aspx 
482 FAA, supra note 326.  
483 This is actually the long title of the FAA  
484 Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-5. [CEA] 
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     As mentioned in Chapter 4, the ATIA was passed in 1982, and entered into force a year later. 
Before looking closer to the ATIA’s provisions, I first look at the Canadian Charter to see what 
kind of protection it offers, and the status it confers to ATI.   
5.2.1 Charter status of the right of access to information in Canada 
     ATI is a statutory right in the Canadian legal framework. In the Charter there is no provision 
for ATI. Although, the ATIA and the Charter were passed at the same year, in 1982, ATI did not 
become part of the fundamental freedoms of Canadians. Article 2, “Fundamental Freedoms” of 
the Charter includes freedom of opinion and expression and freedom of the press, but not ATI. 
The lack of this status makes a difference on the treatment of this right. Charter rights have a 
very special status in Canada’s legal and political traditions. The notion of fundamental rights 
carries relevant democratic implications. They are strongly protected and cannot be 
compromised by the preferences of the government of the day. The ATIA is a piece of federal 
legislation, which may be repealed or revised by a simple majority vote in the federal House of 
Commons, to improve or limit the right it confers. If ATI were to be a Charter right, it would 
establish uniform application of some common rules to all levels of government in Canada. Also, 
the ATIA is administered quite differently from the Charter. Whereas complaints of violations 
of Charter rights are adjudicated strictly through Canada’s court system, the ATIA complaints are 
generally dealt first through the ICC.  
     There are important consequences from treating a social value – as ATI is often considered - 
as a human right. First, the fundamental nature of the right requires a strict interpretation of any 
limitation to the exercise of that right. Secondly, public authorities must subject any such 
limitation to a scrutiny of proportionality. The principle of proportionality requires that 
derogations remain within the limits of what is appropriate and necessary for achieving the aim 
in view. If a social value is accepted as a human right, it is also expected that some sacrifices will 
be made for the realisation of these rights to take place. Human rights take precedence over other 
issues. In the case of ATI, a human right status would allow sometimes that the government will 
be disadvantaged. For many other human rights, these sacrifices seem to be the rule. But “In 
stark contrast, in the area of access to information, the dominant approach in Canada is to deny 
requests if there is even a small risk that disclosure of the information may cause even minor 
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harm to a protected interest.”485 This approach puts into risk the whole ATI regime and makes 
access rights vulnerable and subject to the will of the government.  
      There are rights that have made their way to the Canadian Charter as a result of an 
interpretative enterprise exercised by the Courts. According to the “the living tree doctrine” the 
Canadian constitution is organic and must be read in a broad and progressive manner to adapt it 
to the changing times. This doctrine allows for legal stretching in interpreting the Charter rights 
by putting them in a broader social context beyond the legal realm. That has been the case with 
the social and economic rights, which were not explicitly included as rights in the Charter. 
However, the protection of social and economic rights is recognized as a component of other 
constitutional rights such as the right to equality (s.15) and the right to “life, liberty and security 
of the person” (s.7). It is up to the courts to provide such protection for those groups who most 
need protection, and have the most legitimate claims for judicial intervention on their behalf.  
     In addition, the Supreme Court has also emphasized that broadly framed Charter rights must 
be interpreted consistently with Canada’s international human rights commitments. While 
international human rights are not directly enforceable as law in Canada, the Court has 
emphasized that international human rights articulate the Charter values and rights, and that the 
reasonable exercise of conferred decision-making authority must conform to these values. 
     While the Charter does not confer constitutional status to ATI, there has been an attempt to 
push for constitutional protection of the right to ATI under section 2(b) of the Charter, but 
without success. In 2010, in the case Ontario Public Safety486, the Supreme Court established 
that ATI is derivate of the freedom of expression, but this claim may arise only in special 
circumstances. The Court argued that “the scope of the s. 2(b) protection includes a right to 
access to documents only where access is necessary to permit meaningful discussion on a matter 
of public importance, subject to privileges and functional constraints.”487 In the case in question 
these requirements were not satisfied, and section 2(b) was not engaged. According to 
Kazmierski, “The case rightly garnered much attention because it was the first decision in which 
                                                          
485 Centre for Law and Democracy. Response to the OIC call for dialogue: Recommendations for improving the 
Right to Information in Canada, January 2013 at 5. 
486 Ontario Public Safety and Security v Criminal Lawyers’ Association, 2010 SCC 23, [2010] 1SCR 815 [Ontario 
Public Safety].  
487 Ibid at para 31.  
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a majority of the Court recognized that there was constitutional protection for the right to access 
government information.”488   
     Furthermore, the right of ATI has acquired a quasi-constitutional status thanks to the Supreme 
Court. In Minister of National Defence489 the Court has characterized ATI as quasi-constitutional 
because of the role privacy plays in a democratic society. The Supreme Court deems quasi-
constitutional laws as fundamental or of special importance to the Canadian legal system. They 
are given primacy over ordinary legislation.  The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that quasi-
constitutional statutes are to be interpreted purposively.490  This means that conflicts in 
interpretation should be resolved in favour of the underlying purposes of the acts.491 
Additionally, the recognition of the quasi-constitutional status of a statute is a factor in the 
statute’s interpretation, suggesting that the rights it confers are to be construed broadly, and any 
exceptions to them must be made clear.  
 
     The Courts in Canada have a tool box at their disposal which allows them to stretch the legal 
interpretation of rights by considering a broad contextualization and the Canadian international 
commitments in human rights. As mentioned in section 5.1 above, Canada has signed the ICCPR 
and was one of the first countries to ratify its Optional Protocol.492 These international 
documents recognize a right to know as having a fundamental value. As such, Canada has 
committed to confer to such recognition. The living tree doctrine could help push the actual 
recognition even further to give ATI rights a constitutional status, able to meet international 
standards.    
5.2.2 Exploring the Access to Information Act  
     When the ATIA was introduced in Parliament in 1980, its goals were to have a more informed 
dialogue between political leaders and citizens, to improve decision making, and have greater 
                                                          
488 Kazmierski, supra note 80 at 54.  
489 Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Minister of National Defense), 2011 SCC 25, [2011] 2 SCR 306 
[Minister of National Defence].  
490 Charlebois v Saint John (City), 2005 SCC 74, [2005] SCJ No. 77 at para 54. 
491 New Brunswick (Human Rights Commission) v Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan Inc., 2008 SCC 45, [2008] 
SCJ No. 46 at para 19.  
492 Michael Byers, “Canada’s implementation of International Law: Why it matters ?, In Is our house in order ? 
Canada’s Implementation of International Law”, Chios Charmody, eds, (Montreal & Kingston: McGill –Queens’s 
University Press, 2010) at 27. 
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accountability by the federal government and its institutions.493 However, the version of the Act 
adopted in 1982 had no mentioning of any of those aspirations. The ATIA has 77 sections and its 
purpose clause (s.2) states:  
The purpose of this Act is to extend the present laws of Canada to provide a right of access to 
information in records under the control of a government institution in accordance with the 
principles that government information should be available to the public, that necessary 
exemptions to the right of access should be limited and specific and that decisions on the 
disclosure of government information should be reviewed independently of government.  
 
     Reading this purpose clause one can imply that this statute did not intend to bring a 
fundamental change in terms of better transparency, accountability or citizen participation. 
Instead, it simply extended the right of the public in accessing to government information. 
     The ATIA applies to “government institutions” at the federal level, which include government 
departments, ministries, and bodies listed in Schedule 1 and Crown corporations and their wholly 
owned subsidiaries (s.3). The ATIA does not cover to important public authorities such as the 
House of Commons, the Senate and the judiciary - they are excluded from its application. The 
FAA in 2006 extended the reach of the ATIA to approximately 70 additional bodies including the 
Canadian Wheat Board, five Agents of Parliament, five Foundations created under federal 
statute, seven Crown Corporations, and other parliamentary officers and crown corporations. 
However, many public bodies still remain out of the scope of the Act.  
     The ATIA has been highly criticized for its wide regime of exclusions and exemptions. It 
provides a special category of exclusions in sections 68-69. In accordance to article 68, the Act 
does not apply to: 
- published material or material available for purchase; library or museum material;  or 
material placed in the Canadian national archives, libraries, galleries or museums.  
- information under the control of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation that relates to 
journalistic, creative or programming activities 
- any information under the control of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited 
     Another type of exclusion is found in section 69 which excludes the confidences of the 
Cabinet from the application of the Act. This exclusion, which became part of the ATIA at the 
                                                          
493 Racicot & Work, supra note 286 at 4.  
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last minute before its adoption, has been one of the most criticized sections of the Act. Meetings 
or discussions between ministers can result in the creation of records that are Cabinet 
confidences, providing that the discussions concern the making of government decisions or the 
formulation of government policy.494According to the Treasury Board of Canada “In order to 
reach final decisions, ministers must be able to express their views freely during the discussions 
held in Cabinet. To allow the exchange of views to be disclosed publicly would result in the 
erosion of the collective responsibility of ministers.”495 It is, in fact, recognized by the Supreme 
Court that Cabinet confidentiality is essential to good government. In Babcock, the Court 
explained that “The process of democratic governance works best when Cabinet members 
charged with government policy and decision-making are free to express themselves around the 
Cabinet table unreservedly.”496 
     To preserve this rule of confidentiality, the Act provides that it does not apply to confidences 
of the Council. According the section 69 Cabinet confidences include: memoranda or discussion 
papers presented to Council, agenda, communications, or briefings of Council and draft 
legislation. However, there are three situations outlined in s. 69(3) of the ATIA, where certain 
classes of documents are producible. First, any Cabinet confidences that have existed more than 
twenty years can be made public. Second, discussion papers where the decision to which papers 
relate has been made public. Third, discussion papers where the decision has not been made 
public must be produced if four years have passed since the decision was made. In all other 
cases, Cabinet confidences remain not only outside the scope of the ATIA, but also the judicial 
review. In the context of litigation, under the CEA, cabinet confidences cannot be reviewed 
neither by the ICC nor a court. This type of exclusion make Cabinet confidences unreachable by 
the ATIA.  
     In addition, the ATIA does not apply to other categories of records which are listed as 
exemptions in sections 13-24. The exemptions fall into two distinct categories, mandatory and 
discretionary. Mandatory exemptions must be invoked. They are introduced with the wording 
                                                          
494 Subsection 69(2) of the ATIA.  
495 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, 13.4 Section 69 of the Act – Confidences 
of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada (Cabinet confidences), online: <https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/atip-
aiprp/tools/atim-maai01-eng.asp>. 
496 Babcock v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] 3 SCR 3, 2002 SCC 57, at para 18 [Babcock]. 
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“… the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose …” which indicates that there is 
no option but to refuse ATI. For instance, section 13 provides that information obtained in 
confidence will be refused. Discretionary exemptions [s.14, 15(1), 16(1), 16(2), 17, 18, 21, 22, 
23, 26] are introduced with the wording “the head of a government institution may refuse to 
disclose.” In these instances, government institutions have the option to disclose or to protect the 
information. Each exemption is based on “an injury test” or “class test”. Exemptions which 
incorporate an injury test take into consideration whether the disclosure of certain information 
could “reasonably be expected” to be injurious to a specific interest (i.e. to the conduct of 
international affairs, the conduct of a lawful investigation, financial interests of Canada etc.). In 
order to successfully invoke the provision, it must be shown that the expectation of injury is both 
reasonable and likely (versus improbable or doubtful). Class test exemptions are those applying 
to a record that matches the description given in the statutory provision (i.e. information obtained 
in confidence from other governments, advice or recommendations, trade secrets etc.). If the 
information being requested falls within the described type, then the exemption can be applied.  
     There are a number of exemptions in the ATIA that demonstrate a major structural weakness in 
Canada’s ATI regime. By erecting multiple walls of defense against information requests, the 
law treats ATI as a threat to be neutralized rather than a right to be promoted. While ATI is not, 
under international law, absolute, it may be overridden only in limited and justifiable 
circumstances. Schedule 1 fails to include a large number of the authorities which, according to 
international law, should be covered by an ATI law. Experience in many countries demonstrates 
the shortcomings of a list approach.  
    Another weakness in the Act is the lack of a general provision for the public interest override 
which is found in many other provincial laws in Canada and internationally. The Act does not 
contain a general public interest override which would require that information be disclosed in 
all cases where the general public interest in disclosure outweighs the specific public interest or 
other (third party) interest protected by the exempting provision. Rather, the public interest in 
disclosure is addressed on a case-by-case basis and only in connection with two exemptions in 
the ATIA. First, paragraph 19(2)(c) incorporates the provisions of section 8 of the Privacy Act 
which includes, in subparagraph 8(2)(m)(i) a discretionary provision for the release of personal 
information in circumstances where the head of the institution forms the opinion that “the public 
133 
 
interest in disclosure of the personal information in issue clearly outweighs the invasion of 
privacy.” Second, subsection 20(6) provides for the disclosure of third party information “if that 
disclosure would be in the public interest as it relates to public health, public safety or protection 
of the environment and, if the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs in importance any 
financial loss or gain to, prejudice to the competitive position of or interference with contractual 
or other negotiations of a third party.” These two provisions protect important interests of 
Canadians, such as privacy, health or safety, but these are not the only cases where one may find 
a public interest. This demonstrates that the ATIA does not engage seriously with the test of the 
public interest override.  
     Furthermore, several exceptions in the ATIA are either overbroad or the legitimate interest for 
nondisclosure is hard to find. There are many overlapping as well, which diminishes the clarity 
of the Act. For example, section 20.4 specifically excludes information about National Arts 
Centre contracts or donations, while section 14 protects federal/provincial relations. There is no 
need for these special warrants since section 18(b) already excludes information that “could 
reasonably be expected to prejudice the competitive position of a government institution or to 
interfere with contractual or other negotiations of a government institution.” This argument also 
applies to sections 16.1, 16.2, 16.3, 16.4, 20.1 and 20.2.  Specific information the disclosure of 
which would be harmful is already covered in section 16(1)(c) of the ATIA. Hence, there is no 
reason why the law enforcement exception would be insufficient to protect against disclosures 
that would harm these agencies’ investigative and enforcement functions.  
     Some exceptions in the ATIA lack proper harm tests, which make one wonder why it would 
be necessary to withhold information the disclosure of which would not cause any harm. 
Exceptions which lack a harm test include: information received in confidence from other States 
or governments (section 13(1)), law enforcement information (section 16(1)(a)), information 
related to law enforcement investigative techniques (section 16(1)(b)), information obtained or 
prepared by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police while performing their duty (section 16(3)), 
information treated as confidential by crown corporations (18.1(1)), financial or commercial 
information which is treated as confidential by a third party (section 20(1)(b)), those in favour of 
government advice (section 21), draft reports or internal working papers related to government 
audits (section 22.1). There is no doubt that there are legitimate interests protected by these 
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exceptions, but they fail to include a harm test. In the last example (s.22.1) government should be 
able to refuse requests for information the disclosure of which would harm its interests, but this 
does not mean that all information should be treated as confidential. By failing to specify a harm 
test, these exceptions undermine a public interest in information, and limit ATI as a public right.  
     There is no penalty or sanction on the public servants who wrongly deny requests for ATI. At 
the time the ATIA was adopted, Rankin argued that it was expected that such provisions were not 
necessary in Canada and that the legislation itself would provide sufficient motivation in 
achieving compliance with its objectives.497 Now, it is known for a fact that the expectation was 
not met. Although, in 1999, section 67.1 was added to make it an offence to intentionally 
obstruct the right of access. A punishment of imprisonment varies from six months to two years, 
and fines ranging $5,000-10,000 may be applied against the offenders. To my knowledge, the 
penalties have never been applied. However, even these penalties are only given in two cases, 
when obstructing the work of the ICC, and when intentionally destroying, falsifying or 
concealing a record. In all other cases, no penalties apply.  
     Regarding the subjects of the ATIA, the law limits the right of ATI only to citizens and 
permanent residents of Canada. Section 4(2) allows this right to be extended to other persons by 
order of the Governor in Council. However, this can only happen in rare circumstances. In 
addition, in 1989, an Extension Order498 extended the right of ATI to individuals who are present 
in Canada, even if not permanent residents or citizens. However, this extension was done within 
the meaning of the Refugee and Protection Act, which meant that it could benefit refugees in the 
country. This is a clear flaw in the ATIA, and runs counter to the established international 
practice. International law recognizes ATI as a human right, which means that it belongs to all 
people, regardless of nationality.  
     Among the most significant and recurring problems reported by users of the ATIA are long 
delays in responding to ATI requests. The act has set time limits to answer information requests. 
In accordance with section 7, public authorities should generally respond to access requests 
within 30 days. However, section 9 allows public authorities to extend this by “a reasonable 
                                                          
497 Rankin, “The new ATIPA”, supra note 278 at 37. 
498 Access to Information Act Extension Order, No. 1, SOR/89-207. Online <http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-89-207/page-1.html>. 
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period of time” by giving notice to the requester and, if their extension runs longer than 30 
additional days, by giving notice to the ICC as well. However, the “the reasonableness” of  
extension is left undetermined, allowing for indefinite time extensions, which could last for 
months, or even years. In limited cases, requests never get a response, and they are labelled as 
“deemed refusals.”499  
 
     Formally, time extensions may only be invoked in exceptional cases where “the request is for 
a large number of records or necessitates a search through a large number of records and meeting 
the original time limit would unreasonably interfere with the operations of the government 
institution” (s.9(1)(a)) or where “consultations are necessary to comply with the request that 
cannot reasonably be completed within the original time limit” (s.9 (1)(b)). The 2015 National 
FOI Audit found that response times exceeded 30 days in 59% of all cases which resulted in a F 
grade on speed of disclosure.500 Other studies have shown that public authorities regularly 
exceed their own, discretionary and often already unduly long timeframes for responding to 
requests.501 
 
     ATI requests are without doubt time-sensitive. Timeliness should be the core goal for public 
authorities in dealing with requests, and the legislation should certainly set it as a requirement. 
Long delays in access can often render requests moot, for example if the information is sought 
by a journalist working under a deadline. Studies have suggested that Canadian authorities 
frequently use their power to delay in responding to requests with the specific purpose of 
controlling information flows.502 Another problem with the ATIA is that it does not formally even 
require authorities to respond to requests as soon as possible. Section 4(2.1) requires that the 
                                                          
499 This is a term used by information commissioners in Canada. According to the Information and Privacy of 
Ontario “A deemed refusal occurs….when a public body fails to carry out its duty under the legislation within the 
time constraints imposed”. Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner, “Deemed Refusals”, Above Board, 
Volume 3, Issue 1, May 8, 2013. online <http://oipc.nl.ca/pdfs/NewsletterMay2013.pdf> 
500 Newspapers Canada, National Freedom of Information Audit 2015. Online 
<http://newspaperscanada.ca/sites/default/files/FOI-2015-FINAL.pdf> 
501 A study by the Office of the Information Commissioner, for example, found that more than 25% of all    requests 
were not responded to even within the extended deadlines public authorities gave to requesters.       See Office of the 
Information Commissioner, Out of Time: 2008–2009 Report Cards and Systemic Issues Affecting Access to 
Information in Canada (2010), at 3. 
502See Roberts, “Administrative discretion and ATIA”, supra note 5. 
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government provide “timely access to the record”, but this provision is too vague. There was an 
amendment made to the Act in 2006 to include a statutory duty to assist requesters. The duty 
required institutions to make every reasonable effort to help applicants receive complete, 
accurate and timely responses to requests, without regard to their identity. However, because of 
the vagueness of this amendments, it has not been taken very seriously by the government. 
Naurin argued that if transparency is not accompanied by sanctions applied to those acting 
against social expectations or even in a corrupt and illegal manner, then their public 
accountability remains toothless.503   
     An area where the ATIA lags behind global standards is the cost of access. The ATIA has 
made it a requirement that an application fee must be paid to make a request for information. 
Although the fee is only five dollars, it affects the making of requests. In addition to the initial 
requesting fee, requesters may be required to pay access fees based on the resources spent in 
responding to the request. Once the idea of fees is in place, it affects demands for requests. 
Indeed, in 2011, the federal government proposed a hike in access fees. Remarkably, this was 
claimed to be “in order to control demand.”504 The government was specifically seeking to use 
fees as a means of discouraging Canadians from exercising their right of ATI. Responding to 
access requests should be a core government responsibility, and the resources to recoup the costs 
of access should be included within the agency’s overall budget.  
 
A. Access to Information Act need for change  
     It is now widely agreed that the ATIA should be updated505 because it is in desperate need of 
reform506. In fact, the Act was criticized since its adoption as being very seriously flawed. 
Rankin argued that “a last minute amendment to the Bill may conceivably have gutted it, by 
exempting politically embarrassing information.”507 In addition, according to Rubin, Canada 
                                                          
503 Daniel Naurin, “Transparency, Publicity, Accountability – The Missing Links.” (2006) 12:3 Swiss Political 
Science Review 90-98 at 94 [Naurin, “Transparency”].  
504 Dean Beeby, “Feds eye access-to-information fee hike to ‘control-demand’”, The Globe and Mail, 13 March 
2011, online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/feds-eye-access-to- information-fee-hike-to-control-
demand/article571747/>.         
505 Douglas et al, supra note 291 at 1. See also Roberts, “Two Challenges”, supra note 463; Canadian Newspaper 
Association, “In Pursuit of Meaningful Access to Information Reform: Proposals to Strengthen Canadian 
Democracy”, 9 February 2004. 
506 Rankin, “ATIA 25 years later”, supra note 113 at 3. 
507  Rankin, “The new ATIPA”, supra note 278 at 1.  
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never ranked near the top on ATI since the adoption of the Act.508 He argued that it was no secret 
that Canada adopted a rather weak access act in 1982, and indeed, in the 1986-1987 
Parliamentary statutory review, all the parties saw this, and recommended a better act.  
     Today, ATI regime is recognized of being outmoded, out of step with international trends, 
and subject to systemic delays.509 Canada has fallen behind due to failure to reform the act and 
modernize its procedures.510 McKie argued that “Narratives concerning Canada’s ATIA follow 
what has become a disturbingly familiar pattern, punctuated with words including ‘broken’, 
‘dysfunctional’, and ‘useless’.”511 Especially for a legislation like the ATIA, which the courts 
have affirmed is quasi-constitutional in nature512, its continuing vitality now hinges upon 
meaningful reform efforts513. 
     As explained in Chapter 4, there has been an increased advocacy in the last few years to 
amend it. Most of the debates focus on the coverage of the ATIA. ATI proponents are pushing 
that “the Act covers the House of Commons and Senate as two of the most significant 
institutions in the functioning of Canadian Democracy.”514 Also, the Cabinet confidences, and 
information in Ministers’ offices have been part of the amendment proposals. This is the case in 
all Canadian provinces where Cabinet documents are reviewed by the Commissioner in the case 
of a dispute. Internationally, only South Africa’s FOI law follows Canada’s example.515  
                                                          
508 Ken Rubin, “The myth of access to information”, The Hill Times, January 31, 2011, online 
<http://www.kenrubin.ca/articles/myth-of-access-to-information.pdf> 
509 See Beeby D, 2011. “Canada Ranks Last in Freedom of Information: Study”, Globe and Mail, 9 January, online 
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/>; Chase, S. “Can Access to Information be Fixed?” Goble and Mail, 15 January 
2011, A4.; Hazel, R., & B. Worthy. 2010. “Assessing the Performance f Freedom of Information” (2010) 27 
Government Information Quarterly at 352-359 [Hazel &Worthy, “Assessing”]; Stanley Tromp, “Fallen behind: 
Canada’s Access to Information Act in the World Context” 2008, online <http://www3.telus.net/index100.report>. 
510 Canadian Journalists for Free Expression, “A hollow right: Access to information in crisis”,  A submission by 
Canadian Journalists for Free Expression to the Office of the Information Commissioner concerning reform Of 
Canada’s Access to Information Act, January 2013, at 3 [CJFE, “A hollow right”].  
511 David McKie, “Access to Information: The Frustrations- and the Hope” in Mike Larsen & Kevin Walby, eds, 
Brokering Access: Power, Politics, and Freedom of Information Process in Canada (UBC Press: Vancouver, 2012) 
at 314 [McKie].  
512 See Lavigne v Canada (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages), 2002 SCC 53, [2002] 2 SCR 773 at 
para 25 [Lavigne]; Conseil de la Magistrature du Québec v, Commission d’accès à l’information, [2000] R.J.Q. 
638 (Que. C.A.), para. 47, cited with approval by Bastarache and LeBel JJ. (dissenting but not on this 
point) in Macdonell v. Quebec (Commission d’accès à l’information) 2002 SCC 71, at para. 72. 
513 Rankin, “ATIA 25 years later”, supra note 113 at 3. 
514 CJFE, “A hollow right”, supra note 511 at 9. 
515 Ibid, at 10. 
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5.2.3 The case of Ontario   
     Ontario is the fourth province in Canada to adopt an ATI law in 1988 after Nova Scotia, New 
Brunswick and Quebec. It represents an interesting case to compare with the federal level since 
the design of the law is slightly different comparing to the ATIA. There are two laws governing 
ATI in Ontario, one at the provincial and the other municipal level. The Freedom of Information 
and Protection Privacy Act (FIPPA)516 and the Municipal Freedom of Information and 
Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA)517 together establish a system for public access to 
government information and for protecting personal information. The first thing that one can 
notice about both these laws is the facts that both ATI and privacy are governed by the same law. 
This is different at the federal level, where the ATIA and the Privacy Act are two separate 
statutes.  
    The FIPPA came into effect on January 1, 1988, five years after the ATIA. The coverage of 
FIPPA was not much different than the one provided by the ATIA - legislature, courts, and 
cabinet confidences were excluded from the Act. It initially applied to all provincial ministries 
and most provincial agencies, boards and commissions. However, the range of institutions 
covered under the FIPPA expanded three times in one decade. Information Commissioner of 
Ontario reports that in 2003, Ontario’s energy utilities, Hydro One and Power Generation, were 
brought under FIPPA; Ontario’s universities were placed under FIPPA in 2006; in 2012, Ontario 
became the last province in Canada to bring its hospitals under FOI legislation.518 In 2005, a 
definition of “educational institution” was added to subsection 2 (1) of the Act and amendments 
relating to educational institutions were made to several sections of the Act. Also, the Broader 
Public Sector Accountability Act519 amended the FIPPA to designate hospitals as institutions 
under the Act.  
                                                          
516 R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31 online <http://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/90f31>. 
517 R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56. online  <http://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/90m56>. 
518 Ann Cavoukian, The evolution of freedom of information in Ontario: From reactive to proactive disclosure, 
Academics Matters-OCUFA’s Journal of Higher Education. May 2013. Online 
<http://www.academicmatters.ca/2013/05/the-evolution-of-freedom-of-information-in-ontario-from-reactive-to-
proactice-disclosure/>. 
519 Broader Public Sector Accountability Act, 2010, SO 2010, c. 25 
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     In 1996, the Savings and Restructuring Act520 amended FIPPA giving institutions the 
authority to refuse access in certain circumstances to records on the basis that a request was 
frivolous or vexatious. As a result, section 27.1(1) was added to the FIPPA to deal with 
vexatious requests to deny the right to information if “the head [of an institution] is of the 
opinion on reasonable grounds that the request for access is frivolous or vexatious.”521 According 
to the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) a request is considered vexatious when “the 
head considers the request as abusing the right of access or interfering with the operation of the 
institution; or to be made in bad faith or for ulterior motives.”522 Such provisions have been 
debated for long of having positive and negative effects on ATI regime. However, the Delagrave 
Report concluded that there are a “very small” number of frivolous, vexatious or abusive 
requests under the Act, but recognized that “processing them represents a waste of resources that 
could be better spent responding to legitimate access requests.”523 However, there is a risk in 
having these provisions in place. According to Hofley et al “The adoption of a clause allowing 
for the rejection of a request on this basis would raise the question of the need for a process to 
ensure that government institutions do not abuse such a power”524.  
     Exemptions in the FIPPA are listed in sections 12-22, and some of them are subject to the test 
of public interest override.  According to section 23 of the FIPPA exemptions do “not apply 
where a compelling public interest in the disclosure of the record clearly outweighs the purpose 
of the exemption.” The public interest override applies to sections 13 (advice to government), 15 
(relations with other governments), 17 (third party information), 18 (economic and other interests 
of Ontario), 20 (danger to health or safety), 21 (personal privacy) and 21.1 (species at risk). The 
public interest test contains three parts, and all three must be satisfied for the disclosure to take 
place: 1.a public interest in disclosure, 2.this public interest must be compelling, and 3.this 
                                                          
520 Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 36:1 Bill 26, Savings and Restructuring Act, 1996, online 
<http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/bills/bills_detail.do?locale=en&BillID=1581&isCurrent=false&BillStagePrintId>. 
521 Ontario Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, section 10(1)(b). The institution must provide 
reasons for disregarding a request on these grounds (section 27.1(1)). Criteria for determining whether a request is 
“frivolous or vexatious” are elaborated in R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 460, section 5.1. Such a request must be part of a 
“pattern of conduct that amounts to an abuse of the right of access or would interfere with the operations of the 
institution,” or be “made in bad faith or for a purpose other than to obtain access.” The decision to refuse a request 
may be appealed to the Information Commissioner. 
522 Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, “Statistical Reports: Glossary of terms”, online 
<https://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/FIPPA-Glossary.pdf>. 
523 ATI, “Making it Work”, supra note 290 at 73.  
524 Randall Hofley, Craig Collins-Williams, & Stikeman Elliott LLP, “A thematic comparison of access legislation 
across Canadian and international jurisdictions”, May 9, 2008, at 45 [Hofley, Collins-Williams & Elliott LLP].  
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compelling public interest must clearly outweigh the purpose of the exemption claim. However, 
section 23 leaves out certain exemptions. That means that the override does not apply to 
exemptions covering section 12 (Cabinet records), section 14 (law enforcement records), section 
16 (records relating to the defence of Canada), and section 19 (records qualifying for solicitor 
client privilege).  
     An interesting provision of the FIPPA is section 11(1) which provides for a proactive duty to 
disclose certain information. It states: “Despite any other provision of this Act, a head shall, as 
soon as practicable, disclose any record to the public or persons affected if the head has 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that it is in the public interest to do so and that the 
record reveals a grave environmental, health or safety hazard to the public.” This section 
demonstrates a real commitment to promote transparency and openness, despite of the 
restrictions posed by the provisions in the Act. This is done in the name of the public interest, 
and for important issues like health and safety. This commitment shows that the government 
appreciates certain public values and is ready to act proactively in protecting them.  
     The FIPPA is enforced by the Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) who 
according to section 59 has order-making powers. In addition, the IPC engages or commissions 
research on issues concerning the ATI and privacy regime in Ontario, and conducts public 
education programs. The IPC has proved itself to be a very powerful body that has influenced the 
implementation of the FIPPA and the advancement of the rights of ATI and privacy.   
     Looking at the FIPPA and the ATIA, one can notice several differences. First, a section 
similar to section 27.1(1) of the FIPPA is not present in the ATIA. There is no mechanism in the 
ATIA for rejecting requests based on the ground that they are “unreasonable”, “frivolous” or 
“vexatious”. From an institutional perspective having such provision in place is a good thing, 
because it prevents the overloading of public bodies.  
     Second, there is no section in the ATIA containing a general public interest override, like 
section 23 in the FIPPA. The ATIA only provides two provisions of limited application 
[s.19(2)(c) and 20.(6)], but lacks such an important safeguard in other provisions for exemptions 
in the Act. This is a major weakness in the ATIA, one that undermines the public’s right to know 
about matters of general interest.  
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     Third, a proactive disclosure provision, like the one found in section 11(1) of the FIPPA, is 
absent in the ATIA. This adds to the weakness of the federal act, and demonstrates that the act is 
falling behind not only internationally, but also at home.  
 
     Fourth, the IPC has order-making powers, which means that it has some teeth to compel ATI 
to institutions that fail to disclose information upon request. In addition, the IPC plays a 
significant role in public education and research. The ICC does not such powers. He/she is rather 
an ombudsman with powers to investigate and make recommendations. There is no power to 
order disclosure of a record. Of course, the requesting party and/or the Commissioner may 
initiate a complaint before the Federal Court, but this is a much longer way to compel an 
institution to disclose records. This undermines the ICC roles and leave her powerless against 
government defiance of the ATIA.  
     Fifth, the FIPPA covers to a certain extent the legislature “but only in respect of records of 
reviewable expenses of the Opposition leaders and the persons employed in their offices and in 
respect of the personal information contained in those records.”525 Although this provision is 
limited, it is a powerful weapon in the hands of the opposition to control the government in 
power and keep it accountable. Such provision is inexistent at the federal level, and has been the 
focus of a lot of debate, especially from the ICC.  
5.3 EU’s legal framework on transparency and ATD  
     At the EU, the right of access to administrative documents has been closely developed along 
the need for more transparency. They have both come a long way in less than two decades. In the 
past, administrative transparency was considered an appealing but innocuous idea. At best, it was 
a merely political, non-binding guideline. Its implementation was not commanded by law, but 
rather entrusted to the good will of the government or even to the discretion of the front-line civil 
servants. However, transparency now is a principle recognized by the treaties, and ATD has 
gained a constitutional status. I look closely at this development below. 
                                                          
525 Section 1.1(1) of the FIPPA 
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5.3.1 Treaty status 
     In the EU, legal provisions on transparency are complicated and dispersed in treaties, 
regulations, the Charter and the Convention. Three treaties have shaped the foundations of 
transparency as a principle, and of ATD as a human right. First, a theme of transparency gained 
relevance in 1992 with the Treaty of Maastricht526, known also as the TEU. Article A(2), which 
is the very first article, stated: “This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to 
the citizen.” This is a clear expression of a commitment to openness and establishes a principle 
of transparency. In addition, the Declaration that was attached to the Treaty stated:  
The Conference considers that transparency of the decision-making process strengthens the 
democratic nature of the institutions and the public's confidence in the administration. The 
Conference accordingly recommends that the Commission submit to the Council no later 
than 1993 a report on measures designed to improve public access to the information 
available to the institutions. 
 
     Here, the principle of transparency is clearly linked to democratic governance and trust in 
institutions, and all of them are related to public ATI. The EU makes real commitments for 
concrete measures in improving ATI with the intention to bring the Union closer to its citizens. 
However, the access right was not yet established as a self-standing right. The Treaty of 
Maastricht, Article 138e signed the creation of the EU Ombudsman appointed by the EP and 
responsible to administer cases of maladministration of the activities of the Community 
institutions and bodies.  
     Second, in 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty introduced Article 191a (which later was renumbered 
255 EC Treaty), which established a full right of ATD. This article stated: 
1. Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having their 
registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to European Parliament, 
Council and Commission documents, subject to the principles and the conditions to be 
defined in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3.  
2. General principles and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing this right 
of access to documents shall be determined by the Council, acting in accordance with the 
                                                          
526 Treaty of Maastricht, 7 February 1992, OJ C 191, online <http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf>. 
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procedure referred to in Article 189b within two years of the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam.  
3. Each institution referred to above shall elaborate in its own Rules of Procedure specific 
provisions regarding access to its documents527. 
 
     The Amsterdam Treaty brought transparency and ATD to a whole new level. First, it 
recognized a treaty right to ATD for all organizations and persons in the EU without limitation to 
citizenship. However, the right of ATD was only limited to three institutions, the EP, the Council 
and the Commission. Second, it required the establishment of general principles on the right of 
ATD within two years. This provision was the precursor of the Regulation 1049 - the EU law 
governing ATI regime. Third, it required from the EP, the Council and the Commission to 
establish their own provisions on ATD in their Rules of Procedure. As such, the Treaty signed a 
new era for both the transparency a principle and the recognition of ATD as a fundamental right. 
     Third, in 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon provided a legal framework for transparency that 
included a general, unconditional right of ATD. The treaty sanctioned ATD as a fundamental 
right and considered transparency as ancillary both to representative and participatory 
democracy. An Article 16 A was inserted in the treaty, with the wording of Article 255 as 
follows: 
(a) 1.   In order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil society, the 
Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall conduct their work as openly as 
possible. 
2.   The European Parliament shall meet in public, as shall the Council when considering 
and voting on a draft legislative act. 
(b) …. The words ‘European Parliament, Council and Commission documents’ shall be 
replaced by ‘documents of the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, whatever 
their medium’…. 
(c)  ….  
(d) …‘The Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank and the 
European Investment Bank shall be subject to this paragraph only when exercising their 
administrative tasks. 
                                                          
527 Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 45 which inserted Article 191a at 46, online <http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-
making/treaties/pdf/treaty_of_amsterdam/treaty_of_amsterdam_en.pdf>. 
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The European Parliament and the Council shall ensure publication of the documents 
relating to the legislative procedures…528. 
 
     The Lisbon Treaty brought several changes to the EU legal framework on transparency. First, 
it reinstated the EU’s commitment to improving openness and transparency, and engaging 
citizens in participating in the EU governance. This commitment explicitly links the principle of 
openness to the right of every citizen to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Second, it 
expanded the subjects of the Regulation 1049 (which was already in place from 2001) from only 
three institutions to all the EU bodies, except for the CJEU and the two EU Banks529. Third, it 
required from the EP and the Council to hold open meetings in the course of legislative 
proceedings, and publish those documents.  
     These three treaties changed the face of transparency in the EU and gave ATD the status of a 
fundamental human right. They signed a new chapter in the discussions of democratic 
governance and citizen engagement by considering the principle of transparency as one of the 
pillars of democracy.  
     Transparency and ATD have also been shaped by two other important legal documents in the 
EU, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Convention on Human Rights. The EU Charter, 
binding on all the member states from the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, explicitly 
guarantees ATD to “any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having 
its registered office in a Member State.”530 The right of ATD is listed under the “Citizen’s 
Rights” Part of the Charter, which means that it is considered important for the enjoyment of the 
EU citizenship. Article 42 the Charter echoes the terms of the Lisbon and Amsterdam Treaty.   
     The fundamental nature of the right of ATD has direct consequences in its treatment. First, it 
requires a strict interpretation of any limitation to the exercise of the right. Secondly, public 
authorities must subject any such limitation to a scrutiny of proportionality. The principle of 
proportionality requires that derogations remain within the limits of what is appropriate and 
                                                          
528 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
13 December 2007 OJ C 306, 17.12.2007, online  
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2007.306.01.0001.01.ENG#g-001>. 
529 Note that they are not entirely excluded from the scheme of the Regulation 1049. It applies to them when 
performing administrative duties.  
530 Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 42.  
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necessary for achieving the aim in view. Thirdly, transparency regimes should be revised so as to 
guarantee the widest possible access to official documents. As a result, the right of access at the 
EU level significantly influences legislation and court practice in the Member States as they are 
expected to discipline administrative transparency accordingly. It is possible, for example, to 
demand specific information from an EU institution, when the source of that information is a 
Member State.  
     In addition, the EU Convention, although it does not contain any express right to ATD, has 
evolved its own “right to freedom of information” as part of the right to freedom of expression in 
Article 10 of the Convention. It grants the right to “hold opinions and impart information and 
ideas without interference by public authority.” The lack of a self-standing right of ATD has 
often been identified as an important weakness in the Convention. However, the position is 
changing, the Convention is considered to be a “living instrument” and recent case law suggests 
that, the Convention has been influenced by international trends.  
     To sum up, in less than two decades, transparency and ATD in the EU law have evolved 
dramatically, from a guidance to a principle, and from an institutional guideline to a fundamental 
human right. The principle of transparency is considered one the main pillars of the EU law and 
an inextricable element of the unional principle of democracy.531  
 
5.3.2 Exploring Regulation 1049 
      In the EU, the present regime of ATD is governed by Regulation 1049/2001.532 At the time 
of its adoption it was considered by the EU institutions to have constituted a “major change”. 
                                                          
531 The close link between transparency and democracy was for the first time clearly recognized in the Declaration 
No 17 on public access to documents, which was attached to the Treaty of Maastricht. The Declaration emphasized 
that transparency of decision-making process strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions and the public’s 
confidence on administration. Furthermore, this link was for first time reaffirmed by the Advocate General Tesauro 
in the case Netherland versus Council (C-58/94). In particular, the Advocate General was of the opinion that the 
principle of democracy, which constitutes one of the cornerstones of the Community edifice, is the basis for the right 
of access to documents. See Opinion of the Advocate General Tesauro of November 1995, Case C-58/94 
(Netherland v. Council), point 14-16.   
532 On the Implementation of the Principles on EC Regulation 1049/2001 Regarding Public Access to European 
Parliament, Council and Commission Documents, COM (2004) 45 final; L Cotino, “Theory and Reality of Public 
Access to EU Information,” in D Curtin, A Kellerman, and S Blockmans, eds, The EU Constitution: The Best Way 
Forward? (Kluwer, 2005) at 233-244; J Heliskoski & P Leino, “Darkness at the break of the noon: The Case law on 
Regulation No 1049/2001 on Access to Documents” (2006) 43 CMLRev 735; Carol Harlow, “Transparency in the 
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However, several scholars have argued that it has merely consolidated the existing legal 
framework533 since it was shadowed by treaty requirements.  
 
     The regulation has a grand opening by boldly stating the treaty principle of openness. The 
language used throughout the entire Regulation demonstrates great ambitions for the future of 
the EU. The first Recital underlines the commitment of the EU institutions for “a new stage in 
the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are 
taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen.”534 Just reading the first 
opening recital of the Regulation one has a feeling that its mission is not only granting ATD to 
the citizens but also making them part of the decisions in the EU. This is manifested clearly in 
Recital (2) where the true purpose of the principle of openness is revealed – to enable the 
participation of the citizens in the decision-making process. Openness and participation in the 
EU have even a bigger purpose in the Regulation – to strengthen the principles of democracy.535 
The ambitions and enthusiasm about this “new stage” of the EU politics is evident in the 
purposive clause. The purpose of Regulation is to “to give the fullest possible effect to the right 
of public access to documents”536 and:  
 
(a) to define the principles, conditions and limits on grounds of public or private interest 
governing the right of access to….documents ….in such a way as to ensure the widest 
possible access to documents, 
(b) to establish rules ensuring the easiest possible exercise of this right, and 
(c) to promote good administrative practice on access to documents. 
 
     The purpose of the Regulation is threefold, all aiming to build the right infrastructure of 
principles, rules and practices in order to facilitate the exercise of the right of ATD. This 
                                                          
European Union: Weighing the Public and Private Interest’, in J Wouters, L Verhey, and P Kiiver (eds), European 
Constitutionalism beyond Lisbon (Intersentia, 2009) at 209-238 [Harlow, “Transparency].  
533 D. Curtin, & I.F. Dekker, “Good Governance: the Concept and its Application by the European Union”, in 
Curtin, D. and Wessel, R.A.,eds, Good Governance and the European Union: Reflections on Concepts, Institutions 
and Substance (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2005) at 2 [Curtin & Dekker, “Good Governance”].  
534 Reg 1049, supra note 64, Recital (1).  
535 Ibid, Recital (2).  
536 Ibid, Recital (4).  
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language shows a serious commitment in establishing a right to ATD, one that goes beyond a 
mere proclamation of a right, and is promoted through good administrative practices.  
 
     Regulation 1049 applies to all institutions in the EU, but the CJEU, two EU Banks and some 
central agencies. It includes some exceptions listed in Article 4. The exceptions of Article 4 (1) 
have a general scope. They are regarded as compulsory and absolute, meaning that “should 
disclosure of a document cause harm to one of the interests mentioned [in Article 4(1)], access to 
this document should be denied.”537 In other words, there is no possibility of an overriding public 
interest in disclosure with regard to these exceptions. Article 4(1) provides that: 
The institutions shall refuse ATD where disclosure would undermine the protection of: 
(a) the public interest as regards: 
– public security, 
– defence and military matters, 
– international relations,  
– the financial, monetary or economic policy of the community or a Member State; 
(b) privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with community 
legislation regarding the protection of personal data. 
 
     By contrast, the exceptions provided for by Article 4 (2) and 4 (3) have a more limited scope. 
Both exceptions are subject to an overriding public interest in disclosure. This implies a 
balancing of the public interest in disclosure against the protection of another interest. Article 4 
(2) and 4 (3) state: 
2. The institutions shall refuse ATD where disclosure would undermine the protection of:  
— commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual property,  
— court proceedings and legal advice,  
— the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits, unless there is an overriding public 
interest in disclosure.  
3. Access to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal use or received by an 
institution, which related to a matter where the decision has not been taken by the institution, 
                                                          
537 Report from the Commission on the implementation of the principles in EC Regulation n° 1049/2001, COM 
(2004)45 final, at 17. 
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shall be refused if disclosure of the document would seriously undermine the institution's 
decision making process, unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure. 
    Article 4(3) has been the focus of a lot of debates. It safeguards the decision-making process of 
the institutions and is intended to protect the so-called space-to-think. This article makes a 
distinction between cases where the institution has not yet finished its thinking and those where 
the thinking period is over because the institution has made a decision. Two tests may be applied 
in this case, the harm test and the public interest override. Engaging the harm test a document 
would be denied only if public access would seriously undermine the institution’s decision-
making process. Furthermore, an overriding public interest requires an evaluation of institutional 
interest if it is worth being protected. Regulation 1049 does not contain an exception that 
automatically protects a so-called “space to think”. The exception might occur only by applying 
the two tests. Documents containing internal discussions are thus within the scope of the 
Regulation. The CJEU538 has recently established that public access must, therefore, be given to 
such documents on request unless the institution concerned can show that serious harm to its 
decision-making process is reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical.  
     Another important class of exceptions relate to the EU-Member State relationship. A Member 
State may request the institution not to disclose a document originating from that Member State 
without its prior agreement (Article 4 (5)). In case a Member State holds a document originating 
from an institution, it is entitled to apply its own national law on public access.  
     A set of special provisions are included in Article 9 which regards sensitive documents. These 
documents (called EU RESTRICTED) are classified as “Top Secret”, “Secret” or “Confidential” 
in accordance with the security rules of the institution concerned. They protect essential interests 
of the EU or one or more of its member states in the areas covered by Article 4 (1) (a), notably 
public security, defence and military matters. 
     The Regulation provides that public access applies to all documents held by an institution. The 
term “document” is defined broadly so as to include any content, whatever its storage medium, 
concerning a matter relating to the policies, activities and decisions falling within the institution's 
sphere of responsibility (Article 3). A Community institution may - if an exception to public 
access applies - consider giving partial access to a document. Article 4 (6) states that if only parts 
                                                          
538 Access Info case.  
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of the requested document are covered by any of the exceptions, the remaining parts of the 
document shall be released. Partial access is an important element of the ATD regime, as it 
restricts the scope of exceptions to only cover the specifically excepted information of a 
particular document. In certain circumstances, an institution might even be obliged to release 
only a part of a document.539  
     An important element of an ATI regime is the cost of submitting a request. In the EU, 
submitting a request for documents is free of charge. The only charges that can be incurred when 
requesting documents are those that correspond to the cost of producing and sending copies. This 
comes as no surprise as ATD has a human right status in the EU.  
     The scope of the Regulation extends the right of ATD to every citizen and resident in the EU. 
The right of access extends even further, as the institutions by discretion540 may grant access to 
any natural or legal person not residing or not having its registered office in a Member State. 
This is expected considering that the EU has joined the Council of Europe’s Convention on 
access to official documents. Its standards provide: first, the right belongs to everyone, without 
discrimination on any ground (Article 2.1); second, there is no obligation to give reasons (Article 
4.1); third, the person can remain anonymous except when disclosure of identity is essential in 
processing the request (Article 4.2). The EU follows these standards strictly.  
     The timelines for processing ATD requests are strictly settled in Regulation 1049. According 
to Article 7, institutions have fifteen working days to respond to access requests. This can be 
extended with another fifteen days for cases relating to very long documents. In cases of refusals, 
the applicants have fifteen days to make a “confirmatory application” to the institution to 
reconsider the refusal. The institution has another fifteen days to either grant the information or 
give reason for refusals. After refusals, applicants have two choices, they can either institute 
court proceedings against the institution or make a complaint to the European Ombudsman. 
                                                          
539 See the Judgment of the CJEU in Council v. Hautala, elaborated in paras. 2.4.3 and 4.2. 
540 See European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001, art. 2, 2001 O.J. (L 145) 
44, <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/l1145/1_14520010531 en00430048.pdf > (stating that 
institutions may grant access to documents not only to people residing in the member state, but also to any person 
not residing in the state as well). For the implementing rules of procedure of the Council, see Council Decision 
338/2004 EC, Euratom, and for the rules of the Commission, see 2001 O.J. (L 145). The European Parliament is not 
as forthright in this matter but exercises discretion in individual cases. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RULES OF 
PROCEDURE, RULES 96, 97 (2005). 
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Hence, the Regulation provides a two-stage administrative procedure for application, followed 
by the possibility to contest a refusal through the court or complaint to the Ombudsman.  
 
A. Proposals for change of Regulation 1049 
     The debate over changes of Regulation 1049, or the so-called the recasting process is going 
on for almost a decade. The Commission’s first proposal was in 2008541, another attempt came in 
2011542, and the EP proposed amendments tabled by the Parliament on 11 March 2009543. The 
Council and the Commission have come against the EP, with the latter tabling proposals to 
increase access rights, and the former blocking them and “wishing to restrict in seemingly new 
ways the right of access to documents and the manner that it has been implemented.”544 MEPs 
viewed the Commission’s original proposed changes as a backwards step for transparency. But 
the Parliament’s amendments to the bill were fiercely opposed by member states in the Council 
of Ministers. The 2008 proposals to revise the regulation were blocked for so long, the EU’s 
executive was forced to issue a second set of proposals in 2011 to bring the legislation in line 
with the Lisbon Treaty, which had come into force in the meantime.  
 
     The main concerns are focused on normative definitions of what should be considered a 
document, the scope and extent of exceptions, etc. The most far-reaching of the proposed 
changes is to amend the definition of “document” so that no application for ATD drawn up by an 
institution could be made unless that document had been “formally transmitted to one or more 
recipients or otherwise registered.”545 Another proposed change would exclude any possibility of 
public ATD that form part of the administrative file of an investigation or of proceedings 
concerning an act of individual scope until the investigation has been closed or the act has 
become definitive.546 The Commission also proposed to add two new exceptions to Article 4 - 
                                                          
541 Eur-Lex. COM(2008)229: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission Documents. April 30, 2008 
www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/com/com_com(2008)0229_/com_com(2008)0229_en.pdf  
542 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 
1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents /* 
COM/2011/0137 final, March 23, 2011, online:   
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0137:FIN:EN:HTML>. 
543 Philip Choppel QC, Information rights:  law and practice, 3rd eds, (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2010) at 99.  
544 Maiani, Pasquier & Villeneuve, “Less Is More”, supra note 426 at 155-170. 
545 This would be changing Article 3(a) of the Reg 1049.  
546 Ibid.  
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the protection of “the environment, such as breeding sites of rare species”, with no possibility of 
an overriding public interest in disclosure547 and the protection of “the objectivity and 
impartiality of selection procedures”, subject to the possibility of an overriding public interest in 
disclosure. This exception would apply to procedures for the award of contracts and for the 
selection of staff. The exception for the protection of court proceedings and legal advice in 
Article 4(2) would be expanded to include “arbitration and dispute settlement proceedings.”548 
Regarding privacy and integrity of the Individual, the Commission also proposed to replace the 
exception in Article 4(1)(b) by a new Article 4(5) based on the CJEU case Bavarian Lager. The 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) has produced an opinion549, which is critical of the 
Commission’s proposal. 
     These proposals would actually narrow the right of access550 and the scope of the Regulation. 
One of the objectives “which seems to underlie the proposals, is to increase the institutions’ 
discretionary power to control the flow of information during the policy-making process.”551 
 
5.3.3 The case of Albania 
     The Albanian case is interesting for this research since it offers new insights on how 
transparency emerges in the legal framework and then normalizes in the legal system. This case 
represents an interesting experiential pattern of the EU’s influence in transplanting transparency 
through accession requirements. I have argued elsewhere that this influence has the potential to 
ignite a new policy paradigm for transparency that I call “transparency through integration.”552 
Albania is not yet a member in the EU, but it is a candidate from June 2014553. It was officially 
recognized by the EU as a “potential candidate country”, when it started negotiations on a 
                                                          
547 Article 4(1)(e). 
548 Article 4(2)(c). 
549 Opinion of the EDPS on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding 
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, 30 Jun. 2008, available on the website 
of the EDPS, online: <www.edps.europa.eu>. 
550 Sylvia Kierkegaard, “Open access to public documents – More secrecy, less transparency!” (2009) 25 Computer 
law & Security Review 3-27 at 3 [Kierkegaard, “Open access”].  
551 Harden, “Revision of 1049”, supra note 389 at 255.  
552 Irma Spahiu, “Government Transparency in Albania and the Role of the European Union”, European Public Law 
21(1) 2015 at 140 [Spahiu, “Government”].  
553 European Commission, EU candidate status for Albania, 27.06.2014, online:  
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/albania/index_en.htm>. 
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Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2003.554The SAA was successfully agreed 
and signed on 12 June 2006, thus completing the first major step toward Albania’s full 
membership in the EU. The SAA with Albania entered into force in April 2009 and that same 
month Albania presented its application for membership in the EU. The deadline for the 
fulfilment of all the commitments in the SAA is 31 March 2019. For Albania to be accepted as 
an EU candidate, the European Commission has outlined twelve key priorities as identified in the 
EU 2010 Opinion on the country’s European Union Membership Application.555 These 
requirements and the Albanian’s aspirations to join the EU have deeply influenced the countries 
approach towards democratization, and transparency as one of the pillars of democracy. As such, 
the EU has served “as a catalyst for positive change on government transparency.”556  
     The principle of transparency is reflected in many legal provisions in Albania. FOI is 
considered a fundamental human right in the Albanian legal framework. Article 23 of the 
Albanian Constitution establishes the right to collect, receive and disseminate information557 and 
specifically guarantees the right of access to government-held information. In addition, Article 
56558 guarantees the right to be informed for the status of the environment and its protection. 
Furthermore, Article 17559 of the Constitution provides for limitations on rights, but only in 
accordance with the standards articulated in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
which Albania ratified in October 1996 and where FOI, including the right of ATI is a core 
element of the broader right to freedom of expression. The principle of transparency is also 
reflected on Article 20 of the Code of Administrative Procedures560.  
                                                          
554 For more details see the European Commission on Albanian Membership status, online: <http://ec.europa. 
eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/albania/index_en.htm>. 
555 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: 
Commission Opinion on Albania’s Application for Membership of the European Union, para. 3, p. 2. (2010). 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0680:FIN:EN:PDF (Accessed 15 Feb.2014). 
556 Spahiu, “Government”, supra note 553 at 137. 
557 Albanian Constitution, Law No. 8417, date 21 Oct. 1998 amended. http://www.ipls.org/services/ 
kusht/contents.html (Accessed 5 Apr. 2013).Art. 23 of the Constitution says: (1) The right to information is 
guaranteed. (2) Everyone has the right, in compliance with law, to get information about the activity of state organs, 
as well as of persons who exercise state functions. (3) Everybody is given the possibility to follow the meetings of 
collectively elected organs 
558 Article 56 of the Constitution states ‘Everyone has the right to be informed for the status of the environment and 
its protection.’ 
559 Article 17 says ‘These limitations may not infringe the essence of the rights and freedoms and in no case may 
exceed the limitations provided for in the European Convention on Human Rights.’ 
560 Law No. 8485, date 12 May 1999 ‘The Code of Administrative Procedures’, online: <http://www.pad.gov.al>. 
/Content/KuadriLigjor/en-law/ligji8485.htm?action=view (Accessed 2 Feb. 2014). Art. 20 ‘Right to be informed’ of 
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     Albania was the first country in the region to adopt a law on ATI. The Law “On the Right to 
Information on Official Documents”561 was adopted on 30 June 1999. This law was replaced by 
Law 119 “On the Right to Information” in September 2014, and entered into force in November 
of that year. This new law was congratulated for the advanced provisions of transparency and 
safeguards of the right to ATI. Experts stated: “The New Right to Information Law of Albania, is 
assessed by many experts as one of the most important steps taken towards transparency and 
accountability, bringing the legislation in line with the best international standards in the region 
and beyond.”562 
     Some of the sweeping changes introduced by the new law are:  
- The introduction of a more extensive definition of the term “public authority” extending 
to commercial companies where the state holds the majority of shares, and entities that 
exercise public functions (Article 2).  
- Proactive disclosure of information, according to well-designed transparency programs 
which every public institution should have in place. These programs should be revised 
every 5 years (Article 4 and 5). This includes publication of certain categories 
information that are made public without request (Article 7). 
- The register of requests, which should be updates every three months and published at the 
website of the public institution (Article 8). 
- The obligation for public authorities to designate a Coordinator for the Right to 
Information, whose role is to supervise the authority’s responses to requests (Article 10).  
- Much shorter times for responding to information request, from 40 days (with the old 
law) to 10 working days (Article 15). There is an extension of 5 days in specific cases.  
                                                          
the Code states: Every person participating in an administrative procedure has the right to be informed on and to 
have access to the documents used during the procedure, unless limits defined by law. The right mentioned in the 
first paragraph of this article may be exercised personally or through an authorized representative. The 
administrative body, developing the administrative procedure, is obliged to grant information to the participants 
concerning their rights and duties. 
561 The Law on the Right to Information for Official Documents, No. 8503, 30 June 1999, online: 
<http://hidaa.gov.al/english/pub/l_8503.htm> 
562 Institute for Development of Freedom of Information, “New Right to Information in Albania”, 7 November 2014, 
online:<https://idfi.ge/en/new%E2%80%93freedom%E2%80%93of%E2%80%93ifnromation%E2%80%93legislati
on%E2%80%93albania>; See Also InfoCip, New Right to Information law enacted by the Albanian Parliament, 
online: <http://www.infocip.org/en/?p=1312>. 
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- the creation of a new body, the Information Commissioner, which existed as the 
Commissioner for the Protection of Personal Data. Previously, the oversight of the access 
law was attributed to the People’s Advocate (Article 24).  
- Heavy administrative sanctions for failure to respond to the requirements of the law 
(Article 18). There are seventeen types of fines which go from $1500 - $3000 Cad in 
value563.  
     In addition, the requests for information are free. According to Article 13, for hard copies 
tariffs may apply only to cover the cost of reproduction of materials and delivery. The new law 
also includes a number of new concepts, including reclassification of secret documents564, and 
release of partial information and through maximal use of information technology. 
     All these provisions are very progressive considering the equivalent laws in Canada, and even 
the EU. The Albanian law has the shortest deadlines, very wide coverage of public bodies, and 
very high penalties for those who fail to implement the law by letter.  What is the most striking 
element in the law is the purpose clause in Article 1, which states: “The rules provided for in this 
law intend to guarantee the recognition of a public’s right to information, in the framework of 
exercising the rights and freedoms of individuals in practice, and the formation of ideas on the 
state of the country and the society.” This provision is not found in any of the laws in focus for 
this research. It resonates with the idea of the right to ATI as developed by Habermas in his 
discursive theory of law. The law considers the right of ATI as one of the individual’s rights and 
freedoms and looks at it from two perspectives, instrumentally, as facilitating the enjoyment of 
other rights in practice, and intrinsically as an independent right which contributes to the 
exchanging and shaping of ideas and views around much bigger issues such as those of state 
affairs and the society. This second perspective is very compelling considering that it comes 
from a country with a relatively short experience with democracy. This perspective appeals my 
idea of the right of ATI as a human right that helps shaping persons in private lives as individuals 
with right and freedoms, but also shaping citizens in the public sphere by facilitating the 
                                                          
563 These fines are very heavy considering that the minimum salary in Albania is $220 and the average is $530, 
according to the Institute of Statistics in Albania (INSTAT), online: <http://www.instat.gov.al/al/themes/pagat-dhe-
kosto-e-punës.aspx?tab=tabs-5>. 
564 According to Article 17.5 of the Law 119/2014 “The right to information is not automatically refused when the 
information sought is found in documents classified as “state secret”. In this case, the public authority, receiving the 
information request, starts immediately the classification review procedure” 
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dissemination of information that contributes to forming views and actively participating in 
influencing societal and political directions.  
5.4 Comparison of the Canadian and the EU legal framework 
     Looking at the ATI legislation in the two jurisdictions, and the two case studies, one will 
notice some significant differences. Table 6 below is a summary of the differences noticed from 
the comparison between the ATI laws in Canada and the EU, and the two case studies. 
     First, the ATIA and the Regulation 1049 are guided by different principles. Regulation 1049 
follows the Nordic approach concerning ATD, and establishes the principle of the widest 
possible access as its central principle. The EU puts more emphasis on the principle of 
transparency and openness which holds in itself a bigger mission – addressing issues of 
democratic deficit in the EU, reducing the feeling of alienation towards the EU institutions 
among the citizenry, filling the gap between the Union and its citizens, bringing them closer 
together, and making them part of the decision-making process. Hence, the provisions of 
Regulation 1049 have developed with the principles transparency, openness and democratic 
participation at heart. The same purpose and mission is not evident at the ATIA and any 
mentioning with regard to the above principles is missing. The aspirations when the Act was 
introduced in 1980 were very similar, but then the final draft, did not include such language. The 
ATIA did not show any other ambition, rather than extending the right of ATI to complement 
other laws already in place. It looks like the inspiration for an ATI legislation came from the 
same concerns in both Canada and the EU, but then developed in different directions.   
     This difference demonstrates the dynamics of every ATI legislation which emerge from 
aspirations of widening democratic rights, but could only develop to truly protect those rights if 
they are embraced by political power. ATI rights only become embedded in political traditions 
by a strong advocacy in moments in history when politics need transparency for survival. Rubin 
claimed that the law was only written because of popular demand and pressure (there was a 
lobby group called ACCESS) would be pushing matters565.  
                                                          
565 Ken Rubin, “The myth of access to information”, The Hill Times, January 31, 2011, online: 
<http://www.kenrubin.ca/articles/myth-of-access-to-information.pdf>. 
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     Second, the right of ATI has a higher status, and hence, a higher protection in the EU than in 
Canada. ATI is a statutory right in Canada, recognized as quasi-constitutional by the courts. This 
could be considered a positive development and a step forward on the recognition of the special 
status of access rights, but it is not enough. There are arguments that the power of the ATIA as a 
whole is often illusory because of a weak oversight body with only limited powers.  The Ontario 
case provides a model that addresses this weaknesses. In the EU, the right of access, has a 
constitutional nature, as confirmed by the fact that it was reproduced in Article 42 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. This upgrade in status has been made possible by the different treaties in 
the EU that put ATD together with the principle of transparency at the heart of the EU law. The 
right of ATD emerged in the EU project as a right of citizenship, which would allow citizens of 
the Member States to become citizens of the Union, as it is clearly established in Article 10 (2) 
of the revised Treaty of the European Union.566 The Albanian case offers another example of a 
constitutional protection of the right to ATI. Its law has been upgraded to reflect this status and 
has a compelling purpose clause which appeals to an ideal right of ATI instrumentally and 
intrinsically.  
     Differences in the content of the laws are a result of the status they hold in the hierarchy of 
legal norms – the higher the status, the higher the protection. Four elements are a reflection of 
the difference in status of the ATI rights:  
a. The time limits available to respond to requests.  At the EU requests of access should be 
processed “promptly”(Article 7 and 8 of Regulation 1049) or without undue delay within 15 
working days with a possibility for extension for 15 days. In Albania this time is 10 working 
days with an extension of 5 days. In Canada, this time is 30 days567 with the possibility of 
extension for “a reasonable period of time” in case of complex cases. The same provisions are 
found in the FIPPA. Of course, what is considered to be “reasonable” is a matter of subjectivity 
which leads to inconsistencies in timelines within government institutions. Long delays in 
responses are a big concern because they cause a depreciation of the value of information. 
                                                          
566 Article 10 par. 2 of the Treaty of the European Union states: Citizens are directly represented at Union level in 
the European Parliament. Member States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or 
Government and in the Council by their governments, themselves democratically accountable either to their national 
Parliaments, or to their citizens.   
567 Section 7 of ATIA 
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Darbishire argues that information “is a perishable commodity and to delay its publication even 
for a short period may well deprive it of all value and interest.”568 
 
b. The range of persons to whom a right of ATI is granted. The right of ATI in Canada is given 
on the basis of citizenship or residency. Non-residents cannot file access requests. In the EU the 
right is enjoyed by everyone. Non-residents seem to be excluded, but the EU institutions have 
never applied the existing distinction to the detriment of non-residents, implicitly acknowledging 
the inconsistency of the distinction. In Albania, the right is extended to everyone, even the 
stateless persons. Indeed, if ATI has a fundamental nature, then the exclusion of non-resident 
aliens is questionable.  
 
c. The difference in the rules for exemptions. It is often argued that the success of an access 
regime depends on the clarity of its exceptions – when exemptions to access rights are set up 
clearly in the law, there is no room for abuse of discretionary power. In the EU, mandatory 
exemptions are listed clearly, so that there will not be exceptions to the rule (Article 4(1)). For 
other exemptions (Article 4(2) and (3)), a three part harm test is established to consider in any 
case when discretionary power would be exercised. A general public interest override test was 
also found in the FIPPA. Such test does not apply to the ATIA. Instead, injury-test and class-test 
exemptions are set up with most of the discretionary exemptions free from the application of 
public interest test. Furthermore, there is some overlapping in some provisions, which adds 
difficulty to the clarity of provisions and complicates the application of the act.    
 
d. The range of institutions covered. In the EU, the Regulation 1049 regulates public access to 
the EP, Council and Commission documents, in addition to all other agencies which were 
included after the Lisbon Treaty.  In Canada, all courts, the Parliament, the Prime Minister’s 
Office and ministerial offices are excluded from the access regime. Similar coverage was in 
place for the FIPPA. This wide range of exclusions has drawn lots of criticism among ATI 
advocates who have come forward with proposals for amendments of the ATIA.   
                                                          
568 Darbishire, 2010, at 16. 
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     Third, the recent developments in ATI legislation in both jurisdictions reveal the tensions that 
exist around issues of transparency and ATI. They demonstrate that any advancement in ATI 
comes through tough political battles. In the EU, amendments to Regulation 1049 have been 
delayed for years because of the tensions between the main EU institutions. In Canada, 
amendments to the ATIA are not going anywhere because of the little support they have from the 
political class. Trying to explain the hostility towards ATI laws, Roberts argued that FOI laws 
are political creatures - although in the long run they significantly improve governance, they do 
not represent an immediate benefit for those who are in power, and ATI laws depend heavily on 
the predispositions of the political executives and officials who are required to administer it.569   
     Having examined the legal requirements for ATI in both countries, one can notice that they 
offer opportunities and challenges for all actors involved. Despite their weaknesses ATI laws 
provide a starting point towards a wider recognition of ATI rights. Of course, better laws make a 
better start, but they do not guarantee a successful access rights regime in and on themselves. 
Sometimes the gap between law and practice is surprisingly much wider than expected, and 
deeply affects law implementation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
569 Roberts 2002, at 176.  
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CHAPTER 6:  INFORMATION VS PRIVACY – A CONCEPTUAL AND LEGAL 
DISCOURSE 
 
     This chapter makes an analysis of the rights of privacy and ATI in Canada and the EU. As I 
explained in the previous chapter, one of the main exceptions for ATI in both jurisdictions is for 
reasons of privacy. In addition, privacy contains an element of ATI since it gives individuals a 
right to access their personal information.  
     The purpose of the chapter is to shed some light on issues surrounding the rights of ATI and 
privacy, their interactions, and when they complement and/or conflict each other. In doing so, I 
engage with some definitional analysis of ATI and privacy and then look at the legal provisions 
to understand what they have to offer for a harmonization of both rights.  
 
     As argued previously in this research, transparency and ATI come with the expectation that 
information held by the government should be openly accessible to the public. In the meantime, 
we all want that our personal information remains private and be protected. Governments 
nowadays are vast storehouses of information, including information about individuals gathered 
from different sources. Tom Onyshko argued more than ten years ago that “the federal 
government has probably become the single largest collector of personal information in 
Canada.”570 In this context, two rights are at stake, the right of ATI, and the right of privacy of 
the persons to whom information belongs. In this case, there is a need to reconcile the twin 
objectives of these rights, but to do so, one needs to know where to draw the line between public 
and private information. Sometimes, drawing that line is a tough choice to make, since these 
“boundaries…. have been moving targets for several generations.”571 To engage with this 
analysis one first needs to know: what is privacy?      
 
6.1  Conceptualization of privacy  
     Privacy is broadly defined in many disciplines, taking different approaches. Privacy also 
means many things for different people and different things for the same person in different 
                                                          
570 Onyshko, “The FCC & ATIA”, supra note 244 at 102.  
571 Anne Wells Branscomb, Who Owns Information? From Privacy to Public Access (New York: BasicBooks, 
1994) at 8 [Branscomb]. 
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contexts. Indeed, as BeVier argues “Privacy is a chameleon-like word, used denotatively to 
designate a range a wildly disparate interests.”572 Many scholars and academics have given 
different definitions on privacy. For instance, going far back to John Locke, he looks at privacy 
as man having property on his own person and products of his labour.573 Later on, “The right to 
Privacy”574 was a profound beginning toward developing a conception of privacy as the “right to 
be let alone”. Post referred to privacy as a black hole that causes headache to those studying it. 
He admitted that “Privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory 
dimensions, so engorged with various distinct meanings, so that I sometimes despair whether it 
can be usefully addressed at all.”575  
 
     In the legal and philosophical discourse privacy is described to be in “chaos”.576 In the legal  
context, Hulett argues that “the greatest difficulty in this area is the ambiguous nature of  
privacy.”577 He talks about the existence of a constitutional right to privacy, and refers to privacy  
as a newly emerging constitutional right (although not included in the Constitution) without a  
clear legal definition. Although Hulett writes on the American context, the same situation applies  
in Canada regarding the constitutional status of privacy. Privacy is not explicitly mentioned in  
the Canadian Constitution, although it is recognized to have a constitutional status.  
 
     Some Canadian scholars have contributed to the legal discourse on privacy. For instance, 
Bruyer introduced an innovative idea on addressing privacy issues. He argues that “Privacy… is 
conceived as an equality issue, not a liberty issue. Perhaps at its core privacy protects and 
ensures equality in the sense that we are all entitled to equal concern and respect as individuals, 
and not that we are entitled to do as we please.”578 This idea is especially compelling if we 
                                                          
572 Lillian R. BeVier, “Information about individuals in the hands of Government: Some reflections on Mechanisms 
for privacy protection” (1995-1996) 4 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 455 at 458 [BeVier]. 
573 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Edited with an Introduction by C.B. Macpherson (Indianapolis, 
Ind.: Hackett Pub. Co., 1980) at 19 [Locke].  
574 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, “The right to Privacy” (1890) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 [Warren & 
Brandeis]. 
575 Robert C. Post, “Three Concepts of Privacy” (2001) 89 Geo. L.J. 2087, 2087 at 2087 [Post].   
576 Julie C. Innes, Privacy, Intimacy and Isolation (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 3 [Innes, 
Privacy].  
577 M Hulett, “Privacy and the Freedom of Information Act” (1975) 27 Administrative Law Review, 275 at 276 
[Hulett]. 
578 Richard Bruyer, “Privacy: A Review and Critique of the Literature” (2006) 43:3 Alberta Law Review 553 at 587 
[Bruyer]. 
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consider privacy a societal rather than an individual value, an approach taken by some authors 
mentioned in this article. Another Canadian scholar, Brown, recognizes the chaos that exists in 
the legal literature around privacy by emphasizing the consequences in understanding cases 
when privacy is invaded. He writes: “Because no single version can possibly claim common 
assent…. We have no reference point to determine whether “privacy” has been “breached”579. 
This is a concern for the public officials dealing with privacy cases, and as I will explain later in 
this article, a challenge for the courts as well.   
 
     According to Solove, “Privacy is a sweeping concept encompassing (among other things) 
freedom of thought, control over one’s body, solitude in one’s home, control over information 
about oneself, freedom from surveillance, protection of one’s reputation, and protection from 
searches and interrogations.”580 Solove adds a very interesting facet to the definition of privacy. 
He goes further of what people think about their own privacy saying that “Privacy…is not 
simply a matter of individual prerogative; it is also an issue of what society deems appropriate to 
protect.”581 Similarly, he argues that privacy “is an aspect of social structure, an architecture of 
information regulation.”582. A comparable approach was taken by Allen-Castellito who also 
argues that “Privacy involves not only individual control, but also the social regulation of 
information.”583 Another scholar, Penney, offers a taxonomy in studying privacy focusing in 
economic and moral aspects of the term. Penney argues that “privacy is described in relation to 
the discrete interests that it protects.”584  
 
     Solove advances a theory on how to reconcile the tension between transparency and privacy. 
He contends that information privacy must be re-conceptualized in the context of public 
records.585 What he offers is a taxonomy of privacy which serves the purpose of studying and 
approaching privacy while competing with other values such as ATI.  
                                                          
579 Russell Brown, “Rethinking Privacy: Exclusivity, Private Relation and Tort Law” (2006) 43:3 Alberta Law 
Review 589 at 592 [Brown]. 
580 Daniel J. Solove, “Conceptualizing privacy” (2002) 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1087, at 1087 [Solove, “Conceptualizing”]. 
581 Ibid at 1111.  
582 Ibid at 1115.  
583 Anita Allen-Castellito, “Coercing Privacy” (1999) 40 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 723 at 723 [Allen-Catellino].   
584 Steven Penney, “Conceptions of Privacy: A Comment on R .v. Kang-Brown and R. v. A.M. (2008) 46:1 Alberta 
Law Review 203 at 203 [Penney].  
585 Daniel J. Solove, “Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution” (2002) 86 Minn. L. 
Rev. 1137 [Solove, “Access”].  
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     For the purpose of this chapter I focus on a particular aspect of privacy, one that encapsulates 
its meaning in the Privacy Act586 and ATIA587 – the informational privacy. This term is first 
introduced by Westin in 1967 and describes privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others.”588 Similarly, the Canadian Federal Privacy Commissioner (PCC) 
defines informational privacy as “the right of an individual to exercise control over the 
collection, use, and disclosure of his or her personal information.”589  
 
6.2  Debates on the dichotomy access to information-privacy  
     At the first sight, it seems like the rights of ATI and personal privacy are always in conflict 
since the former gives the right to ATI held by the government and the latter prevents the ATI 
pertaining to individuals held by the government. However, these two rights in most of the cases 
complement each other. There are many scholars who support this argument. Banisar argues that 
“RTI [right to information] and Privacy often play complementary roles. Both are focused on 
ensuring the accountability of powerful institutions to individuals in the information age.”590 
O’Brien contends that “although informational privacy and access to governmental information 
appear contrary and point in opposite directions, they are conceptually complementary and the 
nexus between the two is information flow.”591 Indeed, the purpose of privacy provisions is to 
protect the privacy and provide individuals with a right of access to their information held by the 
government. In this context, Julie Innes discusses, “Privacy might not necessarily be opposed to 
publicity; its function might be to provide the individual with control over certain aspects of her 
life.”592 However, it is not uncommon that privacy and access rights may come into conflict with 
each other. As Ann Cavoukian, former Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario 
(IPCO), contends “Government-held public data may contain the personal information that 
                                                          
586 Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c. P-21 
587 Access to Information Act, RSC, 1985, c. A-1. 
588 Alan W. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967) at 7 [Westin].  
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relates to businesses, or may contain the personal information of identifiable individuals.”593 
Both business and personal information cannot be disclosed unless there is a public interest that 
overrides the private one. In these circumstances conflicts are expected to arise. The graph below 
simplifies the relationship between the rights of privacy and ATI, and the situation when they 
collide 
 
 
Source: David Banisar, The right to Information and Privacy: Balancing Rights and Managing Conflicts, World 
Bank Institute-Governance Working Papers Series, 2011, Figure 3.1, at 9. 
 
 
      Some misperceptions on the use of these two pieces of legislation have created tension in the  
application of their provisions. Carlson and Miller argue that “FOIAs create a presumption that 
all public records, including those containing personal information, shall be available for public 
inspection.”594 In addition, some arguments arise in relation to the reasonable expectation of 
privacy. According to the IPCO “Many would argue that once personal information has been  
made public, there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy relating to that information, and  
therefore, privacy protection rules no longer apply.”595 Solove talks in this sense about a “secrecy 
paradigm” drawing attention to the assertion that “private” means “secret” (which he criticizes). 
He urges for an abandonment of the “longstanding notion that there is no claim to privacy when 
information appears in a public record.”596 In this context he calls for a reconceptualization of 
informational privacy.  
 
     This problem is reduced with the inclusion of exemptions in both Acts. For instance, Onyshko  
                                                          
593 Ann Cavoukian, “Balancing Access and Privacy: How Publicly Available Personal Information is Handled in 
Ontario” (October 2000), Canada, Symposium on the Protection of Information in Local Governments: The 
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594 Steven C. Carlson & Ernest D. Miller, “Comment: Public Data and Personal Privacy” (1999) 16 Santa Clara 
Computer & High Tech. L.J. 83 at 89 [Carlson & Miller].  
595 Cavoukian, “Balancing Access”, supra note 593 at 1. 
596 Solove, “Access”, supra note 585 at 1140.  
Protecting 
personal 
data
Access to 
government 
information 
164 
 
observes that in the ATIA “The personal information exemption seeks to reconcile the claim of  
individual privacy with the benefit of broad public access.”597 O’Brien argues in this regard that  
“Privacy Act allows for disclosure in the public interest of only certain kinds of information,  
while the Freedom of Information Act allows for invasions of privacy by disclosures of personal  
information if a public need is established.”598  
 
     An important principle of privacy protection is that personal information acquired for one  
purpose should not be used for another purpose without the consent of the individual to whom  
the information concerns. However, in many cases personal information finds its way out to the  
public domain by different means. This can become unpredictable since, as O’Brien argues, the 
problem is exacerbated “by the ambiguous nature of the information control and the absence of 
any specific constitutional guarantee of either personal privacy or right of access.”599 
Furthermore, with the use of technology being significantly intensified, information has become  
a commodity in the market of goods and ideas. The IPCO contends that “Personal information 
has become a commodity that is being bought and sold by companies, almost entirely at the 
expense of personal privacy.”600 This is a non-anticipated consequence of access laws because, 
as Branscomb puts it, “Commercialization of the information is in conflict with established 
notions about the right of individuals to privacy.”601  
 
     These situations are not easy to manage by the public officials602 in charge of handling  
information requests. They often find themselves in the middle of two fires. O’Brien observes  
that in some cases “Administrators have two options: they may refuse to disclose information  
and risk a lawsuit under FOI by the party denied access, or they may disclose the information  
and risk a suit under the Privacy Act by the individual whose file was released.”603 This is not a  
                                                          
597 Onyshko, “The FC & ATIA”, supra note 244 at 102.  
598 O’Brien, “Privacy”, supra note 591at 89.  
599 Ibid at 45-46.  
600 Ann Cavoukian, “Privacy as a Fundamental Human Right vs. an Economic Right: An Attempt at Conciliation” 
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601 Branscomb, supra note 571 at 3.  
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comfortable position to be in, especially if someone is making decisions on these grounds on a 
daily basis. In order to make fair decisions one needs to have detailed guidelines in the  
laws/policies/regulations or some sort of directions which should be unified across all 
government departments to assure consistency. I will return to this problem later in section III 
when I analyse the legal framework.    
 
      More than three decades ago, in 1982, McCamus identified a problem with the balance 
between between privacy and ATI. He asked “If, at all, can these two conflicting values be 
reconciled?”604, and answered that under the Canadian federal legislation reconciliation of access 
and privacy values is left essentially to the discretion of public officials.605 McCamus found it 
problematic that the Canadian law addressed the conflict between access and privacy by simply 
subduing it to the administrative discretion. He argued that in following this approach, the 
Canadian scheme risked to undermine both the access rights conferred by the ATIA and the 
degree of privacy protection afforded by the Privacy Act. Indeed, in applying this scheme it is 
expected that the resolution of conflicts between privacy and access rights will not be consistent 
throughout government administration since different public officials will decide differently 
based on their perception of the value of these rights. In my view, this inconsistency stems from 
the conceptual chaos that exists in the Canadian legal framework where privacy and information 
may take many faces. McCamus further argues that the situation becomes even riskier when 
public officials find themselves in a situation of a conflict of interest when they are asked to 
disclose information about their offices or colleagues which might enable tangible public 
assessment of their performance.606 In this context, it is anticipated that access to records will be 
denied in order to prevent appropriate scrutiny of public affairs on the excuse that disclosure will 
unfairly violate the privacy of the individuals involved. Similar assertion was made by Banisar 
about 30 years later who observed that “A conflict sometimes arises when government officials 
attempt to shield their decision-making from scrutiny by misinterpreting their demand for 
secrecy as a privacy interest.”607    
                                                          
604 John D. McCamus, “The delicate balance: Reconciling privacy protection with the freedom of Information 
principle” (1982) 3:1 Government Information Quarterly 49, at 51 [McCamus, “The delicate balance”]. 
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      McCamus raised two important questions: First, one of institutional design: In what  
institutional forum should conflicts of access and privacy be resolved - courts, legislature or  
bureaucracy? Second, what guidance should be given to those dealing with the resolution of such  
conflicts? He points out that the American response to the first question is: the courts through  
judicial review. However, the Canadian response has been to rely on administrative discretion.608   
McCamus identifies a significant problem with this response – the bureaucrats having a lot of  
discretion and not much guidance do not provide an adequate institutional design to maintain the  
“delicate balance” between the two rights. To address McCamus’s concerns a careful analysis of 
the available legal provisions is necessary.   
 
6.3 Legal framework of privacy in Canada  
 
6.3.1 Charter Status of Privacy  
     Canadians do not enjoy an explicit constitutional right to privacy since the Charter does not 
specifically include such right. There have been some early unsuccessful attempts to include 
privacy in the Charter. For instance, in the Special Joint Senate-House of Commons Committee 
on the Constitution in 1981, the Honorable David Crombie proposed the inclusion of a 
constitutional right of privacy in the Canadian Charter. This amendment was defeated by a vote 
of fourteen to ten.609 Nevertheless, a whole body of case law has developed in Canada around the 
status of privacy which recognizes that privacy is protected under the Charter indirectly through 
sections 7610 and 8611. Many Supreme Court of Canada decisions acknowledge that privacy is 
protected under the Charter. According to Khullar and Cosco “The Supreme Court has … linked 
the right to privacy with human dignity, liberty and security in its reflections on the s. 7 of the 
Charter.”612  
                                                          
608 McCamus, “The delicate balance”, supra note 604 at 53. 
609 Parliament of Canada, “Minutes of Proceeding and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and 
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Prepared for: Canadian Bar Association, National Administrative Law, Labour & Employment Law and Privacy & 
Access Law PD Conference, Ottawa, Ontario at 3 [Khullar & Cosco].  
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     The cases discussed below make the assertion that privacy is a constitutional right. In 
Beare613, Justice LaForest expressed “considerable sympathy”614 for the proposition that section 
7 includes a right to privacy. The same approach was taken by Justice Wilson in Morgentaler615 
where section 7 was recognized to grant “the individual a degree of autonomy in making 
decisions of fundamental personal importance.”616 Justice McLachlin (dissenting) in Rodriguez617 
acknowledged that “security of the person, [is] a concept which encompasses the notions of dignity 
and the right to privacy.”618 In addition, he argued that “Security of the person has an element of 
personal autonomy, protecting the dignity and privacy of individuals with respect to decisions 
concerning their own body.  It is part of the persona and dignity of the human being that he or she 
have the autonomy to decide what is best for his or her body.”619  
 
     Justice LaForest again in Godbout620emphasized his position held in Beare, and reiterated his 
general view that “the right to liberty enshrined in s. 7 of the Charter protects within its ambit 
the right to an irreducible sphere of personal autonomy wherein individuals may make inherently 
private choices free from state interference.”621 Same observations about privacy as reflected in 
s. 7 of the Charter are made in Children’s Aid Society622 where the Court recognized that “In a 
free and democratic society, the individual must be left room for personal autonomy to live his or 
her own life and to make decisions that are of fundamental personal importance.”623 
 
     Section 7 of the Charter protects informational privacy which means that the liberty and  
security interests are related to the freedom to engage on private and personal communications  
                                                          
613 R. v Beare; R. v Higgins, [1988] 2 SCR 387 [Beare]. 
614 Ibid at para 58. 
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617 Rodriguez v British Columbia [1993] 3 SCR 519 [Rodriguez]. 
618 Ibid at 340. 
619 Ibid at 345. 
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622 B. (R.) v Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 SCR 315 at 368-369 [Children’s Aid Society]. 
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without being observed upon. This association was made clear in O’Connor624 in which Chief 
Justice Lamer and Justice Sopinka referred to the “constitutional right to privacy” in information 
stating that “a constitutional right to privacy extends to information contained in many forms of 
third party records.”625 Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, specifically located the reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the liberty and security interest in section 7 of the Charter. She made a good 
analysis of the “Right to Privacy” in paragraphs 110-199 and explained that “Respect for 
individual privacy is an essential component of what it means to be “free”.  As a corollary, the 
infringement of this right undeniably impinges upon an individual's “liberty” in our free and 
democratic society.”626 The Supreme Court of Canada has discussed the “reasonable expectation 
of privacy” in its decision in the case of Hunter627. Similar observation was made in Ryan628, 
where the court recognized that the liberty and security protected in section 7 encompasses the 
right to privacy. The court reiterated that “In its s. 7 jurisprudence, it has expressed great 
sympathy with the notion that liberty and security of the person involve privacy interests. That 
privacy is essential to human dignity, a basic value underlying the Charter, has also been 
recognized.”629 When addressing privacy and access legislation in Dagg630 Justice LaForest 
explained the importance of privacy describing it as a “fundamental value….grounded on 
physical and moral autonomy- freedom to engage on one’s own thoughts, actions and 
decisions.”631 Furthermore, in Lavigne632 the Court recognized the constitutional value of privacy 
and the quasi-constitutional status of the Privacy Act.  
 
     All the above cases acknowledged that section 7 protects the right of privacy. In addition, 
there are other cases that recognize privacy as a constitutional right protected under section 8. 
Khullar and Cosco argue that “The right of privacy is not only a human right, it is a human right 
protected by the Charter....The right to privacy, particularly informational privacy, is frequently 
                                                          
624 R. v O’Connor, [1995] 4 SCR 411, [1995] SCJ No. 68 [O’Connor]. 
625 Ibid at para 17. 
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addressed under section 8 of the Charter.”633 In Hunter634, the Supreme Court made it clear that 
section 8 protection against unreasonable search and seizure includes the right to privacy.635 In 
Dyment636 Justice LaForest held that the underlying purpose of the section 8 is to protect the 
right to privacy which is more than just a physical right as it includes the privacy in information 
about oneself. He states that there are “reasonable expectations of the individual that the 
information shall remain confidential to the persons.”637 Furthermore in Tessling638 the Supreme 
Court confirmed that privacy is the “dominate organizing principle”639 in an analysis under 
section 8 of the Charter, and distinguished between three kinds of privacy “personal privacy, 
territorial privacy and informational privacy.”640 In Mills641 the Court refers to Hunter as the first 
case to recognize that section 8 protects the right to privacy642, and makes an analysis of privacy 
in paragraphs 77-89.  In Duarte643 the Supreme Court also recognized that section 8 promotes 
values by protecting the right to control the dissemination of information about oneself. 
Moreover, in Dagg the Court refers to privacy as “worthy of constitutional protection, at least in 
so far as it is encompassed by the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under 
s. 8.”644 
 
     As noted in Chapter 5, ATI is not protected under the Charter, and except for a limited 
recognition under section 2(b) there is no agreement in the case law that suggests that such 
protection exists. On the contrary, the right of privacy is widely recognized by the Supreme 
Court of Canada jurisprudence that it is protected under sections 7 and 8 of the Charter. This 
observation of the constitutional status of the two rights is significant since it helps to understand 
which of them will take precedence in cases of conflict. The uneven protection of the rights of 
ATI and privacy in Canada has its ramifications in the implementation of the respective Acts.  
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6.3.2 Exploring the Privacy Act and its interaction with the Access to Information Act  
 
     The Canadian Privacy Act and the ATIA were part of the same Bill (C-43) and both came into 
effect at the same time in 1983. The Supreme Court in has characterized both acts as “quasi-
constitutional” because of the role they play in the preservation of a free and democratic society. 
 
     The purpose of the Privacy Act, as it is enshrined in section 2, is to “protect the privacy of 
individuals with respect to personal information about themselves held by a government 
institution and that provide individuals with a right of access to that information.”645 The Act 
does not contain any definition of “privacy”. Instead, it defines “personal information” as 
“information about an identifiable individual that is recorded in any form”646. This definition is 
broad and contains examples of personal information. Obviously, this definition does not offer a 
good reference to understand the complexity of privacy, and its interactions with other rights. 
This was noticed shortly after the law was passed. The Report of the Standing Committee on 
Justice and Solicitor General in 1987 recognized that “This problem of lack of definition of the 
central concept of privacy is endemic in data protection legislation.”647 The definition of 
“personal information” is followed by a lengthy list (twelve elements) of what constitutes 
personal information for the purpose of this legislation. This list cannot encompass all cases of 
personal information the governments deal with in their everyday operations. However, 
information not specifically mentioned in the list but clearly covered by the broad definition, is 
to be considered personal information. 
  
     The Privacy Act imposes obligations on how the government must handle personal 
information.  As the PCC puts it “The Privacy Act ….imposes obligations on some 250 federal 
government departments and agencies to respect privacy rights by limiting the collection, use 
and disclosure of personal information.”648 There is another act on privacy in Canada, PIPEDA 
                                                          
645 Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c. P-21, at s 2.  
646 Section 3 of the Privacy Act.  
647 Open and shut, supra note 272 at 58 [“Open and shut”]. 
648 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Legal information related to the Privacy Act: The Privacy Act, 
online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada < http://www.priv.gc.ca/leg_c/leg_c_a_e.asp>. 
171 
 
(Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act)649 , which regulates privacy in 
the private sector. This Chapter does not engage with PIPEDA.  
 
     If we now look at the ATIA, personal information is part of the mandatory exemptions, and 
found in section 19, which states: “the head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose 
any record requested under this Act that contains personal information as defined in section 3 of 
the Privacy Act.”650 However, this section allows for information to be disclosed if it is requested 
by the person to whom it relates; it is publically available, and in accordance to section 8 of the 
Privacy Act.651 The purpose of section 19 of the ATIA is to strike a balance between the right of 
ATI in records under the control of a government institution and the right of each individual to 
his or her privacy. Section 19 incorporates by reference section 3 and 8 of the Privacy Act, which 
are essential for the interpretation and application of this exemption. According to the TBS, the 
application of section 19 of the ATIA requires a three-step process: 
1. Establish that the information falls within the definition of personal information found in 
section 3 of the Privacy Act.  
2. Ensure that paragraphs 3(j), (k), (l) and (m) of the definition of personal information do 
not apply to permit the disclosure of the personal information. 
3. Exercise discretion as to whether the information may nonetheless be disclosed under 
subsection 19(2) of the ATIA652 
     Subsection 19(1) is a mandatory exemption based on a class test that provides that, subject to 
the three exceptions in subsection 19(2), the head of a government institution shall refuse to 
disclose any record requested under the ATIA containing personal information as defined in 
section 3 of the Privacy Act.  
     Just like in the ATIA, there are a few exemptions in the Privacy Act, as well. They are listed in 
section 8, and permit disclosure for eleven exceptions. The last one, section 8(2)(m)(i) includes 
                                                          
649 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5 
650 Ibid at s 19.  
651 Ibid at s 19. 
652 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Access to Information Manual, 11.13 Section 19 – Personal information, 
online: <https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/atip-aiprp/tools/atim-maai01-eng.asp> 
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the public interest, which allows for disclosure of personal information by the head of the 
institution if “the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that 
could result from the disclosure.”653 Regarding this section, the PCC clarifies that “The provision 
is applied in unique, fact-specific situations. It is not designed to deal with the disclosure of 
personal information on a systematic or routine basis. Rather, it is an important section in the Act 
which provides institutions with a tool they may need to effectively balance an individual’s right 
to privacy with the public’s need to know.”654 This argument is premised on the idea that the two 
Acts complement each other, no one takes precedent over the other, and they are to be read 
together.  
 
     Indeed, section 8(2)(m)(i) is a very significant provision that deals with balancing the right of  
privacy against access when a public interest is involved. The principle of “public interest  
override” takes precedence over the protection of privacy when the two conflict each other. This  
demonstrates the importance of these two values in the Canadian legal system. But, establishing 
a “public interest” may become problematic since has to satisfy two criteria: first it has to be 
proven it exits, and second, it has to outweigh privacy. According to the subsection (m) of 
section 8 of the Privacy Act, this responsibility falls on the head of the institution. Even if the 
public interest is evident, how can one say when it outweighs privacy? There clearly is a need  
for a balancing exercise in these circumstances, so the question to ask is: how will the process of 
balancing be pursued? There are no additional provisions in either acts on how this process  
happens, and what rules should be taken into account when deciding on the “public interest”. 
Therefore, the decision on the “public interest override” falls under the discretion of the head of 
the institution processing requests. As Karzmieski argued “government officials exercise 
discretion at almost every stage of the access process.”655   
 
                                                          
653 Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c. P-21, at s. 8(m)(i) 
654 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Facts Sheets: The Privacy Act: Not an excuse to promote 
secrecy” (April 2006). Online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada <http://www.priv.gc.ca/resource/fs-
fi/02_05_d_29_e.asp>. 
655 Vincent Kazmierski, “Lights, Judges, Access: How Active Judicial Review of Discretionary Decisions Protects 
Access to Government Information” (2013) 51:1 Alberta Law Review 49 at 50 [Kazmierski].  
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     The Supreme Court has described the two Acts as a “seamless code with complementary 
provisions that can and should be interpreted harmoniously.”656 This means that neither Act can 
be read without the other. In other words, privacy provisions have exceptions about information 
that falls under ATIA, and the ATIA provisions have exceptions about information that falls 
under the Privacy Act. The complexity of these exceptions in both statutes is not always easy to 
disentangle. It is challenging to classify information that is covered under the ATIA if it falls 
under any of the exceptions, including privacy. That is the reason some scholars have debated on 
the complexity of ATI Acts. For instance, Antonia Scalia has labelled FOI laws as the Taj Mahal 
of the Doctrine of Unanticipated Consequences.657 Similarly, Beall argued that “one of the 
continuing themes spicing the reams of literature on FOIA has been the view that the Act opened 
a Pandora’s jar of unintended consequences.”658 
 
     The leading case regarding the interaction between the two rights is Dagg, a the Supreme 
Court case, which ruled that once it is determined that a record falls within the definition of 
“personal information” in s. 3 of the Privacy Act, it is not necessary to consider whether it is also 
encompassed by one of the specific, non-exhaustive examples set out in paragraphs (a) to (i).659 
However, in some cases, it is necessary to refer to paragraphs (a) to (i) of the definition to 
determine to whom the personal information belongs – for example, views and opinions of 
individuals, which are discussed in paragraphs (e), (g) and (h) of the definition.  
 
6.4  The legal framework of privacy in the EU 
 
     The current EU privacy rules originate from Convention No. 108, adopted within the Council 
of Europe in Strasbourg in 1981660. This Convention has proved to be very influential in the 
                                                          
656 Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2003 
SCC 8 at para 22, [2003] 1 SCR 66, at para 22 [RCMP]. The Supreme Court noted in this case that the Privacy Act 
and the Access to Information Act contain: “a seamless code with complementary provisions that can and should be 
interpreted harmoniously”. 
657 Antonio Scalia, “The Freedom of Information has no Clothes” (March/April 1982) 6:2 Regulation: AEI Journal 
of Government and Society 14 at 15 [Scalia]. 
658 Christopher P. Beall, “The exaltation of Privacy Doctrines over Public Information Law” (1995-1996) 45 Duke 
Law Journal 1249 at 1253 [Beall]. 
659 Dagg, supra note 630. 
660 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 28 January 
1981 (European Treaty Series, No. 108). 
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shaping of data protection law at domestic level in Europe and it is still the only international 
treaty on data protection. The Convention is currently ratified by all EU Member States. 
Europeans value their privacy as one of the most important individual rights. The Eurobarometer 
survey, conducted in March 2015, asked 28,000 EU citizens what they think about the protection 
of their personal data. The survey showed that the protection of personal data remains a very 
important concern for citizens.661 Based on this incentive, an entire edifice of privacy protection 
was built to improve the information flow between Member States. In 1995, the EU adopted 
Directive 95/46662. This is the equivalent of the PIPEDA in Canada and deals with information 
processed by private companies. Pursuant to Article 286 EC, Directive 95/46 was transposed in 
2001 into a regulation on the processing of personal data, Regulation 45/2001663. This is the 
equivalent of the Canadian Privacy Act and governs the information processed by the EU 
institutions.  
 
   6.4.1 The Charter status of privacy and Treaty provisions 
 
     Protection of informational privacy in Europe is dealt with primarily by means of data 
protection laws, the purpose of which is to set standards for the handling of personal information. 
Privacy and data protection are however distinguishable. They are protected by separate 
provisions in the EU Charter. Privacy falls under Article 7 of the Charter “Respect for private 
and family life” which states “Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family 
life, home and communications.” Data protection falls under Article 8 “Protection of personal 
data” which states “Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or 
her” (Article 8.1). Additionally, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) protects the 
right of privacy under Article 8 “Right to respect for private and family life” which states 
“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.” (Article 8.1). Furthermore, data protection also received a major boost from the 
                                                          
661 European Commission, Public Opinion. Online: <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm>. 
662 Directive 95/46 of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 Oct. 1995 on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, O.J. 1995, L 
281/31. 
663 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 8, 
12.01.2001. 
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inclusion in the Lisbon treaty, and then Article 16 of the TFEU, which provides that “everyone 
has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them.”664 
 
    However, the distinction between data protection and privacy is often blurred in practice, since 
both rights are closely connected and even overlap each other to a very high extent. The courts 
have opted for a broad scope of the right of privacy which extends further than the notion of 
respect for private and family life of Article 7 of the Charter. The jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), for example, though it is based on the right to respect for 
private life found in Article 8 of the ECHR665, has sometimes relied on data protection 
instruments. They include Convention No.108 and the Directive to determine the scope of that 
right in the information privacy context. Indeed, according to Krananborg, the scope of “private 
life” in Article 8 “seems to be on a par with the scope of data protection”666. 
      
     Decisions involving a conflict of ATI and privacy in the EU have as their starting point the 
relevant articles of the Charter, which include not just Article 42 (regarding the right of ATD of 
the EU institutions) and Articles 7 (concerning the protection of private life/privacy), but also 
Article 8 (concerning data protection). They must also take account of the requirement of Article 
52(3)667 of the Charter to interpret those rights from the point of view of their ECHR 
counterparts thus requiring an examination of the Charter rights from the point of view of both 
Article 8 (privacy) and Article 10 (FOI found under the Freedom of expression) of the ECHR. 
 
     A recent example in the EU where an extensive exercise of balancing the right of privacy and 
the right to know is the Google case.668 The CJEU upheld that internet companies like Google 
                                                          
664 TEU, supra note 58. 
665 See Rotaru v Romania [2000] ECHR 192 (4 May 2000) at paba.43 where the Court said (obiter) that “there is no 
reason in principle to justify excluding activities of a professional or business nature from the notion of private life”. 
666 H. Kranenborg, “Access to Documents and Data Protection in the European Union: On the Public Nature of 
Personal Data” (2008) Common Market Law Review 45, 1092 [Kranenborg]. 
667 Subsection 52(3) of the Charter states: “In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and 
scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent 
Union law providing more extensive protection.” 
668 Case C-131/12. Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and 
Mario Costeja González [Google Spain and Google], online: 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&num=C-131/12&td=ALLDaniel>.  
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have to accommodate requests to remove certain personal information from their search engine 
results.669 In this case, the information was picked by Google from the website of a Spanish 
public body regarding two legitimate announcements for insolvency. In its reasoning of the case, 
the Court made several references to Articles 7 (Private and family life) and 8 (Protection of 
personal data) of the EU Charter. This served as a reminder “about the value of information in 
society, which…. help us make informed decisions in our public and private lives.”670  
 
6.4.2  Exploring Regulation 45 and its interactions with Regulation 1049 
     Regulation 45 was adopted with a clear objective, laid out in Article 1 as having two 
purposes:   
- for the institutions and bodies [...] to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural 
persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data,  
- to neither restrict, nor prohibit the free flow of personal data between themselves or to 
recipients subject to [the principles of the data protection directive.  
 
     There are several articles in the Regulation 45 that might have a strong effect in their 
application when they are cross-referenced with the provisions of Regulation 1049. First, Article 
5 has four requirements which state: 
 
Personal data may be processed only if: 
(a) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest on the 
basis of the Treaties  
(b) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is 
subject, or 
(c) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party  
(d) the data subject has unambiguously given his or her consent 
 
     This article plays an instrumental role when it comes to public disclosure of personal data as 
it defines whether such an act may be legitimate or not. The two first elements of the Article (a 
and b) recognize the fact that a public administration or body is sometimes obliged to disclose 
personal data. Therefore, the data protection regulation opens up to an interpretation according to 
                                                          
669 Court of Justice of the European Union, Press Release No 70/74, Luxemburg, 13 May 2014. 
670 Irma Spahiu, “Between the right to know and the right to forget: looking beyond the Google case” (2015) 6:2 
European Journal of Law and Technology at 18 [Spahiu, “RTK”].  
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Regulation 1049. In case Regulation 1049 requires disclosure, Article 5 does not constitute an 
obstacle.  
     Second, Article 8 requires that personal data shall only be transferred to recipients subject to 
the national law: 
(a) if the recipient establishes that the data are necessary for the performance of a task carried 
out in the public interest or subject to the exercise of public authority, or 
(b) if the recipient establishes the necessity of having the data transferred and if there is no 
reason to assume that the data subject's legitimate interests might be prejudiced. 
 
     Article 8(b) is an illustration of the tension between the data protection regulation and the 
public access regulation, and moreover between the different objectives of the two regulations. A 
literal interpretation of the text would lead to a result which seriously impairs the effectiveness of 
the Regulation 1049. Such a result could not have been envisaged by the Community legislature. 
This subsection presupposes that the recipient of a document containing personal data establishes 
why he needs access to it. However, ATD is given to enable citizens to participate more closely 
in the democratic process. As such, it is essential to this objective that the citizen does not have 
to establish any specific interest in the disclosure of a document.  
 
     Therefore, subsection sub-section 8(b) has to be interpreted in the light of the objectives of 
the relevant provisions of both the Regulation 45 and the Regulation 1049. On the one hand, 
Article 2 of the Regulation 1049 gives the EU citizens a legally enforceable right to ATD. On the 
other hand, Article 8(b), merely envisages the protection of the data subject, in cases when the 
disclosure of the data is in itself allowed according to the provisions of Community law on data 
processing. In such cases the transfer of the data in itself would normally not prejudice a 
persons’s legitimate interests. In other words, if the transfer of personal data is allowed by the 
other provisions of Regulation 45, Article 8(b) cannot restrict disclosure.      
 
     These considerations lead to the following interpretation: in cases where data are transferred 
to give effect to Article 2 of the Regulation 1049, and provided that the disclosure of the data is 
allowed according to the provisions of Community law on data processing, the necessity of 
having the data transferred is by definition established. Moreover, such a transfer cannot 
prejudice the legitimate interest of the data subject. In other words, a necessary transfer cannot 
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prejudice legitimate interests, taken into account the conditions and safeguards provided by 
Regulation 1049.   
 
     If we now look at Regulation 1049, Article 4 (1) (b) is cross-referenced with Regulation 45 
because the relevant rules on data protection referred to in this provision are laid down in 
Regulation 45. Article 4(1)(b) provides that: 
 
“1. The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the 
protection of:  
(b) privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with Community 
legislation regarding the protection of personal data.” 
 
     This provision must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, where three elements need to be 
taken into account:    
 
1- the mere fact that a document mentions personal data does not automatically mean that the 
privacy and integrity of a person are affected. It should be proved that the privacy and the 
integrity of the data subject must be at stake.  
2- the words “would undermine” imply that the protection of the privacy and integrity of an 
individual must be harmed. The level of harm needed for the applicability of the exception to 
public access is not mentioned. However, the wording “undermining” implies that the effect on 
the interest of the data subject should be substantial. Hence, it should be proved that the public 
access must substantially affect the data subject.    
3- the harm done to a person's privacy and integrity should be examined in accordance with 
community legislation regarding the protection of personal data. The prime sources of 
community legislation regarding the protection of personal data are Directive 95/46/EC and 
Regulation (EC) 45/2001. Hence, public access can only be given if this is allowed by the data 
protection legislation.   
 
     The interaction between Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049 and Article 8(b) of Regulation 45 
has been extensively interpreted in the Bavarian Lager671, a guiding privacy case of the CJEU. 
                                                          
671 European Commission v The Bavarian Lager Co. Ltd., Case C-28/08 P, 2010 I-06055 [Bavarian Lager]. 
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The decision clarified the meaning of Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049 which must be 
interpreted as a direct referral to the data protection regulation, without any threshold. Moreover, 
the Court is clear about the fact that names may be regarded as “personal data” and that the 
communication of such data falls within the definition of “processing” in the sense of Regulation 
45. In case of a public access request for a document containing personal data, such as in the 
Bavarian Lager case, the rules on data protection are entirely applicable, with Article 8(b) having 
crucial importance.  
 
6.5  Comparisons and conclusions 
 
     The comparisons of the rights of privacy and ATI in Canada and the EU demonstrate the 
tensions and the challenges that exist in implementing ATI laws. In Canada, ATI and privacy do 
conflict each other on a regularly basis as the data shows. Over the years the number of privacy 
exemptions under the ATIA has grown exponentially (see Tables 4 and 5).  
 
     Scholarly debates describe privacy as an individual right rooted in traditional liberal 
thought672, based upon premises of individualism existing to promote the worth and the dignity 
of the individual.673 Similarly, privacy has been described as inherently personal and as a right 
which recognizes the sovereignty of the individual674. As such, the rationale for information 
privacy, is most commonly articulated in terms of personal rights. It is often conceived of as a 
civil liberty of negative nature and as human right which protects individual autonomy and/or 
human dignity675. Such categorization of the right of privacy makes it a strong competitor to the 
right of ATI.   
 
                                                          
672 Priscilla P Regan, “Privacy as a Common Good in the Digital World” (2002) 5 Information, Communication and 
Society 382, at 397 [Regan]. 
673 Thomas Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression (1970) 545, 549, cited in Daniel Solove, “I‘ve Got 
Nothing to Hide’ and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy” (2007) 44 San Diego Law Review 745, 760. 
674 Daniel Solove, “I‘ve Got Nothing to Hide’ and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy” (2007) 44 San Diego Law 
Review 745, at 761 [Solove, “Nothing to hide”]. 
675 Privacy is explicitly recognized as a human right in Article 17 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights and also in Article 8 of the European Human Rights Conventions. The former has been interpreted by the 
Human Rights Committee as requiring, inter alia, the implementation of basic data protection principles: See 
General Comment 16, issued 23 March 1998, at 7 and 10. 
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     A conceptual analysis of the notions of privacy and information validates the concerns of the 
legal practitioners. Chief Justice of Canada McLachlin admitted that “it is logically impossible to 
give both rights a dominant position. On the one hand, as a ‘right’, one would expect the right to 
personal privacy to be understood broadly. On the other hand, because personal privacy is cast as 
an exception to the right of access to government information, it must be interpreted 
narrowly”.676 In Canada, the structure of the ATIA and Privacy Act mirrors the inherent tension 
between the public’s right to ATI, and the individual’s right to restrict the disclosure of 
information for privacy reasons. Indeed, the legislator’s choice to enact these two pieces of 
legislation together, to draft them so that they share definitions and exemptions, to design them 
as a “seamless code”, places this tension at the heart of any interpretative exercise of the Acts677.  
 
     The Canadian legal framework has established a constitutional privacy right, but does not 
grant such status to the right of ATI. This right has been slower to develop in that direction, and 
it has not yet reached the same degree of acceptance constitutionally. The statutory scheme 
establishes a far-reaching domain of discretionary power which creates the risk that access to 
records will be denied in order to preclude appropriate scrutiny of public affairs on the pretext 
that disclosure will unfairly invade the privacy of data subjects678. The three-step test applied to 
the section 19 of the ATIA, include discretion as the last step of the test. Therefore, the dominant 
approach in Canada will be to deny requests if there is even a small risk that disclosure of the 
information may cause even minor harm to a protected interest. The requirement of harm to a 
protected interest is not interpreted rigorously, as it should be to override a fundamental human 
right. The public interest override in section 19 is applied only where there is a clearly dominant 
interest in the information in question, and not at all for exceptions such as privacy. For this 
reason Canada, has been criticized of going “far beyond keeping private lives private…. This 
slavish devotion to privacy chokes off information that really should be public.”679 
     In the EU, both privacy and ATI rights have a constitutional status recognized in treaties, the 
Charter and the Convention. This gives them equal footing when conflicting with each other. The 
                                                          
676 McLachlin, “ATI”, supra note 228 at 8.  
677 Ibid, at 7.  
678 McCamus, “The delicate balance”, supra note 604 at 54.  
679 Fred Vallance-Jones, “Let’s keep it a secret”, Media-The Canadian Association of Journalists, Fall 2004, 10(4), 
at 37 [Vallance-Jones, “Let’s keep”].  
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two Regulation governing each rights have a wider and more complex relationship with each 
other, with manyArticles referring to each other. The three-part test applied for the section 
4(1)(b) of the Regulation 1049 when is cross-referenced with Regulation 45, does not include a 
discretion step. However, even in the EU, it seems that privacy has preference over access, 
because of the value embedded in it as an individual value. I will look further into the privacy-
ATI dichotomy when I explore the courts jurisprudence and the legal discourse that surrounds it.  
     Although, the prevailing view is that ATI and privacy are inherently contradictory, their 
interrelationship is in fact a complex one. ATI is concerned with the transparency and access, 
while privacy with secrecy and protecting information from disclosure. However, the rights of 
privacy and ATI may overlap in a complementary manner. First, privacy laws may have 
important transparency dimensions. Rights of access under privacy laws may overlap with ATI 
rights to the extent that individuals are able to use ATI laws to access their own personal data. 
Hence “an individual should be able to use them to access his or her own personal information 
unless the FOI or privacy law specifically precludes this.”680 Second, privacy regimes require the 
granting of access to personal information and ATI regimes include privacy provisions 
exempting personal information from access. Third, both regimes rely on effective information 
management to be able to operate appropriately. Solove (2003) argues that “information flow 
and privacy are both extremely important values; finding the right balance will be critical to 
shaping the future of a world increasingly driven by information.”681 
 
     Table 4 below provides information regarding the times ATI requests have been rejected in 
Canada because of privacy exemptions. The numbers suggest that it happens quite often. Table 5 
illustrates in a graph the rejections for privacy reasons (blue line) in relation to the total number 
of rejections (orange line). The numbers show that privacy rejections constitute a considerable 
amount when compared to the total number (always over 30%), and they keep increasing. 
 
 
                                                          
680 Maeve McDonagh & Moira Paterson, Freedom of Information: Taking Account of the Circumstances of 
Individual Applicants (2010) Public Law, at 505 [McDonagh & Paterson]. 
681 Solove, D. (2003) ‘The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections against Disclosure’ 53 (3) Duke 
Law Journal 1039, at 1065 [Solove, “The vitues”].  
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Table 4: Exemptions applied under ATIA 
  
sec.19 
2013-14 
20,702 
2012-13 
20,797 
2011-12 
18,665 
2010-11 
18,392 
(36.5%) 
2009-10 
16,544 
(34%) 
2008-09 
13,985 
(31.2%) 
2007-08 
12,119 
(29.5%) 
2007-08 
10,755 
(30.2%) 
2006-07 
9,098 
(30.5%) 
2005-06 
8,499 
(32.1%) 
Source: Data of the Government of Canada at InfoSource. Available at http://www.infosource.gc.ca/index-eng.asp 
 
 
Table 5: Access to Information and privacy requests  
 
Source: Table drawn by author using data of the Government of Canada at InfoSource. Available at 
http://www.infosource.gc.ca/index-eng.asp 
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PART III  
THE DYNAMICS OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION: ACTORS 
AND PRACTICES 
CHAPTER 7: THE ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF ACCESS TO 
INFORMATION    
 
     In this chapter I look at the administrative system of management of ATI laws, government 
institutions responsible, their mandate and practices. As I have argued in the previous chapter, 
the disclosure of information heavily depends on the public officials holding the information. 
Many scholars have paid close attention to this challenge and have emphasized the critical role 
of implementation of ATI laws plays for an effective ATI regime. The purpose of this chapter is 
to examine how the practices of government institutions affect the ATI regimes in both Canada 
and the EU, and what are the implications of discretionary powers on transparency and ATI. To 
do so, I play close attention to the institutions responsible for the administration of the ATI laws. 
Their practices are indicators of how governments perceive and value ATI as a right. Statistics, 
policies, and guidelines of some of these institutions will be studied to understand the dynamics 
of the ATI regime.  
 
     In addition, I look at the role of the public official assigned to deal with ATI requests, the 
ATIP Coordinators. To complement the study of ATI practices, I have prepared a questionnaire 
that asks ATIP coordinators a few questions about the value of ATI laws. Then, I compare the 
data gathered in this chapter with the information I received from the interviews with the some 
representatives of the media and the NGOs. By doing so, I examine ATI processes both from an 
“insider” (looking at those responsible for the management of the ATI system) and an “outsider” 
perspective (looking at the users of the right of ATI). Berzins draws attention that the analysis of 
the issues may suffer from lack of familiarity with the internal working of the access process. 
Also, an insider’s view could be of value to those outside the process since it helps them 
empathize with ATI’s objectives and dynamics and understand how the system works better.682 
                                                          
682 Christopher Berzins, “Ontario’s Freedom of Information Access Process: ‘A view from the Inside’” (2002) 
26:1&2 Advocates Quarterly 1 at 2 [Berzins]. 
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7.1  Looking at access to information from a political and cultural institutional perspective 
 
     The contextual factor which matters most for understanding variations in the design and 
implementation of ATI laws is the institutional structure of political power, understood in the 
broad sense as including both the formal rules governing relations between important actors, and 
the organisational forms those actors take.683 In countries where there are centralised institutions 
enjoying a formal monopoly over representation in the policymaking process, ATI laws tend to 
be weaker than in countries where there are more veto points which tend to compete with one 
another. This is because, in the former case, political groups who hold the monopoly enjoy 
privileged access to a good deal of official information without the need for general access laws. 
In fact, their privileged access is likely to be threatened by such laws, and they are likely to share 
a preference for secrecy with the bureaucracy. 
     
     According to Larsen and Walby, the debate about government transparency takes place in two 
interconnected realms. The first is the political realm and it focuses on participatory democracy 
and the constitutional state. The second is the administrative realm and it focuses on managerial 
concerns related to the idea of good governance684. Especially in governmental systems, where 
the political power is highly concentrated in the executive branch, the relationship between the 
two realms has a strong bond of a subjugatory nature. In these systems, the political realm seems 
to dictate “the urge to regulate the flow of information”685, as Savoie puts it. First-past-the-post 
parliamentary systems such as Australia or Canada, which produce frequent majority 
governments, have systematically resisted calls to overhaul their FOI laws686. This is explained 
with the political traditions of the monarchy, which allowed for the concentration of power on 
the monarch’s hands. Political control is exacerbated even more in systems with little checks and 
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balances on executive power. Looking at the factors that affected ATI legislation in Canada, 
McCamus noted: 
     The Canadian system of government places effective control over both the executive and 
legislative branches of government in the hands of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. If the 
enactment of freedom of information legislation ….is to be explained in part by the existence 
of tension between executive and legislative branches of government, such tension normally 
is absent in the Canadian context.687 
 
     McCamus countered these arguments by saying that, in a system which emphasizes party 
discipline, access legislation is needed to restore accountability.688 
The Westminster system of government had always been criticized for the degree to which 
it concentrates political authority in the hands of Cabinet ministers and bureaucrats. The 
long tradition of this monopoly has resulted in a political apathy of the citizens. Chambers 
rightfully argued long time ago that “In parliamentary systems based on the British model, 
citizens are more likely to defer to the judgment of their representatives, rather than having 
power in their hands, because their democratic institutions were added onto an aristocratic 
institution - the British monarchy.689  
 
     Another important factor which determines how ATI is perceived, debated and implemented 
is the political and administrative culture dominant in the institutional settings. ATI laws are only 
the tip of the iceberg in the enormous ATI edifice. Base on his experience with ATI, former 
Information Commissioner Michinson argued that:  
 
FOI laws are not fundamentally flawed. There are areas that need to be amended or updated 
to reflect experience and societal progress, but the laws do a pretty good job of reflecting the 
underlying value of open and transparent government. The main difficulty is a cultural one. 
Unless there is a culture of transparency within government, the legislation will never work 
to its optimum potential.690  
 
     Similarly, Larsen and Walby contended that “The dysfunctionalities of the current ATI 
framework are by no means reducible to problems with the law, ‘techniques of opacity’ are tied 
                                                          
687 McCamus, “FOI in Canada”, supra note 283 at 51.  
688 Ibid, at 54.  
689 Elizabeth Chambers, “The Referendum and the Plebiscite”, in Norman Ward & Duff. Spafford eds, Politics in 
Saskatchewan 59, 62 (1968) [Chambers]. 
690 Tom Michinson, “Access, Transparency and Democracy: Looking Back, Looking Forward: Remarks by Tom 
Mitchinson, Office of Ontario, September 20, 2002, at 2, online: < https://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/up-
092002tm.pdf> [Michinson, “Access”]. 
186 
 
to political and administrative cultures.”691 Indeed, as I have discussed in Chapter 4, with the 
notable exception of the Nordic countries, until recently a strong anti-transparency tradition 
characterised both the Canadian and the EU legal orders.  
 
     Many scholars argue that there is a strong association between transparency, ATI and 
democracy. Yet, international developments demonstrate that the idea that stronger democracies 
are more favourable to transparency and ATI, is not necessarily true. Indeed, countries like the 
UK and Germany, which were democratic throughout the post–war era and have older traditions 
of parliamentary governments, have only adopted ATI laws in 2000 and 2005692 respectively, 
while former communist East European countries, like Albania, did so before them.  
 
     This behaviour has been explained by evidence in comparative contexts which reinforces the 
observation, anticipated by Roberts693, that transparency can be expected to weaken confidence 
in government because, first, it offers a drum-beat of scandal, and second because the 
discretionary decisions over the release of information itself, reinforces the public‘s view that the 
government has something to hide694. Speaking about the US on the difficulties of achieving a 
fully transparent state, Fenster argued that formal legal rights have failed to overcome the 
political, practical, and bureaucratic obstacles that obstruct the state‘s visibility to the public695. 
 
     A politically sensitive area with respect to the ATI right is national security. There is a 
danger that claims of national security may unduly limit the openness and transparency needed in 
a democratic society.696 Edward Snowden, a former U.S. National Security Agency contractor 
who made possible the leaking of classified documents about the NSA's surveillance programs, 
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argued that “Terrorism is ‘an extraordinarily rare natural disaster’ and should not be used as an 
excuse by government to pass laws that limit our rights and freedoms.”697  
 
7.2   Government approaches to access to information in Canada  
 
7.2.1 The Canadian political environment on transparency and access to information  
     The Canadian government has a long history of promises for improving transparency and 
enhancing the public’s right to know. When the Liberals introduced the ATIA in 1980 they 
claimed that the Act would be “one of the cornerstones of Canadian democracy.”698 However, 
John Crosbie, the first Justice Minister to be responsible for the Act, dismissed it as a tool for 
“mischief-makers” whose objective is to “embarrass political leaders and titillate the public.”699 
 Again, in its 1993 election platform, the opposition Liberal party complained that “the people 
are irritated with governments . . . that try to conduct key parts of the public business behind 
closed doors”. They promised that open government would be “the watchword of the Liberal 
program.”700 However, in the 2000s Canada’s government was involved in many scandals, with 
the sponsorship scandal in 2004 being one of the biggest for misuse of public funds. This meant 
that the culture of secrecy was still resilient in Canadian politics, and that ATI was a necessary 
tool against this culture.   
 
     At the electoral campaign in 2005, Stephen Harper affirmed that “Information is the lifeblood 
of a democracy. Without adequate access to key information about government policies and 
programs, citizens and parliamentarians cannot make informed decisions, and incompetent or 
corrupt governance can be hidden under a cloak of secrecy.”701 When the Conservative 
government came to power in 2006 Harper promised to include the changes recommended by the 
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ICC into his first bill “The Federal Accountability Act”. Instead, the government announced that 
the ATIA reforms were going to be sent separately to a Parliamentary committee for review, 
reportedly due to pressure from the bureaucracy. The proposed changes were strongly criticized 
by the ICC as reducing ATI702. The Harper government was later highly criticized to have “failed 
to champion access to information”703 and also for imposing “new gag rules on officials speaking 
to the media or releasing information without permission.”704 In addition, the Harper government 
according to the Globe and Mail, used amber-lighting protocols to ensure that all potentially 
sensitive requests were sent to the Privy Council Office and Prime Minister’s Office for 
review.705 Furthermore, in 2012, the Harper government was involved in the Senate expenses 
scandal when several senators were accused of spending public money for personal expenses, 
hence, pointing on matters of accountability and transparency.  
 
     The current Liberal government of Canada, elected in October, 2015 made big promises on 
improving openness as part of an effort to restore popular faith in the government that was 
thought to have become remote and unresponsive. Before coming to power Liberal leader 
Trudeau introduced a Bill in 2014706 for an overhaul of the ATIA, which was defeated in 
Parliament in 2015 (See Chapter 4.2.2). Time will tell whether and how these electoral promises 
will be fulfilled.  
 
     Despite all the promises, ATI in Canada has been kept hostage of political indifference 
towards transparency. The repetitive failure to truly commit to transparency has strong roots in 
Canada’s Westminster model of government. This model is supported by the legal structure in 
place which keeps transparency away from the Cabinet confidences. The Supreme Court of 
Canada explained that “the process of democratic government works best when Cabinet 
members charged with government policy and decision-making are free to express themselves 
around Cabinet table unreservedly.”707 Cabinet confidences are currently excluded from the 
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application of the ATIA and the Privacy Act, and the government believes this should continue. 
“The fear is that if Cabinet discussions were made public, ministers would censor themselves, 
refraining from unpopular opinions or making politically incorrect comments, thus 
compromising the value of the discussions.”708 However, in 2005, the Department of Justice 
proposed a modification to the current scheme.  If the proposal were considered, the Government 
would have enshrined in the legislation the right of the ICC and the IPC to go to court to 
challenge definitional issues (if information constitutes a confidence). The proposal would have 
also allowed the ICC to ask the Federal Court to review the government’s determination that 
information sought under an access request, fell within the definition of a Cabinet confidence 
and, for that reason, was properly not accessible pursuant to the Act. If the Court would not agree 
with the determination made by the government, then the information would have no longer been 
excluded from the application of the Act.709 No action has been pursued following this proposal, 
which demonstrates the difficulty of changing the status quo of the Cabinet confidences.  
 
     The Canadian ATI regime took a step back in May 2008 when cancelled CAIRS - a 
centralized tracking system. This was in contradiction with the inspiration of the ATIA. The 
development of CAIRS was approved by Cabinet in 1988 and became operational in 1990. The 
system was substantially upgraded in 2001 to enable the government to monitor the progress of 
ATI requests and facilitate the coordination of responses to requests.710According to the 
Canadian Bar Association “CAIRS provided a central repository of information on all current 
and past requests and an opportunity for enhanced proactive disclosure under the ATIA.”711 One 
of the reasons for the scrapping of CAIRS was its cost. The government argued that it “was no 
longer useful and too expensive to manage”.712 According to Roberts, in 2000 the Canadian 
government estimated that the annual cost of administering the ATIA was US $ 19.4 million or 
about US $ 1,340 for each information request received that year713. According to the TBS, the 
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total cost of operations relating to ATI requests from 1983 to 2014 was $670,470,779 which 
represents an average cost of $1,077 per request completed.714 These expenses seem high, and I 
am not sure whether the numbers are realistic or what kind of expenses they include. However, 
they cannot be a reason for dismantling good tracking systems as CAIRS. Especially now, the 
advancements in information technology offer better data management.   
 
     The general rule in the ATIA is that “government information should be available to the 
public,” and that “necessary exceptions to the right of access should be limited and specific.715” 
Justice La Forest in its 2005 report on the ATIA review, advised that if this legal principle is to 
have its full effect, the bureaucracy must experience a profound cultural shift.”716 To achieve this 
shift government must do much more to foster a “culture of compliance” by making it clear to 
officials that access should be provided unless there is a clear and compelling reason not to do 
so; developing better information management systems; ensuring adequate training for access 
officials; and providing adequate incentives for compliance717. The persistence in preserving 
rules that limit transparency, directly affects the working of the entire machinery of the 
government, the politically elected ministers and bureaucrats supporting them. According to 
Sossin:  
Elected officials are supposed to maintain the fundamental values of responsible government, 
which guarantees that a cabinet minister maintains political responsibility for the actions of 
his or her ministry. This legal fiction holds that bureaucratic actors work in the loyal service 
of government, thus ensuring a hierarchal line of accountability between elected ministers 
and unelected bureaucrats.718 
 
     Hence, for the change to occur, it has to start from above at the polical level, and spill over 
the bureaucratic machinery. Especially in a system with strong party discipline as Canada, a top-
down approach would be a more viable option.  
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7.2.2 Government practices affecting the Access to Information Act implementation   
     Having a piece of legislation in place does not translate to an effective ATI regime. In the 
case of ATI, Roberts has argued that “Statutory entitlements could be undermined if government 
institutions refuse to commit adequate resources for implementation or consistently exercise 
discretionary powers granted by the law in ways that are inimical to aims of the legislation.”719 
Indeed, several practices exist in Canada that limit the scope of the ATIA. First, there are some 
internal departmental procedures, described by Roberts as the “hidden law” on ATI, or “internal 
routines and technologies.”720 They can substantially restrict statutory rights for certain kinds of 
requesters721. This “hidden law” is built upon the development of sophisticated procedures within 
federal institutions for managing politically sensitive requests for information.722  
 
      Second, there is potential for differential treatment of requesters, depending on their status. 
The ATIA provides that individuals making requests should identify themselves. This provision 
poses risks for any potential discrimination based on the status of the individual. For instance, 
the results of a study conducted by Roberts at the Human Resource and Development Canada for 
requests in 1999-2001 showed that “requests that came from the media and political parties had 
significantly longer processing times and the probability that such requests would exceed 
statutory response times was significantly higher.”723 This study suggests that while the ATIA 
mandates that all requesters be treated equally, some requests coming from specific subjects are, 
in practice, often treated differently. Roberts also reports that at the Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada (CIC), there is a procedure for handling politically sensitive requests, which is known 
within CIC as the “amber light process”. An amber light is a warning to officials to proceed with 
caution in their handling of an ATI request. The complete “disclosure package”, including 
documents which are to be released to the requester, along with the “communications products” 
is sent to the Minister’s Office for review.724 According to Roberts, comparable amber light 
procedures have been adopted within other major departments such as Department of Foreign 
                                                          
719 Roberts, “Administrative discretion and ATIA”, supra note 5 at 176.  
720 Roberts, “Spin control”, supra note 169 at 1.  
721 Ibid, at 17.  
722 Roberts, “Two Challenges”, supra note 463 at 119.   
723 Roberts, “Administrative discretion and ATIA”, supra note 5 at 176.  
724 Roberts, “Spin control”, supra note 169 at 7.  
192 
 
Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Department of National Defence (DND), the 
Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS), Department of Justice725. 
 
     In support of the differential treatment of requests, Roberts observed that federal departments 
and agencies deployed software systems for tracking information requests such as the ATIPflow. 
This was a case-management software program to manage the workload and collect data. It 
allowed ATIP officers to categorize incoming requests by level of sensitivity. Roberts criticized 
this system for being a clear violation of the ATIA, since the practice of categorizing requests by 
sensitivity is not sanctioned anywhere in the Act.726 Because of the controversy it attracted, the 
ATIPflow tracking system was replaced with the new AccessPro Case Management System 
software727 in 2009.  
 
     The differential treatment based on the content of a request was analyzed in a report on the 
ATIA administration completed for TBS in February 2002. The report found that in some 
departments, “senior management required weekly updates as to the content of requests. This 
would allow them to highlight areas of interest/sensitivity for close monitoring. Other 
departments were requested to give senior management this type of information on an as-and-
when required basis.”728 The report confirmed that the differential treatment did exist in ATI 
administration, and it was against the requirement of the ATIA that all requests should receive 
equal treatment.   
 
     Third, blame-avoidance policy-strategy responses accompany transparency. These strategies 
typically involve a more active and defensive central management of information than before, 
with the intention to lower political risks of blame. According to Hood, they may consist of 
charges for information that had previously been freely supplied, price levels not likely to be 
readily affordable by ordinary citizens or even the abandonment of services, where blame might 
ensue. There is good evidence that large fee estimates will cause requesters to narrow or abandon 
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their requests.729.To the extent that blame-avoidance prompts policy strategy responses of this 
type, the result is likely to be at least jeopardy and, perversity. Hood claimed that, while FOI 
measures are almost invariably introduced with the promise that they will produce a new culture 
of openness in executive government, the effect in practice tends to be the opposite, in the form 
of a climate of tighter central management of politically sensitive information.730 It is in these 
situations when, in Heremans’s words, “too much transparency can kill transparency by 
triggering a variety of evasive practices.”731 
 
     Fourth, there is a chance of abandonment, tweaking, or redundancy of record-keeping. Some 
practices in bureaucratic behaviour involve a risk of shifting from written deliberation or 
recorded phone conversations, to informal face-to-face discussions, whenever civil servants or 
policy-makers want such debates to take place in secret.732 It has been argued that ATI triggers a 
chilling effect whereby the record is either reduced or exists “off paper,” a process labeled as 
“empty archives” phenomenon in Sweden.733 In many cases erasure of records takes place, 
which is the worst thing, because an erasure of records means erasure of history. Vallance-Jones 
alleged that “A lot of time you can't prove that the reason you got a response of ‘no records’ 
wasn't because nothing existed, but because perhaps the records were destroyed.”734 Certain 
practices aim at derailing the disclosure of information by producing documents which are 
difficult to find and make sense of. Fenster argued that “when an agency or an individual 
government official prefers to protect information from disclosure, then the agency or official is 
more likely to produce it in a form, circulate it by a method, and/or maintain or destroy it so that 
the information will either fall outside disclosure requirements or avoid detection.”735 For 
instance, the Senate expense scandal left no public paper trail in the Prime Minister's own 
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bureaucracy, not an email, memo or even a sticky note, according to CBC News. According to 
Weston “The PM's public service, claimed ….that it had no documents of any kind related to the 
scandal nor anyone involved in it, including Harper's former chief of staff, Nigel Wright. The 
federal Justice Department made a similar claim”.736  
 
     Another way to circumvent responses to transparency measures is producing so much data 
that only the most persistent and knowledgeable individuals can effectively distinguish signal 
from noise. Hood mentions “snowing” as a procedure in which the pursuit of blame-avoidance 
leads to so much data being produced with so little interpretation or quality control that it has the 
effect of reducing rather than increasing effective openness and information.737 
 
      Information technology represents great opportunities for the dissemination of data, but also 
a greater challenge for the preservation of information. We are now at the age of electronics, 
internet, emails, virtual clouds, online social networks, and so on, which were foreign to human 
communication in the 80s. Much of government business is now done by emails. Electronic 
communication cannot be recorded properly and in many cases gets lost. This loss could occur 
either purposely or involuntarily, but both ways can have a major repercussion on access rights. 
 
    Fifth, sometimes selective proactive disclosure is introduced as an improvement of ATI. 
Politicians and officials often strategically choose to disclose “information” through coordinated 
public relations campaigns that produce pre-packaged, tightly controlled “news”. In this 
institutional process, the texts of government information are edited, explained, de- and re-
contextualized, and interpreted.738 For instance, considering Canada’s commitment to the OGP 
and the Action Plan to honor it, the government has taken pride of the achievements. In the 
debates that took place at the House of Commons for the Justin Trudeau’s Bill C-613 (amending 
the ATIA), Dan Albas, Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Treasury Board, 
maintained that under the Conservative government, Canadians were accessing more information 
from the government than ever before. In support of this statement he referred to the increased 
                                                          
736 Greg Weston, “Senate expense scandal left no paper trail, really?”, CBC News, September 2, 2013. Online: 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/senate-expense-scandal-left-no-paper-trail-really-1.1344795>. 
737 Hood, “What happens”, supra note 76 at 204. 
738 Fenster, “Opacity”, supra note 50 at 926-927. 
195 
 
number of the pages of released information from the government (6 million pages in 2012-
2013). 739 But, is open data the same as open government?  Responding to these comments, Geist 
critically argued that “An open government plan that only addresses the information that 
government wants to make available, rather than all of the information to which the public is 
entitled, is not an open plan.”740 Of course, providing more data can improve transparency, but 
data alone cannot be a substitute for ATI since it fails to honor the right of the public in getting 
the information it needs, instead of what is being offered selectively.  
     Sixth, delays and the creation of backlogs can become commonplace. Backlogs can develop 
for several reasons. A simple answer can be a shortage of resources that prevents from 
responding on time. Another is the lack of experience in handling a large number of requests. A 
toothless ICC also creates backlogs since it cannot order public officials to release information. 
In that case, bureaucratic incentives to comply with the law become weaker, creating another 
backlog at the ICC office, those of complaints and appeals.741 The Globe and Mail experience 
with an information request in 2009 discovered two years later that departments try to get as 
many requests as possible out the door within the legally mandated timeframe. That way, they 
can claim they adequately processed a number of requests. The files left sitting in the system 
have already been deemed to be failures and no amount of work can restore their status – so they 
may sit there for a long time. According to a civil servant “Once a file is late, it's late. There is 
nothing that can change that. A day late, a month late, a year late, it's all the same. It's late.”742 
Since there is no sanction for late responses, the incentive to respond to them is missing. This 
situation brings the creation of huge backlogs and extended delays. It is obviously a hole in the 
ATIA that needs to be fixed. 
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     Seventh, reducing resources available for the administration of the ATIA can affect its 
implementation. According to the TBS, in the 90s federal departments and agencies reduced 
resources for FOI administration and enforcement, as part of a broader restraint exercise that was 
intended to trim “non-essential spending” within the public service743.  Some central agencies 
explored the possibility of increasing ATI fees744 to recoup the cost administering ATI, but there 
was no action on that idea. For some officials, the resources dedicated to ATI administration 
could not be defended as essential spending; on the contrary, FOI requirements were viewed as a 
“disruptive and costly” imposition745. Budget reductions have certainly lengthened processing 
time for FOI requests and increased the inclination of departments and agencies to withhold 
requested information. Cutting off resources is against the spirit of the ATIA - it deeply affects its 
practices. It is obvious, according to Vallance-Jones, that “the act cannot function as it was 
intended to if officials aren’t given enough people to do the job.”746 
 
     Most of these practices surfaced during the Inquiry on the Sponsorship Scandal. Referring to 
the Inquiry, ICC John Reid explained that witnesses in the Gomery Commission gave plenty of 
evidence about the abuse of power. He said:  
 
We have heard evidence about deliberate attempts to avoid keeping a paper trail of decisions, 
recommendations and actions…We have seen how access requests are stonewalled and 
ignored, and ATIP coordinators bullied, in order to save ministers and departments from 
embarrassment.  And, most troubling of all, we have seen evidence that, in times of a 
perceived national unity crisis, governments may feel that the obligation to be law abiding is 
optional and that ends come to justify any means.747 
 
     All these examples demonstrate how much power rests on the hands of the political 
leadership and their bureaucratic machinery, and how this power can be detrimental to the proper 
implementation of an ATI law.   
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744 Treasury Board Secretariat, “Review of costs associated with administration of ATIP legislation,” April 1996. 
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for Treasury Board Secretariat, Government of Canada, 1996. 
746 Fred Vallance-Jones, “Access, Administration, and Democratic Intent” in Brokering Access: Power, Politics, and 
Freedom of Information Process in Canada, Edited by Mike Larsen and Kevin Walby, (UBC Press: Vancouver, 
2012) at 307 [Vallance-Jones, “Access”].  
747 John Reid, Information Commissioner of Canada, “A Commissioner’s Perspective: Then and Now”, 
October 6, 2005, online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/media_room-speeches-2005-october_6.aspx>. 
197 
 
 
A. Institutions responsible for the administration of the Access to Information Act  
     In Canada, three different central agencies have specific roles and responsibilities under the 
ATIA: the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS), the Department of Justice (DJ) and the Privy 
Council Office (PCO). Two ministers share responsibilities for ATI, the President of the TBS 
Board, and the Minister of Justice. The TBS supports the President of the Treasury Board in his 
duty as designated Minister responsible for the administrative oversight of the Act. He is 
responsible for issuing policy instruments to the ATI and Privacy community and other federal 
institutions with respect to the administration of the Act and advising, training, and guidance. 
TBS publishes InfoSource748, a compilation of statistical information about the ATIA 
administration of institutions, their programs and information holdings to assist individuals 
exercising rights under the legislation. It also collects annual statistics on the administration of 
the Act.  
 
     The Minister of Justice is also a designated minister for the ATIA and responsible for the 
legislation. He deals with issues such as the extension of the right of access, the designation of 
the head of a government institution, specifying investigative bodies and classes of investigations 
and amending schedule I which enumerates the institutions covered by the Act. Institutions 
receive legal advice on ATI from the DJ through in-house legal services units or from its 
Information Law and Privacy Unit. 
 
     Finally, the Clerk of the Privy Council is responsible for policies on the administration of 
Confidences of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada and determines what information 
constitutes a Confidence of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada. Cabinet Confidences are 
excluded from the application of the Act, according to section 69. The Act lists a number of 
examples749 of records that may be excluded including: Cabinet memoranda, discussion papers, 
agendas, records of discussions and communications between Ministers on matters relating to the 
making of government decisions or the formulation of government policy; pre-Cabinet briefings 
                                                          
748 See <www.infosource.gc.ca>.   
749 Section 69 (1) of the ATIA.   
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of Ministers and draft legislation. This list indicates that the workings of the Canadian 
government is immune from transparency rules.   
 
     The everyday administration of the ATIA is carried out by the head of each institution, ATIP 
coordinators and occasionally other public officials. The head of each institution is responsible 
for the administration of the Act within the respective institution. The “head of a government 
institution” is the elected Minister responsible for a department or agency, an appointed public 
office holder or the chief executive officer of an organization. Their responsibilities include the 
processing of access requests, the designation of a delegate, the exercise of discretion and ATI 
awareness. There are more than forty powers, duties and functions in the Act that can be 
delegated. Many models of delegations exist across the federal government.750  
      
     The ATIA establishes an annual reporting requirement for all departments and agencies under 
the Act, based on which they are required to report to Parliament of their administration of the 
Act. This is a good practice, especially if the legislature has some level of political competition 
between parties which would put those reports in good use to control government. But, in case of 
a majority government the reports go unnoticed.  
     After joining the OGP in 2012, Canada committed to intensify its efforts towards better 
transparency, and learn from international best practices.751 A series of projects were introduced and 
implemented following the OGP. In 2013, the government announced an Access to Information and 
Privacy Online Request Pilot Project752. Three departments participated in the one-year pilot 
project, the Citizenship and Immigration Canada, the Shared Services Canada and the TBS. Now 
the list has extended to 31 institutions that offer their services on line through a common 
portal.753 Through this service people may submit their request on line and pay online as well. 
The common practice to make a request for information under ATIA has been to write a letter and a 
                                                          
750 Josée Villeneuve, “Assessment of public institutions’ performance in access to information: The Canadian 
experience”, Office of the Information Commissioner at 9.  
751 Government of Canada, “Canada's Action Plan on Open Government 2014-16”, online: 
<http://open.canada.ca/en/content/canadas-action-plan-open-government-2014-16>. 
752 Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, “Access to Information and Privacy Online Request Pilot Project”, online: 
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check in the amount of the application fee. This was a substantial barrier to ATI usage, considering 
that many other services now are provided online. The online service will certainly improve the 
process of preparing and submitting a request, but that alone will not change much in terms of how 
request will be administered upon submission.   
     Another initiative that took place in 2013 was the launch of the open data portal.754 It contains 
datasets compiled by over 20 departments and agencies755, covering a broad range of topics. By 
accessing the portal, people may explore different kinds of data from housing to health and 
environmental data. Furthermore, in 2014, the TBS issued the Directive on Open Government, 
which established an open by default position and required institutions to maximize the release 
of data and information, with a goal to effect a fundamental change in government culture756. 
This directive includes commitments falling in three streams: Open Data (aimed at better use of 
new technologies), Open Dialogue (aimed at citizen participation), and Open Information (aimed 
at increasing professional integrity).757 Since this is a recent initiative there are not enough data 
available to assess its effectiveness. It certainly has the potential to serve as a bridge to link 
citizens and government.  
 
     Certainly, these achievements are a step forward towards more transparency, but the open 
data movement has failed to confront the problems in the ATIA regime in Canada. Government 
commitments to the OGP have been silent on any action that may address the weakness in the 
law or the practices that are governed by the ATIA.   
 
B. Public Officials – Access to information and Privacy Coordinators  
     The central point of service for the day-to-day administration of the ATIA are the ATIP 
coordinators. They generally have delegated authority for responding to requests. Depending 
upon the size of the institution and the volume of requests it receives, a coordinator may be 
supported by a team of specialized analysts. Coordinators establish procedures for providing 
                                                          
754 The portal can be found at <http://open.canada.ca/en>. 
755 Government of Canada, “Minister Clement Launches Next Generation Open Data Portal”, News Release, June 
2013, online: <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=750989>. 
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responses to access requests, ensure that all records relevant to the request are identified and 
reviewed, determine whether any exemptions or exclusions must be invoked, conduct 
consultations and apply the principles found in the ATIA. 
 
     The TBS has a list available on line with the names of all ATIP coordinators across the 
federal government, including their addresses, emails and telephone numbers. There are 260 
ATIP coordinators at the federal level. I have drawn information from the TBS list to prepare my 
questionnaire for the ATIP coordinators.  
 
     To recognize the work that the ATIP coordinators do for the administration of the ATIA, one 
has to understand the position they hold in the structure of the institutions they are part of. Their 
position in the public office requires them to adequately respond to public’s information requests 
while protecting the interests of their institutions. Regarding this delicate balance they have to 
strike, Mann argued long time ago that “Access coordinators represent the ‘meat in the 
sandwich’, positioned between a suspicious requesting public and a distrustful bureaucracy, and 
are further positioned in a confrontational role with oversight bodies.”758. There is no doubt that 
officials dealing with the ATIA are subject to continuing pressure from other officials to adopt 
restrictive understandings of an institution’s obligations under the law. Only a few years after the 
law’s adoption, a TBS survey found that many ATIP coordinators felt significant cross-pressures 
between their obligations under the law and career considerations within their department.759 
Recent studies show that these cross-pressures continue to operate. In 2002, The Review Task 
Force reported that it had a “number of very frank discussions” in which coordinators “talked 
about the stress involved in dealing with sensitive files and difficult requests.”760 The coordinator 
role is almost always at a fairly junior level in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Having this position, 
Flaherty argued “they rarely have the clout to make a significant difference in their agency. In 
fact, even a Chief Privacy Officer would have problems making his or her own voice heard in 
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such hierarchical power structures.”761 Very recently, a story from British Columbia, which 
emerged in the media in May 2015, revealed that “a BC former bureaucrat came forward to 
claim he was told to delete messages someone else might want to see.”762 Such story is a clear 
indication of the tension that exists inside the ATIA machinery. 
 
     Referring to such a weak position of the ATIA officials, Savoie acknowledged that the bottom 
line for the average public servant is to not embarrass the minister, because that is the surest way 
to have the career stopped or slowed down.763 To do so, they have to pursue instructions from 
above in the bureaucratic hierarchy, and in many cases engage in practices that limit ATI rights. 
For instance, a survey of ATIP coordinators in thirteen large federal departments, conducted for 
the ATI Task Force in 2001 revealed that “Additional attention is often given to requests that 
originate from the media, political parties or other high profile categories of requesters…. The 
complexity of these requests are heightened as institutions attempt to prepare for any possible 
questions or potential for any public scrutiny which may arise as a result of the release of 
records.”764 
 
     The work of the ATIP coordinators is to reveal the workings of politically elected or other 
bureaucrats in their offices. As such, they are part of a larger bureaucratic machinery. One of the 
reasons they resist the idea of ATI is blame-avoidance. Weber argues that concealment insulates 
bureaucracies from criticism and interference; it allows them to correct mistakes and to reverse 
direction without costly, often embarrassing explanations; and it permits them to cut corners with 
no questions being asked.765 Hood described blame-avoidance as a descriptive account of a force 
that is often said to underlie much of political and institutional behaviour in practice.766 He asked 
a question: what happens when the supposedly irresistible force of transparency as a doctrine of 
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better governance meets the apparently immovable object of blame-avoiding behaviour in 
political and institutional affairs?767 Hood’s response is that blame-avoidance can lead to the 
banalization of transparency.  
 
     Another reason for bureaucratic resistance to ATI is the control of information and 
knowledge. Max Weber explained the function and logic of bureaucratic administration as 
resting in part on the production and hoarding of information. According to Weber, keeping 
secret its knowledge and intentions from competing organizations and from the public768 is 
embedded in the bureaucratic ethics. Hence, it is not a surprise that “Officials are well versed in 
the code of silence and under gag orders”769, according to Rubin, because the motive to engage 
in secrecy is partly inherent to bureaucratic organisations. Weber has recognized that 
bureaucracies are machines for controlling information and for controlling through 
information770. This is such a powerful revelation to which I will expand on developing my 
theory of ATI as a human right, a right which contributes to the acquiring of knowledge through 
controlling government information.  
 
      Similar arguments on information as knowledge are made by Fenster. He maintains that state 
institutions know what information they have produced and where such information is stored 
and, through that monopoly of knowledge about their own information, retain significant 
discretion over the existence and ultimate release of documents.771 Because they have the 
monopoly in their hands, producers or custodians of information shift the medium, classification, 
or content of information they prefer to keep secret towards the safe harbors provided under the 
exceptions to disclosure laws.772 In doing so, public officials become a “law unto themselves” 
within the limits clearly stated in the statute773. At times that can stretch the limits of law to the 
point that it allows to engage in practices that are not obviously a violation of the law, or to the 
                                                          
767 Ibid.  
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point that the law is silent. In this sense, they operate at the limits of the law. Roberts recognized 
such tension and maintained that “Statutory entitlements could be diminished or obliterated by 
the informal norms and routines that govern the work of officials responsible for administering 
the law.”774 
 
C. The Exercise of discretion and its implications 
     It is widely accepted that government officials exercise discretion at almost every stage of the 
access process. When the statutory provisions give discretionary power to the bureaucrats to 
make their own decisions, it represents an opening for them to engage in practices “inherently 
embedded in their culture”, in Habermas’s words.  
 
     Despite the risks it represents, discretionary power may be necessary for many reasons. For 
instance, the law cannot regulate all scenarios of real life, it is designed for a general application. 
As such it is difficult to produce a rule that is applicable to all cases. There will always be 
complex cases for which it is difficult identifying all the factors to be applied, and weighing 
those factors.775 This is the reason why the law allows for discretionary powers, so that the public 
officials have space and freedom to apply the general rule. For the discretion to be applied within 
legitimate limits, there should be enough guidelines to make the exercise of discretion easier and 
allow for consistency within the institutions. To facilitate this process Sossin and Smith advised 
that every time a specific discretion has been granted by law, it should be followed by guidelines 
from the institutions that are assigned with the law’s application. These guidelines should be 
broad enough to be applied across departments or institutions, and allow space for use of 
judgement or options for choice, but narrow enough to “set out the various factors which may 
not be considered by decision-makers.”776   
 
     Sossin made a careful analysis of discretion and described it as having different faces. It could 
be an exercise of authority, an act of choice, a social judgement shaped by organizational 
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boundaries inside the bureaucracy, and by the need to attain the results desired by others.777 This 
description fully captures the tensions that are embedded in the exercise of every discretion 
which encapsulates the pressures that exist in public administration. The ATI system of 
management certainly suffers from the same tensions which define and shape how the access 
rights will be implemented in practice. This is one of the main concerns throughout this research, 
one that focuses on the huge impact that the discretion has on restricting or expanding the rights 
granted by statute. Unfortunately, the restriction of rights happens way too often. Davis asserts 
that “Perhaps nine-tenths of injustice in our legal system flows from discretion and perhaps only 
one-tenth form rules.”778 In the case of ATI rights this holds much truth, as scholars and 
practitioners have recognized. Roberts has continuously argued that “internal bureaucratic 
procedures play an important role in defining what the right to information means in practice”779, 
or that the right of ATI “depends heavily on the predispositions of the political executives and 
officials who are required to administer it.”780The Office of the ICC has often experienced that 
the public officials in Canada tend to operate on the restrictive side of discretion, where 
exemptions are the norm, rather than exception. Michinson explained that more alarming 
instances are those “where government organizations try to push the scope of an exemption 
beyond the stated legislative intent.”781 
 
     To prevent cases of injustices from happening, Sossin suggested that there is a need for a 
legitimation of discretion by the wider public. This could minimize the suspicions about any 
abuse of power by the public officials. Sossin advocates for a form of administration sufficiently 
democratic as to engage the population in the administrative process782 by validating the 
discretion publically on the basis of its substantive content.783 This translates into a decision-
making that is supported by reasoning which is opened for scrutiny by the public. Instead of just 
giving the outcome of their decisions, the public officials have to explain in detail how and why 
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they reached that outcome, by listing all factors that influenced the decisions. Only this way, 
according to Sossin, the exercise of discretion by public officials will be accepted as both 
legitimate and just. Otherwise, a suspicious shadow will accompany every decision-making. 
Sossin’s suggestion for a legitimation of discretion offers a tangible solution for the 
establishment of a credible public administration. However, applying Sossin’s suggestion to the 
ATI regime means to be transparent about transparency, and this is what public officials are 
trying to avoid in the first place.  
 
7.2.3 Studies and official data on access to information requests  
     There have been several studies concerned with exploring the tensions and constraints within 
the ATI system in Canada. They focused on different problems with ATI taking various 
approaches. Most of them have produced valuable data about ATI requests.    
 
      A major study on ATI in Canada was conducted by Alasdair Roberts in 2001. He used a 
novel approach to study ATI by examining the different procedural treatment of information 
requests. He looked for evidence in internal routines that govern the administration of the ATIA. 
Roberts analyzed data collected within an administrative database of one major Canadian 
department – Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) - relating to the processing of 
2,120 ATI requests for three years between 1999 and 2001.784 According to the study, the delays 
occur because of the involvement of higher up authorities and the need to contemplate the 
political and personal relations angles when deciding whether or not to disclose the information. 
The study discovered that requests from journalists and political parties require more time to be 
responded to and are more likely to be deemed refusal. It confirmed the role of internal practices 
in the way in which legislation is implemented and understood by government officials.   
 
     Roberts described the procedure that the request had to follow if it was spotted to come from 
journalists. It was considered an “amber light” request, and identified as sensitive. In that case,  
the request had to be sent to the minister’s office and to the communications department. These 
two would work together with the office that possessed the information to develop a media 
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strategy. This strategy together with the document were finally sent to the minister for approval, 
and only then could they be made available to the applicant.785  
 
     The “amber light” practice seem to have become common place in the Canadian public 
offices. It is obvious that going through an “amber light” procedure requires time and resources. 
To examine the cost of ATI procedures, a study was conducted by the TBS in 1996. It found that 
“one-third of total FOI costs could be attributed to time spent in determining whether material 
should be withheld from requesters.”786 This could explain, in part, the big costs associated with 
keeping in place an ATI system.  
  
     Attallah and Pyman conducted a study in 2001 on the use of the ATIA. Using official 
statistics, they discovered that between 1985 and 2000 around 10% of the information requests 
received by the Canadian government were made by journalists787. They found that the nature of 
the stories had changed over time. In the first stage of the law’s implementation, the pieces were 
very specific or they were part of more extensive stories that belonged to the genre of 
investigative journalism. Later, they became more complex, based on more sophisticated 
questions and following-up on previous work. The stories had varied apparent intentions, such as  
exposing clientelism or showing inefficiency and the waste of resources, although in the majority 
of situations the requests, and the stories aimed to describe the work of governmental agencies.  
 
- InfoSource Data  
     Using the InfoSource from the TBS website, I looked at some of the statistical data and 
developed my own tables. The tables contain statistics for a period of 10 years, from 2004-2014. 
Table 6 looks at the source of ATI requests. The data includes 5 categories of requesters, 
business, public, media, organization, and academia. The trend shows that ATI in Canada is 
dominated by business as a category. Public also occupies a significant space of ATI requests. In 
the last two years is has overpassed business and has a steady progress. The numbers confirm 
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that ATI is important for citizens and they are making use of the system, despite the constraints 
they may face. Contrary to the general belief, and what has been argued by the politicians, media 
only constitutes a small percentage in ATI requests. Data shows that media requests are also 
progressing, but with a much smaller pace. The trend demonstrates that ATI is not controlled by 
the media, and only for journalistic purposes. It is noticeable that ATI request from organizations 
are declining, and this was explained by the frustration described by the NGOs in my interviews. 
Many of them admitted that long delays and hefty fees has caused their withdrawal from the ATI 
system due to the lack of resources. Academia is the category with the fewest requests, and that 
raises important questions about the use of ATI in research.  
 
     Table 7 compiles data on the number of requests and their status (if they were closed, 
disclosed, exempted, or excluded). The trend shows that while the numbers of exclusions and 
exemptions have remained steady, the numbers of the documents partly disclosed is progressing 
much faster than those completely disclosed. And while the total number of requests is climbing 
at a high rate, the documents disclosed had a decline in 2007-2010, and are progressing slowly in 
2011-2014.  
 
     Table 8 contains data on the time of reply. While the total number of requests were following 
the same trend until 2012, this is not the case in 2012-2014. The number of documents disclosed 
have remained almost steady, although the total number has risen, meaning that more requests 
are replied late. This confirms the concern regarding delays on ATI request, and there is no 
measure how late they are replied to, because as one public official admits “once a response is 
late, it is late” – how late its does not matter.  
 
     Table 9 comprises data on the type of exemptions applied under the ATIA, according to 
specific sections. There are 13 categories of exemptions. The trend shows that the most common 
of exemptions is privacy, with a huge difference with other exemptions. The high number 
confirms what is argued in Chapter 6, that ATI and privacy collide very often with each other, 
and that privacy tends to trump ATI rights in Canada. Public officials do not engage in a careful 
balancing exercise, but play the safe card by declining request every time information may 
concern personal data. Privacy is followed by International Affairs and defence, and then law 
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enforcement exemption, which have also come up in the scholarly debates and the interviews, as 
being often misused to sway from the ATIA application.  
 
     Table 10 includes data about exclusions applied under the ATIA. The numbers in both 
categories there have remained almost steady, and that is explained with the mandatory nature of 
these exceptions under the law. The Cabinet confidences have been the source of considerable 
debate for reform by many actors, including the ICC.   
 
     Table 11 lists the top ten institutions receiving most of the requests over the years. Citizenship 
and Immigration has occupied the first place for ten consecutive years. Also Canada Revenue 
Agency, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canadian Border Services Agency, and National 
Defence have most of the time occupied the top five places among the institutions receiving 
more requests. These data are significant because they indicate what matters the most to the 
Canadians. Areas like immigration, taxes, law enforcement, national defence, health, 
environment, seems to be hot topics to the public eye.   
 
     Table 12 compiles data about the fees and costs of the ATIA operations. This is complemented 
with Table 8 which shows the costs in a graph form for a period of 30 years since 1983 when the 
ATIA entered into force. The total cost of operations relating to ATI requests since 1983 is 
$670,470,779 which represents an average cost of $1,077 per request completed. Total fees 
collected were $6,116,471 which represents an average fee of $9.82 per request completed788. 
The total expenses of processing ATI requests are $664,354,308 which divided with the number 
of years from 1983 (31 years) represents $ 21,430,784 per year. It is obvious that costs of 
operations have increased exponentially, while the fees have remained the same. These costs 
have been the focus of many government decisions, and the main reason for removing CAIRS. 
While there are financial constraints related to the ATIA operations, the costs are not an 
acceptable excuse if one considers the provision of this service a public good. From this 
perspective, the focus should not be on the cost, but the efficiency of the service.  
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- Questionnaire of the ATIP coordinators   
     As I previously mentioned, there are 260 institutions listed at the TBS webpage. The total 
number of persons serving as ATIP coordinators is smaller since there is some overlapping 
where the same persons serve as an ATIP Coordinator in more than one institution. It is 
interesting that the number of women is about twice the number of men (120 of them are women 
and 70 are men). Only 31 of them offer online services for requests.  
 
     I prepared a three-part questionnaire for the ATIP coordinators with the purpose of 
understanding the practices of administration of ATI requests, the guiding principles and the 
value attached to ATI from their institutional perspective. I selected 113 from 260 institutions 
listed on the website, making a random choice, but paying attention to include those listed in 
Table 11 containing data about institutions with the most requests. I sent out the questionnaire in 
April 2015 via email using the contact addresses available at the TBS website, suggesting a 
period of one month to reply. At the end of the month there was no response.  
 
     I sent the questionnaire again in May, and received 2 emails from institutions requesting 
reassurance that their names and institutions would be kept confidential. From these two 
institutions only one replied by filling the questionnaire, after I sent another email saying that 
their names would remain confident, and that they could fill the questionnaire partly, if they were 
not comfortable of answering all the questions. Soon after my second email I received two more 
filled questionnaires. Also, five institutions sent emails declining to participate and saying they 
“could not fill the questionnaire”. Furthermore, I received three emails from institutions 
providing web links with their information (one of them very detailed), and so indirectly 
responding that they wouldn’t fill the questionnaire.  
 
     In addition, I received an email from one of my informants saying that the TBS had instructed 
all ATIP Coordinators not to respond to my questionnaire, and that the TBS was instead going to 
respond on their behalf. The informants reported that “the policy division of the Treasury Board 
Secretariat has arbitrarily decided they want to respond on behalf of the entire Government, and 
have instructed all ATIP Coordinators not to respond to you”.  
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     In a hopeless attempt, I sent the questionnaire for the third time and extended the time 
available for reply till June. However, this attempt yielded no results. In total, for this 
questionnaire, I received four responses out of 113 requests, five direct and three indirect 
declines. This is a turnout of 3.5% response rate, and it came as a great disappointment at a time 
that I was expecting to get some questions answered for my research. However, after reflecting 
on the research I had done up to that point, I realized that the silence of the ATIP coordinators 
was an expectable behaviour. In fact, the email I received from my informant, was the 
confirmation of what it had already surfaced in my literature review, and which often came up in 
various debates from scholars and practitioners. The TBS instructions were the evidence of a 
centralized ATI system, which did not allow for much freedom in the work of the ATIP 
coordinators.  
 
     This was not the first time a researcher got a surprisingly low response rate on a project on 
ATI in Canada. Laverne Jacobs conducted a similar study, and the initial results were 
disappointing. She writes that “the most striking finding that arose from this study was how few 
responses were received. Although 33 government departments were approached and all given at 
least two weeks to respond, with reminders, only one response surfaced.”789 However, at the end 
of the project the response rate had increased to 12 and the responded pool was qualitatively 
significant.  
 
     Regarding the results of the four responses I got from the questionnaire, some observations 
are worth pointing out. Some responses drew my attention, due to their deviation from common 
expectations. There was at least one participant that disagreed to the role of proactive disclosure 
(Question (Q) 1, Part I) in public information, participation, debate, understanding and trust, and 
one or two that agreed that proactive disclosure contributes to information overload, reduction of 
a space to think for public officials and confusion about choices in decision-making. Responses 
                                                          
789 Laverne Jacobs, “Building on the Ombudsman: Polyjuralism and the Impact of Dispute Resolution in the 
Canadian Access to Information Context”, Prepared for the 1st Global Conference on Transparency Research 
(Rutgers, May 19-20, 2011); For final results see: Laverne Jacobs, “Evolution of the idiosyncrasy of the role of 
ombudsman/person in Canada”, in Laverne Jacobs & Sasha Baglay, eds., The Nature of Inquisitorial Processes in 
Administrative Regimes: Global Perspectives (Surrey, UK: Ashgate Pub. Company, 2013).   
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to Q.2 revealed that that sometimes institutions frame information in certain ways which are 
beneficial to the institutional interests; leave out information details if that information is 
controversial; choose a technical language that needs a certain level of education to make sense 
of. Responses to Q.3 disclose that 3 of 4 agencies do not make information available even if 
there are a lot of ATI requests. There are also indications that agencies do not have policies in 
place to stimulate proactive disclosure, and that there is not enough number of people dedicated 
to transparency. Responses to Q.4 reveal that the most common used source to make information 
available is through the agency’s website, and that none of the institutions asks for the public’s 
feedback on the quality of information provided.  
 
     Responses to Q.1, Part II, tell that 3 out of 4 agencies disagree that ATI helps in decision-
making by providing public input. There are also concerns related to the numbers of people and 
the budget assigned to the ATI processing. Responses to Q.2 confirms that agencies believe that 
ATI has a journalistic nature; they do not help fighting corruption; they embarrass government, 
and do not protect human rights. Responses to Q.3 and 4 reveal that the interactions between 
their agencies and requesters are either functional or friendly, and that except for media, all other 
requesters have basic or no knowledge on the ATI legal framework. Responses to Q.5 confirm 
that responding to ATI requests needs consultation with superiors, and in some cases ATIP 
coordinators find themselves in troubles trying to respond the sensitive requests. Q.6 reveals that 
ATIP coordinators use their discretion in responding to ATI requests, but also seek advice from 
at least another person in their institution.  
 
     Part III discloses that most ATIP people have experience in the public office, have an average 
of 16 hours of training on ATI, and that ATIP offices have 1-3 people working in them.  
 
     These results, although limited because of the small number of responses, confirm some of 
the problems highlighted in the literature review, and reveal important insights of how ATI is 
understood by the public officials in Canada.  
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7.2.4 The case of Ontario  
     I bring now the case of Ontario and present practices that have developed during the FIPPA 
implementation. Of course, the practices noticed at the federal level are not exclusively applied 
there. They may be found elsewhere, in Ontario as well. I was focused in bringing here examples 
that are specific for Ontario.   
 
     It is interesting to mention that in Ontario, the service of submitting ATI requests was free 
until 1995. After the economic crisis in the early 90s, the Ontario’s 1995 Savings and 
Restructuring Act was adopted and introduced a new five-dollar application fee. Additional fees 
were introduced for processing requests for personal information; and fees for processing all 
other requests – known as “general record” requests - were extended. New fees for filing 
complaints to the IPC were also introduced790.  
 
     Defended by the government as a “broadening of the user-pay principle”791, the changes have 
already had a dramatic effect on the frequency with which FOI law were used. Between 1995 
and 1997, the total number of FOI requests submitted to the provincial government dropped by 
over thirty percent792, and appeals to the provincial Information Commissioner dropped by over 
forty percent793. This is an example where fees act as a deterrent to the ATI rights and have an 
immediate effect on the frequency of ATI usage.  
 
7.3  Institutional approaches to transparency and access to documents in the EU  
7.3.1 The EU political environment on transparency and access to documents  
     As mentioned previously, a reason behind the movement towards the adoption of an ATD law 
in the EU was to overcome the “democratic deficit” which characterizes EU governance794. The 
                                                          
790 These were not the only legislative amendments made by the Harris government. The 1995 Labour Relations Act 
(S.O. 1995, c. 1, ss. 82 and 83) also amended FOIPPA to exclude records relating to labour relations and 
employment-related matters. The effect of this provision is to deny a right of access to many records relating to 
collective bargaining, as well as information relating to a specific individual’s employment history. 
791 Canadian Press Newswire, "Ontario information access fees to be highest in Canada: Commissioner Tom 
Wright." Canadian Press Newswire, Toronto. December 4, 1995. 
792 This data is taken from annual reports provided by provincial institutions to the Office of the Information and   
Privacy Commissioner. 
793 Roberts, “Less government”, supra note 796 at 25. 
794 Patrick Birkinshaw, “Freedom of information and its impact in the United Kingdom” (2010) 27 Government 
Information Quarterly 312–321 at 319 [Birkinshaw, “FOI & UK”].   
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EU is a supranational organization, which, by its very nature, is more distant from the populace 
than a national government. Because of this structure, Leino argues “often the right of public 
access turns into institutional politics with the institutions and the Member States in fact 
buttressing their own interests.”795 
 
     Moreover, there is a general lack of knowledge about Brussels politics, resulting in a 
perception of the EP Members as being more removed from their constituents. Another feature 
of the EU politics and representative system is the absence of true European parties. All of these 
factors combined make constituencies quite weak and furthers the distance between the EU and 
its citizens. Eurobarometer data shows a sharp decline in trust in national and European political 
institutions since the advent of the financial crisis.796 Transparency plays a significant role in 
restoring the public’s trust in the EU institutions. According to Birkinshaw, within the EU legal 
discourse, transparency has a specific meaning: it is placed against the so-called lack of 
democracy of the EU that is the reality of the complexity of the European construct797. The EP 
has recognized that “transparency is essential to a democratic political union of citizens, in which 
citizens can fully participate in the democratic process. Secrecy and discretion belong to an era 
when Europe was built by diplomats and civil servants.”798 
 
     In the EU, the most prominent aspect of transparency is the right of ATD which is part of an 
actual legal framework, including treaties, the Charter and the Convention of Human Rights. 
Other aspects of transparency, such as the transparency of conducting consultations, the register 
of experts and of interest representatives, have been dealt with by the EU institutions. In the case 
of the Commission, it has declared that it “believes that high standards of transparency are part 
of the legitimacy of any modern administration.”799 Consultations and dialogue are the main 
                                                          
795 Päivi Leino, “Transparency, Participation and EU Institutional Practice: An Inquiry into the Limits of the ‘Widest 
Possible’”, EUI Working Papers, March 2014, at 2, 
online:<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2416242>. 
796 European Commission, Eurobarometer 76: Public Opinion in the European Union (Brussels: European 
Commission, 2011), at 3. 
797 Birkinshaw, “FOI and Openness”, supra note 2 at 189. 
798 The European Parliament, Report on public access to documents (Rule 104(7)) for the years 2011-2013 
(2013/2155(INI)) Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 27.2.2014, at 14. 
799 European Commission, “Green Paper. European Transparency Initiative (Brussels: European Commission, 2006) 
at 2; see also Siim Kallas, “The Need for a European Transparency Initiative”, Speech given to the Nottingham 
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venue though which the Commission achieves its communications with the public.800 The 
Commission uses two important policy tools to enable citizen engagement and participation. The 
first tool was introduced in the follow-up of the White Paper801 and signed the establishment of 
an online consultation system, “Your Voice in Europe”802.  This is the European Commission's 
“single access point” to a variety of ongoing consultations and feedback opportunities which 
enable citizens to express their views on EU policies at different stages throughout the policy 
lifecycle. While this system is a venue for public participation, it only gives a limited and 
indirect right to citizens to decide on important public matters. The formal right for policy 
initiation and decision-making remains in the hands of the Commission. Hence, such policy tool 
has its limitations. 
 
     The second policy tool originates in the Treaty of Lisbon, which introduced a new instrument 
to involve citizens directly. The European’s Citizens’ Initiative803 (ECI), operational since April 
2012, creates for the first time an instrument for citizens to call on the Commission to initiate 
legislation.804 It allows one million EU citizens from at least seven Member states to participate 
directly in the development of EU policies, by calling on the European Commission to make a 
legislative proposal. The precise rules for submitting an initiative successfully are laid down in 
the Regulation on the Citizens’ Initiative.805 Once having met all requirements for submitting an 
initiative, the organizers of an initiative meet the Commission representatives in person and have 
the opportunity to present their initiative at a public hearing in the EP. The Commission has to 
decide whether to act on it within three months and has to publish a reasoned response. While 
this venue for public participation may represent opportunities to engage in EU law-making, it is 
                                                          
Business School, 3rd March 2005, online:  
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/130>. 
800 Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue – General principles and minimum standards for 
consultation of interested parties by the Commission COM (2002) 704 final. 
801 European Commission, “European governance: A white paper”,  COM(2001) 428,  25.7.2001, online: 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-01-10_en.htm>. 
802 European Commission, “Your Voice in Europe”, online: <http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/index_en.htm>. 
803 European Commission, “The European’s Citizen Initiative, online: <http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-
initiative/public/initiatives/ongoing>. 
804 Eva G. Heidbreder, “Civil society participation in EU governance” (2012) 7:2 Living Reviews in European 
Governance at 10, online:  <http://www.livingreviews.org/lreg-2012-2> [Heidbreder]. 
805 Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 on the 
citizens’ initiative, OJ L 65/1, 11.03.2011. online:  <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:065:0001:0022:en:PDF>.  
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still up to the Commission to take the initiatives seriously. For instance, in 2014, the European 
Commission rejected a European-wide citizens’ initiative on the controversial trade deal of 
Canada-EU CETA. The initiative was supported by 230 organizations, with 3,284,289 
signatures806 from 21 EU members. The Commission refused to register the initiative, claiming 
that the proposed citizens' initiative falls manifestly outside the framework of the Commission's 
powers.807 This example demonstrates how vulnerable this forms of participation are to the 
political will. While they may have potential, they are no substitution for other forms of 
transparency.  
 
     In addition to these policy tools, the Commission, together with other EU institutions, 
engages in dialogue with interest groups which through lobbying and consultation push their 
agendas in the EU’s political process. This is part of the ETI808 which makes an effort to regulate 
lobbying and other consultation standards in the EU. In the course of the ETI, the European 
Commission and the EP, integrated their registers in one “Transparency Register” on 23 June 
2011, thus establishing a joint framework for relations with interest representatives for both 
institutions. This Joint Register constitutes a single database that lists all individuals or 
organizations that take part in EU policy-making.809 
 
     It is widely accepted that the Commission is dependent upon its exchanges with organized 
civil society, because of their expertise in many policy areas. So, an increase of legitimacy is 
expected, because all kinds of interest groups will seek to represent their interest at EU level.810 
The fact that the European Commission has no direct mandate by the citizens makes exchanges 
with interest representatives necessary to close the gap between the Commission and the citizens. 
However, there are concerns about these negotiations taking place away for the wider public. 
                                                          
806 European Initiative against TTIP and CETA. <https://stop-ttip.org/>. 
807 Scott Harris, “European Commission rejects citizens' initiative on CETA”, The Council of Canadians Acting for 
Social Justice, September 11, 2014. Online: <http://canadians.org/blog/european-commission-rejects-citizens-
initiative-ceta>. 
808 ETI: A framework for relations with interest representatives COM (2008) 323 final 
809 On the merger of the EP and Commission registers see European Commission, Commission and European 
Parliament launch Joint Transparency Register to shed light on all those seeking to influence European policy. 
Online: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-773_en.htm. 
810 Irina Michalowitz, “The Transparency Initiative - Barking up the Wrong Tree?”, SciencesPo, Centre de 
Recherches Internationale (2007) at 7. Online: <http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/en/content/transparency-initiative-
barking-wrong-tree>.  
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According to Michalowitz “there is …. no guarantee that all stakeholders are included and 
included equally.811 Greenwood argues that the solution for equality and inclusion is 
transparency which “should enable wider civil society to control these exchanges.”812  
 
     Looking at the ETI, it outlines that transparency provisions are principally inclusive and in 
respect of political equality. However, at the end, it is up to the EU institutions to decide upon 
whom to consult. In addition, the publicity enforcement on lobby organizations in the registers is 
fairly weak, since it takes a laissez-faire approach. Furthermore, organizations themselves cannot 
be sure that they are equally heard nor listened to by the EU institutions, nor is the public able to 
scrutinize the contacts of EU civil servants and lobby organizations. Greenwood observed that 
the analysis of ETI related documents definitely shows a justificatory rhetoric towards the 
pursuit of the normative goal of participatory legitimacy813. Indeed, the normative dimension of 
transparency is traceable in the public discourse surrounding the ETI, but it seems that the 
political will to act accordingly is not yet sufficiently strong to make even more use of the 
democratic potential of transparency and transparent governance. 
 
     Apart from the Commission, the EP has regular and intensive contacts to various interest 
groups.814 According to Rasmussen, lobbying the EP is a “necessary evil”815 because it is 
essential to the functioning of the EP, particularly when MEPs are attempting to gauge the 
impact of policies on specific sectors. Interest groups provide information and technical expertise 
to MEPs, which ensures more informed policy formulation. In addition, the principle of openness 
is firmly applied by the EP, because the internal rules of procedure stipulate that both the plenary 
and the committee sessions be public816. This was realized only recently with regards to the 
Council, as only after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon a provision was introduced 
                                                          
811 Ibid. 
812 Justin Greenwood, “The lobby regulation element of the European Transparency Initiative: Between liberal and 
deliberative models of democracy” (2011) 9:3 Comparative European Politics 317–343 at 319.  
813 Ibid, at 318.  
814 Heidbreder, supra note 804 at 14.  
815 Maja Kluger Rasmussen, “Lobbying the European Parliament: A necessary evil”, CEPS Policy Brief, No. 242, 
May 2011, at 2. http://aei.pitt.edu/31864/1/No_242_Rasmussen_on_EP_Lobbying_final.pdf 
816 See Article 103 (transparency of Parliament’s Activities) of European Parliament’s Rule of Procedure.   
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stating that the Council shall meet in public817 when it deliberates and votes on a draft legislative 
act. The EP took a step forward in 2014 to bring greater transparency to its decision making by 
recording and publishing records of final voting in committee. Previously most committee votes 
were taken by a simple show of hands and were not recorded. The decision818, adopted on 26 
February 2014, applies to all final votes on resolutions and legislation. It also makes it 
compulsory to record and publish the final votes by MEPs in plenary on non-binding resolutions. 
 
     All three EU institutions, conforming to the requirements of Regulation 1049, have now 
established specific information catalogues called the “register” of official documents covering 
all information that has been processed or collected by government agencies. Many of the 
documents produced are automatically recorded on the registers after processing. The registers 
are published on line with many documents available for searching and downloading freely. The 
registers also enables citizens to make ATD requests by filling an online form. The Council819, 
the Commission820, and the EP821 have all operated a register that contains documents dating 
from at least 2001, date of the Regulation 1049.  
 
7.3.2  Institutional practices affecting the right of access to documents  
     In the EU, the path towards transparency and the right of ATD encompasses a contradiction –
the progress in the legal recognition of a treaty transparency principle and a constitutional right 
of ATD is not accompanied with same progress in practical application of this legal framework. 
Secrecy was the rule rather than an exception to the workings of the EU institutions until the late 
90s. At that time, the idea was that if the Council were to deliberate in public, “progress would 
either be blocked because delegations would be forced to take an immovable position, or the 
                                                          
817 It is worth mentioning that since June 2006 Council deliberations on legislative acts to be adopted under co-
decision procedure take place in public. (See Article 8 of Council’ s Rules of Procedure of 15 September 2006, 
2006/683/EC, OJ 2006., l. 285/47).   
818 European Parliament, On Amendment of Rule 166 of Parliament’s Rule of Procedure concerning the final vote 
and rule 195(3) concerning voting in Committee 2014/2001(REG). online: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A7-2014-
0035+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en>. 
819 European Council, Document Register. Online: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-
publications/public-register/>. 
820 European Commission, Register of Commission Documents. Online: 
<https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/>. 
821 European Parliament, Register of Documents. Online: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegistreWeb/search/simpleSearchHome.htm>. 
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public proceedings would be theatre, with the real business being done by officials behind closed 
doors”822. Although, in 2000 the legal framework on transparency transformed significantly, the 
culture of secrecy still finds its way in the everyday operations of the EU institutions and 
agencies. Data of the European Ombudsman shows that complaints relating to lack of 
transparency within the EU institutions continue to top the list of complaints, occupying 20% to 
30% of the total complaints that the Ombudsman’s office. The most common transparency issues 
raised are the institutions’ refusal to grant access to documents and/or information.823 
 
     The experience with transparency and ATD in the EU demonstrates some practices that 
indicate resistance towards openness. Especially in the phase when specific issues among the 
myriad of possible issues are chosen for the agenda of the European decision-making bodies, 
access is narrowed down drastically. Heritier argues that the phase of policy preparation where 
proposals on specific issues are being drafted allows for access offered through public hearings, 
formal consultations and the use of Commission Green and White Papers, but deliberation and 
bargaining is insulated824. Even the EP, which is considered the most opened among the EU 
governing bodies, engages in secrecy practices. EP committee process is open to the public825. 
However, many pre-conciliation negotiations between the Council and the EP are removed from 
the public826. In addition, the EP engages in practices where exceptions are used to deny ATD 
requests. The rate of use of exclusions for the EP shows that for the last three years, 2012 (32%), 
2013 (50%) and 2014 (39%), privacy is the most common of the exceptions laid out in Article 4 
of the Regulation 1049.827 
 
     The internal dialogues between the three main EU institutions, known as “trilogues”, are 
usually covered in secrecy. Trilogues are informal negotiations between the EP, the Council and 
the Commission aimed at reaching early agreements on new EU legislation. Currently trilogue 
                                                          
822 Curtin, “Betwixt and Between”, supra note 393 at 85. 
823 European Ombudsman, Annual Report 2014. Online: 
<http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/activities/annualreport.faces/en/59959/html.bookmark#hl3>. 
824 Héritier, “Composite democracy in Europe”, supra note 3 at 827. 
825 M. Shackleton, (2001) “Co-decision since Amsterdam. A laboratory for institutional innovation and change’” 
ECSA Seventh Biennial International Conference, 31May–2 June, at 10.  
826 Héritier, “Composite democracy in Europe”, supra note 3 at 827. 
827 European Parliament, “Public access to documents 2014”, March 2015, at 11. Online: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/PDF/rapport2014/original_EN.pdf>. 
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negotiations are not regulated, and meetings have an informal and ad-hoc nature. In spite of their 
crucial role in the legislative process, trilogues are closed meetings, and there is a severe lack of 
access to key information such as participants, agendas, minutes or documents considered. 
Hence, it is difficult for citizens to follow specific legislative processes during trilogues. 
Concerned about this weakness, the European Ombudsman, Emily O'Reilly, opened an 
investigation into the transparency of trilogues with a view to boosting transparent law-making 
in the EU. The Ombudsman asked the three institutions for information about their disclosure 
policies on trilogue documents, including details of meetings, documents relating to ongoing 
trilogues, minutes or notes drawn up after such meetings, as well as lists of participants.828 
 
     Regarding the operations of the Commission, they expose practices that limit transparency and 
ATD.  Requests of ATD are often rejected under many exceptions. The privacy exception is the 
third most frequently invoked exception used by the European Commission when denying 
requests829, and the numbers reveal that its use is increasing. The Commission in 2014 denied 
Access Info a breakdown of Commissioners expenses on official travel and hospitality on 
grounds of privacy.830 Another exception used to justify the rejection of disclosing information is 
the international relations. Civil society has raised concerns about the way in which the 
international relations exception is applied to matters of high public interest. There is still 
controversy around the lack of openness of trade negotiations with the United States (TTIP 
negotiations) and Canada (CETA negotiations), where a culture of secretive diplomacy rather 
than of democratic transparency persists.  
 
     A recent decision of the European Commission is impeding the public’s right to submit ATD 
online requiring a valid postal address for an ATD request. In April 2014 the European 
Commission introduced a new requirement831 that asked all requesters to provide a postal 
                                                          
828 European Ombudsman, Ombudsman opens investigation to promote transparency of "trilogues", Press release no. 
9, 28 May 2015. Online: <http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/press/release.faces/en/59975/html.bookmark>. 
829 See Report of the Commission on the application in 2014 of Regulation (EC) No. 1049/2001, COM (2015), 391 
final, 6.8.2015, Annex 1, at 3. Online: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/access_documents/docs/rapport_2014/com_2015_391_en.pdf>. 
830 Access Info Europe, European Commission urged to act to improve transparency, 24 June 2015. Online: 
<http://www.access-info.org/frontpage/17207>. 
831 European Commission, “Note to heads of Unit responsible for access to documents”, 19.03.2014, online: 
<http://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/1337/response/4880/attach/2/Notification%20of%20negative%20replies%20N
ote%20to%20DGs%20signed.pdf>. 
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address as a precondition for registering their request. In May, the Commission started to send 
messages to requesters stating that postal address were required for registering and handling 
requests in line with the procedural requirements. The Commission message stated that “Pending 
your reply, we reserve the right to refuse the registration of your request.”832 Hence, requests via 
the AsktheEU.org web portal were refused to be registered by the Commission if they were not 
accompanied by a postal address.833 AsktheEU.org, which is run by Access Info Europe, was 
launched in September 2011 with the aim of making the requesting process more transparent. It 
is set up to work via email, with requests and responses published online in real time. This kind 
of practice goes against the spirit of Regulation 1049, since this requirement for postal address is 
not found in the law.  
 
     The workings of the Council have drawn a lot of criticism for failing to comply with EU 
transparency rules. Most of the critics point to not respecting time frames for responding, 
applying too many extensions to requests, and not informing all requesters of their right to appeal 
when information was denied.834 According to a report of Access Info Europe, an analysis of 50 
ATD requests submitted to the Council between 2011 and 2013 via the AsktheEU.org platform, 
found that the average time for answering was 20 working days, over the maximum 15 working 
days permitted by EU law. Requests which resulted in partial denials of information were 
answered in an average of 49 working days835. This report also raises concerns about the broad 
application of exceptions such as privacy and international relations. The privacy exception was 
used to deny information about the identities of Member State representatives participating in 
Council meetings, even on legislative negotiations. The international relations exception was 
invoked to deny public access to multiple documents about the Council’s interactions with third 
countries such as China and Mexico. A further issue was that of record keeping: the Council 
informed requesters that it does not keep minutes of all working parties and in one instance 
reported that legal advice had only been delivered to Member State representatives orally.836 
                                                          
832 Access Info Europe, “European Commission attempting to block citizens’ requests via AsktheEU.org”, 2 June 
2014. Online: <http://www.access-info.org/eut/12558>. 
833 Access Info Europe, “Activity Report 2014”, at 8. Online: <http://www.access-info.org/wp-
content/uploads/AIE_Annual_Report_2014.pdf>. 
834 Access Info Europe, “AsktheEU.org Report on Council of the European Union: Transparency problems 
exposed”, 19 May 2014. online:<http://www.access-info.org/eut/12523>. 
835 Ibid.  
836 Ibid.  
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     The discussions over changes in Regulation 1049, have revealed another weakness in the 
ATD regime in the EU. Member States such as France, Germany and the UK are seeking to limit 
the public’s right of access to EU documents. They are using the reform of the regulation as an 
opportunity to add new exceptions and to weaken the right of ATD837. The influence of these 
Member States has led to a common Council position, which, if adopted, would increase the 
opacity of the EU decision-making process, lead to a regression of the right of ATD in the EU 
and weaken citizens’ ability to hold the institutions to account; thus violating the EU and 
international law.838 
 
7.3.3 Official data on transparency and access to documents requests 
- Data from the Register of Documents of the EP, Commission and Council 
     Using data from the Annual Reports on ATD from these three institutions, I developed my 
own tables. The tables contain statistics for a period of 10 years, from 2005-2014. Tables 15, 18 
and 21 look at the source of ATD requests, respectively for the Commission, the Council and the 
EP. The data includes the same or similar categories of requesters for all three institutions, such 
as academics, public authorities, lawyers, journalists, civil society, other EU institutions and an 
unspecified category which includes mainly the public. The tables share some interesting trends. 
The most requests are submitted by the public (others or unspecified) and the academics, 
followed by the civil society. There is a significant gap in numbers for these categories compared 
to other ones. This trend is distinguishable from that in Canada, where academia requests are 
insignificant. Another difference with Canada is the number of civil society requests which 
comes third in the list of categories. In Canada, this number kept declining despite the rise on 
total requests. Journalists, for all three institutions, just as in Canada, have kept a low profile, and 
only occupy a small percentage of requests. These numbers, again, confirm that ATI should not 
be associated with the media.  
 
                                                          
837 Council of the European Union, Interinstitutional File: 8410/12, online: <http://www.access-info.org/wp-
content/uploads/Outcome_from_proceedings_notes_30_March_2012-2.pdf>. 
838 Access Info Europe, “EU decision-makers push for less transparency”, 5 June 2012. Online: <http://www.access-
info.org/eut/11652>. 
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     Tables 16, and 19 compile data on the number of requests and their status (if they were 
disclosed fully, partially or refused). The numbers indicate that requests disclosed outnumber 
significantly those refused, although the Commissioner’s data are steadier than those of the 
Council.839 
 
     Tables 17, 20 and 22 contain data on the refusals made based on exceptions for all three 
institutions. Privacy is the second largest reason for refusals for the Commission (tab 17) and the 
EP (tab 22), and the decision-making is the first reason for refusals in the Council (tab 20) and 
the EP (tab 22), and the third for the Commission (tab 17). These data demonstrate that the 
decision-making process in the EU happens away from the public eye, and is protected by a veil 
of secrecy. In this approach, the EU does not differ much from Canada, where also the Cabinet 
confidences are fanatically preserved from being affected by the ATIA provisions. Also, privacy 
exceptions prevail in both jurisdictions as one of the main reasons for declining requests for ATI. 
 
- Questionnaire for the Transparency Units 
     I delivered the same questionnaire (as the one used in Canada) to the EU institutions and 
agencies. However, the steps were different from what I did for Canada. The EU does not have a 
government body assigned to manage the administration of the ATD. As a result, it does not 
have a central database that gives the names or contacts of the persons that process ATD 
requests. The EU does not have ATIP coordinators, but the main institutions have “Transparency 
Units”. Hence, I had to search each of the EU agencies’ website, for information on where to 
send my questionnaire.  
 
     The EU has 42 agencies: 2 EUROATOM agencies, 6 executive agencies, 37 decentralized 
agencies including three Agencies under Common Security and Defense Policy to which 
Regulation 1049 does not apply. Only 10 of these agencies have a designated space in their 
website for Access to Documents or Transparency, but only 4 of them have email addresses to 
contact these Units. Most agencies have forms in their websites that could only be completed on 
line. Many agencies do not even have a general email contact, but just phone numbers and 
                                                          
839 Note that this kind of data for the EP are not available, because the data was not clear or missing at the EP 
Register.  
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addresses. I could find the email contacts of 23 agencies and sent the questionnaire to all 23 out 
of 42 agencies. In addition, I sent the email to the EP, the Commission, and the Council. The 
requests were sent at the same time, following the same procedure as in Canada.  
 
     One agency sent links of websites instead of completing the questionnaire and suggested to 
file an ATD request in case I don’t find the information needed. Two agencies declined to 
complete the questionnaire. One explained that the agency was not in a position to participate in 
my project “at the current juncture, due to a stress on resources coupled with urgent work in the 
field of its competence”. The other declined saying that since my request did not constitute a 
request to ATD, they would not consider to fill the questionnaire. I have received six completed 
questionnaires in total, which constitutes a 23% response rate. This rate is also low, but it is 
significantly higher than what I got for Canada.  
 
     The results are worth of observations, and reveal interesting trends, especially if compared to 
the Canadian counterparts. Most of the answers to Q.1, Part I, are positive to the role of the 
proactive disclosure. However, four participants agreed that early proactive disclosure leads to a 
public information overload, and that increases the workload and expenses of the institution. 
Responses to Q.2 revealed that most of the agencies admit that depending on the issue, they 
leave out information details if that information is controversial; frame information in certain 
ways which are beneficial to the institutional interests, and choose a technical language that 
needs a certain level of education to make sense of. Responses to Q.3 inform that agencies do not 
have enough people dedicated to transparency. Responses to Q.4 inform that agencies use all 
sorts of means to make information available, such as social and traditional media, press, and 
open meeting. In addition, they do ask for the public’s feedback on the quality of information 
provided.  
 
     Responses to Q.1, Part II, inform that all agencies agree on the value of ATD. The only 
concern is on the numbers of people and the budget assigned to ATD processing. Responses to 
Q.2 confirms that only sometimes ATI has the purpose to protect human rights; make institutions 
accountable; participate in decision-making; stimulate transparency, or prevent corruption. 
However, differently from Canada, agencies rarely believe that ATI has a journalistic nature. Q.3 
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and 4 inform that academia has the closest relationship with the agencies. The other interactions 
are either functional or friendly. Also, they reveal that mostly media and organizations have 
either a strong or a basic knowledge. Responses to Q.5 confirms that, sometimes, responding to 
ATI requests needs consultation with superiors, and that information benefits certain groups 
rather than the general public. In addition, responses assert that information only rarely helps 
requesters advance some other human rights it. Q.6 reveals that none of the ATD people use their 
discretion in responding to ATD requests. Instead, they seek advice from at least another person 
in their institution.  
 
     Part III discloses that most ATD people have experience in public office (mostly 5-10 years), 
mostly have an average of 1-5 hours of training on ATD, and that most agencies have either none 
or over five people working assigned with ATD requests.   
 
     The results of this questionnaire inform a lot about how EU institutions and agencies perceive 
and value ATD, which is an important indicator of how they implement ATD rules in practice.  
 
7.3.4 The case of Albania  
     Albania represents an interesting case of an advanced legal framework on ATI, but that lacks 
proper implementation. This case is a perfect example of a failure to live up to the requirements 
of the law, and even worse to the acknowledgement of its importance. I have argued elsewhere 
that “Some of the main problems with the transparency regime in Albania have to do with the 
legislation, but more importantly with the practices related to it, with the administrative culture 
of the civil servants and with the awareness of the citizens.”840 
 
     The main problem in Albania is that the administration does not have the necessary 
knowledge about this legislation, nor the capacity to carry on its requirements. In many cases the 
public offices do not have the will to respond to requests for reasons of neglect or purposely to 
hide information. One of Article 19’s regional partner organizations, the Centre for Development 
and Democratisation of the Institutions, reported in 2003 that 87% of the people surveyed 
                                                          
840 Spahiu, “Government”, supra note 230 at 123.  
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working in public authorities did not even know that Albania had a FOI law.841 David Banisar 
argued that “Some laws are adopted and never implemented. In Albania, there has been little use 
of the law because neither users nor government officials are aware of it.”842 The US State 
Department in its 2005 Human Rights Report noted that “this law has not been fully 
implemented, and limited access to public information for citizens and noncitizens remained a 
problem. A lack of government information offices and limited understanding of the law by 
government officials contributed to the problem.”843 
 
     The facts point to an immediate need for awareness and training in public administration. 
What happens very often is that civil servants do not comply with the procedural requirements 
for a transparent administrative activity either because they do not have enough knowledge or 
resist it. The assessment of the NGOs in Albania demonstrate the very limited knowledge of the 
law by public officials at all levels of the administration844. The image of a public official is not 
very highly regarded in Albania. Part of the administration still reflects a secret culture where 
information is considered to be in the ownership of the institution if not of the person holding the 
information. There is certainly need for training of public officials to improve the understanding 
and knowledge of the legal provisions, since its lack may bring serious impediments to the 
realisation of the right of ATI.  
 
     Often, the release of information becomes a commodity which is sold to the citizens at a hefty 
price. As Szekely puts it “Another current problem is the cost of public information – both its 
official and black market price. The black market price (the price of information obtained 
through bribery) is not common knowledge.”845This mentality is embedded in the culture of 
                                                          
841 Article 19, Memorandum on the Albanian Law on the Right to Information on Official Documents, 2. Global 
Campaign for Free Expression (Commissioned by the Representative on Freedom of the Media of the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe).London (September 2004). 
842  D. Banisar, “The Freedominfo.org Global Survey Freedom of Information and Access to Government Record 
Laws Around the World” (May 2004) at 7. Online: <http://www.freedominfo.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/ 
global_survey2006.pdf>.  
843 See US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2005, Government corruption and 
Transparency, (March 2005) at para , online: <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61633.htm>. 
844 Article 19, “Promoting practical access to democracy: A survey of freedom of information in Central and Eastern 
Europe”, October 2002, at 32. Online: <https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/freedom-of-
information-survey-of-central-and-e.pdf>.[Article 19]. 
845 Szekely, at 131. 
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secrecy that has predominated the Albanian administration for many years. Szekely argues that 
“For decades, information handling was a party-state monopoly . . . the provision and the content 
of information were subordinated to a centralized political will.”846 
 
     To explain the problems in ATI implementation it is important to consider that the 
government has changed several times since the FOI law was adopted in 1999, and each change 
normally leads to the reorganization or abolishment of various ministries, with senior public 
officials being replaced. It is a common practice in Albania that every time a party comes to 
power, most of the public officials are replaced with militants as a reward of their support during 
electoral campaign. Appointments of people in offices based on party politics and not on 
personal merits demeans the image of the public official in Albania. This practice causes 
politicization or bad management of administration. This is a fundamental problem for the whole 
process of legal and administrative reform in Albania.  
 
     Another reason for the failure of the ATI regime in Albania is an uneducated public. There is 
a concerning lack of awareness regarding the law at all levels of the Albanian society, from civil 
society to ordinary citizens. According to Article 19, in practice, the law is rarely applied, and 
most Albanians have little knowledge of its existence847. That explains why there are only a few 
requests for official documents and little use of the FOI Law. The situation is expected to 
improve with the new law which has introduced better safeguards and high penalties for non-
compliance. Gent Ibrahimi, a legal expert who participated in the drafting of the law, said the bill 
introduced the concept of personal responsibility in the decision-making process of public 
officials, which is a novelty in Albanian law. Ibrahimi acknowledged that the Albanian legal and 
administrative culture is such that officials only implement what is prescribed by law.848 
 
    However, legal safeguards face many obstacles in Albania – a weak judiciary, a strong 
executive and a politicized administration. This combination is a recipe for failure. The right to 
judicial review of information refusals has almost never been exercised in Albania, perhaps as a 
                                                          
846 Ibid, at 118. 
847 Article 19, supra note 844 at 7.  
848 Besar Likmeta, “Albania Rights Groups Hail New FOI Law”, BalkanInsight, 1 October, 2014. Online: 
<http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/new-foia-law-could-usher-era-of-transparency-in-albania>. 
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result of the small numbers of requests made for information, the excessively lengthy time for 
administrative review, and the lack of confidence in the judiciary due to its reputation for 
corruption. The courts are usually perceived as not trustworthy to solve conflicts or violation of 
rights. As “In most East European countries, judges are accustomed to a phone call form a party 
boss suggesting the dispositions of a case.”849. In one case, the newspaper Republika was 
threatened by a body guard of the Minister of Health, following publication of an article 
reporting on the ongoing problem of unlicensed dental clinics850. Stories like this are a clear 
indicator of a weak system of government which is unable to protect those who exercise their 
legitimate rights recognized by the law and the Constitution.  
     The paradox of Albania stands on the disaccord between the quality of the legislation, and the 
practices of the administration of the law. Albania has one of the best laws in the world, which 
has so far failed to be properly implemented. So, how can this disaccord be explained? One 
strong stimulus for improving the legal framework, not only on ATI, but also more broadly, has 
been the Albanian aspiration for a membership status in the EU. Just like in other countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, political elites in Albania have been willing to support ATI 
legislation, because they are “eager to boost their democratic credentials in order to be 
considered as possible members of the European Union”851. Elsewhere, I have called this process 
of adapting to the rules of accession of the EU “Europeanization by convenience.”852 This is a 
demonstration of the dichotomy that exists between the ATI rules and practices. These practices 
are shaped by the political environment in a given country, but also other inside and outside 
political pressures, which dictate to a certain degree, the path of transparency and ATI.  
 
7.4  Comparisons and Conclusions 
     The analysis in this chapter shows how a statutory right can be shaped through the exercise of 
administrative discretion, an observation made by Roberts853 more than a decade ago. The 
practices in all jurisdictions expose how everyday operations of public administration are 
                                                          
849 T. Rosenberg, “Overcoming the Legacies of Dictatorship” (1995) 74:3 Foreign Affairs 134,141 [Rosenberg].  
850 Article 19, supra note 844 at 45.  
851 Article 19, supra note 844 at 3. 
852 Irma Spahiu, “Exploring the ‘faces’ of Europeanization from an Albanian perspective”, (2015) 11:4 European 
Journal of Contemporary Research at 354 [Spahiu, “Exploring”]. 
853 Roberts, “Administrative discretion and ATIA”, supra note 5 at 176. 
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continuously trying to circumvent legal requirements by giving life to new rules on ATI. Having 
a good ATI law in place is the first step to building an effective ATI regime because, as Berliner 
argues, it institutionalizes transparency and “makes…promises of transparency more 
credible.”854 However, this institutionalization does not happen in vacuum, but it builds upon 
existing institutional culture and rules. In the Canadian context, Bazillion has argued that 
“Administrative secrecy is endemic in the Canadian political system.”855 The same is true for the 
EU, where Pasquier and Villeneuve have pointed to the cultures of transparency and secrecy, 
rooted in historical traditions and traditional state-society relations.856 When considering that the 
ATI regime in the EU is tempered through a battle of interests between Member States, the 
cultural explanation becomes clear. This battle reflects a divide between pro-transparency 
members and other members who oppose it.  
 
     The application of ATI laws requires considerations of broad principles of public interest, 
harm, balancing of rights, and generally, government agencies have a tendency to neglect these 
broader considerations. They worry mainly about the narrower interests that are tied to their 
agency's mission. For instance, according to the ICC, government departments do not take 
seriously their obligations to undertake a two-step process before applying discretionary 
exemptions. Too often departments are content with addressing only the question: “May the 
requested records be kept secret?” Instead, they should be asking: “Even if they may, why should 
the records be kept secret?”857 However, as one cross-national study reveals, there can be high 
costs for setting up the necessary infrastructure for the implementation of ATI laws858 which can 
act as an impediment for having an effective ATI regime. Financial constraints demonstrate that 
ATI does not operate in a tension-free environment, but in one where priorities should be picked 
and choices should be made. Of course, this is not to say that lack of resources justify restrictions 
in ATI, especially if they are made in an arbitrary manner. In any case, the development of 
Internet offers great opportunities for cutting costs on disseminating information.      
                                                          
854 Berliner, “Institutionalizing Transparency”, supra note 227 at 50.  
855 R. Bazillion, “Freedom of Information: A Canadian Dilemma” (1983) 288 Round Table 382-94 at 382.  
856 Pasquier & Villeneuve, “Organizational Barriers”, supra note 30 at 157.  
857 Information Commissioner, “Annual Report, 1994-95” (Ottawa: Department of Public Works and Government 
Services, 1995) at 8.  
858 Jeannine E. Relly & Meghna Sabharwal, “Perceptions of transparency of government policymaking: A cross-
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     The comparison of ATI trends in practices between Canada and the EU offers some 
interesting insights. While the legal protection they offer to transparency and ATI is different 
(with the EU being much more progressive), the practices demonstrate a similar trend – there is a 
tendency towards a restriction of the right of ATI. The decline in Canada is more prevalent, and 
is mostly a result of administrative practices. In the EU, the analysis reveal similar practices. 
Lieno argues that “In today's Europe, there seems to be nothing shameful in arguing that citizens 
are outsiders, and that openness and citizen participation distract efficient decision-making in the 
institutions.”859 In addition, there is an attempt to restrict the right of ATI through both practical 
and legal venues by trying to limit the scope of the Regulation 1049. The case of Albania depicts 
a similar picture where the government has improved the ATI legal environment due to 
international pressures without paying much attention to improvements in practice.  
     The data on the tables presented for both Canada and the EU represent attention-grabbing 
trends on the ATI practices and dynamics. The ATI right is expansively used by the public in 
Canada and the EU. Also, media requests are not significant in both jurisdictions. However, 
other actors are different. In the EU, a significant part of the ATI space is occupied by the 
academia, while in Canada it is occupied by business. The NGOs are much more active in the 
EU than in Canada.  
     The question that is naturally raised when looking at these cases is: Why are government not 
very keen of an expansion of the right to ATI? Ackerman and Sandoval-Ballasteros offer an 
explanation for this trend by taking an international approach. They argue that FOI laws do not 
represent an immediate benefit for those in power. FOI laws open the government to external 
scrutiny, making elites much more vulnerable to outside criticism and significantly empowering 
civil society.860 Flaherty makes similar claims arguing that FOI “only appeals to Opposition 
politicians, not to politicians in power. It has no appeal, and is only a bother, if not a threat, to the 
government and public servants and their control of access to general information.”861 As a 
                                                          
859 Päivi Leino, “Transparency, Participation and EU Institutional Practice: An Inquiry into the Limits of the ‘Widest 
Possible’, EUI Working Papers, March 2014, at 2, online: 
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result, one should always expect some level of resistance from the part of government when 
dealing with transparency and ATI. When the FOI laws were expanding in the 70s, it was argued 
that they represented a “certain kind of public myth” because there was a strong belief that the 
“So-called liberal democratic governments keep a lot of information secret”862. This lack of 
belief in FOI laws has accompanied any FOI laws, and continues to date. According to 
Woodbury “if governments were serious about information access, then information acts would 
have teeth to them, providing punitive damages, the disciplines or dismissal of employees”.863 
     There is a close relationship between law, practice and ATI protection. Below, I offer a 
diagram which simplifies this relationship, but also describes how it works, with law and practice 
being two variables that determine the ATI protection progression line. Canada, the EU and 
Albania occupy different spaces in the diagram depending on the expansion or restriction in the 
two variables.  
 
              Best                                      Best ATI protection 
          norms               
 
 
 
                   Worse                                    Best practices 
     As I have argued above there are many reasons why governments resist the idea of ATI. 
Power and control are two of the most prevailing incentives for such resistance. The cliché about 
information being power has much truth to it. As Max Weber explained, the logic of bureaucratic 
administration rests in part on producing information and “keeping secret its knowledge and 
intentions” from competing organizations and from the public864. Pasquier and Villeneuve 
observed that those in power tend to consider public information their own property.865. The 
                                                          
862 Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action (Chicago: Markham, 1971); Scalia, supra note 657 at 14-19; Henry 
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863 Woodbury, Ibid, at 51.  
864 Weber, Economy, supra note 768, at 992. 
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analysis in this chapter validates such claims. In most of the cases there are state institutions who 
have exclusive knowledge on the information they produce and where such information is stored, 
hence possessing a “monopoly of knowledge”. They also retain significant discretion over the 
release of documents they prefer to keep secret and shift this discretion towards the safe harbors 
provided under the exceptions to disclosure laws.866 This tight control over knowledge gives 
them a big amount of power over citizens. As such, governments are rarely willing to share this 
power in the absence of compelling incentives,867 according to Florini. Hence, governments have 
a free hand to control the public space in which debates occur and ideas are shaped. This could 
lead to alienation of the citizenry from public discourse.  
 
     Considering all above, ATI becomes a powerful tool for providing a rich public space which 
enables individuals to become citizens and be part of debating, shaping and steering the direction 
of their countries. In the Canadian context, Curry argues that there is a certain David versus 
Goliath aspect every time someone files an ATI – common citizens can obtain some of the most 
sensitive documents held by some of the most powerful people in the country.868 At first sight, 
this seems like an unequal playfield for the citizenry. However, as the analysis in this chapter 
indicated, governments have a culture of secrecy embedded in them, but also some incentives, 
and pressures to act accordingly to the ATI requirements. ATI regimes involve many other 
actors, such as information commissioners, courts and NGO-s, whose role is important in 
shaping directions of the right of ATI in a given jurisdiction. They have the potential to promote 
compliance with existing laws and policies, and encourage governments to revise laws, policies, 
and practices869. I study the role of these other actors in the next chapter of this research.  
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CHAPTER 8:  MEDIA AND THE NGOs – LOOKING AT ATI FROM A USER’S 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
     ATI regimes in Canada and the EU are advanced by the noteworthy contribution of different 
NGOs and media working to defend the public’s right of ATI. This chapter looks at the media 
and NGOs for three reasons. First, they are among a few categories of users of ATI rights. 
Second, and more importantly, they play an essential role in promoting transparency and ATI as 
fundamental to democracy and good governance. Third, to clarify a point that seems to emerge 
from the literature for claims (especially from the political class) that the ATI space is occupied 
by journalists who abuse the system just to embarrass governments. Hazell and Worthy argue 
that there is sometimes a strained relationship between governments and media - the government 
feels that information is distorted by the press, and the press feels that there is no information 
that is not fed or manipulated by the government870.    
 
          The purpose of this Chapter is to look at ATI from a user’s perspective. In the previous 
chapter, I examined ATI from an insider’s point of view – that of the government. Now, I turn to 
examine it from an outsider’s standpoint. To understand the outsider’s perspective I examine the 
work of some of the most influential NGOs and media organizations or journalists in Canada and 
the EU on ATI. In addition, I look at the strategies employed by them for the promotion of 
transparency and the right of ATI.  An analysis of the websites of the some of the newspapers 
and NGOs was complemented by interviews with the representatives of some of them. The 
interviewees in this research were chosen among important persons who have been part of 
different deliberations on issues of transparency and ATI.  
 
     The traditions role of the media is investigatory journalism and breaking story. Walby and 
Larsen see a connection between ATI and breaking news. He argued that “ATI/FOI requests are 
associated with the breaking of a big story that is the golden goose of investigative 
journalism.871” In addition, McCamus recognized the role of the press as “a prime mover in 
                                                          
870 Robert Hazell & Ben Worthy (September 2009), “Impact of FOI on central government”, University College 
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working for freedom of information legislation.”872 The work of the media and NGOs has 
enriched the understanding of the principle of transparency and has stretched the right of ATI to 
the limits of legal recognition. The relationship between ATI and media has been twofold. On 
one hand, media has helped giving life to the right of ATI by using its breaking stories. On the 
other hand, ATI has “helped the media become much more aware of how government works and 
to identify administrative miscues.”873 
 
     The NGOs, or more widely civil society has also been closely associated with the immense 
work on ATI. Schutter addresses the “promise of participatory democracy” in his account of civil 
society in EU governance and maintains that interest groups and citizens’ initiatives “participate 
in public information and communication processes, so helping to create a general perception of 
the common good.”874 In addition, Curtin refers to the same concept when assigning civil society 
the function of establishing a space for the public deliberation of values and policies.875 Eriksen 
argues that democracy at the level of the EU requires a “single overarching communicative space 
accessible for all, in which proponents and opponents can voice and justify opinions and claims, 
and mobilize support in order to sluice them into decision-making units via social movements 
and political parties.”876 Usually the relationship of the NGOs with the government is less 
confrontational than that of the media.  In an Interview with Viola Aliaj, lawyer at the QZHDI, 
she admitted that “The interaction with ATI officials in Albania has an investigative nature, but 
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not adversarial or conflictual. The administration usually asks why the centre wants information, 
how is it going to use it and for what reasons.”877  
 
     Media and NGOs’ approach to ATI rights could be seen in a spectrum – from human rights 
advocacy to association of ATI with broader themes such as equality, development or justice. 
According to Access Info Europe, “The right of information is a fundamental right in itself….It 
is also an instrumental right, essential for the protection of other human rights.”878 At a broader 
scope, part of aspirations of the UN Sustainable Development Goals from an NGO’s perspective 
is that human development in the coming decades will depend on people’s ATI.879 
 
     Below, I discuss some of the strategies that the NGOs and media use to promote transparency 
and ATI. These strategies are diverse and range from whistleblowing to advocacy to litigation. 
They demonstrate the potential of the media and NGOs for ATI rights promotion and protection.  
 
8.1 Raising public awareness and revealing scandals  
 
8.1.1 Canada’s activism on access to information  
     Generally, NGOs and media are good advocates when it comes to protecting and promoting 
important values in democratic societies - ATI - being one of them. They have demonstrated a 
firm determination to explore the loopholes and weaknesses of the current operational systems 
on ATI legal provisions and their implementation. According to Sulyok and Pap, an NGO’s 
impact is twofold. First of all, they serve as a very powerful source of information, raise 
awareness, and initiate public debate on issues formerly unknown. Second, they perform an 
                                                          
877 Interview with Viola Aliaj, QZHDI, May 8, 2015.  
878 Access Info Europe, “Rendition in record: Using the right to access to information to unveil the paths of illegal 
prisoners transfer flights”, 15 December 2011, at 24, online:  <http://www.access-info.org/wp-
content/uploads/Rendition_on_Record_19_December_2011.pdf>. 
879 A statement signed by various Organizations forming an Open Working Group, calling to fully integrate the 
governance recommendations of the UN High Level Panel of Eminent Persons Report into the proposed Post-2015 
Sustainable Development Goals.  See: Article 19, Post-2015: Access to information and independent media essential 
to development. 3 Feb 2014. Online: <http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37435/en/post-2015:-access-
to-information-and-independent-media-essential-to-development>. 
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investigative role on sensitive issues.880 Similarly, media is one of the most passionate and public 
advocates of access rights today.881 
 
     Indeed, people get most of their information from the news in TV, radio or newspapers. With 
the advancement of technology we can hear or read about breaking news wherever we are 
through our devices. As such, media’s reach to people extends limitless. This role not only brings 
public’s attention to the importance of ATI, but also creates the public space to think about, 
initiate or join debates of public importance. It is not novel to say that governments are not 
particularly sympathetic to being opened when it comes to decision making. In this context, 
NGOs and media that engage in access rights advocacy are not always very welcome to be part 
of deliberations of public importance. Their role is often perceived as taking advantage of 
transparency by revealing information that bears on others’ performance.882 Speaking about the 
EU, Kohl-Koch argues that ‘empirical research documents that civil society involvement in EU 
governance ensures neither equal nor effective representation of stakeholders883. This situation 
stands in contrast to the role that NGOs should play in democratic governance – participating in 
political processes and holding governments accountable.  
 
     In Canada, many NGOs criticize the ATI regime for being subject to significant exceptions 
and the costly, time-consuming and frustrating process for obtaining information. Most NGOs 
are concerned about the delays and costs associated with the Canadian ATI system and dispute 
that the presumption of openness and transparency is being seriously undermined. They hold that 
Canada is falling behind internationally884 at a time when governments all over the world are 
increasingly being more proactive about disclosing information to the public. The Canadian 
                                                          
880 Márton Sulyok & András László Pap, “The role of the NGOs in the Access to Public Information: Issues Related 
to Extraordinary Renditions in Absence of Transparent Public Power:, in Mark B. Salter, ed, Mapping Transatlantic 
Security Relations. The EU, Canada and the War on Terror (London: Routledge, 2010) 162- 197 at 22 [Sulyok & 
Pap].  
881 Annual Report to Parliament by the Information Commissioner , June 1992 
882 O’Neill, “Transparency and Ethics”, supra note 97 at 88. 
883 See B. Kohler-Koch, “If participation does not do the job, will accountability make a difference? The Potential of 
Civil Society Organizations in democractizing the EU”, CGES Working Papers, WP 2011-05 [Kohler-Koch]; 
Kohler-Koch & B. Finke, “The institutional Shaping of EU-Society Relations: A Contribution to Democracy via 
Participation?” (2007) 3 Journal of Civil Society 205 [Kohler-Koch & Finke].  
884 See for example: Stanley Tromp, “Fallen Behind: Canada’s Access to Information Act in the World Context”, 
Report, September 2008, online: <http://www3.telus.net/index100/report>. [Tromp] 
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NGOs’ approach towards the current system of ATI, especially at the federal level, is a strong 
critique of the law and its implementation. The pervasive opinion of the NGOs is that the system 
is out-dated and weak at best and broken at worst. Vincent Gogolek, executive director of the 
B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association (FIPA) reported that game playing, 
delays and workarounds are nothing new to advocates.885 In an interview with me he said that his 
centre uses ATI requests to test the state of the law, and learn what is going on in the 
government. He raised two issues regarding ATI implementation, first – information not being 
recorded, and second - the high fees imposed on the requesters. He illustrated these problems 
with examples. First, the Ministry of Citizenship replied to a FIPA request about records of a 
Conference they had with the US trade representative, that they did not write anything down. In 
another instance, the fee for a request, sent by the centre about the correspondence between the 
BC government and the Governor’s Office in Washington State, was estimated over $600 in BC, 
while in the Washington state costed only $5. The request was the same. When the centre went 
public with the difference in cost, the Deputy Minister sent a letter to them saying that fee was 
reduced to zero. Gogolek explained that “they were clearly using fees to delay and 
discourage.”886     
 
     In addition, the Centre for Law and Democracy (CLD) states that “It is neither revolutionary 
nor even controversial to note that Canada’s right to information system is broken.”887 According 
to them, “the problem has become entrenched at many levels in Canada: problematic legal rules, 
negative official attitudes towards disclosure, an adversarial approach on the part of many civil 
society groups and actors, and general public apathy on this issue.”888. In an interview with 
Michael Karanicolas, Legal Officer at the CLD, he stated that “the ATIA is 30 years old, and 
there is presumably an entire generation of bureucrats that have spent their entire careers under 
the ATI law, and there is still not a culture of openness by default.”889 He considered this 
                                                          
885 Jason Proctor, “Freedom of information laws a poor match for secretive governments, advocates say”,  CBC 
News, May 30, 2015, online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/freedom-of-information-laws-a-
poor-match-for-secretive-governments-advocates-say-1.3093471>. 
886 Interview with Vincent Gogolek, CEO and Executive Director of BC FIPA, May 15, 2015 
887 Centre for Law and Democracy “Response to the OIC Call for Dialogue: Recommendations for Improving the 
Right to Information in Canada”, January 2013, at 1. Online: <http://www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/Canada.RTI_.Jan13.pdf>. 
888 Ibid, at 4.  
889 Interview with Michael Karanicolas, Legal Officer of the Centre of Law and Democracy, April 14, 2015.  
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situation troubling and frustrating to deal with. Another issue which he criticised is the latest 
practice of the government to substitute ATI with open data, claiming that it has been more 
transparent. Karanicolas said that “Open data is great, and it is great the government is doing 
that, but open data is not a substitute for access to information, because information about 
corruption, mismanagement, or information about anything government is embarrassed about, 
that is never going to get released through open data, or it is very unlikely.”890  
 
     Reporters and editors of Newspapers Canada891, who have an extensive experience with ATI, 
had long complained of government restricting information despite legislative guarantees of 
access. In an interview with John Hinds, President and CEO of Newspapers Canada, he outlined 
numerous problems with ATI in Canada. Hinds explained that ATI suffers from many problems, 
it is legalistic in nature (professionals take more advantage), it is complex (one should know how 
to navigate the system), it is resource dependent (only those who can afford it can pay for it), it is 
forgotten into public’s memory (not enough promotion), it is dependent on the institutional 
culture, governments often play a privacy and security card which trumps ATI892. In 2005, the 
Canadian Newspaper Association presented evidence to the OIC describing a policy of “amber 
lighting” or “red flagging” that had been detailed by investigative journalists Ann Rees. 
Thompson describes the amber light process as “a heads up process to advise senior management 
of upcoming access to information releases that may attract media or political attention.”893 
Roberts and Rees described that practice as “a highly sophisticated, government-wide access to 
information surveillance system.”894 
 
                                                          
890 Ibid.  
891 Newspapers Canada is a joint initiative of the Canadian Newspaper Association and the Canadian Community 
Newspapers Association. They consider themselves to be an advocacy group of publishers. They have been actively 
concerned with the state of Freedom of Information in Canada since 1997, online: 
<http://www.newspaperscanada.ca/about-us>. 
892 Interview with John Hinds, President and CEO of Newspaper Canada, April 16, 2015.  
893 Elisabeth Thomson 2006 “PS Brass get ‘Heads Up’ over Access Releases” Ottawa Citizen, 2 October, A3. 
894 See Yavar Hameed & Jeffrey Monaghan, “Accessing Dirty Data: Methodological Strategies for Social Problems 
Research” in Larsen & Walby, supra note 26 at 148 [Hameed & Monaghan]; Ann Rees 2003 “Red File Alert: Public 
Access at Risk” Toronto Star, 1 November, A 32; Ann Rees, 2003 “Transparent Government Needs Obstacles 
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     The Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE) strongly believes that “without access to 
information, freedom of expression is a hollow freedom.”895 It writes in its most recent 2014-
2015 Report Card that 2014 has been a terrible year and arguing that “Our right to know has 
never been more threatened. Years of government neglect and political interference have left our 
Access to Information system an antiquated, ineffective shell of what it is supposed to be.”896 
Tom Henheffer, CJEF’s Executive Director, expressed his disbelief in the ATIA saying that in an 
interview that our access law has no teeth since the government can deny requests without any 
consequences. He explained that “because of the government approach, ATI is becoming 
useless. Many journalists cannot afford to spend a long time following a story …It is a nigh 
nightmare situation.”897 CJFE also issues Reviews of Free Expression in Canada every year 
where it also looks at problems with ATI regime. In 2012 CJFE initiated a survey of its online 
readers seeking input for a dialogue that the OIC was conducting regarding the ATIA. CJFE 
initiated the survey in early December 2012, and received 95 responses to a ten-part 
questionnaire898. A large majority (79%) of those responders were either very or somewhat 
familiar with the ATI system. Regarding the scope of the ATIA’s ‐what it covers ‐ only 1% of the 
respondents would keep things the way they are.899 
 
     CJFE also designs an ATI Annual Public Poll900 which asks Canadians about their opinions 
on some of the most important public issues, including government openness and ATI. The most 
recent Poll demonstrated that Canadians consider ATI important (79%). This is a significant 
change compared to the last year’s Poll, when the response to the question “if Canadians have 
more access to government information than ever before?” only 36% disagreed and 22% agreed. 
                                                          
895 Canadian Journalists for Free Expression, ‘A Hollow right: Access to Information in crisis: A Submission by 
CJFE to the Office of Information Commissioner concerning reform of Canada’s Access to Information Act’ 
(January 2013) at 3.  
896 Canadian Journalists for Free Expression. CJFE’s Report Card 2014-2015, at 4, online:  
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These type of polls are very significant not only because they give a sense on how public feels 
about access rights, but also because they raise public awareness by drawing attention that these 
issues matter. Henheffer said that these polls take the temperature on a few issues, including ATI 
and see what Canadians feel in regards to these issues.901    
Table 23: CJFE Review 2014-2015                         Table 24: CJFE Poll 2014 
                     
Source: CJFE Poll 2015. Gives us back our rights.                 Source: CJFE Poll 2014. Do Canadians care about  
p. 6. May 5, 2015. Available at                                               Free Expression?. p. 6. April 30, 2014. Available at    
http://cjfe.org/sites/default/files/2014review/2014CJFE_Review_Poll.pdf 
                                                                                                  http://cjfe.org/sites/default/files/2014-15%20Poll.pdf     
 
     The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) also uses ATI for monitoring, advocacy 
and policy implementation purposes. According to Interviewee No.5, the centre uses ATI “to 
advocate for a particular type of policy to be implemented…, to inform particular projects, but 
also to get a better sense of how ATI regime works overall.”902 In this interview it was 
recognized that the ATIA is very out of date, there are a lot of exemptions and exclusions, and a 
lot of them are interpreted very broadly. The interviewee gave an example of request that the 
centre had filed to the CSE which took a year to get a no answer. The answer was: “we can’t tell 
you if we have it or not, and even if we do have it is exempted under the provisions of the 
statute.” However, the Interviewee also acknowledged that she has met journalists who get a lot 
                                                          
901 Interview, April 14, 2015.  
902 Interview No.5, June 18, 2015.  
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of good information using ATI, because they have built some expertise on how to navigate the 
system. Journalists, especially of the big media, are taken more seriously by the government 
because “the stakes are higher if they’re messing around with the media”. Also, the interviewee 
admitted that the CCLA does not engage with ATI as much as they wanted to, because of the 
shortage of staff and limited resources which don’t allow to go after information that might get 
long time to generate results.  
 
     Another Canadian NGO - Democracy Watch – has also been active in its criticism against the 
ATIA in Canada. It has been advocating for changes in the Law in a public campaign - the Open 
Government Campaign – trying to inform the public and engage people to participate in putting 
pressure to the government in this issue. Democracy Watch has prepared a template letter903 
which people can fill and send it directly from their website to key politicians calling for changes 
in the ATIA in Canada. The letter is also an appeal to the government to stop excessive secrecy 
and protect the whistleblowers. On May 22nd, 2015, the number of letters sent was 75, 382904 
which is an impressive number that speaks directly about the public interest in ATI issues. 
 
           
A. Breaking Stories of ATI requests in Canada 
     The so-called sponsorship scandal in Canada began with a single ATI request by The Globe 
and Mail. The stories that followed the request triggered a public inquiry and a host of reforms to 
federal ethics rules.905 The scandal came as a result of a Canadian federal government 
“sponsorship program” in the province of Quebec and involving the Liberal Party of Canada, in 
power from 1993 to 2006. Jean Chretien's Liberal government created the sponsorship program 
in the '90s to promote national unity in Quebec, but the administration of the program became a 
huge scandal because of corrupt payments to Liberal-friendly advertising firms, sometimes in 
return for no work.906 Until the issue hit the front pages in early 2004, the federal government 
                                                          
903 The letter can be found at Democracy Watch, Open Government Campaign, online: 
<http://democracywatch.ca/campaigns/open-government-campaign/>. 
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sponsorship program had been in operation quietly, but not altogether anonymously, since 1994 
because of intensifying media coverage.907 Government advertising and promotion were on a 
sharp upward curve, with $111 million spent annually on advertising campaigns by 2003.908 
Daniel Leblanc, a Globe and Mail reporter, helped expose the federal sponsorship scandal using 
documents obtained under the ATIA “to show that three-quarters of the funding was heading into 
Quebec.”909 He then talked to an anonymous whistleblower in the government who totally 
exposed the sponsorship scandal. When the matter became a public inquiry LeBlanc was asked 
in Court to reveal his source. In response, he said that he would rather face jail time than reveal 
the source of information.910. 
     In another case, the Canadian Press journalist Dean Beeby reported in February 2010 that a 
federal cabinet minister’s aide had impeded the release of material – an act for which he had no 
legal authority. Under the ATIA, Beeby had asked for information on the extensive real estate 
portfolio of the Department of Public Works. His request was tagged as sensitive, put into a 
purple-coloured folder, and handed to Sebastien Togneri, a political aide to the minister Christian 
Paradis. The department’s ATI officers decided they had no legal basis to withhold the 
information and ordered 137 pages released to the reporter. Then, at the last minute, Togneri sent 
an urgent email to a senior access official to “unrelease it” and there was a rush to the mailroom 
to save the file from being delivered to media hands. Four months later Beeby received only a 
fraction of the information and it was heavily redacted.911 The final release was made 82 days 
later than allowed under the law and included just 30 pages.912 
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     Access requests also played a part in The Globe's series on the treatment of detainees in 
Afghanistan handed over by the Canadian Forces, which led to new transfer rules between 
Canada and the Afghan government.913 Documents obtained under the ATIA show Canada’s 
Conservative government stopped short of a categorical repudiation of torture. Instead, it issued 
memos to security and defence agencies permitting the use of information that may have been 
gathered through coercion. The series of documents, dubbed Canada’s torture memos, formed 
the basis of several exclusive stories, ones that could not have been written without ATI.914 
 
     It was an access request in the late 1990s by McKie that ultimately made public a key 
database inside Health Canada chronicling cases of adverse drug reactions. Through 
negotiations, Health Canada agreed to release most of the database, and the CBC made it 
available to the public on its website. The data allowed the CBC to report a major rise in adverse 
drug reactions among youth taking certain antidepressants. A second story using the same 
database showed that thousands of seniors were dying each year from the drugs prescribed to 
them by doctors.915 
     Regarding the Senate expense scandal, requests were made from reporters and others using 
the ATIA to obtain all documents relating to the Senate fiasco in the possession of the two 
departments, the Privy Council Office and the Department of Justice. In total, the departments 
responded to more than two dozen requests for documents. In every case, the response was the 
same: The search yielded “zero” pages because the information “did not exist.” A subsequent 
request to the Privy Council Office for “all records related to the expenses of senators” turned up 
five pages of documents, but the government refused to release them on the grounds they 
contained confidential advice from lawyers.916 
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     In Ontario, the provincial government increased its inspections of daycares after a series of 
revelations by the Toronto Star, which used provincial and municipal freedom-of-information 
requests to uncover hundreds of illegal daycares and unsafe conditions at licensed centres.917 
8.1.2 The EU’s activism on access to documents  
      To understand the NGOs ATI activism in the EU, one should have a general idea about their 
status in the EU politics. The EU accepts NGO involvement in policy and decision-making as 
not only a necessity, but as a requirement of the democratic system. Heidbreder acknowledges 
that “As a basic element of the public sphere, civil society has a sense-making, communicative, 
and discursive role in shaping the democratic legitimacy of the Union embedded in identity and 
society formatting processes.”918 Suffering from a general democratic deficit due to its indirect 
forms of representation and political appointment, the EU includes NGOs in policy processes in 
order to increase its democratic legitimacy and bring itself closer to its citizens. The EU actively 
promotes the regular consultation and further involvement of civil society since these 
organisations have a lot of expertise in particular areas and are involved in implementing and 
monitoring EU policies.The Commission has formally recognized the contributions NGOs can 
make through different instruments, such as consultations through Green and White Papers, 
Communications, advisory committees, business test panels and ad hoc consultations. However, 
NGOs have better relationship with the members of the EP, up to a point where NGOs will draft 
legislation on behalf of a parliamentarian. The Commission is somewhat less open, and the 
Council is the hardest to access.  
 
     A scandal broke out in early June 2012 when European Commission spokesman Antonio 
Gravili was quoted by the EUobserver.com, characterising the debate around the reform of the 
EU's ATI rules as “infantile”. He asserted that most requests for what he called “internal EU 
documents” came from corporate lawyers and “nutty NGOs” instead of concerned EU citizens. 
Those targeted by the comments were the Brussels based anti-lobby organisations, who 
increasingly use ATD, including through the AsktheEU.org website. Civil society organisations 
and international FOI experts reacted strongly, in a letter to the Commission’s Vice-President 
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Maros Sefcovic and to the Commission’s President Jose Manuel Barroso calling on them to 
disown Gravili's comments. The letter was signed by over 50 NGOs, civil society platforms and 
FOI advocates, and called on the European Commission to publicly affirm that it respects the 
fundamental right of access to EU documents and the debate about the future of the transparency 
rules. An apology was received in this regard.919   
 
     NGOs in the EU have played an important role for the advancement of ATI. Organizations 
such as, Article 19, the Open Society Justice Initiative, and Access Info Europe (AIE) have urged 
ratification of the Convention on Access to Official Documents because it sets legally binding, 
minimum standards for ATI.920 AIE also intervened in April 2009, when an internal guide from 
the EU Directorate General for Trade was giving tips to public officials on how to not record 
information and to avoid providing documents to the public. AIE team filed requests for copies 
of documents giving staff guidance on how to handle ATD requests. As a result, the matter was 
pursued by an investigation which produced a report called “Questions to Brussels: How should 
a citizen request EU documents?”921 
 
     Another strategy is pursued in regards to access rights – using it as a tool to advance other 
human rights by gathering empirical data. For instance, AIE considers ATI a tool for defending 
other civil liberties and human rights,922 and it has initiated many projects in the EU, in which it 
has used ATI as a tool to assess human rights. This work confirms what research demonstrates, 
that “there is the primary objective on their [NGOs] side to promote access to …information as 
an accessory to evolve the performance of fundamental rights.”923 One such project that will use 
Europe’s ATI laws to get comparative data on civil liberties issues is “Access for Rights.”924 
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This project is a cooperation with another NGO, Statewatch925, and intends to generate 
information that can be used in advocacy. The aim is to address the need for greater transparency 
of security and counter-terrorism measures in Europe in order to minimise the negative impact of 
these measures on civil liberties, including the right of ATI. The project produces data that can 
strengthen the capacity of civil society to use ATI to engage in debate about existing and 
proposed measures and to evaluate their impact on human rights. AIE observes that national and 
EU ATI rules are currently underused by civil liberties and human rights organisations in many 
countries across Europe.926 In an interview with Darbishire, she stated that ATI is important 
because it plays a significant role in participation. According to her, participation is not only 
formal mechanisms, but also engagement via public debate. The presence of media and NGOs is 
important in lobbying - hence we need to control lobbying. In countries with increased 
transparency we have increased participation of one kind or another.927 
 
     Another AIE project is “Access Info Europe and Reprieve” which uses the right of ATI to 
investigate flights associated with “extraordinary rendition”928 – the covert transfer of prisoners 
by the USA from locations in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. The project revealed that the 
two of the 29 jurisdictions929 studied, Canada and EuroControl, have taken respectively 1 and 9 
days to deny information, and the reason of refusal for both was: “body not covered by law.”930 
Information obtained by AIE as part of the Rendition project using ATI in order to get 
information on secret CIA flights, has been used by REDRESS931 and the Human Rights 
Monitoring Institute (HRMI) to bring to court a complaint calling for an investigation into 
allegations that Mustafa al-Hawsawi was illegally transferred to and secretly detained and 
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tortured in Lithuania as part of the CIA-led programme.932 The Global Rendition System 
database and mapping has been released on the eve of President Obama’s major speech on 
counter-terrorism policy. The mapping is the most comprehensive resource so far visualising the 
CIA’s programme of renditions and secret prisons as part of the “war on terror”. 
 
     In the “Policing of protests” Project, AIE asked 42 countries through ATI requests about the 
use of force by police in protest situations. The requests contained five questions designed to 
obtain the information necessary for public oversight of police action during protests.933 For the 
“Detention of Migrants” Program AIE (in cooperation with Global Detention Project) submitted 
66 information requests to 33 governments (two requests for each country) about the detention of 
migrants with the purpose of improving transparency of immigrant detention practices. The 
information informs statistics regarding the numbers and types of detainees, as well as details 
about where people are detained for immigration-related reasons.934 The data also provides 
evidence for victims and human rights advocates, to inform public debate and policy, and to 
facilitate comparative study of detention regimes.  
 
     In addition to using ATI as a tool to advance human rights by means of data gathering, NGOs 
may serve intermediaries to facilitate the public’s ATD. AIE in cooperation with other civil 
society organizations have created a portal - AsktheEU.org935 - to help members of the public get 
information about the EU institutions. The website facilitates the exchange of information 
between the public and the EU public officials. On one hand, the EU citizens may ask questions 
about the EU through this portal using an email that is automatically sent to the correct EU body, 
which in turn has to answer within three weeks. When the EU replies to one’s request, it gets 
published on this website and the person gets a notification.936 On the other hand, the EU 
institutions is less likely to have to answer repeated requests about the same subject. Once a 
question has been answered everyone will be able to find the information stored on this website. 
                                                          
932 Access Info Europe, “Mustafa al-Hawsawi Case”, online: <http://www.access-info.org/a4r/11969>. 
933 Access Info Europe, “The Transparency of the Policing of Protests: Using the right of access to information to 
assess the transparency of police activities during protests”, April 2015, at 7.  http://www.access-info.org/wp-
content/uploads/Police-and-Protest-Report_Final.pdf 
934 Access Info Europe, “Access Info Europe and The Global Detention Project Begin 33-Country Right to 
Information Investigation”, 14 March 2013, online: <http://www.access-info.org/a4r/11941>.  
935 See the Website <http://www.asktheeu.org/> 
936 Access Info Europe. Online: <http://www.asktheeu.org/en/help/about>. 
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     In Albania, although many NGOs have pursued different strategies in advancing ATI right (as 
I explain in the next sections), some of them still consider the publication of legal acts and 
legislation as suffering from lack of transparency. In an interview with Shella, he explained that 
Albanian institutions do not still understand the importance of the publication of the legal acts 
they produce, and this is why the centre has dedicated a good part of its work to improving this 
culture.937 This demonstrates the level of primitivism and the secrecy culture that characterizes 
the public administration in Albania where information in many cases is still considered a 
property of the institutions.   
 
8.2 Rating systems of access to information regimes   
 
      Another strategy used by NGOs and media for the promotion of ATI is the design of Rating 
and Grading systems. There are two Rating systems currently operating to evaluate the ATI 
regimes: one for the legal framework and the other for its implementation.  
 
     Regarding the evaluation of the legal framework, AIE and the CLD have created “The Right 
to Information Rating”938, known as the RTI project. The RTI Rating analyses the quality of the 
world’s ATI laws by assessing the strength of the legal framework for guaranteeing the right to 
information in a given country against international standards. The RTI Rating does not measure 
the quality of implementation, but is limited to a comparative analysis of legal frameworks. One 
pitfall of this system is that in many cases the law itself does not give the whole picture of an 
ATI regime. CLD recognizes that “relatively strong laws do not necessarily ensure openness if 
they are not implemented properly’939. However, regardless of these outlying cases, over time a 
strong ATI law can contribute to advancing openness and help those using it to defend and 
promote the right of ATI. In an interview with Karanicolas, legal officer at CLD he stated that 
“The value of the RTI rating project is that it allows for a systemic and objective analysis of 
                                                          
937 Interview with Gerti Shella, Executive Director, Qendra per Ceshtjet e Informimit Publik (Centre for the Matters 
of Public Information), Albania, May 8, 2015.  
938 Global Right to Information Rating. <http://www.rti-rating.org/>. 
939 Centre for Law and Democracy & Access Info Europe, “RTI Rating Data Analysis Series: Overview of Results 
and Trends”, 28 September 2013, at 1-2, online:   
<http://new.rti-rating.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Report.13.09.Overview-of-RTI-Rating.pdf>. 
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access to information legislation and to allow for comparative analysis. It is very useful from an 
advocacy perspective. Countries tend to compare themselves to their peer group, how well a 
country is doing comparing to another worldwide.”940 
 
          The central idea behind the RTI Rating is to provide ATI advocates, reformers, legislators 
and others with a reliable tool for assessing the overall strength of the legal framework in their 
country.  
 
Table 25: Right to Information Global Rating  
 
 
Source: Global Right to Information Rating, Country Data. 2014. Online: <http://www.rti-rating.org/country-data#>. 
     As the table 25 above shows, in the 2014 RTI Rating Canada scored 79 /150 (while first 
country – Serbia - scored 135/150) and ranked 59/102 countries. Based on this ranking, CLD 
                                                          
940 Interview, 14 April 2015.  
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argues that “It is tempting to say that, when it comes to the right to information, Canada is a third 
world country. Unfortunately, this phrasing is far too kind since, as the Global RTI Rating 
shows, when it comes to the right to information, many third world countries have a lot to teach 
Canada.”941 This is a very strong critique considering that in 1982, when Canada’s national law 
was first adopted, Canada was among the first countries to boast this important democratic 
achievement. But while standards around the world have advanced, Canada’s access laws have 
stagnated and sometimes even regressed.942 
 
     Using the same methodology as the Global RTI Rating, CLD has developed the Canadian 
RTI Rating which compares all thirteen jurisdictions and the federal jurisdiction in Canada (see 
Table 26 below). It is evident that the federal law ranks last, confirming the allegations of the 
NGOs (discussed previously) about a broken system of access in Canada.   
 
Table 26: RTI rating of the Canadian provinces  
Source: Centre for Law and Democracy, Canadian RTI Rating. 2014 http://www.law-democracy.org/live/global-rti-
rating/canadian-rti-rating/ 
 
                                                          
941 Centre for Law and Democracy & Access Info Europe, “RTI Rating Data Analysis Series: Overview of Results 
and Trends”, 28 September 2013, at 22, online:   
<http://new.rti-rating.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Report.13.09.Overview-of-RTI-Rating.pdf>. 
942 Centre for Law and Democracy. 2012. Failing to Measure Up: An Analysis of Access to Information Legislation 
in Canadian Jurisdictions, at 3, online: <http://www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Canada-
report-on-RTI.pdf>. 
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     Karanicolas mentioned in his interview the impact that the RTI rating had in the case of Bill 
C-29 in Newfoundland, which aimed to change the ATI law in the province. CLD made a strong 
opposition to the Bill and produced a report, in which they argued that this Bill was going to 
harm transparency in the province and used data from the RTI rating to show that after reform 
the ATI law would be weaker than Uganda, and Moldova. The NDP opposition picked up on the 
CLD report and cited it in the House of Assembly. This spurred a lot of debate and the Attorney 
General after calling CLD an “amateurish organization”, apologized later.943 This example 
demonstrated the potential of the RTI ratings and the advocacy power it may generate.   
     Another system that is used to assess the implementation of the access laws in Canada is 
developed by Newspapers Canada. This is a grading system in the form of a survey – the 
National Freedom of Information (FOI) Audit - which initiated in 2005 and is since then 
conducted annually. The purpose of the survey is to gather objective information on the health of 
Canada’s ATI regimes and test how readily officials disclose information that should be publicly 
available on request. The audit reviews the performance of Canadian governments and various 
public institutions with respect to their ATI regimes. To obtain the data for the audit, a team of 
researchers requests the same information from the federal and provincial government, as well as 
a selection of municipalities across the country. Newspaper Canada has been doing so for about 
ten years now. Vallance-Jones, who leads the Audit every year admitted in an interview with me 
that “Although the audit is done for journalistic purposes, it is also interested on how law 
works.”944 
 
     For the 2014 audit, almost 400 requests were sent to 11 federal, provincial and municipal 
institutions across the country. Identical requests are sent to all government bodies, allowing 
their responses to be compared both as to how fast they respond and how much information they 
release. The institutions get graded on the speed and the amount of information released.945 
According to Vallance-Jones, the federal government continues to struggle to produce anything 
better than a mediocre performance in the Newspapers Canada audit. At the 2014 Annual Audit, 
                                                          
943 Interview with Michael Karancolas, 14 April, 2015.  
944 Interview with Fred Vallance-Jones, April 23, 2015. 
945 Fred Vallance-Jones, National Freedom of Information Audit 2014, at 2, online: 
<http://www.newspaperscanada.ca/sites/default/files/FOI2014-FINAL.pdf>. 
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it received an F for speed of responses and a C for the extent of information disclosed.946 In the 
interview I had with Vallance-Jones he explained his experience with the Audit by saying that 
the federal government is following a tactic of delaying responses, narrowing and changing the 
scope of the requests by proposing to disclose something else instead of what is initially 
requested. For the Audit requests he expected a two month delay from the federal government.947 
Table 27 below shows the grades assigned for 2014.  
 
     Table 27. Grades for Speed of responses  
 
Source: Newspapers Canada, National Freedom of Information Audit 2014, at 53, online:  
<http://www.newspaperscanada.ca/sites/default/files/FOI2014-FINAL.pdf>. 
 
     The National FOI Audit is the largest and most comprehensive survey of its kind in Canada. 
With its approach of sending identical requests to governments at all three levels, the study offers 
the chance to compare jurisdictions against one another and encourage the kind of openness that 
the authors of FOI legislation seek. The Audit provides the public with the opportunity to see the 
degree to which governments comply with their own FOI legislation, as well as facilitating 
comparisons among jurisdictions. As such, the audit represents an important tool for asserting 
the public’s right to ATI. However, according to Hinds “the Audit is most effective at the 
                                                          
946 Fred Vallance-Jones, National Freedom of Information Audit 2014, at 35, online: 
<http://www.newspaperscanada.ca/sites/default/files/FOI2014-FINAL.pdf>. 
947 Interview with Fred Vallance-Jones, April 23, 2015.  
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municipal level…The federal government doesn’t really care – the Prime Minister doesn’t get 
embarrassed for getting an F.” This quote demonstrates the persistence of the federal government 
in its attitudes towards ATI. Hinds explains it as a secrecy culture problem. He says “The 
government is hierarchical – everybody gets everything signed off, and everybody has to let their 
superiors know everything.”948 Vallance-Jones also expressed concerns about some kind of 
internal direction that is telling federal institutions to aggressively try to clarify request that are 
very clear, as a strategy to delay responses.949 This culture of tight control was evident in the 
responses to the questionnaire I sent to the ATIP coordinators in Canada.  
 
 8.3 Pressuring governments and courts on advancing access to information rights   
 
8.3.1 Engagement in Law reform 
     In Canada, many NGOs have been engaged in Law Reform at the federal and provincial level. 
McCamus credited many civil society groups for the passage of the ATIA in 1982, among others, 
“the Canadian Bar Association, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, associations of 
academics, public interest groups and the press.”950 While there are several attempts at the 
federal level to push for Law Reform, they are mostly done through producing policy assessment 
papers and recommendations. A similar strategy involves supporting the ICC in his/her 
recommendations for Law Reform.951  
 
     Similarly, in the EU, the Ombudsman has been supported by NGOs. For instance, Statewatch, 
which has included the EU’s FOI as one of its observatories, has chosen to file complaints to the 
EU Ombudsman.952 Statewatch claims that “as a result of Statewatch’s complaints, the right of 
the Ombudsman to investigate secrecy complaints was written into the Amsterdam Treaty 
together with a commitment to ‘enshrine’ the public’s right of ATI in an EU Regulation.”953  
                                                          
948 Interview with John Hinds, 16 April, 2015.  
949 Interview with Fred Vallance-Jones, 23 April, 2015.  
950 McCamus, “FOI in Canada”, supra note 283 at 52.  
951 See Centre for Law and Democracy, “Response to the OIC Call for Dialogue: Recommendations for Improving 
the Right to Information in Canada, January 2013, online: <http://www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/Canada.RTI_.Jan13.pdf>. 
952 Note that these complaints were made early on, before the introduction of the Regulation 1049. By 1998 it had 
submitted eight complaints to the EU Ombudsman. See, Statewatch, “FOI in the EU: Working for openness and 
democracy in the EU since 1992”, online: <http://www.statewatch.org/foi.htm>. 
953 Ibid.  
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     In Canada, at the provincial level, it is noteworthy to mention the work of the CLD which has 
contributed to Law reform by making submissions to the legislative committees and provincial 
governments. The Centre made a submission on ATI Reform in Quebec in April 2013954. The 
submission was prepared for a general consultation and public hearing held by the Province of 
Quebec’s Committee on Institutions to address the implementation of Quebec’s Act Respecting 
Access to Documents Held by Public Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information. The 
CLD made another submission to the Independent Review of the Newfoundland and Labrador 
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act on July 2014.955  
 
     Newspapers Canada has also been lobbying for reform to the ATI for two decades, but 
without success. In April 8, 2011 Newspapers Canada , and two other organizations, the 
Canadian Taxpayers Association, and the BC FIPA asked the political parties in Canada to say 
what they will do to fix the ATI system to combat an already disastrous situation956. Newspapers 
Canada contributed to the latest recommendations of the ICC for ATI reform, which according to 
Hinds is long due. For Hinds, in order to makes changes to the system, there is need to give 
order-making power to the ICC, people need to be afraid of him/her. In fact, for Hinds, the whole 
law should be modernized.957 
 
    Another ATI advocate, CJFE supported the amendments proposed in Bill C-613, An Act to 
amend the Parliament of Canada Act and the Access to Information Act (transparency) proposed 
by Trudeau in 2014. It argued that “The bill would improve the current failing access to 
information system and increase government transparency.”958     
 
                                                          
954 Centre for Law and Democracy, “Submission on Access to Information Reform in Quebec”, March 2013, online: 
<http://www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Quebec.RTI_.Mar13.pdf>. 
955 Centre for Law and Democracy, “Submission to the Independent Review of the Newfoundland and Labrador 
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act”, July 2014, online: <http://www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/Canada.Nfld_.RTI_.Jul14.pdf>. 
956 Freedominfo.org, Canadian Political Parties criticized for silence on FOI, 8 April 2011, online:  
<http://www.freedominfo.org/2011/04/canadian-political-parties-criticized-for-silence-on-foi/>. 
957 Interview with John Hinds, April 16, 2015.  
958 Canadian Journalists for Free Expression, “Bill C-613 would improve access to information in Canada”, June 16, 
2014, online:  <http://cjfe.org/resources/media_releases/bill-c-613-would-improve-access-information-canada>. 
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     In the EU, Statewatch has engaged in Law Reform using public campaigns. During the 
negotiation of the draft Regulation 1049 on public access to EU documents, Statewatch led a 
coalition of NGOs in a campaign for openness and citizens' rights - the “Call for an Open 
Europe”. This was launched in 2000 in collaboration with the European Federation of Journalists 
and was supported by hundreds of groups and individuals across Europe.959 
 
     Regulation 1049 is under review and the Commission’s and Council’s proposals are criticized 
for restricting the ATI rules. As a response, an alliance of 131 groups, including transparency 
and ATI campaigners and human rights organisations, have called on the EP to prevent going 
backwards with the proposed legislation. The NGOs warned that European Commission 
proposals that are set to be approved in the coming weeks will "substantially reduce the number 
of public documents" available upon request960. Under the proposed rules, only documents that 
are formally transmitted would be made available upon request to a member of the public. As 
thousands of documents are informally passed between European policymakers, the alliance 
fears that such papers and emails will now be out of reach to the public. Such language could 
even encourage policymakers to begin engaging in administrative practices that actively avoid 
formal transmission of documents so as to prevent the public from gaining access to them.961 
 
     Some Albanian NGOs have also been engaged in law reform in the country. For instance, in 
2012-2013, the “Res Publica” Centre sent 200 requests to various institutions to test the 
implementation of the ATI law in Albania. The test demonstrated that the law is ineffective and 
its practice very slow.962 As the law of 1999 was considered weak and out of date some NGOs 
gave their contribution in improving the legal structure of ATI. The Soros Foundation in Albania 
has offered its expertise on the ATI law review, updating it in accordance with the best 
                                                          
959 International Federation of Journalists. “Report of meeting: Call for an Open Europe: views from civil society on 
access to EU documents”, 27/02/2001, online: <http://www.ifj.org/nc/en/news-single-
view/browse/926/backpid/4/article/report-of-meeting-call-for-an-open-europe-views-from-civil-society-on-access-
to-eu-documents/>. 
960 Leigh Phillips, “Transparency NGOs call on EU not to restrict document access”, The EU Observer. 2 Feb 2011, 
online: <https://euobserver.com/institutional/31736>. 
961 Ibid.  
962 Res Publica, Sa zbatohet në praktikë e drejta për infomim mbi dokumentat zyrtarë? 12.10.2013, online:  
<http://www.respublica.org.al/sa-zbatohet-ne-praktike-e-drejta-per-infomim-mbi-dokumentat-zyrtare/>. 
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international standards in the field.963 In April 2014, Soros and two other NGOs presented their 
proposals for the amendament of the ATI law which were reflected in the new law, adopted six 
months later.964 
8.3.2 Involvement in litigation  
     There are many examples of NGOs and media engaging in litigation in defence of the ATI 
rights in both Canada and the EU. I will briefly mention some of the most important cases, and 
will look at them again in more detail in Chapter ten where I examine the ATI jurisprudence.  
 
     The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) has a history in intervening in ATI cases 
before the Supreme Court. In a recent case - John Doe v. Ontario (Minister of Finance)965- the 
Court interpreted and decided on an exception to Ontario’s provincial ATI regime for “advice or 
recommendations” of a public servant. CCLA intervened in the case to argue that the “advice or 
recommendations” exception should be interpreted narrowly and records should not be shielded 
from disclosure.  CCLA also argued that the interpretation of the legislation should respect the 
values enshrined in the Charter and the global trends towards greater openness and transparency 
in government. Although, the CCLA was not successful on this intervention, its arguments 
before the court opened up discussions about the amount of government information that are 
labelled as “policy options” and therefore inaccessible by the public. The negative decision of 
the Court demonstrates the justice’s system inability to circumvent legislative provisions.   
 
     The CCLA intervened in another the case, Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada 
(Minister of National Defence)966 which was brought before the Supreme Court to consider 
whether Minister’s offices, including the Prime Minister’s Office, are considered “government 
institutions” for the purposes of the ATIA.  The Supreme Court found that the meaning of 
                                                          
963 Fondacioni Shqiperia a Hapur per Shqiperine, “Diskutimi i projektligjit të ri “Për të drejtën e informimit”, 
28.03.2013, online:  <http://www.osfa.al/njoftime/diskutimi-i-projektligjit-te-ri-per-te-drejten-e-informimit>. 
964 Fondacioni Shqiperia a Hapur per Shqiperine, “Pjesëtarë të shoqërisë civile dhe institucioneve shtetërore 
diskutojnë mbi përmirësimin e të drejtës së informimit në Shqipëri”, 11.04.2014, online: 
<http://www.osfa.al/ngjarje/pjesetare-te-shoqerise-civile-dhe-institucioneve-shteterore-diskutojne-mbi-
permiresimin-e-te>, 
965 John Doe v. Ontario (Finance), 2014 SCC 36, [2014] 2 SCR 3 [Doe]. 
966 Canada (Information Commissioner) v Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2011 SCC 25, [2011] 2 SCR 306 
[Minister of National Defence]. 
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“government institution” under the Act did not include ministerial offices and that to expand the 
scope of the Act in this way was an issue for Parliament and not the courts.967 The CCLA 
intervened in this case to argue for a large and liberal interpretation of the ATIA emphasizing its 
quasi-constitutional968 and asked from the Court to recognize this status so that it could conduct a 
broader interpretation of the Act. Once more, the reasoning in this decision confirmed that the 
Courts can only go that far in the interpretation of the access laws in Canada. According to 
Interviewee No.5, these cases were brought before the Court to at least make the argument about 
the link between the freedom of expression and ATI, and push further on what was established 
before regarding a constitutional status of ATI.  
 
     Another Canadian NGO, the Criminal Lawyers’ Association (CLA),969 intervened in in a 
landmark case of the Supreme Court - Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v Criminal Lawyers’ 
Association970. The Court decision recognized a limited right to ATI held by public authorities as 
part of the freedom of expression of the Canadian Charter.971 The Supreme Court recognized, 
albeit in somewhat careful language, that ATI “is a derivative”972 which may arise in certain 
conditions. The CLA made a request under Ontario’s Freedom of Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act973 for documents held by the Ontario Provincial Police which were denied. The case 
was brought as a constitutional claim and in turn, the Court recognized for the first time in its 
history the right of ATI as a “derivative right” of the freedom of expression. This recognition, 
however, was limited to where it is a necessary precondition of meaningful expression on the 
functioning of government974. This case has a meaningful significance since it provides a 
constitutional framework for ATI laws.  
                                                          
967 Ibid, at para 13.  
968 See Factum of the CCLA to the SCC in Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of National 
Defence), 2011 SCC 25, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 306. .2010, at 3, online: <http://ccla.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/2011-04-04-Factum-for-Web-Posting.pdf>. 
969  CLA is one of the largest specialty legal organizations in Canada. See http://www.criminallawyers.ca/. 
According to By-Law No.1, CLA “is an organization of Ontario criminal defence lawyers formed solely for 
charitable, educational, scientific and legislative purposes”. See 
<http://www.criminallawyers.ca/pdf/bylaws/CLABYLAWS.pdf >. 
970 Ontario Public Safety and Security v Criminal Lawyers’ Association, 2010 SCC 23, [2010] 1 SCR 815 [Criminal 
Lawyers’ Association]. 
971 Section 2(b). 
972 Criminal Lawyers’ Association, supra note 970 at para 29.  
973 Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31. 
974 Criminal Lawyers’ Association, supra note 970 at para 58.  
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     The European NGOs have also played a significant role in challenging the governments to the 
courts for breaching ATD rights. A series of cases initiated from the NGOs can be traced in both 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Court of Justice (CJEU). In its 
judgment in Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary975, the ECtHR recognised that the public 
has a right to receive information of general interest. The applicant, the Hungarian Civil Liberties 
Union, alleged that the Hungarian courts denied it access to the details of a parliamentarian’s 
complaint - was a breach of its right of ATI of public interest976.The Court characterized the 
applicant as a “watch dog” which status warrants Convention protection.977  
 
     In its judgment of the case Youth Initiative For Human Rights v Serbia978, the ECtHR 
recognised more explicitly than ever before the ATD right held by public authorities, based on 
Article 10 of the Convention (right to freedom of expression and information). The applicant was 
a Serbian NGO - Youth Initiative for Human Rights - and the judgment recognised the 
importance of NGOs acting in the public interest979. The Court engaged in an interpretative 
exercise of the ATI right, and argued that “the notion of ‘freedom to receive information’ 
embraces a right of access to information.”980  
 
     In the case of OVESSG981  the ECtHR further clarified and expanded the scope of application 
of Article 10 of the Convention with regard to the right of ATD. The decision is especially 
supportive for requests by journalists and NGOs to have ATD/982 The ECtHR, recognized that 
the function of creating forums for public debate is not limited to the press. That function may 
                                                          
975 Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v Hungary, [2009] ECHR 618, 37374/05, (2011) 53 EHRR [Társaság].  
976 Ibid, at para 3.  
977 Ibid, at para 27.  
978 Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, No. 48135/06, 25 June 2013 [Youth Initiative].   
979  Dirk Voorhoof, “Article 10 of the Convention includes the right of access to data held by an 
intelligence agency”, Strasbourg Observers, July 8, 2013, online: 
<http://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/07/08/article-10-of-the-convention-includes-the-right-of-access-to-data-held-
by-intelligence-agency/>. 
980 Youth Initiative, supra note 978 at para 20. 
981 Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung eines wirtschaftlich gesunden land- und 
forstwirtschaftlichen Grundbesitzes v. Austria, No. 39534/07, 28 November 2013 [OVESSG].  
982 Dirk Voorhoof & Rónán Ó Fathaigh, “The press and NGOs’ right of access to official documents under strict 
scrutiny of the European Court of Human Rights”, Strasbourg Observers. December 3, 2013, online:  
<http://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/12/03/the-press-and-ngos-right-of-access-to-official-documents-under-strict-
scrutiny-of-the-european-court-of-human-rights-2/>. 
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also be exercised by NGOs whose activities are an essential element of an informed public 
debate. The Court has therefore accepted that NGOs, like the press, may be characterised as 
social “watchdogs.”983 NGOs are characterized with such an important status, since they are 
involved in the legitimate gathering of information of public interest984 and therefore, their 
activities warrant similar Convention protection to that afforded to the press.985 
 
     The CJEU has been another venue followed by the NGOs to defend the public’s right to 
information. In the landmark case - Council v Access Info (280/11)986-  AIE submitted a request 
to the Council for a copy of the report which contained information on the Member States’ 
reactions to the Commission’s proposal for the reform of Regulation 1049. With this appeal AIE 
moved the CJEU to clarify the obligation for transparency on the EU isntitutions in the course of 
a legislative procedure. The case demonstrates the power of using ATI in holding institutions 
accountable even in ongoing conversations during the course of a legislative procedure. The case 
will certainly affect issues of accountability and democratic nature of the EU representatives.987 
 
     In another CJEU case - IFAW Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds GmbH – a German animal 
rights NGO asked the Commission for access to certain documents which the Commission had 
received from Germany. The Court decided that the Member States do not have a right of 
absolute veto, but had to give reasons for refusal.988 This case epitomises “new grounds for the 
relations between Member States rules and the EU rules of access to documents.”989  
 
                                                          
983 OVESSG, supra note 981 at para 34.  
984 Ibid, at para 36.  
985 Ibid, at para 34.  
986 Note that there are two cases here- case T-233/09 was before the General Court and then it was appealed to the 
Court of Justice. The appealed case is C-280/11 P, Council of the European Union v Access Info Europe. The case is 
not published yet in the European Court Reports. For reference see 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-280/11> [Access Info Europe]. 
987 Irma Spahiu, “Courts: An effective venue to Promote Government Transparency? The case of the European 
Union” (2015) 31(80) Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 5-24, at 10 [Spahiu, “Courts”]. 
988 In Case C-64/05 P (n 59) para 4(15) says: “Even though it is neither the object nor the effect of this Regulation to 
amend national legislation on access to documents, it is nevertheless clear that, by virtue of the principle of loyal 
cooperation which governs relations between the institutions and the Member States, Member States should take 
care not to hamper the proper application of this Regulation and should respect the security rules of the institutions.” 
989 Spahiu, “Courts”, supra note 987 at 12.  
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     The Albanian NGOs have also engaged in litigation, although in a limited number because of 
the limited resources and the high political pressure. The number is growing together with public 
awareness and citizen consciousness. “Res Publica” and the QZHDI are two centres that have 
been involved in many court cases. In 2013, “Res Publica” was very active in litigation engaging 
Ministries. “Res Publica” filed two requests at the Ministry of the Environment, one about the 
advertisements paid by this Ministry in 2009-2013, and the other about the pollution levels in 
Albania. Both requests were refused by the Ministry. Both cases ended up in court, which ruled 
in favor of the Centre and requested the release of the information by the Ministry, as part of its 
legal obligations.990 In addition, “Res Publica” requested from the Ministry of Economy 
information regarding the file of the privatization of “Albpetrol”, the biggest public oil company 
in the country. The request was ignored for months and ended up in court. The Court decided in 
July 2013 that the Ministry should provide the centre with the information.991 In 2014, a famous 
case against the Council of Ministers, originated from an ATI request filed by “Res Publica” 
about the files on the hiring process of the members of the Commission of Public Procurement. 
The Council of the Ministers, the body that appointed the members, turned down the request. 
The case was sent to the Administrative Court which decided in October 2014 that the Council of 
Ministers should release the requested information.992  
 
     QZHDI has also been involved in ATI litigation since the adoption of the ATI law. QZHDI 
started a judicial review against the decision of the Ministry of Education that denied information 
to an NGO regarding the criteria needed to start a day-care centre. The Court of Tirana ordered 
the Ministry to provide the information requested. This was the first time that a court in Albania 
decided on an ATI case. In October-November 2003 QZHDI led a group of five NGOs at the 
Constitutional Court of Albania against an order of the then Prime Minister Fatos Nano, who 
ordered all institutions to withhold information from the media. Only four days before the 
appearance at the Court, the Prime Minister Nano changed his order and abandoned the case. 
                                                          
990 Res Publica, “E drejta e informimit – Dy vendime te tjera, kesaj rradhe kunder Ministrise se Mjedisit”, 8.10.2014, 
online: <http://www.respublica.org.al/e-drejta-e-informimit-dy-vendime-te-tjera-kesaj-rradhe-kunder-ministrise-se-
mjedisit/>. 
991 Res Publica, “Detyrim për dhënie informacioni: Res Publica Vs Ministria e Ekonomisë, Tregtisë dhe 
Energjitikës”, 18.7.2013, online: <http://www.respublica.org.al/detyrim-per-dhenie-informacioni-res-publica-vs-
ministria-e-ekonomise-tregtise-dhe-energjitikes/>. 
992 Res Publica, “E drejta e informimit – Res Publica fiton gjyqin kunder Keshillit te Ministrave”, 6.10.2014, online:  
<http://www.respublica.org.al/e-drejta-e-informimit-res-publica-fiton-gjyqin-kunder-keshillit-te-ministrave/>. 
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This case demonstrated how easily and openly the government dismissed the ATI law without 
fear of legal consequences.  In another case, QZHDI got involved in a project for which 
information requests were sent to the administration and the court. The centre got refusals from 
both branches and some cases went to court. According to Aliaj, a lawyer at the centre, it was 
ironic that the courts refused to release information, even after they ruled in their judgements in 
favor of the release.993 The QZHDI is actually leading a court case against the Ministry of 
Economy for a refusal to provide information regarding the privatization of AlbTelecom, the sole 
public company of telecommunication in Albania. The Ministry refused to release the acquisition 
contract to the QZHDI and the case is still ongoing.994 
8.4 Data for access to information requests made by the NGOs and media  
      The following data informs about the amount of ATI requests filed by the NGOs at the main 
government institutions in Canada and the EU. At the federal level, the Canadian government 
has received a considerably small amount of ATI requests compared to the other categories 
(business or public). Table 28 below compares data from 2012 and 2013. The number of requests 
reflects data form all the Departments and Agencies at the federal level (approximately 256).  
 
      Table 29 has all the data collected from the Canadian federal departments and agencies from 
2004 to 2014. The table includes information about organizations and the media, but many media 
are organized in associations which pursue interests that are similar to those of the NGOs (as 
argued in Chapter 3), which makes this division not clear cut. As one can notice, while the 
number of ATI requests for media has significantly increased (from 2680 to 8421), the 
percentage to the total requests has not followed the same pattern (only increased 3.4%). For 
organizations, the numbers have remained more or less steady (from 2107 to 2898), but the 
percentage to total requests has declined significantly (from 8.4% to 4.8%).  
 
 
                                                          
993 Note that all this information about QZHDI cases were reported in the Interview with Viola Aliaj, QZHDI, May 
8, 2015. I could not find further information elsewhere.  
994 Ceshtje gjyqesore (case law), online: <http://qzhdi-alb.org/ceshtje-gjyqesore>. 
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Table 28: Source of Access to Information requests received   
 
Source: Government of Canada, Info Source Bulletin Number 37B – Statistical Reporting. Online:  
<http://www.infosource.gc.ca/bulletin/2014/b/bulletin37b02-eng.asp#ai>. 
 
      
Table 29: Requests for ATI to the federal government of Canada 2004-2014 
Years 2013-
2014 
2012-
2013 
2011-
2012 
2010-
2011 
2009-
2010 
2008-
2009 
2007-
2008 
2006-
2007 
2005-
2006 
2004-
2005 
Total 
req.  
60, 105 62,839 51, 332 41, 641 39, 154 34, 041 31, 487 29, 182 27,269 25,207 
media 8,421 
(14%) 
8, 321 
(13%) 
5,133 
(9%) 
5, 234 
(12.6%) 
3, 693 
(10.5%) 
4,804 
(14.1%
) 
4,411 
(14%) 
3,617 
(12.4%) 
2,451 
(9%) 
2,680 
(10.6%) 
Orgz. 2,898 
(4.8%) 
2, 415 
(3.8%) 
1, 946 
(3.7%) 
1, 706 
(4.1%) 
1, 559 
(4.4%) 
2,097 
(6.2%) 
2, 850 
(9.1%) 
2,932 
(10%) 
1,980 
(7.3%) 
2,107 
(8.4%) 
Source: Table drawn by author using data of the Government of Canada at InfoSource. Online: 
<http://www.infosource.gc.ca/index-eng.asp>. 
 
 
     This trend is interesting and reveals a lot about the constraints of pursuing ATI requests. The 
process is lengthy and costly, and only powerful media can afford. Some of the media 
interviewees have emphasized the lack of resources which works as an impediment to engage 
with ATI – the system is difficult to navigate for someone unexperienced, and needs money and 
time, which most of the NGOs and small media do not have. This was confirmed in the 
262 
 
interviews that I had with Hinds (Newspaper Canada), Henheffer (CJFE), Karanicolas (CLD), 
and CCLA.  The number of requests from the NGOs show a concerning trend – the percentage 
has dropped by more than half. While this has happened for different reasons (mainly lack of 
resources), it constitutes a retreat of the NGOs from the ATI system. Many authors have argued 
about the important role of the NGOs for establishing spaces for public deliberation of values 
and policies, and courts have attributed them the status of a “watchdog”. Therefore, an NGO 
withdrawal from the ATI space means missing opportunities for discussions of values and 
extraction of knowledge. This may have major repercussions in the ATI regime in Canada.  
 
Table 30: Requests for ATI at the federal level   
 
 
     The data in Tables 28, 29 and 30 show another interesting pattern which answers my third 
concern I laid out at the very beginning of this chapter – whether media occupies most of the 
space in ATI requests. Data reveals that journalists are not at the ones who make the most of 
requests for ATI. Yes, the numbers are rising, but very slowly (only 3.4%). In 2014, the requests 
from journalist constituted 14% of the total number of requests, which is not a big number 
considering that most media engage in investigative journalism to get their stories. Therefore, the 
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claims from the government that journalist exhaust the ATI system, with the purpose to reveal 
stories that embarrass governments, are not based in facts and numbers.  Table 30 shows the 
same data in graph form.  
     Table 31 below shows ATD requests made to the European Commission from 2004 to 2013. 
The categorization of groups here is slightly different from the Canadian one. Instead of the term 
“organization”, the term “civil society” is used. This is an umbrella term that does not 
specifically indicate what groups could be included in the categorization and what is the 
percentage of the NGOs. As a result the numbers could be a bit misleading. However, for the 
purpose of this research, civil society can be accepted as an umbrella term that can be identified 
with NGOs. This is part of the problem of the definitional certainty, as I explained in Chapter 3.  
 
Table 31: ATD requests to the European Commission  
Years  2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
Total  6,525 6,014 6,477 6,361 5,055 5,197 4,196 3,841 3,396 3,093 
Journal. 364-
5.58% 
289-
4.81% 
210-
3.25
% 
213-
3.35
% 
102-
2.02
% 
127-
2.46% 
121-
2.9% 
43-
1.14% 
36-
1.07% 
15-
0.5% 
Civil 
Society
995  
1084-
16.62
% 
620-
10.32
% 
556-
8.59
% 
520-
8.18
% 
498-
9.85
% 
949-
18.26
% 
745-
17.77
% 
663-
17.27
% 
1000-
29.44
% 
844-
27.31
% 
Source: Chart drawn by the author using data from the European Commission, Access to Documents. Online: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/access_documents/reports_en.htm>. 
 
Table 32 below reflects the same data in graph form.  
 
 
 
                                                          
995 Civil Society here includes: Interest groups, industry, NGOs, etc. See, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/access_documents/docs/rapport_2013/com-2014-619_en.pdf>. 
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Table 32: Requests for ATD to the Commission  
 
 
     A similar pattern of decline (as the Canadian one) is noticed at the European Commission. 
The number of requests made by journalists has increased almost 25 times, while its percentage 
has only increased about 10 times.  The number of requests of civil society has an irregular 
pattern, declining from 2009-2012, but increasing in 2013. However, it is still lower than it was 
in 2004-2005, when it was almost ¾ higher. This significant drop can be explained by many 
things. It is worth mentioning that in 2008 the Commission submitted its proposal for the recast 
of Regulation 1049, which received a huge backlash from civil society organizations. The fact 
that the numbers are still low may be attributed to the fact that the position of the Commission 
has not changed much on the Regulation, and the negotiations between the EU institutions on the 
matter are still frozen. 
     Tables 33 and 34 below shows ATD requests made to the Council of the European Union 
from 2004 to 2013. Here the numbers show a different picture from the tables above.  
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Table 33: Requests of ATD made to the Council of the European Union  
Years  2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
Total  7,564 6,166 9,641 9,188 8,444 10,732 7,809 11,353 9,454 12,907 
Journal
. 
136-
1.8% 
172-
2.8% 
318-
3.3% 
239-
2.6% 
228-
2.7% 
300-
2.8% 
226-
2.9% 
261-
2.3% 
217-
2.3% 
335-
2.6% 
Civil 
Society
996/NG
Os 
2224-
29.4% 
/431-
5.7% 
1677-
27.2% 
/222-
3.6% 
2487-
25.8%
/260- 
2.7% 
2563-
27.9%
/165- 
1.8% 
2305-
27.3%
/135- 
1.6% 
1964-
18.3%
/386- 
3.6% 
1109-
14.2%
/132- 
1.7% 
1998-
17.6%
/124- 
1.1% 
1626-
17.2%
/113- 
1.2% 
2813-
21.8% 
Source: Table drawn by author using data from the Council of European Union, Access to Documents Annual 
Reports. Online: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/search/?q=access+to+documents+annual+reports>. 
 
Table 34 reflects the same numbers in graph form.  
Table 34: Requests for ATD to the Council  
 
                                                          
996 Civil Society here includes: Consultants, Environmental Lobbies, Other groups of interests, 
Industrial/Commercial Sector and NGOs. Online: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-
publications/publications/2014/council-annual-report-access-to-documents-2013/>. 
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     In tables 33 and 34 the number of the requests and the percentage for journalists has steadily 
declined. The same trend is noticed for the total number of requests. But, the numbers are 
different for civil society and especially for NGOs (which are shown separately from the civil 
society numbers for the Council). These numbers have increased despite of the big decline in the 
total number. What is noticeable here is the hike in numbers of requests of the NGOs (from 1.2% 
to 5.7%). The Council is perceived to be the most secretive body in the EU, and which does not 
offer much cooperation with civil society. That might have drawn the attention of the NGOs.  
 
     Tables 35 and 36 shows the number of requests for ATD made to the EP. The number of total 
requests has decreased significantly, almost two times lower than ten years ago. The requests 
made by the journalists show a very irregular trend, going up and down, with 2008 being the 
lowest point in terms of numbers of requests and percentage (1 and 0.11% respectively). 
However, they follow the same trend with the total requests. The requests from civil society have 
also dropped from 2004 in both numbers and percentage. The small numbers of requests is 
noticeable for this table. The data might be explained with the fact that the EP is considered to be 
an advocate of ATD in the EU, and has fought in many political battles to improve transparency 
and ATD in the EU. This makes it not a very important target for filing ATD requests.   
 
Table 35: Requests for ATD to the European Parliament 2004-2013 
Years 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
Total 610 777 1,161 1,139 1,260 1,300 1,865 1,917 1,814 1,245 
Journal. 30-
5% 
23- 
3% 
68-
5.84% 
81-
7.12% 
42-
3.35% 
1-
0.11% 
53-
2.86% 
55-
2.88% 
117-
6.47% 
21-
1.71% 
Civil 
Society
997 
110-
18% 
132-
16.95
% 
120-
10.36
% 
233-
20.47
% 
274-
21.75
% 
703-
54.06
% 
409-
21.95
% 
410-
21.39
% 
373-
20.59
% 
305-
24.57
% 
Source: Table Drawn by the author using data from European Parliament, Register of Documents: Annual Report. 
Online: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegistreWeb/information/report.htm>. 
 
                                                          
997 Civil Society here includes: Interests Groups, Industry, NGOs, etc.  online: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/register/pdf/rapport_annuel_2013_EN.pdf>. 
 
 
267 
 
Table 36 below shows the same figures in graph form.  
Table 36: Requests for ATD to the European Parliament 
 
      
     The data above is somehow mixed, but is an indicator about the amount of work being done 
by NGOs in both Canada and the EU. In Canada, although the total number of requests have 
risen significantly, requests made by the NGOs have dropped. As some of the interviews have 
revealed, the falling numbers are attributed to the broken ATI regime. Long delays and high fees 
coupled with the attitudes of the government officials mean that the information takes longer and 
more expensive to get, resources that most of the NGOs don’t have. This situation makes NGOs 
less attracted and active in their ATI activity. 
 
     In the EU, the numbers are diverse. On the one hand, for the European Commission the 
requests from civil society seem to have steadily grown, following the same curb as the total 
number, while for the Council the numbers have grown even faster. On the other hand, for the 
EP numbers have dropped, but following the same trend as the total number. It seems that the 
Council is the EU institution that has attracted the most attention of the civil society and the 
NGOs in particular. This could be explained in part with what is happening at the EU regarding 
the changes of Regulation 1049. Another reason might be the extensive lobbying mechanism that 
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exists in the EU, where “an estimated 3000 lobbying entities have an office in Brussels and 
target European institutions to influence legislation.”998 One of the benefits that the lobbying 
offers is access to the decision-making process of the institutions.999 As such, organizations and 
media already have another venue to access documents of the EU institutions. This was 
confirmed in the interview with Darbishire which admitted that access in the EU institutions is 
also realized through other forms, such as participation in not only formal mechanisms, but also 
engagement via public debate and via lobbying.1000 The Commission and the EP, are more 
committed to transparency, and have a joint Transparency Register1001 for lobbying, launched in 
20111002. This may explain the declining numbers of request to the EP and the Commission. The 
numbers for the EP are lower due to the fact that the EP has been a long-standing advocate for 
transparency in the EU.  
 
8.5 Comparisons and conclusions   
 
     As argued above, the promotion and development of transparency and ATI right in Canada 
and the EU owes a special recognition to the media and NGOs. The dynamics of ATI regime in 
both jurisdictions cannot be understood without the role of these “social watchdogs” because as 
they push for publicity, right to free press, and obtain information in the public interest. Stories 
of these ATI users show another face of the ATI regime, one that is somehow different from that 
depicted by public officials. These stories tell that there are problems with the ATI regimes in 
both jurisdictions. In Canada, all persons I interviewed agreed that the ATIA law is in desperate 
need for change, and that getting information through ATI requests has become more difficult. In 
the EU, the recast of Regulation 1049 is still pending. But, as Darbishire explained, “it may not 
be the best time for law reform” considering the economic crisis, the Greek crisis, the refugee 
crisis, and lately the security threats in the EU.  Otherwise, Darbishire contemplated that the EU 
                                                          
998 Transparency International, “EU lobbying”, online: 
<http://www.transparencyinternational.eu/focus_areas/lobbying-the-eu/>. 
999 See European Parliament, “Library Briefing: Lobbying the EU institutions”, 18.06.2013, online:   
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130558/LDM_BRI(2013)130558_REV1_EN.
pdf>. 
1000 Interview with Helen Darbishire, Executive Director of Access Info Europe, August 10, 2015. 
1001 See Transparency Register, online: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do?redir=false&locale=en>. 
1002 European Commission, Press Release, 23 June 2011, online: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-
773_en.htm?locale=en>. 
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is “doing quite well in defending and even advancing transparency. Of course, Regulation 
1049/2001 could be better, but …the key is the implementation, for which we fight by making a 
noise about specific cases.”1003 
 
     As this chapter examined, NGOs and media have worked in many fronts to accomplish their 
role of social watchdogs. It is fascinating to know that some of the biggest scandals in the 
Canadian history, related to misuse of huge amounts of public funds, have been illuminated by 
journalists using ATI requests. It is in this cases, that one understands the great value of ATI 
rights, as ones that tear up the veil of secrecy, keep our government accountable and make for 
active citizens. These cases open up spaces to think, get knowledge, shape ideas, break 
monopolies of knowledge, control information and control through information. Habermas 
contends that “civil society, through resonant and autonomous public spheres, develops impulses 
with enough vitality to bring conflicts from the periphery into the center of the political 
system.”1004 Through ATI, NGOs and media have drawn public’s attention to issues that really 
matter for public life and created opportunities for developing ideas, debating and participating. 
The mention in section 2(b) of the Charter of the “freedom of opinion” has led one Canadian 
writer to suggest that the role of the press in opinion formation requires compulsory access to 
government information,1005 
 
     It is interesting how the Canadian and European NGOs have come together in creating the 
Global RTI Rating which is then adopted in Canada to create its Canadian version. In the EU 
some of the work was focused on using ATI as a tool to assess other human rights. This strategy 
was absent in Canada. Data gathered from institutions demonstrate some interesting trends. In 
Canada, the numbers of requests from NGOs are falling and this is explained with the feeling of 
“fatigue” due to the long delays and expensive process that most NGOs cannot afford. In the EU, 
these numbers are increasing, but mostly those of requests submitted to the EU Council. This can 
be due to the recasting process of Regulation 1049 which started in 2008 and has been in 
deadlock from 2011.   
                                                          
1003 Interview with Helen Darbishire, August 10, 2015.  
1004 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 128 at 330.  
1005 M. Manning, “Rights, Freedoms and the Courts: A practical analysis of the Constitution Act”, 1982, at 210 
[Manning]. 
270 
 
 
     The EU is a step ahead of Canada when it comes to the status of the right of ATI. Canada 
needs first a push for an upgrade the ATI law and then recognize ATI as a fundamental human 
right. Almost all the NGOs working on ATI in Canada have recognized that “the foundational 
attitude towards access to information as a human right ….is signally absent in Canada.”1006 The 
CLD acknowledges that “It is time for Canadians and their government to recognise that the 
right to access information held by public bodies is a human right. This now needs to be matched 
by action, initially in terms of amending the ATIA.”1007 This is the reason why NGOs and media 
in Canada were engaged in Law reform and litigation, to push for changes in ATI regime. 
However, the commitment on this front has not generated any substantial results in Canada. The 
way the federal system works in Canada gives too much power to the government. As a result, 
even attempts to engage the Court system have not done much since they lack the legal 
framework necessary to expand the meaning of access rights. CLD argued in this regard: 
 
     Unfortunately, neither global recognition of the fundamental importance of RTI as a human 
right nor the Supreme Court’s ruling have had an impact on attitudes towards RTI in Canada, 
where access systems remain stuck in the same rut they have occupied for decades. To break out 
of this rut, Canada needs one jurisdiction that is prepared to think outside of the (Canadian) box 
and be prepared to take bold steps to put in place a truly effective RTI regime. There is enormous 
resistance to this, based largely on accumulated attitudes and biases.1008  
 
     However, using the Courts’ system, the NGOs have succeeded a partial achievement of the 
ATI recognition as a human right - the interpretation of the Supreme Court that recognizes ATI 
under freedom of expression – making ATI a Charter right1009, subject to some limitation. Of 
course, this is an initial step towards the full recognition of ATI as a constitutional human right.   
 
     The EU NGOs have been more successful in their attempts to affect legislative or policy 
changes. They have been active in pressuring government in important milestones of the rights to 
                                                          
1006Centre for Law and Democracy, “Response to the OIC Call for Dialogue: Recommendations for Improving the 
Right to Information in Canada”, January 2013, at 4-5, online:  <http://www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/Canada.RTI_.Jan13.pdf>. 
1007 Ibid, at 16-17.   
1008 Centre for Law and Democracy, “Submission to the Independent Review of the Newfoundland and Labrador 
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act”, July 2014 at 4, online: <http://www.law-
democracy.org/live/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Canada.Nfld_.RTI_.Jul14.pdf>. 
1009 See Criminal Lawyers’ Association, supra note 970.  
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ATD such as the Treaty protection of these rights, the introduction Charter rights, or the 
recasting process of Regulation 1049. This is in part due to the division of political power in the 
EU, where the co-decision procedure has enabled the EU Parliament to block initiatives that 
would endanger the future of the ATD in the EU. One could say that the NGOs in the EU have 
been supported by the EU Parliament and the courts’ system. Courts have more leeway to favour 
rights if they are also protected by legislation – and the European courts have certainly expanded 
the meaning of ATD provisions with the intervention of some of the NGOs. 
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CHAPTER 9: THE ROLE OF THE OVERSIGHT INSTITUTIONS: LOOKING AT 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION FROM AN ARBITER’S PERSPECTIVE  
 
     Information Commissioners and Ombudsmen are institutions that oversee the application of 
the ATI laws in practice and offer valuable perspectives on upholding the public values of these 
laws according to guiding democratic principles. There exist two models of ATI oversight, an 
Information Commissioner model, and an Ombudsman model. Canada and the EU represent 
each of them respectively. Within the first model, there are two variations, related to their powers 
and scope. I use the case study of Ontario and Albania as an example of these variations.   
 
     Oversight institutions serve as arbiters between the government and the public. The purpose 
of this chapter is to understand their rationale in conciliating the public interest in ATI with the 
interest of institutions. I explore their work, their relationship with government and other actors, 
and their influence in the development of an ATI rights regime in both jurisdictions. In doing so, 
I identify the strengths and weaknesses of their control/overview system. Data, such as statistics, 
annual reports, recommendations, legislative proposals, etc, will be visited to comprehend how 
ATI is valued from their perspective. I analyze these data trying to make sense of the tensions 
around cases of complaints, and the battles being fought every day to hold in place a dynamic 
ATI system.  
 
9.1  The role of the Information Commissioner of Canada as a watchdog on access to 
information   
     A fundamental principle of the ATIA is that decisions on disclosure should be reviewed 
independently of government. In the case of an access refusal, the Act sets out two levels of 
independent review. The first review is carried out by the Information Commissioner of Canada 
(ICC) and the second by the courts. The ICC was introduced with the ATIA in 1982 and the 
Office was established in 1983. It assists individuals and organizations who believe that federal 
institutions have not respected their rights under the ATIA. The Chief Justice McLachlin has 
referred to the Commissioners as the “watchdogs of the fundamental rights” protected by 
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the ATIA.1010 The Commissioner has established herself clearly as a guardian of ATI rights, and 
has emphasized the importance of information in society. Legault, one the most influential ICCs 
has stated that “information is the new source of wealth, power and influence. Those who have it 
want to protect it. Those who don’t, want access to it. Never before has information - especially 
government information - been so high on the public’s radar.”1011 This statement reveals a clear 
dichotomy embedded in every ATI regime, the governments’s need for protecting information 
and the public’s right to access it. This dichotomy informs a great deal about the importance of 
information for controlling through power and influence, and goes to the core of my main 
concern in this research - breaking up the information monopoly.   
 
     The ICC investigates complaints about how federal institutions handle ATI requests. The 
Commissioner is appointed directly by the Parliament and reports to it by way of annual reports, 
special reports and parliamentary appearances. Being an agent of the legislature allows the 
Commissioner to be removed from the government of the day, and scrutinize the activities of 
government. Commissioners have developed on the Ombudsman model - they have strong 
investigative powers to assist them in mediating between dissatisfied information applicants and 
government institutions. They may not order a complaint to be resolved in a particular way, but 
can only recommend to government to act upon ATI requests. Thus, it is upon the institutions to 
follow the ICC’s recommendations or not. When the Commissioner concludes that a complaint is 
well founded and the institution does not act upon her formal recommendation to disclose 
records, she may, with the complainant’s consent, seek judicial review by the Federal Court. A 
complainant may also seek judicial review after receiving the results of the Commissioner’s 
investigation. The ICC closely monitors all cases with potential ramifications on the right of ATI 
and may seek leave to participate in proceedings with potential impact on the right.  
     The ICC uses a combination of individual investigations, systemic investigations and report 
cards for the oversight on the state of compliance of the federal government with the ATIA. The 
goal of these investigations is to maximize compliance with the Act while fostering disclosure of 
                                                          
1010 McLachlin, “ATI”, supra note 228 at 6.  
1011 Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, Speaking Notes of Suzanne Legault Information 
Commissioner of Canada to the Canadian Legal Information Institute (CanLII) Conference, Ottawa, September 13, 
2013, online <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/media-room-salle-media_speeches-discours_2013_5.aspx>. 
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public sector information. The ICC uses a full range of tools, activities and powers at her 
disposal, from mediation to persuasion and litigation, as required. The working of the ICC Office 
is supported by three branches. First, the Complaints Resolution and Compliance Branch carries 
out investigations and dispute resolution efforts to resolve complaints. It also conducts systemic 
investigations1012. Second, the Legal Services Branch provides legal advice on investigations, as 
well as on legislative and administrative matters. It also represents the Commissioner in court 
cases. Third, the Corporate Services mainly delivers administrative and management support.  
     In addition to the investigation of complaints received externally, the Commissioner has the 
authority to initiate the investigation of complaints on her own motion when she is satisfied that 
there are reasonable grounds to investigate a matter relating to requesting or obtaining access to 
records under the Act. Another type of a self-initiated investigation is a systemic investigation 
which the ICC undertakes when there are complaints of ongoing concern regarding certain issues 
such as chronically late responses, misuse of time extensions, lack of resources, etc.1013 
 
     Furthermore, the ICC uses another tool to evaluate the institutional compliance under the 
ATIA – the Report cards. They are a type of proactive commissioner-initiated assessment that 
looks into assessing systemic issues such as chronically late responses, misuse of time 
extensions, lack of resources, etc. As the name indicates, at the end of its investigation, the ICC 
issues report evaluations with letter grades for each institution. Report cards allow for a 
measurement in ATI compliance and a comparison between institutions’ performance.  
 
     The ICC has continuously been concerned with the level protection of ATI rights in Canada. It 
has been engaged in many debates on the need to reform the ATI regime, and has been a key 
opposition in many government initiatives affecting ATI. For instance, the ICC’s response to the 
open government initiative was that although proactive disclosure is a good thing, it isn’t 
                                                          
1012 Note: these investigations are initiated by the ICC on issues of ongoing concern.  
1013 Josée Villeneuve, “Assessment of public institutions’ performance in access to information: The Canadian 
experience”, Paper prepared for the first Global Conference on Transparency Research, Newark, USA, 2011, at 7, 
online: 
<https://spaa.newark.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/files/Transparency_Research_Conference/Papers/Villeneuve_Jos
ee.pdf> [Villeneuve]. 
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enough. The ICC argued “In order to promote trust in public institutions, there is not only a need 
to increase the availability and the quality of information, but also to ensure access to that 
information. Citizens want to be able to validate the information that is provided to them, or to 
obtain more details about an issue of interest or simply know that the right is there for them to 
exercise when needed.”1014 
  
     The ICC values the importance of ATI for two reasons. First, at the individual level ATI 
affects the rights of all Canadians. The ICC Legault once said: “I am often asked to explain why 
access to information is important to Canadians. In response, I point out that federal policies, 
programs and laws touch so many aspects of everyday life—the regulation of health products, 
international travel, mail delivery, transportation and food safety, to name just a few.”1015 This 
statement shows the extent of which the use of ATI affects many human rights. Second, at a 
more general level, ATI influences the way of governing, and makes it more inclusive and 
participatory. ICC recognizes that ATI “is fundamental to Canada’s system of government, a key 
tool that facilitates citizen engagement with the public policy process. When the access system 
falters, not only is Canadians’ participation in government thwarted but ultimately, the health of 
Canadian democracy is at stake.”1016 Because of the importance of ATI in the functioning of a 
democratic system, the ICC has transformed itself in a resilient advocate for such a right.      
    
     As I have explained in previous chapters, the number of ATI requests has increased 
progressively. This number has been reflected in a growing number of the complaints at the ICC. 
As the table below shows, complaints about refusals of requests have increased significantly 
from 2009, and that has had a significant effect on the total number. The numbers of the other 
two categories, have slightly fluctuated over the years, but have stayed more or less at the same 
level.   
 
                                                          
1014 Information Commissioner Suzanne Legault before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure 
and House Affairs, November 2013. 
1015 Office of the Information Commissioner, Message from the Commissioner, Annual Report 2013-2014, online: 
<http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/rapport-annuel-annual-report_2013-2014_1.aspx>. 
1016 Office of the Information Commissioner, Annual Report 2012-2013: Message from the Commissioner, online: 
<http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/annual-reports-rapports-annuel_2012-2013_1.aspx>. 
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Table 37: Number of the complaints at the ICC 2009-2015 
Complaints 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 
Refusal1017 864 996 1036 1040 1219 1102 
Administrative1018 792 810   391   519   801   604 
Cabinet 
confidence 
  33   22     38     37     61     43 
Total  1689 1828 1465 1596 2081 1749 
Source: Table drawn by the author with data from the Office of the Information Commissioner, Annual Reports. 
Online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr_ar-ra.aspx>. 
 
     Despite of the growing number of complaints, the ICC has been suffering from budget 
constraints for a while. The Office has explained that significant and successive budget cuts have 
placed the OIC at the limit of its financial and organizational flexibility. These combined factors 
have a direct impact on the OIC’s ability to safeguard information rights under the ATIA.1019 
Between 2011-12 and 2012-2013, overall complaints increased by 9 percent. Over that period, 
missing record complaints increased by 51 percent. According to the annual report 2013-14, the 
complaints have increased 30 percent, but the budget cuts were reduced by roughly 11 percent 
since 2009.1020 Gogolek, the Executive Director of the BC FIPA analyzed the repercussions of 
the ICC budget cuts. He explained that the cuts meant two things. First, without resources, there 
will delays in the Commissioner's office, meaning that information requesters will have to wait 
even longer to get their documents. Second, because of the two step complaint procedure, “if the 
government digs in its heels, requesters can't even get their day in Federal Court until the 
Commissioner's office finishes its review of the file.”1021 Budget constraints place a real burden 
in the work of the ICC and weakens its position vis á vis to the government for the protection of 
the ATI rights.  
                                                          
1017 about the application of exemptions, no record or excluded information. 
1018 about delays, time extensions and fees 
1019 Office of the Information Commissioner, Quarterly Financial Report 2014-2015, online: <http://www.oic-
ci.gc.ca/eng/rapport-financier-trimestriel-quarterly-financial-report-2014-2015-q1.aspx>. 
1020 Office of the Information Commissioner, Canadian Access and Privacy Association Conference 2014: Speaking 
notes for Emily McCarthy, Assistant Commissioner, December 8, 2014, online: <http://www.oic-
ci.gc.ca/eng/media-room-salle-media_speeches-discours_2014_6.aspx>. 
1021 Vincent Gogolek, “Don't Tackle Increasing Access to Information Complaints by Silencing the Watchdog”, 
Huffington Post: The Blog. 12.10.2014, online:   
<http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/vincent-gogolek/access-to-information-_b_6298050.html>. 
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9.1.1 Powers of the Information Commissioner of Canada  
     One of the most controversial issues in relation to the reform of Canada’s ATI legislation is 
whether or not to grant order-making power to the ICC. Canada’s jurisdictions have adopted 
different approaches on this issue. Oversight bodies in Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, 
Ontario, Prince Edward Island and Quebec have the power to issue legally binding orders, while 
oversight bodies in the other provinces and territories can only make recommendations. Rankin 
argued that requesters and government officials in these six provinces consider the order-making 
model to be very successful, due to a very robust mediation role played by Commissioners.1022 In 
addition, Flaherty emphasized that Information and Privacy Commissioners in Ontario, B.C., and 
Alberta are as successful as they are “because they are true regulators, even though they rarely 
exercise actual order-making power on the privacy side of their mandate. It is the prospect of 
their doing so that makes all parts of government pay attention to them.”1023 
 
     There are opposing perspectives on the issue of the order-making power. On the one hand, it 
has been argued that order-making power serves to enhance the efficacy of the informal dispute 
resolution process, as well as overall compliance. According to David Loukidelis, British 
Columbia’s Information and Privacy Commissioner, speaking about his office said: “over the 16 
years of our office’s experience, …order-making power has served, in fact, to encourage dispute 
resolution. Using mediation, we consistently resolve some 85% to 90% of the access appeals that 
come to our office.”1024  
 
      On the other hand, the opposing argument is that making the ICC’s orders legally binding 
will turn the administrative appeal into a more cumbersome, procedurally rigorous and time 
consuming process. Increasing the pressure on the administrative process by establishing an 
administrative review procedure such as the one offered by the ICC is supposed to produce quick 
and simple results. In this procedure, the involvement of review officers who become experts in 
                                                          
1022 Rankin, “FOI in Canada”, supra note 243 at 24. 
1023 Flaherty, supra note 861 at 26.  
1024 Report of the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, The Access to Information 
Act: First Steps Towards Renewal (June 2009), at 6, online: 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=3999593&Language=E>. 
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dealing with ATI appeals, has been considered an advantage. These officers gain expertise in 
determining whether or not information is being legitimately withheld. The ICC’s Overview of 
the ATIA Investigative Procedure1025 makes it clear that the process is almost judicial in its 
procedural rigour. For example, it includes opportunities for representation by the complainant, 
the public authority’s access and privacy office, and other authority officials. Making the ICC 
orders legally binding is feared that will make the complaint process more complex.  
 
     Departing from these two contrasting positions, the House of Commons Standing Committee 
on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, in 2009, recommended that the ICC be granted 
order-making power over procedural matters (such as timelines and fees), but not over 
substantive refusals (such as the application of exceptions). In 2002, the Review Task Force 
supported the order-making model concluding that a quasi-judicial body with order-making 
powers combined with a strong mediation function, would be the model most conducive to 
achieving consistent compliance and a robust culture of access.1026 
 
     Many ATI proponents, especially the media, have long advocated for a change in the ICC’s 
powers. For instance, the CNA has emphasized that the powers of the Commissioner need to be 
strengthened.1027 The CJEF has boldly stated that the powers of the ICC should be transformed 
from those of an ombudsman to those of an order-making tribunal.1028 Roberts has criticized the 
current model by arguing that “the ombudsman model appears to have produced exactly the sort 
of vices that it was intended to avoid: adversarialism, legalism and formality.”1029 He has 
suggested that an effective ATI reform can be achieved by bolstering the authority of the ICC by 
                                                          
1025 See online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr_ar-ra.aspx>. 
1026 Government of Canada, Access to Information: Making it Work for Canadians. Report of the Access to 
Information Review Task Force (June 2002), online: <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/BT22-83-
2002E.pdf>,  
1027 Canadian Newspaper Association, Public Affairs, “In Pursuit of Meaningful Access to Information Reform 
Proposals to Strengthen Canadian Democracy”, February, 2005, at 3, online: 
<http://www.newspaperscanada.ca/sites/default/files/CNA%20POLICY%20-
%20In%20Pursuit%20of%20Meaningful%20Access%20to%20Information%20Reform.pdf>. 
1028 Canadian Journalists for Free Expression, “A hollow right: Access to information in crisis”,  A submission by 
Canadian Journalists for Free Expression to the Office of the Information Commissioner concerning reform Of 
Canada’s Access to Information Act, January 2013, at 11. 
1029 Alasdair Roberts, “New Strategies for Enforcement of the Access to Information Act” (2002) 27 Queen’s L.J. at 
665 [Roberts, “New Strategies”]. 
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giving him the power to order the disclosure of information, just as some provincial 
Commissioners do.1030  
 
     Even the government has acknowledged the success of an order-making Information 
Commissioner. In 2002, a report of the Treasury Board and the Department of Justice on ATIA 
Reform stated that “in Canadian provinces where a full order-making model is in place, 
requesters and government officials consider it to be very successful.”1031 The Conservative 
Party promised in the 2006 election campaign to give the ICC the power to order the release of 
information1032, a promise not kept. 
 
     However, nothing has changed in this regard. Canada’s problems with institutional 
compliance and bureaucratic resistance to transparency are persistent and demonstrate that, as 
Flaherty argued, the Commissioner over time “has become something of a toothless 
watchdog.”1033 The same position was upheld in Heinz, a 2006 Supreme Court case on privacy 
and ATI, which ruled that “the Privacy Commissioner and the Information Commissioner are of 
little help because, with no power to make binding orders, they have no teeth.”1034 Although 
there is no data to show how often, or in what circumstances, requesters choose not to complain 
about access refusals, in a survey undertaken by the Public Policy Forum in 2001, many 
requesters reported that they regarded the complaint process as “useless” and consequently did 
not report problems of noncompliance.1035 This view reinforces the idea that an empowered 
oversight body is essential to an effective ATI regime. As such, the order-making power has the 
potential to enhance the status of the ICC and the compliance of public authorities with her 
decisions, which could, in turn, enable her to put in place a much more rapid complaints 
processing system.  
                                                          
1030 Alasdair Roberts, “Monitoring Performance by Federal Agencies: A Tool for Enforcement of the Access to 
Information Act”, March 1999, Working Paper, School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, at 6 [Roberts, 
“Monitoring Performance”]. 
1031 ATI, “Making it Work”, supra note 290 at 112-113. 
1032 Stand Up for Canada, The 2006 Conservative Party federal election platform, online: 
<http://www.cbc.ca/canadavotes2006/leadersparties/pdf/conservative_platform20060113.pdf>. 
1033 Flaherty, supra note 861 at 26.  
1034 H.J. Heinz Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2006] 1 SCR 441, 2006 SCC 13 [Heinz].  
1035 D. Zussman, N. Averill & G. Lépine, Report on Consultations to Review the Access to Information Act and its 
Implementation (Ottawa: Public Policy Forum, 20 August 2001), online: Public Policy Forum 
<http://www.ppforum.com/english/ati/atifinale.pdf>.  
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     The ICC Office has held two different positions regarding the order-making power. Initially, 
the ICC has been hesitant to accept that having binding power, its orders would be taken more 
seriously by the government. Instead, the ICC resisted proposals by parliamentarians and non-
governmental organizations that he be given an “order power” comparable to that exercised by 
provincial commissioners. Former ICC John Grace observed in 1994: “The virtue of the 
ombudsman’s approach is… that it allows for a less adversarial, less legalistic, more informal 
style. The test of a constructive relationship with government institutions is whether it results in 
the release of more information than under a regime with the power to enforce orders.”1036 The 
next Commissioner held the same position. In 1998, Commissioner Grace criticized the 
proposals for order power, observing that it might lead “more to conflict and excessively 
legalistic approaches than to more openness.”1037 Later, Commissioner Reid restated this 
position, arguing that his office enjoys a remarkable success rate notwithstanding its lack of 
order powers.1038  
 
     However, more recently, the Commissioner seems to have changed its position towards the 
order-making power. Especially Commissioner Legault has been bold in her proposals to change 
the ATIA including a change in the model of the ICC. She has continuously emphasized the 
urgent need to modernize the ATI regime from a legislative perspective and to align it with more 
progressive regimes both nationally and internationally.1039 This change in position was probably 
caused by a deteriorating situation within the ATI regime in Canada and the increased non-
compliance rates. The authority of the ICC has been corroding over the years, and her position 
taken less seriously by the government. Against this trend, the ICC seems to be fighting a lonely 
battle because of the lack of strong allies. The Office has openly acknowledged that there is no 
                                                          
1036 Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, The Access to Information Act: Ten Years On (Ottawa: 
Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1994) at 9. 
1037 Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, Annual Report 1997-1998 (Ottawa: Minister of Public 
Works and Government Services Canada, 1998) at 10. 
1038 J.M. Reid, “Remarks to the Ottawa Chapter of the Institute of Internal Auditors” (17 October 2000), online: 
Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, online: <http://www.infocom.gc.ca/speeches/speechview-
e.asp?intspeechId=11>. 
1039 Suzzane Legault, “Strengthening the Access to Information Act To Meet Today's Imperatives”, Presentation to 
The Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, Office of the Information Commissioner of 
Canada, 2009.   
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well-established advocacy group that specializes in ATI issues1040, leaving her without partners 
in the battle for an ATI modernization.  
      The powers of the ICC, have also been subject of many court decisions which have usually 
been favourable to the ICC. The Federal Court in Canada (Attorney General) v Canada 
(Information Commissioner), paragraph 177 outlined the powers of the ICC. These powers, it is 
argued, make the ICC much more flexible in dealing with ATI cases which sometimes require a 
variety of legal rules of evidence and inquiry.  
 
A. The Merger Project  
     As mentioned before, the only jurisdiction in Canada where the Information and the Privacy 
Commissioners hold distinct offices is the federal level. This difference between the federal and 
provincial models has enticed the interest of law practitioners and academics in Canada. There 
has been ongoing debates on merging the two offices at the federal level and providing them 
with order-making powers. Rankin argued that since the early 1990s, when the Mulroney 
government announced its intention to merge the offices of the ICC and PCC under a single 
commissioner, the pros and cons of such an initiative have been debated.1041 According to 
Banisar, a primary government concern of having two bodies is that there could be conflict 
between the two—and that could become messy, expensive, and embarrassing. There was also 
concern that public bodies and the public will receive conflicting advice from the two 
commissioners when they disagree.1042 As noted by the Canadian Access to Information Review 
Task Force in 2002:  
 
A situation can arise where the Information Commissioner advises the institution to disclose 
personal information in the public interest, but the Privacy Commissioner advises the institution 
to protect the information on the grounds that the public interest in the case does not clearly 
outweigh the invasion of privacy that could result from disclosure. This puts the institution in the 
difficult position of having conflicting recommendations from the two Commissioners.1043 
 
                                                          
1040 Roberts, “New Strategies”, supra note 1033 
1041 Rankin, “FOI in Canada”, supra note 243 at 20. 
1042 Banisar, “RTI”, supra note 590 at 24.  
1043 ATI, “Making it Work”, supra note 290 at 59.  
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     Banisar commented that the most significant benefit of having a single body is the shared 
expertise and reduction of conflict. He explained that there is a strong interrelation between ATI 
and privacy rights. Although they have some areas of conflict, there also are strong areas of 
commonality. Having a single body can reduce the possibility of institutional conflict. For 
Banisar, in practice, many requests for information under ATI legislation will relate to personal 
information, and having this dual expertise will allow for better balancing.1044 In addition, 
Banisar warns about an imbalance that could be especially problematic because one law has a 
greater constitutional protection1045, referring to the Privacy Act. However, the Privacy 
Commissioners have the opposite opinion on this view. According to them, the strongest 
drawback to adopting a single-commission model is the danger that one interest may be stronger 
or perceived as more powerful and that the bodies do not equally protect or balance both 
interests. They worried that it would “diminish” or “dilute” the profile of privacy at a time when 
there were profound privacy challenges.1046  
 
     To end the debate, and evaluate these pros and cons of the merger, in 2005, the government 
appointed the Supreme Court Justice, the Honourable Gérard La Forest, to study the feasibility of 
merging the two offices or of cross-appointing one single commissioner to both. The Canadian 
Privacy Act allows for the appointment of the Information Commissioner as Privacy 
Commissioner, but as Justice La Forest would comment after the review that this “option has 
never been exercised, although the possibility of combining the two offices has received active 
consideration.”1047 Justice La Forest conducted his review between July 22, 2005 (the date of his 
appointment) and November 15, 2005 (the date of his report to the Minister of Justice).1048 His 
report recommended against a full merger on the basis that it would be likely to have a 
detrimental impact on the policy aims of the legislation.1049 La Forest suggested that having a 
                                                          
1044 Banisar, “RTI”, supra note 590 at 25.  
1045 Ibid, at 26.  
1046 Remarks of the Information Commissioner of Canada to the Canadian Access and Privacy Association, October 
28, 2003. 
1047 Gérard La Forest, The Offices of the Information and Privacy Commissioners: The Merger And Related Issues, 
Report of the Special Advisor to the Canadian Minister of Justice (2005), at 19.  See also page 20-23 for a useful 
summary of the combined models that operate at the provincial level. Online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/ip/rep-
rap.pdf>. 
1048 Information Commissioner of Canada, Recurring Themes: Merger of the Offices of the Information and Privacy 
Commissioners, Annual Report 2005-2006, online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr_ar-ra_2005-2006_6.aspx>. 
1049La Forest, supra note 1052 at 55. 
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single federal commissioner represent both ATI and privacy concerns would reduce the amount 
of attention brought to either one of these areas. He further argued that a single Information and 
Privacy Commissioner may be overburdened and unable to meet their obligations as well as they 
currently do, due to the challenges that arise in both access and privacy regimes. La Forest was 
of the opinion that potential gains, in terms of government transparency, from having only one 
commissioner, would not be significant enough to go through with the merger.1050 In addition, he 
concluded that the order-making model is not inconsistent with a very robust mediation role 
played by these Commissioners.1051 Justice la Forest recommended, among other things, that 
there should not be a full merger of the offices for policy reasons related to the ATIA, the Privacy 
Act, and PIPEDA; the ATIA and the Privacy Act should be amended to specifically empower the 
commissioners to comment on government programs affecting their spheres of jurisdiction, and 
to recognize the role of the commissioners in educating the public and conducting research 
relevant to their mandates.1052 
 
     The ICC John Reid, at first supported the idea of having a federal Commission based on the 
provincial model, but after Justice La Forest’s report he no longer advocated the single-
commissioner model. Regarding the merger proposal, Reid expressed his opposition explaining 
that “In the single-commissioner model, it is certainly possible that one value – openness or 
privacy – would get preferential treatment.”1053 Considering the recommendations of the La 
Forest Report and the other opposition faced by the Commissioners and other ATI advocates, the 
government put the merger project on hold. After 10 years, it seems that this project is 
abandoned since there have been no more discussions around the possibility of a merger. 
 
9.1.2 Administration of complaints  
     The Office of the ICC investigates complaints about federal institutions’ handling of access 
requests. The ICC has strong investigative powers to assist her in mediating between dissatisfied 
                                                          
1050 Ibid, at 43.  
1051 Rankin, “FOI in Canada”, supra note 243 at 24. 
1052 Office of the Information Commissioner, “Strengthening the Access to Information Act To Meet Today's 
Imperatives”, online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/pa-ap-atia_reform_2009-march_2009-
strengthening_the_access_to_information_act_to_meet_todays_imperatives.aspx>. 
1053 John Reid, Information Commissioner of Canada, “A Commissioner’s Perspective: Then and Now”,  
October 6, 2005, online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/media_room-speeches-2005-october_6.aspx>. 
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information applicants and government institutions. As an ombudsperson, the Commissioner 
may not order a complaint to be resolved in a particular way, though she may refer a case to the 
Federal Court for resolution. Whenever possible, the Commissioner relies on persuasion to solve 
disputes, asking for a Federal Court review only if an individual has been improperly denied 
access and a negotiated solution has proved impossible. 
 
     The Commissioner has no discretion to refuse to investigate a complaint. Complaints may allege 
improper refusal to disclose requested records, undue delay in providing records, inadequate searches 
for requested records, excessive fees, unreasonable time extensions, refusal to translate requested 
records, or any other matter relating to requesting or obtaining access to records under the Act1054. In 
addition to the investigation of complaints received externally, the Commissioner can initiate the 
investigation of complaints on her own motion when she is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds 
to investigate a matter relating to requesting or obtaining access to records under the Act.  
 
     When the Office receives a complaint, it confidentially investigates the facts, allowing both 
the complainant and the federal organization to present their cases. Jacobs argued that the ICC 
“has understood its role as an ombudsman to mean that it should keep everything, including the 
very fact of most cases occurring as confidential.”1055 This effort may require Office staff to 
critically analyze and review policies, procedures, legislation and case law, as well as examine 
government records. The Office obtains the information needed to examine the complaint 
through meetings or correspondence with officials and the complainant. The law requires the 
Commissioner to carry out “impartial, independent and non-partisan investigations.”1056 In 
accordance with the information gathered through the investigation, the Commissioner makes a 
finding which cannot be of civil or criminal liability. When the Commissioner finds that an 
exception to the right of access has not been properly applied, she informs the head of the 
institution that the complaint is well founded and formally recommends that the withheld 
information be disclosed. On occasions, when the head of an institution does not agree to follow 
this recommendation, the Commissioner may, with the consent of the complainant, ask the 
                                                          
1054 Section 30 of the ATIA.   
1055 Laverne Astrid Jacobs, “Fashioning Administrative Independence at the “Tribunal” Level: An Ethnographic 
Study of Access to Information and Privacy Commission in Canada”, Dissertation, Graduate Program in Law, York 
University, Toronto, July 2009, at 297.  
1056 Heinz, supra note 1034 at para 33.   
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Federal Court, under section 42 of the Act, to review the institution’s refusal to release the 
information. In addition, a complainant is entitled to ask the Federal Court, under section 41 of 
the Act, to review an institution’s refusal to disclose information. The referral to the federal court 
concludes the formal investigation by the ICC. 
 
     In many cases complaints are resolved by mediation. In fact, experience suggests that 
institutions may find the prospect of a formal investigation sufficiently distasteful that they 
would prefer to cooperate informally with the OIC in developing and implementing compliance 
plans1057. The ICC encourages federal institutions to disclose information as a matter of course 
and to respect Canadians’ rights to request and receive information in the name of transparency 
and accountability. However, the ICC advised that in the 30-plus year history, the Office has 
“documented multiple challenges and deficiencies with the Act. The Act is applied to encourage 
a culture of delay. The Act is applied to deny disclosure. It acts as a shield against transparency. 
The interests of the government trump the interests of the public.”1058 This situation can be 
explained with the commissioner’s approach of naming and shaming which may only have 
limited effectiveness. The repetition of ATI shameful stories has normalized them and dulled the 
shameful character of these stories. In response to this culture, the ICC has continuously pushed 
the government to change its approach to ATI rights, modernize the legislation, and reflect a 
culture change in its practices. The latest ICC proposal for a comprehensive modernization of the 
ATIA was made in 2015 and included 85 recommendations. So far, no government action has 
taken place in response to those recommendations.  
  
A. Examples of types of requests  
     The ICC receives lots of complaints, but the number does not reflect all the dissatisfied 
applicants, many of which decide not to bring their case to the ICC. This represents a major 
difficulty in assessing the traditional approach to enforcement of the federal ATI law – it does 
not operate unless complaints are made. As a result, there may be only a weak correlation 
                                                          
1057 The Information Commissioner indicated in April 1998 that the OIC's work “had a sobering and motivating 
effect” within these institutions, and that the actions which they had been prompted to take were likely to improve 
compliance. See: 1997-98 Annual Report, at 13-17, and 1996-97 Annual Report, at 77-79. 
1058 Office of the Information Commissioner, “Striking the Right Balance for Transparency–Recommendations to 
modernize the Access to Information Act”, March 2015, at 5. [pdf] online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/rapport-de-
modernisation-modernization-report.aspx>. 
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between complaint statistics and actual non-compliance. However, the numbers that are brought 
to the ICC demonstrate to a certain extent the dynamics of the ATI regime in Canada.  
 
     The complaints to the ICC are diverse in nature, but many of them are on matters of national 
security, international affairs and defence. Commissioner Legault launched a pilot project in 
2011 to target files pertaining to these issues, which are often complex and time-consuming to 
investigate. The files contained a variety of request. For example, an historian complained about 
the heavily redacted records the Department of Justice Canada released relating to a law Canada 
had passed in the late 1930s preventing Canadians from fighting in foreign wars.1059 Another 
complaint was about the refusal by Library and Archives Canada (LAC) to release records 
related to security at the 1976 Montréal and 1988 Calgary Olympics. Other complaints pertained 
to important historical events such as the archival records about the demise of the constitutional 
amendment proposed in the Meech Lake Accord in 1990.1060  
 
     Section 19 is the most often cited exemption in the Commissioner’s complaints. The OIC 
office cannot access information subject of s.69 of the ATIA, but may ask the Privy Council 
Office (PCO) to certify documents as Cabinet confidences. In 2013–2014, 45 percent of the new 
complaints at the Commissioner involved issues relating to section 19.1061 While the ICC has not 
been very successful in limiting the application of this section, in some cases it may convince the 
institution to consider whether any of the conditions that would permit disclosure of personal 
information apply. This may include determining whether the information is publicly available, 
whether the person to whom the information relates might consent to the information’s release or 
whether the information warrants being disclosed in the public interest.1062 
 
     Many complaints to the ICC are about missing records in the government agencies, which 
according to the Office have increased substantially. For this reason, in 2012-2013 the ICC 
conducted a systemic investigation into the use of text-based messaging in federal institutions. 
                                                          
1059 Office of the Information Commissioner, Annual Report 2013-2014, Investigations, online: <http://www.oic-
ci.gc.ca/eng/rapport-annuel-annual-report_2013-2014_4.aspx>. 
1060 Ibid. 
1061 Ibid. 
1062 Office of the Information Commissioner, Annual Report 2012-2013: Ensuring compliance with the Act, online: 
<http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/annual-reports-rapports-annuel_2012-2013_1.aspx>. 
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Eleven were selected for review. The Commissioner found that the use of instant messaging on 
government-issued wireless devices to conduct government business is putting the right of ATI 
at an unacceptable risk. In addition, she found that access to instant messages sent and received 
by ministers’ office staff is at particular risk.1063 
 
     On September 11, 2015, the ICC filed a notice of application against the Prime Minister 
pursuant to section 42 of the ATIA.1064 This case is in relation to an ATI request for any records 
created between March 26, 2013 to August 22, 2013 related to Senators Mike Duffy, Mac Harb, 
Patrick Brazeau and Pamela Wallin.1065 The case was commenced following an investigation by 
the ICC’s office concerning PCO’s refusal to disclose records responsive to an ATI request. As a 
result of this investigation, the Commissioner concluded that PCO was not justified when 
refusing ATI, and recommended that the Prime Minister disclose a significant amount of 
additional information. The PCO, on behalf of the Prime Minister, declined to implement the 
recommendation. The court case challenged the Prime Minister’s decision, as head of PCO, to 
refuse records responsive to the ATI request based on claimed exemptions for “personal 
information” (s.19(1)), “advice and recommendations” (s.21(1)(a)) and “solicitor-client 
privilege” (s.23). In the proceeding, the ICC maintained that the Prime Minister erred in relying 
on these exemptions when refusing access to the requested information. The ICC also maintained 
that where there was discretion to either disclose or withhold information, the Prime Minister 
failed to demonstrate that this discretion was exercised in a reasonable manner bearing in mind 
all relevant factors including the public interest in the information’s disclosure.1066  
 
     The above cases reflect some of the tensions that exist in the ATI regime in Canada, the 
nature of the ATI requests, and their significance on Canadian constitutionalism, accountability 
and governance. They also demonstrate a powerless but devoted advocate of ATI, who is 
fighting back against the culture of secrecy in Canadian institutions.   
                                                          
1063 Office of the Information Commissioner, “Instant Messaging putting Access to Information at risk”, April 2014, 
online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/pin-to-pin-nip-a-nip.aspx>. 
1064 Information Commissioner of Canada v. The Prime Minister of Canada, T-1535-15. 
1065 Office of the Information Commissioner, “Information Commissioner files a notice of application against the 
Prime Minister of Canada”, September 11, 2015 online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/les-grands-titres_top-
stories_20.aspx?>. 
1066 Ibid. 
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9.1.3 The interaction with other institutions   
     The ICC has continuously advocated for ATI rights by criticizing the effectiveness of the ATI 
regime and engaging in many law reform initiatives. For decades Canadian Commissioners have 
warned that the ATI system is in crisis and in need for repair. To address this crisis, the ICC 
Office has worked in several fronts to fulfill its watchdog duties in keeping in place an effective 
ATI regime in Canada. It has used several instruments to achieve this goal and engaged with 
many institutions, such as the Parliament, the government and the courts. Since the 
Commissioner is an independent agent of Parliament, she uses two principal reporting 
instruments to inform Parliament on its activities, an annual report and special reports. The 
annual reports provide an overview of the activities of the ICC for an entire fiscal year, while the 
special reports are used to bring to the attention of Parliament any issues of urgency or 
importance. For instance, a Special Report in 2008 identified several interconnected issues in the 
ATI system: information management, time extensions, consultations, human resources and 
training, and leadership. In 2009, another systemic issue affecting timely responses to access 
requests revealed that it was to the delegation of authorities.1067 
 
     The ICC has been invited many times by the government to give recommendations on how to 
improve the ATI system in Canada. For instance, in 2006, when the Prime Minister Harper came 
to power with big promises on improving the ATI system, Commissioner Reid issued a set of 
recommendations which aimed to address the weaknesses and enhance ATI rights. However, 
instead of considering Reid’s recommendations, the government discharged him from the office. 
Reid's successor, Marleau sounded the same dire alarm, calling the state of the ATI system 
“grim”, and issued a widely praised report with a dozen specific recommendations to rescue the 
access system. The Conservative government followed the same approach with the Marleau's 
report – it ignored it until the Marleau quit in apparent frustration, as Weston argued.1068 The 
next and current commissioner, Legault, continued the work of her predecessors in fighting a 
battle to uphold ATI rights in Canada. This battle became tougher in the years of Legault’s term, 
                                                          
1067 Villeneuve, supra note 1013 at 19.  
1068 Greg Weston, “Senate expense scandal left no paper trail, really?”, CBC News, September 2, 2013, online: 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/senate-expense-scandal-left-no-paper-trail-really-1.1344795>. 
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to the point that she has continuously been warning that the public's ATI right is at risk of being 
totally obliterated. 
 
     Another significant engagement of the ICC with the government, was during 2007, when she 
was consulted about the future of the CAIRS as part of the TBS’s policy renewal initiative 
pertaining to ATI. In October 2007, the ICC recommended to TBS that CAIRS be maintained 
until an alternative could be found. However, in April 2008, TBS announced that that it was 
discontinuing the requirement to update CAIRS. After this decision, the ICC received two 
complaints and initiated an investigation. The Office consulted with a number of stakeholders 
and obtained representations from them. The representations indicated that the information in 
CAIRS provided real value to access requesters and the public in general. The lack of a 
centralized source of information made the search process more time consuming, inefficient and 
costly. As a result, the Office recommended that any alternate system should allow for quick, 
inexpensive and easy searches of current and previous requests. TBS representations highlighted 
various factors that were considered prior to the decision, such as the fact that the system was of 
limited value to federal institutions and that the information was still available directly from 
these institutions. The ICC argued that although CAIRS was not originally designed for public 
use, the information contained in the database generated substantial and continued public 
interest.1069 In addition, the ICC explained that abolishing the requirement to update the 
information contained in CAIRS effectively eliminated a centralized source of information on 
access requests received by federal institutions. However, since the information was still 
available from institutions, the Office was unable to conclude that the policy change represented 
a denial of access under the Act.1070 
 
A. Problems with ATI administration  
     The everyday work of the ICC with the ATI complaints has revealed that there are significant 
problems with the administration of ATIA in Canada. 
 
                                                          
1069 Office of the Information Commissioner, “The Coordination of Access to Information Requests System 
(CAIRS)”, 2009-2010, online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/syst-inv_inv-syst_2009-2010_1.aspx>. 
1070 Ibid.  
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- Frequent political interference 
     ICC John Reid often called for action because government continued to distrust and resist 
the ATIA and the oversight of the ICC. He argued: 
 
Governments claim to embrace openness but they act to exert political control over what is 
disclosed and the timing of disclosure.  If the right of access is to be meaningful, the legal 
incentives for compliance must be strengthened, there must be a well-resourced and fiercely 
independent watchdog and all members of Parliament must become engaged in monitoring the 
manner in which Ministers and public servants discharge their obligations to be transparent.1071 
     In an investigation the ICC found a pattern of improper involvement by a small group of 
ministerial staff members at Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) in 
responding to requests under the ATIA. She noticed that “these staffers inserted themselves in 
various ways into a process that was designed to be carried out in an objective manner by public 
servants. Consequently, the rights conferred under the Act were compromised”1072. The ICC 
investigation revealed that ministerial staff were involved in processing ATI requests; officials 
delayed responding in order to obtain the approval of ministerial staff members who did not have 
any delegated authority under the Act; ministerial staff exerted pressure over employees in the 
ATIP Directorate where employees were instructed to preserve good relations with the 
Minister’s Office at the expense of these employees’ responsibilities under the Act.1073 At the 
conclusion of the investigation, the ICC made a number of recommendations to PWGSC to 
prevent political interference from recurring. The Minister accepted all but one recommendation 
and a number of measures were implemented by March 31, 2014.1074 
     One recent example of political interference in the administration of ATI relates to the long-
gun registry. All started when the ICC received an information request for Firearms Registry 
database. The request was made on March 27, 2012, before the coming into force of the Ending 
the Long-gun Registry Act (ELRA). On April 13, 2012, the ICC wrote to the then Minister of 
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the Honourable Vic Toews, to inform him that any 
                                                          
1071 John Reid, Information Commissioner of Canada, “A Commissioner’s Perspective: Then and Now”,  
October 6, 2005, online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/media_room-speeches-2005-october_6.aspx?>. 
1072 Interference with Access to Information: Part 2 - Special report to Parliament by Suzanne Legault Information 
Commissioner of Canada, April 2014, at 3, online:  <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/ingerence-dans-acces-a-
l’information-partie-2-interference-with-access-to-information-part-2.aspx> 
1073 Ibid, at 8-9.  
1074 Ibid, at 3.  
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records for which a request had been received under the Act were subject to the right of access 
and could not be destroyed until a response had been provided. What happened was that between 
October 25 and October 29, 2012, the RCMP destroyed all electronic records of non-restricted 
firearms. Beeby explained that long-gun registry records were largely destroyed by Oct. 31, 
2012.1075 After a long investigation, the ICC concluded that the RCMP illegally destroyed 
records related to long-gun registry, while they were still under investigation, and thus there was 
an obligation to preserve the records. 
 
     On May 7, 2015, the government introduced Bill C-59 in Parliament, entitled the Economic 
Action Plan 2015 Act, No. 1.  Two sections of the Bill C-59 amended the ELRA, sections 230 
and 231. Section 230 of Bill C-59 amended section 29 of the ELRA to exclude the operation of 
the ATIA retroactive to October 25, 2011, the date on which the ELRA was introduced in 
Parliament. It ousted the application of the ATIA, in particular the provisions guaranteeing the 
right of access (s.4), and complaint (s.30), and the Commissioner’s powers  to investigative 
(s.36), make recommendations (s.37), and seek judicial review (ss. 41, 42 and 46). It also 
retroactively ousted the offence of obstructing the Commissioner in the performance of her 
duties and functions (s.67) and the offence of obstructing the right of access, including by 
destroying records (s.67.1).  Section 230 also provided that the ELRA retroactively superseded 
any other Act of Parliament in the event of any inconsistency, and that the destruction of the 
records shall take place despite any requirements to retain the records or copies contained in any 
other Act.  
 
     Section 231 of the Bill C-59 provided that no administrative, civil or criminal proceedings lie 
against the Crown for the destruction of the records related to the Long-gun Registry from the 
date the ELRA came into force, April 5, 2012. This section also provided that no administrative, 
civil or criminal proceedings lie against the Crown for any act or omission done in purported 
compliance with the Act between October 25, 2011 and the coming into force of section 231. 
 
                                                          
1075 Dean Beeby, “Gun registry access law change could set precedent, watchdog warns MPs”, CBC News, May 14, 
2015, online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/gun-registry-access-law-change-could-set-precedent-watchdog-
warns-mps-1.3074304>. 
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    Bill C-59 spurred the reaction of many ATI advocates and faced the strong opposition of the 
ICC, whose role it ignored and dismissed. In a letter to the Senate, Commissioner Legault 
depicted Bill C-59 as “a perilous precedent against Canadians’ quasi-constitutional right to 
know.”1076 She openly expressed her opposition to the media that she had never seen anything 
like this1077 and that she took the government to the Federal Court on May 14, 2015.1078 As a 
response, the media supported this decision and accused the Harper government to retroactively 
rewrite Canada's ATI law in order to prevent possible criminal charges against the RCMP.1079 
Vallance-Jones described the Bill C-59 as “almost Orwellian. It seeks to rewrite history, to say 
that lawful access to records that existed before didn't actually exist after all.”1080 What was more 
striking in this story was the reaction of the government which considered the Legault's 
investigation as merely finding a “loophole” in the law, one that the government would close 
soon.”1081 A spokesman for Public Safety Minister, Steven Blaney would only say the retroactive 
law would fix a “bureaucratic loophole” that allowed citizens to request heavily redacted copies 
of the gun registry data while the legislation to destroy the data was before Parliament.1082 
 
      This story demonstrates how creative the government can become on finding ways to cover 
cases of abuse in the ATI regime, while exercising a strong political interference in ATI’s 
administration. What is more salient in this case is the normalization of the government’s 
disruptive behavior in managing ATI rights and the ease with which it tries to circumvent legal 
obligations and responsibilities. Giving a retroactive effect to a legal act to cover the destruction 
of registers, is indeed a dangerous precedent that ignores institutional accountability under ATI, 
and dismisses an important right of Canadians, that of exercising control over their government.  
                                                          
1076 Office of the Information Commissioner, “Letter to the Speaker of the Senate”, May 2015, online: 
<http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/registre-armes-depaules_long-gun-registry_1.aspx>. 
1077 CBC News, “Information Commissioner warns of dangerous precedent in RCMP long-gun registry case”, May 
16, 2015, online: <http://www.cbc.ca/radio/thehouse/how-will-canada-meet-its-new-emissions-reduction-target-
1.3074096/information-commissioner-warns-of-dangerous-precedent-in-rcmp-long-gun-registry-case-1.3074098>. 
1078 CBC News, “Info commissioner taking government to court”, May 14, 2015, online: 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/info-commissioner-taking-government-to-court-1.3075113>. 
1079 Bruce Cheadle, “Budget bill C-59 rewrites access law to protect RCMP on gun registry: CP”, CBC News, May 
13, 2015, online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/budget-bill-c-59-rewrites-access-law-to-protect-rcmp-on-gun-
registry-cp-1.3072548> [Cheadle]. 
1080 Ibid.  
1081 Dean Beeby, “Gun registry access law change could set precedent, watchdog warns MPs”, CBC News, May 14, 
2015, online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/gun-registry-access-law-change-could-set-precedent-watchdog-
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1082 Cheadle, supra note 1079.  
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     The political interference in the administration of the ATIA has surfaced as an ongoing 
problem during many of the ICC’s investigations. It had interfered continuously with the work of 
the people who deal everyday with ATI requests, namely the ATIP coordinators, a problem that I 
have already mentioned in Chapter seven. During his mandate Commissioner Reid, expressed 
that he was “frankly troubled by the profound pressures placed on coordinators by their superiors 
to administer the access law as part of the departmental communications function and to avoid, at 
all costs, embarrassing the minister.  [and he was]…troubled by the absence of a comprehensive, 
mandatory training strategy for ATIP offices, senior officials and exempt staff.”1083  
-  Avoidance of record keeping  
     Various federal Information Commissioners have noted that ATI has no meaning when 
government officials do not create records. Commissioner John Grace has noted:  
 
The whole scheme of the Access to Information Act depends on records being created, properly 
indexed and filed, readily retrievable, appropriately archived and carefully assessed before 
destruction to ensure that valuable information is not lost. If records about particular subjects are 
not created, or if they cannot be readily located and produced, the right of access is 
meaningless.1084  
 
     Grace’s successor, Commissioner John Reid picked up the theme, and recommended the 
establishment of a legal framework for information management which would, as a primary 
feature, require federal departments, agencies and institutions to create and appropriately 
maintain records that adequately document their organization, functions, policies, decisions, 
procedures, and essential transactions. He also suggested that ATI legislation include provisions 
requiring the creation of records and a related offence for failure to do so with the intent to deny 
a right of access.1085  
 
                                                          
1083 Information Commissioner of Canada, “Recurring Themes: Merger of the Offices of the Information and 
Privacy Commissioners”, Annual Report 2005-2006, online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr_ar-ra_2005-
2006_6.aspx>. 
1084 Office of the Information Commissioner, John Grace, Annual Report 1999-2000. 
1085 Response to the Report of the Access to Information Review Task Force; Draft Bill, Open Government Act; 
Response to the Government’s Action Plan for Reform of the Access to Information Act (and Bill C-2); and 
evidence given before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, 
March 9, 2009. 
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     The Commissioner Legault has called for the ATIA to include a comprehensive legal duty to 
document decision making, with appropriate sanctions for non-compliance. For example, in a 
September 2013 speech, she included the duty to document among the amendments required to 
modernize the Act, noting that this is particularly necessary in light of new technological 
developments. She advised that “Unless a government official makes a conscious effort to record 
that information elsewhere, it is lost to the public. This duty to record is one of the casualties of 
the instant messaging environment.”1086 
 
-  Time extensions and fees.  
     This has been an ongoing problem for some time, and has put a lot of frustration on the 
applicants. Dragging responses for unlimited time, and high applicable fees have served as a 
deterrent, and caused many requesters to abandon the requests. Time and money to track down 
information requests are scarce resources and many people do not have. In addition, in many 
cases information is time sensitive, and once is delayed it may become useless. Furthermore, as 
mentioned above, a “toothless” watchdog like the ICC cannot not offer much to remedy the costs 
of chasing information. All these things together have caused a decrease on the number of 
complaints at the ICC.  
 
     Some of the investigation at the ICC have revealed extended delays in responses varying from 
days to months, and even years. For instance, in the investigation of a complaint about Transport 
Canada, the ICC discovered a 540-day time extension to respond to a request for records related 
to the development of a joint Canada–U.S. declaration on security and competitiveness. The 
investigation determined that Transport Canada’s extension was invalid.1087 In another case, 
National Defence took a 1,100-day extension to respond to a request for information about the 
sale of surplus military assets to Uruguay. At slightly more than three years, this extension was 
one of the longest the ICC Office had seen in recent memory, 1088 although, there have been 
                                                          
1086 Remarks to the Canadian Legal Information Institute Conference, Ottawa, September 2013. See also the 
Commissioner’s 2010-2011 Annual Report. 
1087 Office of the Information Commissioner, “Annual Report 2012-2013: Ensuring compliance with the Act”, 
online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/annual-reports-rapports-annuel_2012-2013_1.aspx>. 
1088 Ibid.  
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cases when the extension was even longer. One institution took an extension of more than three 
years for responding to an access request.1089  
 
     In regards to the application fees, there have been instances when the fees have been so high 
that they became unaffordable for the average person. Access fees are set out in the ATI 
Regulations1090, but fee estimation is a complex process. Determining fee amounts and 
processing fee payments adds more complexity to the administration of the ATI system and 
results in delays for requesters. Fees are also inconsistently applied across institutions. In 2013–
2014, the ICC investigated a complaint against the Privy Council Office (PCO) about a $4,250 
fee estimate. She learned that this estimate was not based in the Regulations, and the PCO was 
advised to provide a new, reasonable fee estimate. As a result, the PCO decided to decrease the 
fee to $119.80 to the requester.1091   
 
     Time extensions and fees are an inherited problem in the ATIA since there is no provision that 
limits the time extensions and no provision on fees. Commissioner Marleau has argued that 
“extensions have become the norm rather than the exception,”1092 contrary to the intention of the 
Act. Since it is left to an institution to decide on how much time they need to answer to an 
information request, any time can be legal. In addition, fees, especially related to search times, 
depend on the quality and implementation of information management practices. This is 
considered to be a loophole in the law that can only be fixed by legislative changes.    
 
     The ICC has tried in many ways to address the problems with the ATI administration. One the 
tools she has used in this regard has been issuing reports cards with the aim that institutions will 
self-reflect on the results, and change their behaviour towards ATI. The ICC first introduced the 
report cards process in 1998 in order to determine what percentage of requests went beyond the 
                                                          
1089 Ibid.  
1090 Access to Information Regulations, SOR 83-507, online:  <http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-
83-507/page-1.html#h-6>. 
1091 Office of the Information Commissioner, “Striking the right balance for transparency: Recommendations to 
modernize the Access to Information Act”, Chapter 2: The right of access, online: <http://www.oic-
ci.gc.ca/eng/rapport-de-modernisation-modernization-report_4.aspx>. 
1092 Office of the Information Commissioner, “Report Cards: Systemic Issues Affecting Access to Information in 
Canada, 2007-2008” – A Special Report to Parliament by Robert Marleau, February 2009, at 4.  
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statutory timelines, a measure known as the deemed refusal rate.1093 In 1999, the OIC issued 
report cards that provided statistical analyses of performance in a small number of departments, 
and assigned letter grades to each of those departments. The effectiveness of report cards 
declined over time primarily because of the methodology used to assess performance, not the 
real state of compliance within the institution which was dependent on many complex factors.1094 
In 2007-2008 the ICC changed the report card system, by providing a broader picture of 
institutional performance including a description of contextual factors. Institutions received a 
score – ranging from one to five stars, instead of grade letters – according to their overall 
performance.1095  
B. Law reform  
     Considering the state of the ATIA many Information Commissioners have called for 
legislative action to update and strengthen the law. These efforts have begun early in the life of 
the ICC and have intensified through years, even though unsuccessfully. Commissioners Grace, 
Reid, Marleau and Legault have all pushed for changes in the ATIA and came forward with 
concrete recommendations for such change.  In his tenth-year anniversary report, ICC John 
Grace presented his case for reform. He recognized that “while the Act has served well in 
enshrining the right to know, it has also come to express a single-request, often confrontational 
approach to providing information – an approach which is too slow and cumbersome for an 
information society.”1096 He issued forty-three recommendations for the renewal of the ATIA.  
  
     Grace’s successor, Commissioner Reid continuously criticized the effectiveness of the ATI 
system and called for reforms. He has been one of the most active ICC. When the ATIA was 
amended by the Terrorism Act in November 20011097, the amendments allowed the Attorney 
General to issue a certificate to bar an investigation by the ICC regarding information obtained in 
                                                          
1093 Villeneuve, supra note 1013 at 13. The deemed refusal rate is obtained by dividing the number of requests that 
went beyond their statutory timelines by the total number of requests, over a specified period of time 
1094 Ibid, at 14.  
1095 Office of the Information Commissioner, “Report Cards: Systemic Issues Affecting Access to Information in 
Canada, 2007-2008” – A Special Report to Parliament by Robert Marleau, February 2009, at 7.  
1096 Office of the Information Commissioner, “Strengthening the Access to Information Act to Meet Today's 
Imperatives”, March 2009, online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/pa-ap-atia_reform_2009-march_2009-
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1097 Bill C-36, the Anti-Terrorism Act, online: <http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/terrorism/>. 
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confidence from a “foreign entity” or for protection of national security if the Commissioner has 
ordered the release of information. Rankin argued that these changes “led to additional secrecy at 
the federal level.”1098 The ICC described the review as “so limited as to be fruitless for any 
objector and demeaning to the reviewing judge.”1099 
 
     Commissioner Reid followed closely the work of the Access to Information Review Task 
Force created by the government in 2000 to inquire about options for access reform.1100 The Task 
made 139 recommendations for legislative, administrative and cultural reform. In response to 
this report ICC Reid tabled a special report in Parliament in October 2002.1101 However, nothing 
came of this report. In the wake of the Sponsorship scandal, Reid introduced a report in 
Parliament entitled “Blueprint for reform”. Some of the recommendations included that all 
exemptions in the ATIA should contain an injury test and be discretionary; all exemptions should 
be subject to a public interest override; a mandatory requirement for public officials to document 
their actions and decisions; cabinet confidences to be brought within the coverage of the law and 
the review jurisdiction of the ICC; the Act to be a complete code setting out the openness/secrecy 
balance and section 24 of the ATIA, which sets out this open-ended, mandatory, class exemption, 
to be abolished. Reid asked Justice Gomery, who was assigned to conduct the inquiry on the 
Sponsorship Scandal, to look carefully at his blueprint and urged him to support his calls for 
reform of the ATIA.1102  
 
      In response to the Gomery report and recommendations the Liberal Government released a 
framework for revisions of the ATIA in 2005 and ICC released a draft bill.1103 The Bill, entitled 
the Open Government Act, was tabled before the Standing Committee on Access to Information, 
Privacy and Ethics at the request of this Committee. It proposed substantial changes to the access 
law. A primary objective was to address concerns about a “culture of secrecy” within political 
                                                          
1098 Rankin, “FOI in Canada”, supra note 243 at 5. 
1099 Remarks to Special Committee on Bill C-36, 6 December 2001. 
1100 Department of Justice, “A Comprehensive Framework for Access to Information Reform: A discussion Paper”, 
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1102 John Reid, Information Commissioner of Canada, “A Commissioner’s Perspective: Then and Now  
October 6, 2005”, online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/media_room-speeches-2005-october_6.aspx>. 
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and bureaucratic environments. The proposed Act was endorsed by Commissioner Gomery in his 
Phase 2 report, Restoring Accountability.1104 Soon after, just before elections, in November 2005, 
the Conservative Party pledged to pass some of the Reid’s proposals if elected, but that promise 
was broken when they came to power.   
 
     Reid’s successor, Commissioner Marleau, did not give up on the hope for a law reform on 
ATI. In February 2009, ICC Marleau released 12 recommendations for strengthening the ATIA 
and its enforcement system. The House of Commons Standing Committee on Access, Privacy 
and Ethics Committee endorsed some of these recommendations, in a report issued in June 2009. 
However, the Conservative government rejected all of them in December 2009. At the same 
year, Commissioner Legault took over the Office and made 12 recommendations to the Standing 
Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics. She called for the Parliament to review 
the ATIA every five years; the right of ATI to be extended to all persons; the ICC to be provided 
with order-making power for administrative matters; the ATIA to provide the ICC with discretion 
on whether to investigate complaints; the ICC to have a public education and research mandate 
and an advisory mandate on proposed legislative initiatives; the ATIA to be extended to records 
of the general administration of Parliament, the courts, and Cabinet confidences; a mandatory 
approval by the ICC for all extensions beyond sixty days; to allow requesters the option of direct 
recourse to the Federal Court for access refusals.1105 Many of these recommendations were part 
of law reform introduced by other ICCs in the past, but that were disregarded by the government.   
 
     In November 2013, Legault appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Procedure and House Affairs as part of its review of the Board of Internal Economy, the 
governing body of the House of Commons. In her remarks, the Commissioner again spoke in 
favour of extending the coverage of the ATIA to the administration of Parliament. The committee 
declined this request in its report in December 2013. Instead, the committee noted that the “level 
of proactive disclosure already available is sufficient for the transparency and accountability of 
                                                          
1104 Suzanne Legault, Information Commissioner of Canada, “Strengthening the Access to Information Act To Meet 
Today's Imperatives”, Mach 2009, online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/pa-ap-atia_reform_2009-march_2009-
strengthening_the_access_to_information_act_to_meet_todays_imperatives.aspx>. 
1105 Ibid.  
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the House and its Members.”1106 This reaction was another one on the line of rejections the ICC 
had previously faced, but coming from Parliament it demonstrated that all other institutions, not 
just government, try to avoid having ATI apply into own home. 
 
      Despite this rejection, the ICC persistently continued to push for change in the ATI regime. 
Only recently, in 2015, Commissioner Legault, issued 85 recommendations1107 for law reform in 
her report to Parliament. Most of them were introduced before, such as extending the ATIA 
coverage; establishing a comprehensive legal duty to document, with appropriate sanctions for 
non-compliance; extending the right of access to all persons; eliminating all access fees;  
adopting an order-making model for the ICC; introducing offences sanctioned by fines varying 
from $5000-$250001108, among many other recommendations. They had the same fate as other 
proposals – went unrecognized.  
 
     Another indirect strategy followed by the ICC to open up opportunities for modernizing the 
ATI legal framework and strengthening government transparency were the calls for the 
government to join the Open Government Partnership (OGP) as a global initiative to enhance the 
way of governing. In September 2010, the federal and provincial Commissioners across Canada 
issued a call for open government.1109 They also took advantage of this initiative to push for 
legislative changes when the government was developing an Action Plan for the OGP initiative. 
The Commissioners suggested that the Action Plan on OGP represented a missed opportunity for 
comprehensive reform of the ATIA. In a January 2012 letter to Minister Clement on behalf of 
Canada’s information and privacy commissioners, ICC Legault, offered to assist the government 
in developing the Action Plan. The letter suggested the government recognize and support the 
relationship between open government and a modernized ATIA.1110 However, this letter achieved 
                                                          
1106 Office of the Information Commissioner. “Annual Report 2013-2014, Part 4: Promoting Access - Appearances 
before parliamentary committees”, online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/rapport-annuel-annual-report_2013-
2014_6.aspx> 
1107 Office of the Information Commissioner, “Striking the right balance for transparency”, March 2015, online: 
<http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/rapport-de-modernisation-modernization-report_9.aspx#4_2>. 
1108 Ibid, Chapter 7.  
1109 Call for open government from ATIA and Privacy Commissioners, online: <http://www.oic-
ci.gc.ca/eng/med-roo-sal-med_nr-cp_2010_8.aspx>. 
1110 Information Commissioner of Canada, “Letter on open government for the President of the Treasury Board,” 20 
January 2012, online: <http://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/rr-sl-odi-adi_2012_1.aspx>. 
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no recognition by the government and no action for ATI reform was reflected in the OGP Action 
Plan.  
 
     As mentioned above, all the Commissioners have tried more than once while they were in 
office to push for change in the ATI legal framework. However, all of their attempts to influence 
an ATI law reform seem to have failed to overcome institutional barriers, which are raised and 
maintained to preserve the legal status quo in Canada. Cavoukian called these attempts 
“Mayday” calls and cries that have gone unheeded.1111 This inability to make for a strong 
opposition against the government regarding ATI demonstrates the nature of the ICC as a 
“toothless watchdog”, as many scholars have described it. Several failed attempts for a law 
reform has caused a lot of frustration on the ICC as an oversight institution and has left it 
powerless in face of strong government opposition.  
 
9.1.4 The case of Ontario 
     As explained above, the IPCO is different from the ICC in two ways, it has an order-making 
power and the two commissioners are merged into one. The IPCO is argued to be one of the 
most active commissioners in Canada which has left its footprint in ATI’s framework. In 2010, 
Commissioner Ann Cavoukian “unveiled the concept Access by Design consisting of 7 
Fundamental Principles that encourage public institutions to take a proactive approach to 
releasing government records, making the disclosure of government-held information an 
automatic process whenever possible.”1112 “Access by design” is a revolutionary idea that has the 
potential to change the legal landscape and practice of ATI in Canada.  
 
     The appeal process at the IPCO goes through three stages: Intake, Mediation and 
Adjudication. In the intake stage requests are screened and appeals may be dismissed, settled, or 
go to mediation. In mediation the IPCO helps parties to either reach a full settlement or simplify 
                                                          
1111 Information and Privacy Commissioner Ontario, “Submission to the Access to Information Review Task Force: 
Access to Information Act”, May 2001 at 17, online:  <https://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/up-1info0501.pdf>. 
1112 Ann Cavoukian, Information and Privacy Commissioner, “2013 Access and Privacy: Freedom and Liberty”, 
Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner Ontario, at 3, online: 
<http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/ar-2013-e.pdf>. 
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the appeal1113. Mediation can succeed in settling some or all of the issues, reducing the number 
of records in dispute, clarifying the issues and helping the parties to better understand the 
legislation in place. The role of the mediator is to facilitate discussion and negotiation, and in the 
majority of cases, mediation is successful. In situations where mediation is not completely 
successful, the mediator prepares a report, which summarizes the case and identifies the issues 
left unresolved. Then, the file is forwarded to the third stage, adjudication. In the adjudication, a 
written inquiry is conducted and parties are notified about the issues that need to be addressed. 
Parties are given an opportunity to submit written representations1114 emphasizing their position 
on the issues, and they are generally shared between parties in the appeal, unless there are 
confidentiality concerns. Once the adjudicator has considered all representations and reviewed 
the records, a decision is made, and a written order is issued.    
 
     IPCP has been active beyond Ontario, and in the federal level. In her submission to the Task 
Force in 2001, Cavoukian drew attention to the crisis in the federal level related to government 
compliance with the legislation. She explained that “the failure of government institutions to 
comply with …provisions can undermine legislation more than any other factor.”1115 Cavoukian 
urged the Task Force to make improvements to the federal access scheme, including changes for 
strengthening the ICC, such as giving it order-making powers, undertaking mediation and 
conducting research, and public education.1116 
  
     Because the IPCO deals with both privacy and ATI issues, she has often urged to stop using 
privacy as a shield against transparency, in cases when ATI refusals are justified with privacy 
concerns. She criticized this practice by saying that “the reasoning behind this excuse is an effort 
to play it safe, instead of gaining a proper understanding of what the options are for disclosure, 
or in the worst cases, using it as a convenient diversion for inaction.”1117 The IPCO has 
                                                          
1113 Ontario’s Information and Privacy Commissioner, “The Appeal Process”, August 2014, at 5, online:  
<https://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/appeal_process-e.pdf>. 
1114 Ibid, at 6.  
1115 Information and Privacy Commissioner Ontario, “Submission to the Access to Information Review Task Force: 
Access to Information Act”, May 2001, at 15, online: <https://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/up-1info0501.pdf>. 
1116 Ibid, at 17. 
1117 Ann Cavoukian, Information and Privacy Commissioner, “2013 Access and Privacy: Freedom and Liberty”,  
Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner Ontario, at 39, online: 
<http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/ar-2013-e.pdf>. 
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advocated for a strong access system that strikes a careful balance between access and privacy 
and advised governments to ensure the continued relevance of ATI, while still vigilantly 
protecting the personal information of Canadians. In October 2014, the IPCO joined other 
commissioners in urging governments to review and modernize information management 
practices drawing in advancements in information technology. In a joint resolution1118, the 
commissioners said the digital era has brought tremendous opportunities and new challenges for 
access and privacy rights.  
 
9.2 The role of the EU Ombudsman as a watchdog on access to documents   
     First established in Sweden, the ombudsman is traditionally a neutral decision-maker who 
investigates allegations of maladministration in the executive branch of government and 
judiciary.1119 In the EU, the creation of the European Ombudsman (EO) originates at the Treaty 
of Maastricht in 1992,1120 so it was prior than the introduction of the ATI legislation in the EU. 
The role of the EO is to safeguard the fundamental rights of citizens living in Europe by ensuring 
open and accountable administrations within the EU. In this capacity he has been a strong voice 
for the protection of the right to ATD and is considered a prominent advocate of openness within 
the EU architecture. 
 
9.2.1 Powers of the EU Ombudsman  
     The EO deals with complaints regarding maladministration by the EU institutions and bodies 
when they fail to act in accordance with the law. It means that the EO’s scope is much broader 
than investigating complaints on refusals of ATD, as is it the case with the ICC. As Harden puts 
it, “The essence of Ombudsman is not to check the lawfulness of administrative behavior, which 
is the task and prerogative of the ECJ, but to control administrative behavior for compliance with 
                                                          
1118 Protect and Promote Canadians’ Access and Privacy Rights in the Era of Digital Government Resolution of the 
Federal, Provincial and Territorial Privacy and Information Ombudspersons and Commissioners Ottawa, October 
28-29, 2014, online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-c/2014/res_141029_e.asp>. 
1119 See generally, Linda C. Reif, The Ombudsman, Good Governance and the International Human Rights System 
(Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) at 1 [Reif, The Ombudsman]; See also Donald C. Rowat, ed., The 
Ombudsman: Citizen’s Defender (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966) [Rowat, The Ombudsman]; Linda C. 
Reif, ed., The International Ombudsman Anthology: Selected Writings from the International Ombudsman Institute 
(Boston: Kluwer Law, 1999) [Reif, “The International”]; Stephen Owen, “The Ombudsman: Essential Elements & 
Common Challenges” in Linda C. Reif, Mary A. Amrshall & Charles Ferris , eds., The Ombudsman: Diversity and 
Development (Edmonton: International Ombudsman Institute, 1993), at 1 [Owen, “The Ombudsman”]. 
1120 Article 195 (ex 138e) TEC.  
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administrative ethics.”1121 Even though the role of the EO is much broader than fostering 
transparency in the EU, the protection of a right to ATD has been at the centre of his work. The 
position is distinctive within the EU because it is filled entirely at the discretion of the EP.1122 
Magnette argued that “the European Ombudsman is a new kind of ‘agent’, whose status and role 
remain unclear. On the one hand, it is formally a parliamentary body, designed to strengthen the 
control of EU institutions and administrations by MEPs; on the other hand, the profile and role of 
this organ is close to that of a court.”1123 However, just like the Commissioner in Canada, the EO 
does not have order-making power. Only the Courts have power to give legally binding 
judgments and to provide authoritative interpretations of the law. The EO can make proposals 
and recommendations and, as a last resort, draw political attention to a case by making a special 
report to the EP. The effectiveness of the EO thus depends on moral authority.  
 
     The ombudsman role is a Nordic innovation. Its first incumbent, Jacob Söderman, had 
previously served as Finland's ombudsman, and he was elected as an EO on 12 July 1995 and 
took office on 27 September 1995.1124 According to Birkinshaw, Söderman “attacked secrecy in 
the EU with missionary zeal”1125 soon after coming to office. Harden emphasized the importance 
of the EO by saying that “The European Ombudsman has been central to the development of 
openness and transparency as broader principles of law.”1126 During the time as the EO 
Söderman has been very active in promoting transparency and ATI as important values in the 
EU. In fact, in 1996, the Ombudsman undertook an inquiry on its own initiative into the 
provision of public ATD by all European institutions and bodies and dedicated his first ever 
special report to the EP on precisely this topic in 1997. The inquiry involved fifteen Community 
institutions other than the Council and Commission.1127 The reason for the inquiry was that the 
                                                          
1121 Harden, “Revision of 1049”, supra note 389 at 256.  
1122 Corbett, Jacobs, et al, supra note 440 at 240.  
1123 Paul Magnette “Between Parliamentary Control and the Rule of Law: The Political Role of the Ombudsman in 
the European Union”, (2003) 10:5 Journal of European Public Policy, 677-694 at 677 [Magnette].  
1124 Craig, supra note 386 at 742. 
1125 Patrick Birkinshaw, Freedom of information: the law, the practice and the ideal (London: Butterworths, 2001). 
at 369 [Birkinshaw, FOI]. 
1126 I Harden, “The European Ombudsman’s Efforts to Increase Openness in the Union”, in V Deckmyn, ed, 
Increasing Transparency in the European Union (European Institute of Public Administration, 2002) at 123 
[Harden, “The EO”].  
1127 European Ombudsman, “The role of the European Ombudsman”, Israel, September 1997, online:  
<http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/speeches/pdfen/jerus_en.pdf>. 
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Ombudsman's office had received a number of complaints which seemed to suggest that the staff 
of Community institutions and bodies were not always adequately instructed on how to deal with 
requests for documents. Because an important part of the Ombudsman’s mission is to enhance 
relations between Community institutions and bodies and European citizens, a more transparent 
European administration is quite clearly a condition for achievements in this field. After an 
exchange of views with the institutions and bodies in question, during which they all showed a 
positive attitude to the initiative, the Ombudsman formally recommended to fourteen institutions 
in December 1996 that they should come up with a common transparency regime, and adopt 
rules on public access to documents.1128 The Treaty of Amsterdam was still under proposal at 
that time, and it later included a right to ATD. Regulation 1049 was adopted five years later.  
 
     The EO seems to be a powerful institution in the EU. Magnette argued that “The powers of 
the Ombudsman, limited as they are, give him the opportunity to combine the instruments of 
parliamentary scrutiny and judicial control in an original way.”1129 The Annual Reports show 
that the level of compliance from the institutions is high, about eighty per cent each year1130. 
Given that there is no order-making powers assigned to the EO, the high compliance demonstrate 
that EO has established a moral authority in the EU.  
 
9.2.2 Administration of complaints  
     According to the Statute of the Ombudsman,1131 when the EO receives a complaint, he starts 
an investigation. There are three steps that he may take in any case of complaint. First, he looks 
for an amicable solution between the institution concerned and the complainant to remove the 
maladministration and satisfy the complainant. Second, if no friendly solution can be reached, 
the EO informs the institution concerned and, when appropriate, makes draft recommendations. 
The institution must reply within three months. If the recommendations are not accepted and no 
                                                          
1128 Ibid.  
1129 Magnette, supra note 1123 at 678.  
1130 European Ombudsman, Annual Report, 2014, at 25, online: 
<http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/activities/annualreport.faces/en/59959/html.bookmark#hl3> [EO, “Annual 
Report 2014”]. 
1131 Statute: Decision of the European Parliament on the regulations and general conditions governing the 
performance of the Ombudsman's duties, Adopted by Parliament on 9 March 1994 (OJ L 113, 4.5.1994, p. 15) and 
amended by its decisions of 14 March 2002 (OJ L 92, 9.4.2002, p. 13) and 18 June 2008 (OJ L 189, 17.7.2008, p. 
25), online: <http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/resources/statute.faces>. 
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other solution to eliminate the maladministration can be found, the EO sends a special report 
with possible recommendations to the EP and to the institution concerned. This stage gives the 
Parliament a possibility to look for a way to solve the matter. The EO has the obligation to 
inform the appropriate national police if his inquiries reveal criminal activity, or to inform the 
institution or body concerned about the need to initiate a disciplinary process. The Ombudsman's 
office may launch investigations even with its own initiative, and follows the same procedure.  
     The involvement of Parliament in the investigation process is an interesting step which 
provides the EO with a strong support and explains (although in part) why its recommendations 
are followed. As such, the EP has become a strong ally of the EO. 
     As stated above, most of the complaints to the EO deal with cases of maladministration. 
However, requests for ATD constitute a high volume of the general requests. According to the 
EO, “for several years now, 20% to 30% of the complaints that the Ombudsman’s office 
investigates have concerned transparency. The most common transparency issues raised are the 
institutions’ refusal to grant access to documents and/or information.”1132 These numbers 
demonstrate that EU citizens make substantive amounts of requests for ATD. Most of the 
requests are made to the key institutions of the EU. Table 38 below shows that the European 
Commission in 2014 has received almost 60 per cent of the total requests, with a huge difference 
with other EU institutions and bodies. The Commission usually gets more than 50 per cent of the 
total complaints. This is not surprising considering that the Commission has a crucial role in the 
EU decision-making as the executive body of the EU, equivalent to the national government. 
Most of the legislation in the EU originates in the Commission, so most of its activities draw the 
attention of European public.   
 
 
 
                                                          
1132 EO, “Annual Report 2014”, supra note 1130 at 7. 
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Table 38: Inquiries conducted by the EO in 2014 according to institutions 
 
Source: EU ombudsman, Annual Report 2014, online: 
<http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/activities/annualreport.faces/en/59959/html.bookmark#hl3>. 
     The EO receives all sorts of complaints concerning different issues and institutions in the EU. 
I am mentioning below a couple of very recent and important investigations she has been 
engaged into. One of them relates to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 
which has lately drawn a lot of public and media attention. The TTIP, an EU-US trade 
agreement, will create the largest free trade area in history with the aim of reducing the 
regulatory barriers to trade. According to the EO “TTIP will shape future rules and standards in 
areas such as food safety, cars, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, energy, the environment, and the 
workplace.”1133The European Commission was negotiating the agreement on behalf of the EU, 
on a mandate granted by the Council of the EU.1134 During the negotiations on the TTIP there 
were major concerns about the closed process of these negotiations. For instance, Independent 
argued that “the process has been secretive and undemocratic. This secrecy is on-going, with 
nearly all information on negotiations coming from leaked documents and Freedom of 
Information requests.”1135 To address these concerns the EO opened three strategic 
                                                          
1133 EO, “Annual Report 2014”, supra note 1130. 
1134 European Commission, “What is TTIP about”, online: <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/about-
ttip/>. 
1135 Lee Williams, “What is TTIP? And six reasons why the answer should scare you”, The Independent, 6 October 
2015, online: <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/what-is-ttip-and-six-reasons-why-the-answer-should-
scare-you-9779688.html>. 
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investigations, two of which on her own initiative in connection with the ongoing negotiations on 
the TTIP.  
 
    The first complaint about TTIP started on 17 February 2014, when a group of European 
NGOs1136 made a request to the Commission, under Regulation 1049 for access to documents 
related to the agreement. After the Commission's negative reply in the confirmatory application, 
the complainants turned to the EO, who decided on November 4, 2015 that the Commission had 
failed to grant the documents conforming to Regulation 1049.1137  
 
     In addition to this complaint, the Ombudsman O’Reilly started two other investigations 
related to TTIP on her own initiative. In July 2014, the EO began investigating the refusal by the 
Council of the EU to release the directives that the EU was using to negotiate the TTIP. She also 
started inquiring into the steps that the Commission was taking to ensure transparent and public 
participation in TTIP negotiations.1138 Earlier, the Ombudsman had put forward, to the European 
Commission, measures it could take to enable timely public access to TTIP documents, and 
details of meetings with stakeholders. There were concerns over refusal to disclose documents, 
unauthorized disclosure of documents, delays, and certain stakeholders apparently receiving 
privileged access to TTIP documents.1139 Following the EO’s investigations, in October, the 
Council published the directives in question. Shortly after, the Commission announced its plans 
to increase transparency in lobbying, promising to grant broader access to other TTIP 
documents.1140 In February 2015, the Commission published the texts of the agreements in its 
webpage, including the text of the EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CETA).1141  
     Another important inquiry Ombudsman O’Reilly that started in 2014 was on trilogues, which 
are informal meetings between the Parliament, Commission and the Council of the EU. They are 
                                                          
1136 The group consisted of five NGOs: ClientEarth, the European Environmental Bureau, Friends of the Earth 
Europe, Corporate Europe Observatory and the European Federation of Journalists.  
1137 European Ombudsman, Refusal to grant access to documents relating to the TTIP negotiations, Case: 
119/2015/PHP, online: <http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/cases/caseopened.faces/en/59021/html.bookmark>. 
1138 EO, “Annual Report 2014”, supra note 1130 at 8-9.  
1139 Note that these concerns were not only related to the first requests by NGOs. Investigations were broader.  
1140 Ibid, at 9.  
1141 See European Commission, “EU negotiating texts in TTIP”, 10 February 2015, online: 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230>. 
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an important part of the EU legislative process, and have been a major concern for taking place 
in secrecy. This inquiry was “as an effort to facilitate a discussion about how trilogues can be 
made more transparent but also about where non-disclosure of documents needs to be 
maintained.”1142 With this inquiry the EO was trying to address two main concerns: if increased 
transparency concerning trilogues could actually prove harmful to the trilogue process, and if 
there was a risk that greater transparency, at the wrong time, would provide greater lobbying 
opportunities for well-resourced private interests to the detriment of the average citizen. In July 
2016, the EO concluded the inquiry and proposed that the three institutions (the EP, Commission 
and Council) make some information and documentation publicly available, such as: trilogue 
dates, initial positions of the three institutions, general trilogue agendas, etc.1143  
      These examples demonstrate that the EO had developed a relatively good relationship with 
the EU institutions. Especially as it regards the ATD requests, the EO’s practice shows that the 
level of compliance is satisfactory even through there is no order-making power in place to 
facilitate this compliance. This means that the EO has established its authority and credibility in 
the EU as an institution that deserves attention and is taken seriously.   
 
9.2.3 The interaction with other institutions  
     The EO is an impartial body, it takes no orders from any government or organization. 
However, it maintains good relationships with other institutions in the EU. For instance, it has a 
close relationship with the EP for which it produces two types of reports, annual and special 
reports. The annual report summarizes the yearly activity of the EO while special reports are 
submitted in cases when recommendations in an investigation are not accepted by institutions. 
They require the EP to take appropriate action. The European Ombudsman places a great deal of 
importance on relations with the EP. During 2014, the Ombudsman met with over 50 MEPs 
across all main groups on a one-to-one basis on various issues of mutual concern.1144 
 
                                                          
1142 European Ombudsman, Trilogues and transparent law-making - European Ombudsman - Opening Address, A 
speech on the International Right to Know Day, 28 September, 2015, online: 
<http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/activities/speech.faces/en/60991/html.bookmark>. 
1143 Decision of the European Ombudsman setting out proposals following her strategic inquiry OI/8/2015/JAS 
concerning the transparency of Trilogues, 12 July 2016, online: 
<http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/summary.faces/en/69213/html.bookmark>. 
1144 EO, “Annual Report 2014”, supra note 1130 at 26. 
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     In addition, the EO appreciates its relationship with the Commission, given its size in the EU 
administration and that it is the subject of the greatest number of complaints at the EO. The two 
institutions maintain monthly meetings at the director level regularly. In 2014, O’Reilly praised 
the new Commission for its efforts to improve the transparency of its work, especially in the 
context of lobbying transparency. Relationship building is now one of the Ombudsman’s 
priorities at all levels of the Commission. During 2014, the Ombudsman met with several 
relevant Directors and Heads of Unit of the Commission.1145 
 
     Maintaining a good relationship with the main bodies in the EU, is one of the EO’s strategies 
to influence a culture of good administration. This strategy includes upholding the values of 
transparency and ATD as critical for a healthy democracy in the EU. In this context, the EO has 
engaged in lobbying and law reform. The EO office lobbied for the inclusion of a commitment to 
transparency in the Charter of fundamental rights adopted in 2000.1146 It is now a fact that the 
Charter guarantees a fundamental principal of openness and a public right of ATD.  Moreover, 
the EO has provided leadership on ATD via the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour1147 
which is endorsed by the Parliament and supervised by the EO. The Code not only offers a guide 
to the EU institutions, but has also become a vital tool for citizens wishing to inform themselves 
of their rights1148, including the right of ATD. Magnette argued that: 
 
In 2000, he pleaded his case in front of the members of the Convention in charge of drafting the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights… the code was incorporated in the Charter adopted at the Nice 
Summit in December 2000. In less than five years, the Ombudsman managed to codify the 
doctrine of good administrative behaviour and have it incorporated in a Charter which is the 
expression of the Union’s fundamental values.1149  
 
     When the Commission announced the review of Regulation 1049, and proposed a draft for this 
purpose, the EO got involved. On 2 June 2008, the EO, Diamandouros, criticised the draft law 
and called upon the EP to defend the EU’s commitment to transparency and the citizens’ right of 
                                                          
1145 Ibid, at 27. 
1146 Harden, “Statement”, supra note 441  
1147 The European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour (2001), online: 
<http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/resources/code.faces>.  
1148 Ibid, at 2.  
1149 Magnette, supra note 1123 at 685.  
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ATD in the EU. He asserted that the overall effect of the proposed revisions would be that the 
Commission could share documents informally with a limited number of favoured external 
recipients of its choice, without having to give public access to them.1150 
 
     As this involvement shows, the EO, even though not an institution specifically designed to 
promote ATD and transparency, has influenced important developments of this right and 
principle in the EU. It has acted as an ATI advocate from its inception and continually supported 
its expansion through law and practice.  
9.2.4 The case of Albania 
     The Commissioner of the Right to Information and Protection of Personal Data (CRIPPD) in 
Albania is a relatively young institution. Until the end of 2014 its role was occupied by the 
People’s Advocate, which is the equivalent of the Ombudsman in the EU. When the new law on 
ATI1151 came into force in October 2014, it gave the powers of the Information Commissioner to 
the Privacy Commissioner that already existed, merging the two bodies together. CRIPPD is 
similar in nature and scope with the IPCO – it handles both privacy and ATI and its decisions are 
binding. Both these powers were only introduced by the new law to strengthen its authority. In 
the past, the People’s Advocate was a weak institution because of the limited legal remedies and 
the inherited culture of non-compliance of the Albanian institutions.1152 
     Although the time is short to evaluate the work of the CRIPPD, it seems that it is establishing 
a stronger position compared to the People’s Advocate. In just two months, from November to 
December 2014 there have been 26 complaints to the CRIPPD. From those, only five have led to 
investigations, and only two have led to decisions where the authorities were required to provide 
the information requested.1153 The other ones were solved amicably with the mediation of the 
CRIPPD. In 2015, there are 50 decisions published in the Commissioner’s website pertaining to 
                                                          
1150 European Ombudsman, “Ombudsman warns that Citizens’ Right of Access to Documents is at risk”, European 
Ombudsman Press Release No.7 (2008), online: <http://ombudsman.europa.eu/release/en/2008-06-02.htm>. 
1151 Law No. 119/2014, On the right to Information. 
1152 Spahiu, “Government”, supra note 230 at 125.  
1153 Komisionerit për të Drejtën e Informimit dhe Mbrojtjen e të Dhënave Personale, Raporti vjetor (The CRIPPD, 
Annual Report) 2014, at 6, online: <http://idp.al/images/autoriteti/Raporte_Vjetore/RAPORTI_VJETOR_2014.pdf> 
[CRIPPD, Annual Report]. 
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complaints made by individuals and organizations. The decisions are scanned and posted on the 
website, with names erased to maintain confidentiality.1154 These investigations have revealed 
that the ATI law in Albania is mostly disregarded by the public administration which avoids to 
fulfill the obligation under the law by dismissing requests for ATI by citizens.1155 This situation 
has been the norm rather than the exception in Albania and it is inherited from the old law which 
provided no safeguards for the protection of the right of ATI in cases when information was 
denied.  
     The new law provides the CRIPPD with new powers which enhance its capacities to 
supervise the activities of the institutions in compliance with the ATI legislation. For instance, 
the law requires from the public authorities to implement institutional transparency programs, to 
determine the information categories to be made public without request, and the disclosure 
method of this information.1156 CRIPPD approves and distributes the model transparency 
programs1157 and supervises their implementation. In addition, public authorities are required to 
maintain public registers to document all ATI requests and their responses. The CRIPPD sets the 
standards on the format and the content of the register.1158 Furthermore, the CRIPPD examines 
periodically, in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance, public fees/charges for ATI requests 
and, where appropriate, orders their amendment.1159 
     These powers make the CRIPPD an institution that has the potential to change the culture of 
non-compliance in the Albanian public administration. They give teeth to this oversight body, so 
it can be taken seriously by the public officials. However, the CRIPPD’s success will depend 
heavily on the will of the political leadership in Albania. As I argued in Chapter seven, the 
implementation of the law, including the success of the oversight mechanisms depend on the will 
of the government. In the Albanian case this is even more problematic since the government 
controls all other institutions, including the courts.  
                                                          
1154 Regjistri I kerkesave dhe pergjigjeve (the Register of requests and responses), online: 
<http://idp.al/index.php/sq/programi-i-transparences/regjistri-i-kerkesave> 
1155 CRIPPD, Annual Report, supra note 1153 at 6. 
1156 Law No. 119/2014, On the right to Information, Article 4. 
1157 Ibid, Article 6. 
1158 Ibid, Article 8. 
1159 Ibid, Article 13. 
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     Comparing the oversight models in the EU and Canada with the CRIPPD, one can notice a 
big difference in terms of mandate and power. Not only the CRIPPD has order-making power, 
but its oversight extends to many activities of the institutions such as transparency programs, 
public registers and fees. The EO and the ICC do not possess such powers, and their success 
depends on the moral authority they succeed to establish their alliances with other institutions 
and the support from the public.  
9.3 Comparisons and Conclusions  
     Both Canada and the EU have an independent oversight and enforcement bodies to ensure that 
public authorities comply with their duties in relation to transparency and ATI. Both of them are 
creatures of Parliament, and both have limited powers of recommendation, investigation and 
advice. While the ICC was created by the ATIA in 1982, in the EU, the creation of the EO 
originates at the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, so it was prior than the introduction of the ATD 
legislation in the EU. The comparison between Canada and the EU shows that these institutions 
are very similar to each other. Although with limited powers they have engaged in many 
initiatives for ATI reforms. However, is seems like the EU Ombudsman has gained more moral 
grounds as an enforcement body.   
 
    The existence of an oversight body is important because it provides a channel for the citizens 
to understand the actions of government through investigations and inquiries. This process 
encourages the administration to explain to the citizens why it acts as it does and recognizing a 
possible right of appeal. In this context, the existence of an ombudsman also improves the 
general quality of government service by making officials prudent and avoid engaging in 
careless procedures. However, the four models examined above have achieved different levels of 
success in affecting government behaviour. The IPCO and the EO have been more successful, 
than the ICC and the CRIPPD. 
 
    In addition, oversight bodies intervene more frequently in transparency issues, acting as a 
“filter” to prevent the courts’ overload, but also reducing the time for the citizens to process a 
request. Their mission is very different from a judicial one, they have extended powers of 
investigation and can conduct inquiries but cannot impose any legal obligation, unless they have 
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order-making power as it is the case in Ontario and Albania. The ICC and EO can only submit 
draft recommendations, sometimes accompanied with “remarks” or “reform proposals”, to the 
institutions suspected of maladministration but is not empowered to impose sanctions. 
Notwithstanding, through their investigations they have produced general principles and 
precedents that could be employed by government and the courts. In the case of the EO, 
Magnette argued that through his “decisions”, the EO has gradually established a 
“jurisprudence” based on a teleological philosophy of “good administrative practices” and even 
“good governance”. Magnette explained that lack of power to make binding decisions may be a 
weakness, but may also be a source of diffuse power.1160 Oversight bodies have the ultimate 
privilege of being able to conduct inquiries on their own initiative, contrary to the judges. 
Whereas Courts depend on cases brought to them to develop jurisprudence, oversight bodies are 
free to determine their own priorities. 
 
     Furthermore, oversight bodies help improve legislation. Through the careful selection of cases 
which they see as symbolically important, they establish themselves as a power of initiative and 
pressure in the continuous reform of the Canadian and the EU governance. In the name of 
transparency, which they are the guardian of, the oversight bodies empower themselves with the 
right to suggest procedural reforms which aim to increase citizens’ participation in administrative 
procedures. The EO has been more successful in this regard since it has had the support of the 
EP. The involvement of Parliament in the investigation process is an interesting step which is not 
present in Canada, and provides the EO with much more potential that its voice will be heard. As 
such, the EP has become a strong ally of the EO. According to Magnette, the EO, “acting as a 
parliamentary organ, and with the strong support of the EP, …used his powers of inquiry and 
proposition to suggest wide-ranging reforms of European governance.”1161 This kind of support 
is not provided to the ICC, and it seems that it is fighting a lonely battle because of the lack of 
strong allies.  
 
      Table 39 below represents the models of the fours oversight bodies that I studied in this 
chapter.  
                                                          
1160 Magnette, supra note 1123 at 682.  
1161 Ibid, at 690.  
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Table 39: Comparison of Oversight Models 
 Canada  Ontario  EU Albania  
Model Information 
Commissioner 
Information and 
Privacy 
Commissioner 
Ombudsman Commissioner of the 
right to information 
and protection of 
personal data 
(CRIPPD) 
mandate -review 
complaints 
-investigate 
 
-Review decisions 
-conduct research 
-advice on 
proposed 
legislation 
-public education 
-uncover cases 
of 
maladministratio
n 
-review 
complaints 
-conduct 
inquiries 
-investigate 
complaints 
-review transparency 
programs 
-conduct inquires 
-public education 
powers recommendatio
ns  
Order-making  recommendation
s 
Order-making 
Applicatio
n fee 
5$ 10$ personal  
25$ other info 
Free  Free  
Time of 
complaint 
Within 60 days within 30 days  3 calendar 
months 
Within 30 business 
days 
Complaint
s steps 
To ICC first, 
than the 
Federal Court 
To the IPCO first, 
than the Court  
To EO or court 
after making a 
confirmatory 
application1162 
To CRIPPD first, than 
the Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1162 It means that the persons to whom the request is denied, should apply to the institution asking for a review of the 
decision and reasons of rejection, before going to the EO.  
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CHAPTER 10:  TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
JURISPRUDENCE  
 
     Court’s interpretation is critical in understanding how ATI laws are perceived, shaped and 
implemented, and how they are balanced against other rights and interests. The jurisprudence of 
the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) will be explored 
to extrapolate on the nature and the value that the justice system assigns to the access laws. Some 
decisions from the Federal Court of Canada (FCC) and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) will also be explored. These Courts’ decisions complement the legal framework on 
ATI, they offer guidance to practitioners, and expand the legal understanding of the status of 
access rights.  
 
     The purpose of this Chapter is to shed light in the legal discourse and jurisprudence. Court 
interpretation is critical in understanding the design, the purpose and the objectives of ATI laws 
and how they come into play in practice. A case law analysis of ATI rights provides a better 
understanding of their status, and how a legislative scheme helps to define, frame, and value 
access rights. The case law of the two highest courts offers a fruitful insight into the legal and 
social debates around transparency and ATI.  
     The role of the courts in promoting human rights has always been very important. In the EU, 
courts have shown to be essential in transforming ATI into a fundamental human right. In 
Canada, access rights do not hold such status, and although the courts have not been very 
influential in changing that status, they have certainly enhanced it with an expansive 
interpretation of the rights.  
 
10.1  Perspectives from the Canadian courts system  
     The tensions in the ATIA have been for several years facilitated by judicial interpretations. 
McCamus argued about the importance of judicial interpretation saying that “judicial review is 
the most attractive of the alternatives.”1163 Indeed, the case law is significant because it facilitates 
the work of practitioners and public officials by providing guidance on how to decide on 
                                                          
1163 McCamus, at 55.  
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conflicting cases. As Kazmierski points out “ensuring that government officials properly exercise 
their discretion pursuant to access legislation also depends on the role of the judiciary.”1164 ATI 
has drawn a considerable amount of attention from both activists and citizens in Canada. Many 
cases have ended up in courts establishing an important body of jurisprudence that guides 
institutions in the application of the ATI legislation in everyday practice. In these cases access 
rights have been interpreted creatively and new dimensions have been explored. However, the 
courts have not been able to escape the legal restrictions that of the ATIA.       
 
     Although ATI is not a constitutional right in Canada, the SCC has recognized it as having a 
quasi-constitutional status. As Dickson C.J. noted in Canada National Railway, writing in the 
context of human rights legislation, a court's goal in interpreting quasi-constitutional statutes 
should be to preserve the impact of the right. The Court recognized that “in the construction of 
such legislation the words of the Act must be given their plain meaning, but it is equally 
important that the rights enunciated be given their full recognition and effect. We should not 
search for ways and means to minimize those rights and to enfeeble their proper impact.”1165 
      
10.1.1  Access to information as a constitutional right 
     The quasi-constitutional status of access rights was upgraded in 2010 by Criminal Lawyers’ 
Association1166,a landmark case of the SCC in which the Court recognized a limited right to ATI 
held by public authorities as part of the freedom of expression of the Charter.1167 The case was 
brought by the Criminal Lawyers’ Liberties Association under Ontario’s FIPA1168 for documents 
held by the Ontario Provincial Police which were denied. The case was put forward as a 
constitutional claim and in turn, the Court recognized, for the first time that the right of ATI was 
a “derivative right” of the freedom of expression. This case has a meaningful significance since it 
provides a constitutional framework for access rights.   
     
                                                          
1164 Kazmierski, supra note 655 at 51.  
1165 Canadian National Railway Co. v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114, at 1134 
(emphasis added). 
1166 Criminal Lawyers’ Association, supra note 970. 
1167 Section 2(b) 
1168 Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31. 
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     The question before the Court was whether the Constitution recognized an ATI right. The 
Court found that section 2(b) of the Charter protects a derivate right to ATI in certain 
circumstances. According to Kazmierski, this case rightly garnered much attention because it 
was the first decision in which a majority of the Court recognized that there was constitutional 
protection for the right to ATI.1169 However, this protection did not apply in this case. The reason 
for this partial recognition was that s. 2(b) does not guarantee access to all documents in 
government hands. Instead, it guarantees freedom of expression. According to the Court “Access 
is a derivative right which may arise where it is a necessary precondition of meaningful 
expression on the functioning of government.”1170 The Court questioned the application of s. 2(b) 
in this case, and built on the methodology developed in previous cases. It used the framework set 
in Irwin1171 which involved three inquiries: (1) Does the activity in question have expressive 
content, thereby bringing it within the reach of s. 2 (b)? (2) Is there something in the method or 
location of that expression that would remove that protection? (3) If the activity is protected, 
does the state action infringe that protection, either in purpose or effect? Irwin established that to 
demonstrate that there is expressive content in accessing such documents, the claimant must 
establish that the denial of access effectively precludes meaningful commentary.  If the claimant 
could show this, there is a prima facie case for the production of the documents in question.  
 
     Considering the three level methodology in Irwin, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
requirements for considering ATI as part of the s. 2(b) were not satisfied. The main question was 
whether s. 2(b) was engaged at all.  The court concluded that the scope of the s. 2(b) protection 
included a right to ATI only in limited cases “where access is necessary to permit meaningful 
discussion on a matter of public importance, subject to privileges and functional 
constraints.”1172 The derivative right of access ties directly to core democratic values. As the 
Supreme Court noted “access to information in the hands of public institutions can increase 
transparency in government, contribute to an informed public, and enhance an open and 
democratic society.”1173 The unanimous Court also stated there to be:  
                                                          
1169 Kazmierski, supra note 655 at 54. 
1170 Criminal Lawyers’ Association, supra note 970 at para 29. 
1171 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at 967-68. 
1172 Criminal Lawyers’ Association, supra note 970 at para 31.  
1173 Ibid, at para 1.  
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A prima facie case that s. 2(b) may require disclosure of documents in government hands where 
it is shown that, without the desired access, meaningful public discussion and criticism on 
matters of public interest would be substantially impeded.… Open government requires that the 
citizenry be granted access to government records when it is necessary to meaningful public 
debate on the conduct of government institutions.1174 
 
     This position indicates that the Court values ATI as a right that contributes to the public 
debates on issues of governance. In addition, there is a link established between open 
government and public discussions on matters of public interest. ATI is part of this link and 
serves as a catalyst that facilitates the relationship transparency-public debate. While the access 
request in the case was not characterized as necessary to allow for meaningful discussion on a 
matter of public interest, it is significant because it recognized that an underlying derivative right 
potentially exists. Moreover, the Canadian Lawyers’ Association disputed the Respondent 
Minister's contention that the requester's purpose in making a request is a relevant consideration 
in the exercise of his discretion to disclose records. Generally, requesters need not even explain 
why they are requesting the information to which they seek access. To the extent that the purpose 
is known, it should only be considered where it would be a factor in favour of disclosure. Such 
an approach is appropriate in light of the constitutional status of the right to ATI. 
 
     Although the Canadian Lawyers’ Association case does not have a general application, it is 
still important because it is a reminder about the significance of an explicit public interest test 
that should be employed in any ATI case. The Court’s ruling effectively required the public 
interest to be taken into account whenever public authorities are evaluating the applicability of 
discretionary exceptions.1175 The only explicit public interest test included in the ATIA applies to 
the section 20, exception for third-party trade secrets. The scope of the public interest test was 
effectively extended by this case, which held that the public interest must be taken into account 
when deciding whether or not to apply discretionary exceptions1176. As a result, every 
discretionary exception within the ATIA is now deemed to contain at least some form of public 
                                                          
1174 Ibid at para 36. 
1175 Ibid at para. 48. 
1176 Ibid.  
319 
 
interest test, albeit a weak one. However, the ATIA contains many exceptions which are not 
mandatory, and which therefore lack any form of public interest test. 
 
10.1.2  Important cases from jurisprudence   
A.   Access to Information as important for democratic principles  
     In many cases the Supreme Court has described ATI as a pillar of our democracy, and as such 
very important for the principles of accountability and participation. In 1997, in Dagg Justice La 
Forest recognized that “The overarching purpose of access to information legislation is to 
facilitate democracy by helping to ensure that citizens have the information required to 
participate meaningfully in the democratic process and that politicians and bureaucrats remain 
accountable to the citizenry.”1177 In addition, Justice La Forest looked at ATI as a right of the 
citizens given by statute to exercise their responsibilities of citizenship more effectively. He 
stated: “Parliament and the public cannot hope to call the government to account without an 
adequate knowledge of what is going on; nor can they hope to participate in the decision-making 
process and contribute their talents to the formation of policy and legislation if that process is 
hidden from view.”1178 This position demonstrates that the Court acknowledges a direct 
connection between ATI, knowledge, and participation. In this context, the access rights act as a 
premise for knowledge gain, and that in turn may contribute to using that expertise to participate 
in the decision-making process of public institutions.  
 
     More recently, in Merck1179 the Supreme Court stated that ATI is important for accountability. 
It stated that “Broad rights of access to government information serve important public purposes. 
They help to ensure accountability and ultimately, it is hoped, to strengthen democracy. 
‘Sunlight’, as Louis Brandeis put it so well, ‘is said to be the best of disinfectants’…”1180 In 
addition, the Court emphasized it is important that “Citizens have the information required to 
participate meaningfully in the democratic process and that politicians and officials may be held 
meaningfully to account to the public…. to facilitate one of the foundations of our society, 
                                                          
1177 Dagg, supra note 630 at 432-433.  
1178 Ibid.  
1179 Merck Frosst Canada Ltd v. Canada (Health), 2012 SCC 3, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 23 [Merck].  
1180 Ibid, at para 1 
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democracy.”1181 In Merck the Court engaged in a broader interpretation of the ATIA and advised 
that “legislation must be given a broad and purposive interpretation” by the courts.1182  
 
     In addition, as the Supreme Court noted in Minister of National Defence, when tasked with 
interpreting words not defined in ATI legislation, that courts must give such words a broad and 
liberal interpretation “in order to create a meaningful right of access to government 
information.”1183 This approach is in line with the guidance for interpretation of quasi-
constitutional legislation put forward by this Court.  
 
B.   Exemptions and exceptions under the Access to Information Act  
     As explained in the previous chapters, there is a lot of debate regarding the coverage of the 
ATIA, which leaves out of its reach important public institutions, such as ministers’ offices, 
Cabinet confidences, agents of Parliament, etc. Such issue is inherent in the Act, and many 
proposals are made to change its coverage, however without success. The collective decision-
making process has traditionally been protected by the rule of confidentiality, which upholds the 
principle of collective responsibility and enables ministers to engage in full and free discussions 
necessary for the effective functioning of a Cabinet system. In 2011, in Minister of National 
Defence1184 the Supreme Court determined that the offices of the Prime Minister, Ministers of 
the Crown, the RCMP and PCO are not institutions covered by the ATIA. A two-part test was 
devised by the Supreme Court to determine whether records are “under the control” of an 
institution and therefore accessible.  The case arose out of complaints made to the Information 
Commissioner about refusals to provide information in response to a number of requests. The 
records requested were primarily agendas, notes and emails relating to these offices. The main 
focus was on the daily agendas of the Prime Minister Chretien. The Court held that the agenda of 
the former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien in the possession of the RCMP and the PCO were under 
the control of a “government institution”. However, they were not subject to disclosure 
because section 19(1) of the ATIA prohibits the head of a government institution from releasing 
                                                          
1181 Ibid, at para. 22. 
1182 Ibid, at para. 22. 
1183 Minister of National Defence, supra note 966 at para. 48. 
1184 Ibid.  
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any record that contains personal information as defined in s. 3 of the Privacy Act. Section 3(j) of 
the Privacy Act creates an exception by allowing for the disclosure of personal information 
where such information pertains to an individual who is or was an officer or employee of a 
government institution and where the information relates to the position or function of the 
individual.  Nevertheless, the court found that this exception did not apply as the Prime Minister 
could not be viewed as an officer of a government institution. 
     The Canadian Civil Liberties Association intervened in these cases to argue for a large and 
liberal interpretation of the ATIA, emphasizing the quasi-constitutional nature the Act1185 and 
asking the Court to recognize this status. The Supreme Court found that the meaning of 
“government institution” under the ATIA did not include ministerial offices and to expand the 
scope of the Act in this way was an issue for Parliament and not the courts.1186 Indeed, the way 
the Act is designed leaves little room to the courts to interpret the access right beyond the 
exceptions threshold. The reasoning in this decision confirmed that the Courts can only go that 
far in the interpretation of the access laws in Canada. Justice Kelen, J. argued that: “The question 
for the Court is not whether the documents should be accessible to the public under Canada’s 
‘freedom to information’ law, but whether the documents are currently accessible to the public 
under Canada’s existing law.  The Court does not legislate or change the law; it interprets the 
existing law.”1187 
 
     This ruling was preceded by ten years of legal battle going through five levels of courts, and 
every ruling was supported by each of the Prime Ministers of the day. The government and its 
ministries enjoy a special protection in terms of information they produce and how it becomes 
public. Other court cases in the past have supported this “special status” as something embedded 
in the law and political tradition in Canada. For instance, in the case Canada (Attorney General) 
v. Canada (Information Commissioner), one of the 25 institutions in the case stated “Canada's 
form of democracy is responsible parliamentary government [and] public servants are not 
accountable to the public; public servants are accountable to their ministers and ministers are 
                                                          
1185 See Factum of the CCLA to the SCC in Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of National 
Defence), 2011 SCC 25, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 306, 2010 at 3, online: <http://ccla.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/2011-04-04-Factum-for-Web-Posting.pdf>. 
1186 Minister of National Defence, supra note 966 at para 13.  
1187 Ibid, at para 12.  
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accountable in the House.”1188 This position is a strong demonstration of the fact that the 
Canadian tradition requires government to conceal the discussions in its workings. This status 
gives the government the legal right under the ATIA to be excluded from its application. In this 
context, Rankin argued that “it is unlikely that case law will generate any judicial standards or 
guidelines for the application of these exemptions. The Court cannot simply substitute its view 
for that of the Minister as to whether the document is entitled to be released.”1189 
 
     Cabinet confidentiality also enjoys special treatment in the ATIA, which has often become 
subject of judicial interpretation. The Supreme Court has sided with this special treatment in 
many cases. A leading case in this regard is Babcock1190 where the Supreme Court recognized 
that Cabinet confidentiality is essential to good government because “The process of democratic 
governance works best when Cabinet members charged with government policy and decision-
making are free to express themselves around the Cabinet table unreservedly.”1191 The court 
explained that the British democratic tradition which informs the Canadian tradition has long 
affirmed the confidentiality of what is said in the Cabinet room, and documents and papers 
prepared for Cabinet discussions.  The idea is to provide some space for government to thinks 
and discuss matters without public scrutiny, and that they express their ideas freely without 
swaying to their genuine positions. If Cabinet members’ statements were subject to disclosure, 
Cabinet members might censor their words, consciously or unconsciously.  They might shy away 
from stating unpopular positions, or from making comments that might be considered politically 
incorrect. According to the Court, the process of democratic governance works best when 
Cabinet members charged with government policy and decision-making are free to express 
themselves around the Cabinet table unreservedly. In addition, to ensuring candour in Cabinet 
discussions, the Supreme Court recognized another important reason for protecting Cabinet 
documents, namely to avoid creating or fanning ill-informed or captious public or political 
criticism.  Ministers undertake by oath as Privy Councillors to maintain the secrecy of Cabinet 
                                                          
1188 Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Information Commissioner), 2004-03-25, 2004 FC 431, at para 200. 
1189 Rankin, “The new ATIPA”, supra note 278 at 32. 
1190 Babcock, supra note 496.   
1191 Ibid, at para 18.  
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deliberations and the House of Commons and the courts respect the confidentiality of Cabinet 
decision-making.1192 
 
     To preserve the rule of confidentiality, section 69(1) of the ATIA provides that the Act does 
not apply to confidences of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada. This institution is responsible 
for issuing certificates that validate information as confidential. In Babcock, the Supreme Court 
noted that the Clerk of the Privy Council should determine two things for a certification: (1) that 
the information is a Cabinet confidence within s. 39; and (2) that it is desirable that 
confidentiality be retained taking into account the competing interests in disclosure and retaining 
confidentiality.1193 The Court explained that sec. 39 of the ATIA permits the Clerk to certify 
information as confidential, so it does not restrain voluntary disclosure of confidential 
information if the Clerk decides to. The Court in Babcock also recognized that cabinet 
confidences must be subject to consideration of the public interest, and noted that “At one time, 
the common law viewed Cabinet confidentiality as absolute. However, over time the common 
law has come to recognize that the public interest in Cabinet confidences must be balanced 
against the public interest in disclosure, to which it might sometimes be required to yield.”1194 In 
cases when the public interest is not taken into account, under ss. 37 and 38, a judge balances the 
competing public interests in protection and disclosure of information, while under s. 39, by 
contrast, the Clerk or minister balances the competing interests. If the Clerk or minister validly 
certifies information as confidential, a judge or tribunal must refuse any application for 
disclosure, without examining the information.1195  
 
     Although the Supreme Court has recognized a public interest balancing test in cases of 
Cabinet confidences, it has also agreed that this common law balancing can be vitiated by clear 
legislative language.1196 Nonetheless, the erosion of an absolute common law protection for 
Cabinet confidences demonstrates the importance of limiting the protection offered in other 
                                                          
1192 Ibid, at para 18.  
1193 Ibid, at para 28.  
1194 Ibid, at para19. 
1195 Ibid, at para 17. 
1196 See R. v. Ahmad, 2011 SCC 6, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 110, at para 50. 
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contexts as well.1197 This limitation offers a venue of access in cases where public interest is 
predominant. As such, it serves as an important tool in keeping the government accountable.  
     The ATIA also excludes draft legislation1198 from the application of the Act. This provision 
relates to any drafts of legislation proposed by the Government. It is not relevant whether the 
legislation was ever introduced into the House of Commons or the Senate, it still remains a 
Cabinet confidence. Draft legislation remains a confidence even after the final version is 
introduced in the House of Commons or the Senate. In Quinn1199, the Federal Court concluded 
that draft regulations examined by the Clerk of the Privy Council Office are excluded from the 
Act as such an examination is part of the regulatory process.  
    In a recent case, John Doe1200 the Supreme Court interpreted and decided on an exception to 
Ontario’s provincial access regime for “advice or recommendations” of a public servant. The 
Canadian Civil Liberties Association intervened in the case to argue that the “advice or 
recommendations” exception should be interpreted narrowly and records should not be shielded 
from disclosure.  Shielding a broader range of records from disclosure hinders the rights of 
Canadians to have informed public debate and discussion about government policy choices. The 
Association also argued that the interpretation of the legislation should respect the values 
enshrined in the Charter and the global trend towards greater transparency in government. These 
arguments before the court opened up discussions about the amount of government information 
that are labelled as “policy option” and therefore inaccessible by the public. The negative 
decision of the Court demonstrates the justice’s system inability to circumvent legislative 
provisions, and confirms advocates’ concerns about a broken system that needs to be changed.  
 
C.  Solicitor-client privilege  
     Another exemption that may apply to the ATIA gives the head of a government institution 
who receives an access request the discretion to invoke the solicitor-client privilege.1201 There 
                                                          
1197 “Bringing Canada’s lagging information rights into the 21st century”, Comments of the Samuelson-Glushko 
Canadian Internet Policy & Public Interest Clinic, January 31, 2013, at 10.  
1198 ATIA, section 69 (1)(f).  
1199 Quinn v. Canada (Prime Minister), 2011 FC 379. 
1200 John Doe, supra note 965.  
1201 ATIA, supra note 587 s. 23.  
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are two types of decisions to be made in relation to s. 23, (1) a factual decision: Is the requested 
information subject to solicitor-client privilege?, (2) a discretionary decision: Should the 
information nevertheless be disclosed? This requires a balancing of the reasons for non-release 
of privileged information against reasonable factors in favour of release, followed by an exercise 
of discretion. For s. 23 to apply, the heads of institutions do not have to demonstrate prejudice, 
nor give reasons for the refusal to disclose. In Blank1202, the Federal Court of Appeal indicated 
that the permissive nature of s. 23 reflects the fact that the solicitor-client privilege may be 
waived by or on behalf of the client. It can be assumed that, by asserting the solicitor-client 
privilege, the client or a party acting on the client's behalf has decided that waiver would not be 
in the public interest. There is no legal duty on the minister to expressly explain why the 
privilege is not being waived. However, the Court found that partial disclosure of information is 
allowed and “the disclosure of portions of the solicitors' accounts does not constitute waiver of 
solicitor-client privilege.”1203 In addition, the Court ruled that “Documents released to the 
applicant under the prosecution's disclosure obligations in the criminal proceedings do not lose 
their privileged character by that reason alone. Partial disclosure of a record does not render the 
entire record accessible.”1204 The reasoning is based on the severity principle in the ATIA which 
allows for partial disclosure of information. This principle becomes significant especially in 
circumstances when a piece of accessible information is to be found in a documents which is 
exempted from the application of the Act.  
 
D.   Time limits  
     As argued in the previous chapters, one of the major problems in the implementation of the 
Access to Information Act is the unlimited time extensions. The Act sets a limit of 30 days to 
respond to access requests, but also allows for an unlimited extension of that limit. This 
weakness in the Act has been used extensively by the federal institutions causing elongated 
delays. However, in National Defence, a fairly recent case of Federal Court of Appeal,1205 dealt 
with the time limits set out in the Act. The case relates to a request that was made to National 
Defence on February 3, 2011 for records relating to the sale of certain military assets. National 
                                                          
1202 Canada (Justice) v. Blank, 2007 FCA 87. 
1203 Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2005 FC 1551, at para 38.  
1204 Ibid, at para 49.  
1205 See Canada (Office of the Information Commissioner) v Canada (National Defence), 2015 FCA 56.  
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Defence advised the requester that it would extend the time limit by 1,110 days. With the 
requester’s consent, the Commissioner applied for a declaration from the Federal Court that the 
Minister of National Defence had failed to give access to the records requested under the Act 
within the time limits set out in the Act and was, therefore, deemed to have refused to give 
access to the requested information. About one month before the hearing of the application, 
National Defence gave the requester access to the requested records. The Federal Court agreed to 
hear the matter even though the dispute had become moot. The Federal Court of Appeal held that 
the correct interpretation for time extensions was the construction offered by the Information 
Commissioner.1206 A government institution may avail itself of the power to extend the time to 
respond to an access request, as provided by section 9 of the Act, but only when the required 
conditions are met. The Court added: “One such condition is that the period taken be reasonable 
when regard is had to the circumstances set out in paragraph 9(1)(a) and/or 9(1)(b). If this 
condition is not satisfied, the time is not validly extended with the result that the 30-day time 
limit imposed by operation of section 7 remains the applicable limit.”1207 The Court concluded 
that “a deemed refusal arises whenever the initial 30-day time limit has expired without access 
being given, in circumstances where no legally valid extension has been taken.”1208 The decision 
sets standards to institutions in terms of how they must justify the use and length of extensions. 
The case is expected to have a positive impact on timeliness and access rights.  
E.   Personal information: individuals vs corporations  
     Chapter six has made a detailed analysis of the relationship between privacy and ATI, 
emphasizing that privacy is one of common reasons used by the government for denying 
information, as a mandatory exception under the ATIA. Courts have interpreted access and 
privacy provisions to improve the institutions’ ability to deal with various cases. Considering the 
nature of the cases that have made their way up to the justice system, Onyshko argues “The 
court’s interpretation of the definition (of personal privacy) has been the deciding factor in most 
personal information cases. In general, the cases consider two separate but related issues: 
whether information falls within the definition and whether personal information falls within one 
                                                          
1206 Ibid, at para 71.  
1207 Ibid, at para 72.  
1208 Ibid, at para 73.  
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of the definition’s exclusions.”1209 Indeed, most of the time cases before courts deal with 
uncertainty of whether information is private or public and whether it is exempted or not.  
     Section 19 of the ATIA provides that information about an “identifiable individual” 
constitutes personal information as regards to an individual human being, not a corporate entity. 
A corporation would therefore not qualify as an identifiable individual, and s. 19 could not be 
applied to exempt information about a corporation. However, in Janssen-Ortho Inc1210 the 
Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the names of employees of a corporation (who are identifiable 
individuals) qualified as personal information. The exemption applied because none of the 
employees consented to the release of their names or to the disclosure that they were employed 
by the corporation. Similar decision was made in SNC Lavalin1211 where the Federal Court of 
Appeal ruled that the views or opinions of employees while acting as representatives of a 
corporation also qualify as personal information.  
     In another case, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration1212 the Federal Court of Appeal 
ruled that the same information can be “personal” to more than one individual. In this case, 
employees had made statements about their manager during interviews in the context of a 
workplace assessment. The Court said that the names of persons interviewed were the personal 
information of both the interviewees and the manager. After balancing the private interests of the 
interviewees, the private interests of the manager and the public interest in disclosure and non-
disclosure, the Court determined that the manager’s interest in the information should prevail - 
the manager had a right to know under the ATIA both what was said about him and who said it.    
     In Heinz1213, the Supreme Court decided to grant the personal privacy exemptions to third 
parties (Heinz) by engaging in a broader interpretation of “personal information”, as an 
                                                          
1209 Onyshko, “The FC & ATIA”, supra note 244 at107.  
1210 Canada (Health) v. Janssen-Ortho Inc., 2007 FCA 252 [Jansen-Ortho]. 
1211 SNC Lavalin Inc. v. Canada (Canadian International Development Agency), 2007 FCA 397 [SNC Lavalin]. 
1212 Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 270. 
1213 Heinz, supra note 1034. In Heinz, a request for information was made to the CFIA1213. CFIA advised the third 
party, Heinz, of its intention to disclose information requested pursuant to section 271213 of the ATIA, and after 
receiving representations from Heinz, informed Heinz of its intention to disclose requested records, subject to 
certain redactions. Heinz applied for judicial review of this decision pursuant to section 441213 of the ATIA. The issue 
here is whether a third party, may raise an exemption within the context of section 44.  The court determined that a 
third party may raise the "personal information" exemption in the context of a proceeding commenced under section 
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exemption found in s.19 of the ATIA. The Court decided that this information included 
businesses information as well. The Court reestablished that where there is a conflict between the 
right to privacy (of Heinz) and the right of access (of the requester), it is the right to privacy 
which takes precedence over access. In its analysis, the Court emphasized several times that “the 
protection of the privacy of individuals is paramount over the right of access.”1214 The Court’s 
reasoning of the case is based on a careful analysis of balancing the two rights while taking a 
modern approach: “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their 
grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, 
and the intention of Parliament.”1215 
     The Supreme Court has left an important trail of judicial decisions regarding personal 
information of individual persons. In two landmark decisions, Dagg1216 and the RCMP1217, the 
Court extensively engaged in an analysis of what constitutes “personal information”. In both 
cases, the Court first examined whether the information requested was personal, and second, 
whether it fell under the exemptions of s. 3 of the Privacy Act. In Dagg, Michael Dagg1218, the 
appellant1219, filed a request with the Department of Finance for copies of logs with the names, 
identification numbers and signatures of employees entering and leaving the workplace on 
weekends. The issue here was whether the information in the logs constituted “personal 
information” within the meaning of s. 3 of the Privacy Act, and whether the Minister failed to 
exercise his discretion properly in refusing to disclose the requested information pursuant to 
section 19(2)(c) of the ATIA and s. 8(2)(m)(i) of the Privacy Act. The appeal was allowed, but 
with a narrow split, five to four. Justice Cory J. argued that the requested information was related 
to the “responsibilities of the position held by the individual” and fell under the specific 
exception set out at s. 3(j)(iii) of the Privacy Act. In this case, since the information was related 
to the position, not to the individual, the majority of the Court decided that it is not personal 
                                                          
44 of the ATIA. As a result the appeal brought by the Attorney General for disclosure of the information was 
dismissed.  
1214 Heinz, supra note 1034 at para 2. The same emphasis on privacy is noticed in paras 26, 29 and 31.  
1215 Ibid at para 21.  
1216 Dagg, supra note 630.  
1217 RCMP, supra note 656.  
1218 Note that Michael Dagg is a professional ATI consultant.  
1219 The appellant intended to present this information to the union for the collective bargaining process purposes. 
The Minister of Finance, the respondent, disclosed the relevant logs but deleted all the other information requested 
on the ground that it constituted personal information. 
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information and should be released. For the determination of what constitutes “personal 
information” the court engaged in a process of balancing the competing values of access and 
privacy going through several steps.      
 
     First, it analyzed the meaning of “personal information”. Justice La Forest accepted that 
“Privacy is a broad and somewhat evanescent concept.”1220 For this reason he looked at the  
“reasonable expectation of privacy”1221 and concluded that the expectation applied in this case. 
Second, the Court recognized the value of access stating that “The overarching purpose of access 
to information legislation …is to facilitate democracy.  It does so in two related ways.  It helps to 
ensure first, that citizens have the information required to participate meaningfully in the 
democratic process, and secondly, that politicians and bureaucrats remain accountable to the 
citizenry.”1222 Third, the court emphasized that privacy is paramount over access, encompassed 
by the definition of “personal information” in s.3 of the Privacy Act.  La Forest mentioned that 
when the Bill (C-43) was introduced for third reading in 1982, the Minister of Communications 
made the following comments:  “the principle that the right to privacy takes precedence over the 
general right of access has been clearly recognized.”1223 and thus “Parliament did not intend 
access to be given preeminence over privacy.”1224   
 
     The analysis made in Dagg demonstrated that deciding on cases where access and privacy  
rights come into conflict is a very complex and challenging process. The case reveals that 
concerns of conceptualization of privacy have played a significant role in the aggravation of this 
complexity. Justice La Forest admitted that one of the main challenges for the Court was the 
broad definition of privacy.1225 The fact that the split of Justices in Dagg was very narrow 
exhibits uncertainty on the issues. This is observed by Onyshko who argued that “a basic 
problem in the access jurisprudence is that judges adopt conflicting positions without 
                                                          
1220 Dagg, supra note 630 at para 67.  
1221 Ibid, at paras 71-72.  
1222 Ibid at para 61.  
1223 Ibid at para 50. 
1224 Ibid at para 51.  
1225 Ibid at para 67.  
330 
 
distinguishing relevant case law.”1226 Indeed, the Justices in Dagg take different approaches even 
when they use the same legal sources.  
     Similarly, in RCMP1227, the Court examined whether the information requested constituted 
“personal information” as defined in s. 3 of the Privacy Act, and whether the information fell 
within the exception set out in section 3(j) of the Privacy Act.1228  The Court agreed that the 
information requested fell within the definition of “personal information”. The next step was 
whether it was also encompassed by one of the specific, non-exhaustive examples set out in 
paragraphs (a) to (i) of s. 3 of the Act. The Court agreed that, although this was indeed personal 
information, it was associated with the general characteristics of a federal employee position, and 
it was, in effect, information about the position, not about the person. The Court was able to 
draw a line between government employee information which may be accessed by the public on 
the one side (which relates to the general characteristics associated with the position or function), 
and employee information which should be withheld in the interests of privacy on the other side 
(which relates to the competence or characteristics of an individual employee.1229) The analysis 
in the RCMP validates that distinguishing when information is public or private is not a matter of 
choosing between black and white, but instead, choosing between different tones of grey. It 
involves an extensive analysis, which in my view, only a court is capable of conducting. Because 
the information of the four RCMP officers in this case is considered both private (it belongs to 
the officers) and public (has a public interest as officers are public employees), concealing or 
disclosing that information had to go through a careful, detailed examination.  
     Some of the cases in the Canadian jurisprudence reveal that the legislative weaknesses of a 
system cannot be addressed through judicial battles. However, they also demonstrate the 
                                                          
1226 Onyshko, “The FC & ATIA”, supra note 244 at 142.  
1227 The case involves an individual who requested certain information from the RCMP pertaining to four of its 
officers. The RCMP refused to disclose the information on the grounds that the records contained “personal 
information”, as defined by section 3 of the Privacy Act. The case went to the ICC, Federal Court and the Court of 
Appeal, all of which held that the request is not “personal information” and must be released. The appeal in the 
Supreme Court was also allowed. 
1228 RCMP, supra note 656 at para 12.  
1229 Ibid at para 39. The list of the RCMP members’ historical postings, their status and date; (2) the list of ranks, 
and the dates they achieved those ranks; (3) their years of service; and (4) their anniversary dates of service, are all 
elements that relate to the general characteristics associated with the position or functions of an RCMP member.  
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potential of the courts to protect and enhance ATI rights in cases of accountability, conformity 
with democratic principles, exemptions and exceptions, privacy, confidentiality and time limits.  
10.2 Perspectives from the European Union courts 
 
10.2.1 The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
     The CJEU is the court of the EU and interprets the EU legislation.  The Court has established 
numerous principles of European administrative law that have significantly transformed 
operational concepts and methods in European public administration. The Court has played an 
important role as a force for openness. The Court’s judgments have helped to entrench the right 
access to documents (ATD) in popular consciousness. It has consistently applied a presumption 
of openness in disputes about the interpretation of EU policies on ATD.1230 Curtin has called the 
process of acknowledging the right of ATD as a basic democratic right as a “creeping 
constitutionalization”1231 of this right.   
 
     Three years before the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty, Advocate-General Giuseppe 
Tesauro argued that the Court should acknowledge that the right to information was implied in 
the terms of the Treaty on European Union.1232 The opinion of Advocate-General Phillipe Leger 
also pushed for a stronger protection for the right to ATD.1233 The decisions of the Court served 
as precursors to the Regulation 1049. For instance, in Huatala1234, the Court found that the 
Council had erred on not conferring the information to the Member of Parliament Huatala. 
However, the case recognized only a limited right to ATD as the Court avoided ruling on a 
“breach of the fundamental principle” of Community law that citizens of the EU must be given 
the widest and fullest possible ATD of the Community institutions.1235 After the entering into 
force of Regulation 1049, its broad definitions and provisions required the engagement of the 
CJEU to clarify many legal ambiguities in the general phrasing of Regulation, which according 
                                                          
1230 Roberts, “Multilateral Institutions, supra note 365 at 273. 
1231 Deirdre Curtin, “Transparency and political participation in EU governance”, (1999) 3 Cultural values, 445-72 
[Curtin, “Transparency”]. 
1232 Case C-58/94, Netherlands v Council [1995] ECR-I-2169, Opinion of Advocate-General Tesauro, at para 19.  
1233 Case C-353/99 P, Hautala v Council, unreported, 6 December 2001, Opinion of Advocate-General Leger.  
1234 Case C-353/99 P, Council of the European Union v. Heidi Hautala, Judgment of the European Court of Justice 
of 6 December 2001 (dismissing an appeal where the Council wrongly refused to consider partial ATD) [Hautala]. 
1235 Ibid.  
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to Curtin “heralded a period of relatively intensive litigation, enhancing in this area the 
phenomenon of ‘judge-made law’.”1236 It is important to note that the Court practice to date 
demonstrates that it interprets the right of access very broadly, with very few exceptions.  
 
     There are a number of cases from the CJEU jurisprudence that have made history for 
transforming ATD in meaningful ways. Some cases stand out in this regards.  
 
A.   Accountability of Institutions  
     In the landmark case Access Info1237, Acces Info Europe submitted a request to the Council 
for a copy of the report which contained information on the Member States’ reactions to the 
Commission’s proposal for the reform of Regulation 1049. The Council only granted Access 
Info partial ATD by providing the content of discussions, but erasing the names of the states 
making proposals. Access Info appealed the case to the CJEU to clarify the obligation for 
transparency on the EU isntitutions in the course of a legislative procedure.  
 
     The CJEU emphasized that Regulation 1049 echoed the intention of Article 1(2) TEU for 
creating an ever closer union in which decisions were taken as openly as possible and as closely 
as possible to the citizen. Hence, the Court held that the right of ATD was related to the 
democratic nature of the European institutions. Although the Court recognized that this right is 
subject to certain limitations (such as information in the course of a legislative procedure), these 
limitations should be interpreted and applied strictly. The Court found that if the Council decided 
to refuse the request of Access Info, it should have satisfied two conditions. First, explain how 
disclosure could undermine the interest protected by the exception upon which it was relying (in 
this case Article 4(3) of the Regulation). Second, the risk of the interest being undermined should 
have been reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical. The Court carefully balanced the 
                                                          
1236 Deindre Curtin, “The Role of Judge-made Law and EU Supranational Government: A Bumpy Road from 
Secrecy to Translucence’, in E. Spaventa et al. eds, Empowerment and Disempowerment of the EU Citizen (Hart 
Publishing, 2012), at 101 [Curtin, “Judge-made Law]; D. Adamski, “How Wide Is “the Widest Possible”? Judicial 
Interpretation of the Exceptions to the Right of Access to Official Documents Revisited”, (2009) 46 Common 
Market Law Review 521 [Adamski, “How Wide”]. 
1237 Note that there are two cases here- case T-233/09 was before the General Court and then it was appealed to the 
CJEU. The appealed case is C-280/11 P, Council of the European Union v Access Info Europe. The case is not 
published yet in the European Court Reports. For reference see:  
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-280/11> [Access Info Europe]. 
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principle of transparency with the preservation of the effectiveness of the Council’s decision-
making process. It reiterated that the protection of effectiveness of the Council was not enough to 
justify refusing ATD. Instead, the Council should have explained how ATD requested by Access 
Info undermined its decision-making. The Council was not entitled to automatically refuse 
access by relying on a presumption based on the considerations concerning the need to protect 
the delegation’s room for manœuvre during preliminary discussions of the Commission’s 
legislative proposal.  
 
     Access Info Europe is a landmark case that puts ongoing legislative proposals under public 
scrutiny. The case becomes even more significant considering that the documents requested 
aimed to disclose information regarding important changes of the EU Regulation on ATD. These 
changes had the potential to affect the citizens’ rights of access and weaken the accountability of 
EU institutions. Hence, the case sets an important precedent because it demonstrates the power 
of using the right of ATD in holding European institutions accountable even in ongoing 
conversations during the course of a legislative procedure, which falls under the exemptions of 
the Regulation 1049. The case will certainly affect issues of accountability and democratic nature 
of the EU representatives.1238  
 
B.   Member states right of veto  
          The CJEU has offered excellent guidance to the institutions by deciding on cases that deal 
with information that comes from the Member States, but are on the possession of the Union 
institutions and are requested on the basis of Regulation 1049. One of such cases is Kingdom of 
Sweden,1239 a leading case, because it sets new rules for the Member States regarding their ATD 
regime. The case establishes that Member States do not have a right of veto over their 
documents. It is up to the institution to have the final say on whether or not the document will be 
released as they are the ones that are legally liable for that decision before the Court. The 
Member State must explain how and why that document is covered by one of the exceptions 
found in Regulation 1049 and they cannot simply refer to their national law on ATI. The Court 
                                                          
1238 Spahiu, “Courts”, supra note 987 at 10. 
1239 Case C-64/05 P Kingdom of Sweden v Commission of the European Communities and Others [2007] ECR I – 
11389 [Kingdom of Sweden]. 
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acknowledged that Member States do not have “an unconditional right of veto”, but they can 
object to the disclosure of documents, only if it gives proper reasons grounded on the exceptions 
set out in the Regulation.  
 
     This case sets new grounds for the relations between Member States rules and the EU rules of 
ATD. Concerning Member State documents in the possession of the EU institutions, the CJEU 
has restricted the Member State’s discretion in rejecting their disclosure. The Member State is 
mandated to give reasons for its refusal, and, more essentially, these reasons should be able to 
fall under the exceptions outlined in Article 4(1)-(3) of the Regulation 1049 or relate to the 
specific protection accorded to sensitive documents.1240 
 
     In another case before the European Court, IFAW Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds GmbH, a  
German animal rights’ NGO asked the Commission for access to certain documents which the 
Commission had received from Germany. The request asked for documents regarding a 
procedure in which the Commission gave an opinion favorable to the carrying out of an 
industrial project. The Commission refused its request and the case went to the Court of First 
Instance which ruled1241 that the Commission had acted properly since the German authorities 
were opposed to the disclosure of those documents under Article 4(5) of Regulation 1049. The 
case then went to the CJEU (appealed by Sweden1242) which decided that the Court of First 
Instance has erred at looking at s. 4(5) of Regulation 1049 as conferring on Member States a 
right of absolute veto, without the need to state any reasons, on the disclosure of documents 
originating from it.1243 This case epitomises “new grounds for the relations between Member 
States rules and the EU rules of access to documents.”1244  
 
 
                                                          
1240 Art 9, Reg 1049, supra note 64. 
1241 Case T-168/02 IFAW Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds gGmbH v Commission of the European Communities 
[2004], ECR II-04135 [IFAW]. 
1242 Kingdom of Sweden, supra note 1239.   
1243 Ibid, at para 4(15). It says: “Even though it is neither the object nor the effect of this Regulation to amend 
national legislation on access to documents, it is nevertheless clear that, by virtue of the principle of loyal 
cooperation which governs relations between the institutions and the Member States, Member States should take 
care not to hamper the proper application of this Regulation and should respect the security rules of the 
institutions.”’ 
1244 Spahiu, “Courts”, supra note 990 at 12.  
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C.   International Relations  
     In In ’t Veld1245, the CJEU instructed the European Commission to be more transparent about 
negotiations of the TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership1246). The case engaged 
a Member of the European Parliament, Sophie in’t Veld who asked from the Commission ATD 
regarding the TTIP. The Commission rejected the access reasoning that it will affect ongoing 
trade negotiations and hence international relations.  
     In this case, the Court indicated that ATD related to international agreements should be 
ensured, unless it would undermine the conduct of negotiations. Although the Court did not 
impose disclosure as the rule, it set out a certain number of conditions which must be met for the 
documents to remain undisclosed. First, the risk for negotiations should be specific and 
foreseeable. Hypothetical concerns about the possible impact of transparency on the negotiating 
power of the EU will not suffice to refuse ATD. The EU institutions will now have to provide 
clear reasons and explain to the general public why denial of access to negotiating documents 
will harm the position of the EU. The CJEU recognized that invoking the mere existence of a 
threat to the EU’s interests in the field of international relations does not in itself satisfy the 
requirement. Second, the European Commission will need to make an assessment between the 
public interest in ATD and the need to protect the international relations of the EU. In making 
this assessment, the Commission will also have to consider the advantages of increased 
openness, including the possibility for EU citizens to participate more closely in the decision-
making process and to guarantee that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy. Third, any 
exception to the general principle of ATD must be interpreted and applied strictly. Regulation 
1049 requires a right to ATD as wide as possible, hence any restriction must be exceptional and 
duly justified. 
     Although the CJEU has played a significant role in the interpretation of the right of ATD in 
the EU, another court has also made a meaningful contribution to the concepts of access and 
transparency as principles guiding the European Human Rights legislation. This is the European 
                                                          
1245 Council of the European Union v Sophie in ’t Veld, C-350/12P, 3 July 2014 (case not published yet), online: 
<http://www.alde.eu/uploads/media/judgment_03072014.pdf>. 
1246 European Commission, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, online: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/>.  
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Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which, although it is not a EU Court, it is important to ensure 
respect for the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the European Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
 
10.2.2  The contribution of the European Court of Human Rights         
     This Court has gradually developed an expansive reading of the Article 10 of the Convention 
of Human Rights. According to McDonagh, the path to recognition by the ECtHR of a right to 
information as part of the right to freedom of expression has been long and tortuous.1247 Initially, 
it held that the freedom to receive information as guaranteed by Article 10 could not be 
construed as imposing on a state positive obligation to disseminate information or to disclose 
information to the public. Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides 
that “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers.” The conventional view was that the right to receive 
information under Article 10 did not entail a corresponding right of access to official 
information. This was the case for instance in Leander1248 where the applicant sought 
confidential government information so he could bring a claim arising out of an unsuccessful job 
application. This case was unsuccessful. 
 
     However, in subsequent decisions, the ECtHR recognized that there can be a right to ATI. 
Initially, this was done by reference to Article 8 of the Convention through means of personal 
information as in Gaskin1249 or McGinley and Egan1250. Most recently, in Haralambie1251 the 
Court reiterated the vital interest for individuals who were the subject of personal files held by 
the public authorities to be able to have access to them. The Court emphasized that the 
authorities had a duty to provide an effective procedure for obtaining access to such information 
and that their failure to provide for an effective and accessible procedure to enable the applicant 
                                                          
1247 Maeve McDonagh, “The Right to Information in International Human Rights Law”, (2013) 13:1 Human Rights 
Law Review at 34 [McDonagh].  
1248 Leander v Sweden, Merits, App no 9248/81, A/116, (1987) 9 EHRR 433, IHRL 69 (ECHR 1987) [Leander]. 
1249 Gaskin v United Kingdom, Merits and Just Satisfaction, App No 10454/83, Case No 2/1988/146/200, A/160, 
[1989] ECHR 13 [Gaskin]. 
1250 McGinley and Egan v United Kingdom, [1998] ECHR 51, 23414/94, 21825/93 [McGinley and Egan]. 
1251 Haralambie v Romania, App no 21737/03, ECHR 21 January 2010 [Haralambie]. 
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to obtain access to his personal security files within a reasonable time constituted a violation of 
Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
     In the recent case law, however, a different approach has emerged. The Court began to accept 
that the refusal to give access to administrative documents is to be considered as interference in 
the applicant’s right to receive information. Therefore, Article 10 of the Convention may imply a 
right of ATD held by public bodies. This right was confirmed in Társaság1252 where the Court 
recognized for the first time that it had “recently advanced towards a broader interpretation of the 
notion of ‘freedom to receive information’ …and thereby towards the recognition of a right of 
access to information.”1253 In addition, the Court acknowledged that ATD is essential for civil 
society to play its “social watchdog” role and that states have an obligation to eliminate barriers 
to access information where “such barriers exist solely because of an information monopoly held 
by the authorities.”1254Article 10 was central to the Court’s reasoning in this case where the 
Court found a violation of this Article when the Hungarian domestic courts had refused access to 
a complaint which sought constitutional scrutiny of certain amendments to the Hungarian 
Criminal Code. The decision of the Hungarian courts denying access to the details of a 
parliamentarian’s complaint pending before the Constitutional Court had amounted to a breach 
of the right to have ATI of public interest1255. The Court characterized the applicant, a Hungarian 
NGO, as a “watch dog” which status warrants Convention protection1256. It concluded that 
obstacles created in order to hinder ATI of public interest might discourage the media and other 
public interest organizations from pursuing their vital role as “public watchdogs”. 
 
     In later cases, the ECtHR established that Article 10 of the Convention includes a right of 
ATD as part of the freedom of expression. For instance, in its judgment in Youth Initiative for 
Human Rights1257, the Court recognised more explicitly than ever before the right of ATD held 
by public authorities, based on Article 10 of the Convention. The judgment emphasized the role 
of NGOs protecting the public interest. The Court reiterated in robust terms that “when a non-
                                                          
1252 Társaság, supra note 975.  
1253 Ibid, at para 35.  
1254 Darbishire 2010, at 12.  
1255 Társaság, supra note 975 at para 3.  
1256 Ibid, at para 27.  
1257 Youth Initiative, supra note 978.   
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governmental organisation is involved in matters of public interest…., it is exercising a role as a 
public watchdog of similar importance to that of the press.”1258 The applicant, a Serbian NGO, 
requested the Serbian Intelligence Agency to provide some factual information concerning the 
use of electronic surveillance measures by that agency in 2005. The agency first refused the 
request, relying thereby on the statutory provision applicable to secret information. After an 
order by the Information Commissioner that the information at issue be nevertheless disclosed 
under the Serbian Freedom of Information Act 20041259, the Intelligence Agency notified the 
applicant that it did not hold that information. Youth Initiative for Human Rights complained to 
the Court, under Articles 6 and 10 of the Convention, about the refusal of access to the requested 
information held by the intelligence agency, notwithstanding a final and binding decision of the 
Information Commissioner in its favour. The ECtHR engaged in an interpretative exercise of the 
right of ATD, and argued that “the notion of ‘freedom to receive information’ embraces a right 
of access to information.”1260 The decision urged the Serbian Surveillance Agency to release the 
information requested.  
 
     In OVESSG, the Court was especially supportive for requests by journalists and NGOs to 
have ATD.1261 The judgment recognized the role of information and the NGOs in society and 
echoed previous decisions when stated that ‘the function of creating forums for public debate is 
not limited to the press. That function may also be exercised by non-governmental organisations, 
the activities of which are an essential element of informed public debate. The Court has 
therefore accepted that non-governmental organisations, like the press, may be characterised as 
social “watchdogs”’1262. The applicant in this case, OVESSG - an Environmental Austrian 
Association - aimed to research the impact of transfers of ownership of agricultural and forest 
land on society in order to give opinions on draft laws. In 2005, the Association twice requested 
to have access to the decisions of the Tyrol Real Property Transaction Commission, which is 
                                                          
1258 Ibid, at para 20. 
1259 Law on Free Access to Information of Public Importance, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 
120/04, 54/07, 104/09 and 36/10.  
1260 Youth Initiative, supra note 978 at para 20. 
1261 Dirk Voorhoof & Rónán Ó Fathaigh, “The press and NGOs’ right of access to official documents under strict 
scrutiny of the European Court of Human Rights”, Strasbourg Observers, December 3, 2013, online: 
<http://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/12/03/the-press-and-ngos-right-of-access-to-official-documents-under-strict-
scrutiny-of-the-european-court-of-human-rights-2/> [Voorhoof & Ó Fathaigh]. 
1262 OVESSG, supra note 981 at para 34.  
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responsible for approving agricultural and forest land transactions. The Association only 
requested decisions issued over a certain period of time in anonymized form, and indicated that it 
would reimburse the resulting costs. The requests were refused on the ground that they did not 
fall within the scope of the Tyrol Access to Information Act. Moreover, even if the request did 
fall within its scope, pursuant to the Act an authority did not have the duty to provide the 
requested information if doing so would require so many resources that would affect its 
functioning, and would jeopardise the fulfilment of the Commission’s other tasks. The 
applicant’s complaints to the Austrian Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court were 
rejected. The OVESSG complained in the ECtHR about a violation of its right to receive 
information, guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. The Court emphasised that the most 
careful scrutiny on its part is called for when measures taken by the national authorities may 
potentially discourage the participation of the public, and society’s “watchdogs”. NGOs are 
characterized with such an important status, since they are involved in the legitimate gathering of 
information of public interest1263 and therefore, their activities warrant similar Convention 
protection to that afforded to the press.1264 
     The recognition of a human right to ATD by the ECtHR is significant because it has created a 
body of case-law on the right to ATD as being enshrined in the Convention of Human Rights. 
This line of reasoning of the Court has extended the recognition of the freedom of expression, as 
including a right of ATD. Through an interpretative exercise the Court has gradually 
accommodated an access right under Article 10 of the Convention, and as such has enriched the 
European legal framework. This framework has influenced the developments of jurisprudence of 
the CJEU and the activism of the NGOs in the area of transparency and ATI. The ECtHR has 
distinguished the civil society’s important contribution to the discussion of public affairs.1265  
10.3 Comparisons and conclusions 
     The role of the courts in transparency and ATI is important in two ways. First, courts are 
critical in protecting citizens’ rights of access and serving as a remedy against any abuse of such 
                                                          
1263 OVESSG, supra note 981 at para 36.  
1264 Ibid, at para 34.  
1265 Voorhoof & Ó Fathaigh, supra note 1261. 
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rights by the government. Second, the role of the courts becomes exceptional when they act as 
reformers in transforming access rights from a statutory right into a fundamental right.  
 
     The first role of the courts relates to the traditional way courts make justice - courts are 
considered to be mechanisms that uphold the rule of law and resolve disputes. In this role, the 
courts interpret the laws written by the legislature. A more creative role of the court is when they 
create law through an interpretative exercise. This is particularly true in a common law system 
such as Canada, where case law constitutes a source of law. But even in most European countries 
where most of the legislation is codified, courts play a significant role.  The fact that the public’s 
right to know amounts to a fundamental right in EU law, and it is considered a quasi-
constitutional right in the Canadian law is, in part, attributed to the courts. This role makes the 
judiciary a very powerful institution which protects citizens when all other measures have failed. 
In any case, whether cases are won or not, the public can benefit from the very nature of legal 
proceedings for they allow for scrutiny of public policies and practices. In this context, litigation 
can be used to obtain practical advantages on transparency, raising public consciousness of the 
merits of a case and building up political pressure in support of it. According to Article 19, 
litigation has an added value since it can attempt to reassert constitutional priorities and to 
maintain and influence policy formulation when other channels of communication are being 
closed.1266     
 
     The examples from the EU and Canada show that courts have the potential not only to 
safeguard citizens’ rights but also to raise the status of transparency and ATI to a higher level. In 
the EU, the Court of Justice (CJEU) has retained a significant role in the interpretation of the 
right of ATD, and the Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has made a meaningful contribution to 
the concepts of access and transparency as principles guiding the European human rights 
legislation. According to Birkinshaw, “the case law of the EU courts has been supportive of 
transparency and openness and there have been some very important decisions.”1267  
 
                                                          
1266 Article 19 and ADC, “Access to Information: An instrumental Right for Empowerment”, July 2007, at 25. 
1267 Birkinshaw, “FOI & UK”, supra note 797 at 319. 
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     When looking at the European way of judicial interpretation of the right of ATD, the Canadian 
courts can take an example. But, how can the Canadian judiciary act in a creative way to raise 
the access rights to a constitutional level, when the law limits to a certain extent the power of the 
courts to intervene? As some of the judgments have acknowledged, the intervention asked from 
the courts is better suited for the legislature. The reasoning in some of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions confirm that the courts can only go that far in the interpretation of the access laws in 
Canada. In Minister of National Defence, Justice Kelen, J. argued that the Supreme Court is 
often faced with the reality that some documents are not currently accessible under the existing 
law, which makes the question “should they be?” invalid. He emphasizes that the Court does not 
legislate or change the law; it interprets the existing law1268. However, the Supreme Court 
experience has demonstrated that in many cases the Court has engaged with questions of how the 
law should be, not just how it is.  
 
     There is a remedy invoked in some cases by the Supreme Court - the “reading in”. This 
remedy has been very controversial among lawyers and scholars because of the significant power 
it gives to the Supreme Court to change the Charter and control legislature by creating its own 
constitutional provisions. Many scholars argue that the “reading in” marks a dramatic shift in the 
once clear delineation of the separation of powers in the Canadian constitutional democracy. It 
also signals a dramatic shift away from the traditional principle of judicial deference. The power 
to “read in” is relatively new in the Canadian jurisprudence, having been enunciated for the first 
time by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1992 in Schachter1269, and then used in Vriend1270 in 
1998. The question for this research is whether the Supreme Court can read-in at the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and interpret any of its provisions as including a right of ATI. The Court has 
already found a right of ATI under s. 2(b) freedom of expression of the Charter, but that 
provision has limited application. The Court can push further in this provision to accommodate 
access rights.  
 
                                                          
1268 Minister of National Defence, supra note 966 at para 12.  
1269 Schachter v Canada, [1992] 2 SCR 679. 
1270 Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493. 
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     The power of “reading in” is an exception for the Court rather than the rule because the 
responsibility of enacting legislation that accords with the rights guaranteed by the Charter rests 
with the legislature. The rule is that except in the clearest of cases, the court should not dictate 
how the under inclusive legislation must be amended. However, it is apparent that even if the 
ATIA is reformed fundamentally, access rights will still remain at the statutory level, and will 
not be shaped by the government of the day, as Chapter 7 demonstrates. In addition, as the 
practice of the Supreme Court indicates the traditional notion of restricting the “reading in” 
remedy to the “clearest of cases” is no longer the threshold for intruding into the legislative 
sphere. Despite of the controversy around the “reading in” power of the Supreme Court its 
jurisprudence has shown many examples when the use of this power has made significant 
changes (as in Schacter and Vriend) . Especially in the Canadian context, making use of the 
“reading in” power could be the only way to raise the right of ATI at the status of a constitutional 
right.  Considering that Canadian federalism hinders any constitutional amendment that requires 
provincial consent, the process of reading-in the Charter takes essential importance.  
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PART IV 
THE VALUE OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
 
CHAPTER 11:  DEVELOPING A TYPOLOGY OF INFORMATION, MODELS OF 
TRANSPARENCY AND A PERSPECTIVE OF ACESS TO INFORMATION AS A 
HUMAN RIGHT 
     This chapter reflects on the issues surrounding transparency and ATI in the jurisdictions of 
study. It develops a typology of information access and a typology of information delivery. The 
chapter explains transparency as a process taking place in three jurisdictions (Canada, the EU 
and Albania) drawing from experiences in these jurisdictions, and develops three models of 
transparency. In addition, the chapter introduces new definitions for transparency and the right of 
ATI based on the typology of information. Furthermore, the chapter advances a perspective of 
ATI as a human right based on the Habermas’s discursive theory of law and Pateman’s 
democratic participation theory.  
 
     The purpose of the chapter is to make a case for the recognition of ATI as a constitutional 
right in Canada drawing from the EU experience and international advancements in transparency 
and access rights.  
 
11.1  Developing a typology of information and models of transparency 
 
11.1.1 Challenges and tensions of transparency 
     Transparency is regarded as central to a democratic polity1271 and has attained a “quasi-
religious significance.”1272 It is often presented as a solution to problems and inequalities of 
power, such as those concerning access and participation, and as a form of control that will solve 
                                                          
1271 Birkinshaw, FOI, supra note 1125; Patrick Birkinshaw & Mike Varney, Government and Information: The Law 
Relating to Access, Disclosure and Their Regulation (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011) [Birkinshaw & Varney, 
“Government”].  
1272 Hood & Heald, Transparency, supra note 91, at 3. 
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problems of illicit conduct and corruption in government. However, not everyone agrees that 
transparency is a panacea to such problems. Recent research has argued that the effects of 
transparency are not only overrated, but also poorly understood. Transparency is a slippery 
concept, but important enough that it should be handled with some degree of precision.  As such, 
to calibrate an optimal practice of open government, transparency theory must abandon equating 
the best government with one that is the most transparent according to its formal commitments.   
 
     The liberal constitutional democracy is founded on the idea of limiting the powers of 
government and entrenching the basic individual rights.1273 However, what we have today is a 
disparity in power between governments and its citizens. Information sharing can improve such 
disparity, and Justice McLachlin warns that “unless the public…. is informed about the workings 
of government and government agencies, democratic debate will be stifled.”1274 Considering the 
amount of information that government owns, there certainly exists an information asymmetry 
which, according to Stiglitz “may give rise to a disparity between, … the actions of those 
governing and those they are supposed to serve”1275 and “allows government officials the 
discretion to pursue policies that are more in their interests than in the interest of citizenry.”1276 
 
     The evolution in information technology has tremendously benefited transparency and the 
dissemination of information. However, it has produced a false perception that technology will 
put an end to secrecy. Roberts argued that “the claim that ‘the 2010 WikiLeaks disclosures mark 
‘the end of secrecy’…[is] overstated,…the simple logic of radical transparency….can be 
defeated in practice. WikiLeaks only created the illusion of a new era in transparency.”1277 The 
commercial and political considerations routinely compromise the free flow of information now, 
just as they did before Internet. WikiLeaks released a vast amount of information and a large set 
of confidential documents into the public domain.1278 What happened next was that many 
companies, like Amazon, Apple, MasterCard, PayPal, etc, withdrew their services from 
                                                          
1273 Harlow, “Citizen Access”, supra note 212 at 28. 
1274 McLachlin, “ATI”, supra note 228 at 7.  
1275 J. Stiglitz, “Transparency in government. The Right to Tell” (2002) World Bank, Washington, DC, at 32.  
1276 Ibid, at 28.  
1277 Alasdair Roberts, “WikiLeaks: the illusion of transparency” (2012) 78(1) International Review of 
Administrative Sciences 116–133, at 116 [Roberts, “WikiLeaks”]. 
1278 See WikiLeaks Cablegate, online: <https://wikileaks.org/plusd/?qproject[]=cg&q=#result>. 
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Wikileaks.1279 Even more surprising was the public’s reaction that was mute. The release failed 
to generate “universal outrage and pressure for reform.”1280 On the contrary, many people turned 
on WikiLeaks accusing that it had manipulated the video to bolster its allegations of military 
misconduct. “This strategy for stirring up public interest was a mistake”, Domscheit-Berg 
agreed. “A lot of people [felt] . . . that they were being led around by the nose.”1281 Indeed, the 
more WikiLeaks disclosed in 2010, the more American public opinion hardened against it. In 
August, 42 percent of respondents to an ABC News poll were prepared to say that WikiLeaks’ 
releases served the public interest. By December, this had dropped to 29 percent.1282  
 
     The American public reaction to Wikileaks gives the impression that the public does not care 
about information. However, this reaction more than an expression of apathy demonstrates the 
inability of the common citizen to digest a huge, unstructured amount of information. The data of 
the Wikileaks was just raw data, released in huge quantity, which made it harder for the public to 
understand it, and even less react to it. Instead, just a few people could make sense of it. 
Referring to the WikiLeaks, John Lanchester observed that the release of information was 
unprecedented, but the data needed to be interpreted, studied, made into a story.1283 The 
Wikileaks is a good example to respond to claims of governments that they are being more 
transparent when they release more data to the public. Of course, the public perception on the 
data will depend on how complex is the information released to the common citizen. 
 
     Another problem that technology has created is the phenomenon of the “empty archives”. As 
I explained in Chapter seven, tight rules on government transparency have created an adverse 
effect – institutions not recording documents, or not keeping archives on the records. The so-
called “empty archives” phenomenon has been noticed in the EU1284 and Canada as well. One 
study found that in 2002 Canada’s 150,000 federal public servants exchanged about 6 million e-
                                                          
1279 For details see Roberts, “WikiLeaks”, supra note 1280 at 120-121.  
1280 D Leigh & L Harding, WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011) at 
70. 
1281 Domscheit-Berg D, Inside WikiLeaks (New York: Crown Books, 2011) at 163.  
1282 Roberts, “WikiLeaks”, supra note 1280 at 127.  
1283 J Lanchester, “Let us pay” (2010) 32:24 London Review of Books, at 5–8. 
1284 See Andrew Flinn & Harriet Jones, Freedom of Information: Open access, empty archives, 1st ed, (London: 
Routledge, 2009).  
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mails every working day.1285 About a decade later, in 2013, Canada’s Information Commissioner 
expressed concern that the use of around 98,000 Blackberry phones by Canadian public officials 
was putting information out of the reach of the Freedom of Information Act.1286 
  
A. Transparency and participation  
     Academic debates on transparency are made around the idea that transparency and ATI 
include a right to participation in the decision-making process. For instance, Debbasch 
distinguishes three dimensions of freedom of information, and participation is one of them.1287 In 
addition, Braibant has described the concept of “transparence administrative” as comprised by 
seven pillars, possibilities of participation being among them.1288 Although transparency and ATI 
may lead logically, but not necessarily to participation, participation is clearly distinct from 
them. Participation means that a public authority gives to citizens the possibility to express their 
views on a decision that has to be taken, and makes it possible by giving sufficient information 
on time. It also means that the administrative body takes knowledge of the expressed views and 
gives them a role in the balancing of interests in the decision making process. 
 
     Open government laws do not automatically produce the presumed product of transparency, 
an informed, participatory democracy, because they do not necessarily create venues for the 
participation of citizens, the presumed user and beneficiary of open government. Transparency 
laws are not designed to promote participation – they are mainly focused on maximizing the 
release of “government information”, a technical concept that, even if the laws prove successful 
in forcing disclosure, still leaves unmet the normative and utilitarian goals of better, more 
democratic government1289 As such, transparency is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
increasing participation and the nature of institutional arrangements actually militates against 
citizen engagement. In the EU case, Ciborra argued that the complexity of navigating the EU’s 
                                                          
1285 Rankin, “ATI 25 years later”, supra note 113 at 12. 
1286 Jim Bronskill, “Info Czar Suzanne Legault: Ban Instant Messaging On Government BlackBerrys”, Huffington 
Post, 28 November 2013, online: <http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/11/28/suzanne-legault-instant-
messaging_n_4356163.html>. 
1287 Ch. Debbasch, La transparence administrative en Europe, Centre national de la recherche scientifique 
Paris, 1990, 331; J. Rideau, ed, La transparence dans l'Union européenne: mythe ou principe juridique?, 
LGDJ, Paris, 1999, at 12-13. 
1288 G. Braibant, “Réflexions sur la transparence administrative, A.P.T., 1993, at 58 – 59. 
1289 Fenster, “The Opacity”, supra note 50 at 934-935. 
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“labyrinths of information”1290 requires a degree of commitment and an understanding of the 
sometimes complicated processes enjoyed only by those familiar with EU working practices. 
Hence, transparency measures may result in scrutiny being delegated to groups acting on behalf 
of EU citizens to police the activities of policy-makers. To avoid the capturing of transparency 
by specific groups with specialized knowledge on institutional processes, the right of ATI should 
be recognized. This right would give everyone a venue to gain knowledge on the working of the 
government, and possibly affect it by means of participation.   
 
     Arnstein offered a ladder of citizens participation, which can be applied to transparency.  
Employing this ladder, guideline information by the government enables powerholders to 
“educate” or “cure” citizens.1291 Informing citizens about some details of decision-making 
process, which, according to Arnstein, is the third ladder, does not really lead to participation, 
but only allows for citizens to hear and be heard. At this stage, these hearings do not have any 
consequences in decision-making. This is only a “one-way flow of information” - from officials 
to citizens - with no channel provided for feedback and no power for negotiation. Under these 
conditions, particularly when information is provided at a late stage, people have little 
opportunity to influence programs.1292 Only at the sixth, seventh and eighth level, meaningful 
participation occurs and citizens become partners in making decisions. Arnstein ladder of citizen 
participation serves as a conceptual framework for me to develop the typology of information.   
 
11.1.2 Developing a typology of information  
     Many scholars have attempted to describe transparency schematically in order to simplify its 
understanding. Florini looked at transparency as one end of a long continuum of behavior1293 - 
total transparency is at one end, and total secrecy at the other. The aim should be to move closer 
to the transparency end of the spectrum. However, this is a rather simple description which does 
not account for other factors that influence transparency.   
 
                                                          
1290 C. Ciborra, The Labyrinths of Information. Challenging the Wisdom of Systems (Oxford: OUP, 2001). 
1291 Arnstein, “A Ladder”, supra note 134 at 217.  
1292 Ibid, at 219.  
1293 Florini, “Increasing transparency”, supra note 867 at 4. 
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     Other scholars have described transparency as a value, as an instrument, as an attitude, etc. 
First, it has a democratic value - it is a goal in itself, as its public nature is seen as one of 
democracy’s essential characteristics. Second, transparency has an instrumental function - it is 
used by government to control information, and used by the public to hold government 
accountable. Third, transparency has an attitudinal function – it indicates an openness to public 
input from outside, and a readiness to listen. According to these functions of transparency, 
transparency does not by itself enable people to do anything with information. 
  
     Based on what I observed regarding the behaviour of insiders and outsiders in the process of 
transparency, I develop two typologies. From an outsider’s perspective I introduce a “typology 
of information access” – this is a seeking-receiving-reflecting-engaging process. Citizens might 
seek information using ATI, or if information is already available, they may simply access it. 
This second stage depends on many factors which can be subjective (previous knowledge, 
education, interests, beliefs, culture, etc) or objective (economic status, time available, format of 
information, etc). At the third stage, citizens process information – a psychological process that 
helps in organizing and understanding information. It leads to a process of reflection, followed 
by forming opinions and drawing conclusions based on what citizens have processed. This stage 
constitutes a real access since only at this point citizens have clearer ideas about what the 
information is about, its value and connect the information with broader themes. This process is 
mainly individual, and subjective and objective factors play an even bigger role here. At the 
fourth stage, citizens make a decision to engage with others, in a process of exchanging opinions 
and participating in open debates. In this process citizens are exposed to other views and they 
may constantly change their ideas or those of the others. This is the highest form of access in 
which citizens may find themselves repeatedly involved with information seeking and receiving, 
which opens up new windows of engagement with government of other actors interested in 
public matters. Up to stage three citizens fit the profile of someone seeking information for 
private interests (although public interests are not excluded). Only at stage four citizens have the 
potential to become experts on issues of public importance, gain consciousness of their status as 
citizens, and develop the wisdom to apply their knowledge in being active participants in 
democratic processes.  
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     From an insider’s perspective, I develop a “purposive typology of information delivery”- a 
collecting-staging-framing-steering process. Governments are the institutions that either produce 
or collect information that are object of ATI laws. They may decide to disclose raw information 
as a means of strategic political advertising, and setting the stage for information absorption. 
This usually happens when governments want to spread the good news on their achievements 
and successes. Governments may also disclose information selectively with the purpose of 
instilling ideas in political debates, and thus framing certain issues according to their preferences. 
In this case, information is manipulated in a way that reveals certain aspects of information, but 
not others, thus creating illusions of how certain matters should be understood. Lastly, 
governments may use information as a source of power and control, and thus steering the 
outcome of certain issues by controlling the amount of information available publically.  
 
11.1.3   Developing models of transparency 
     Studying all cases in this research, I have noticed certain behaviours that characterize 
respective jurisdictions. I have come up with models to describe transparency in each case. 
Discussed in the context of a value driven approach, Canada (federal) follows what I call “an 
individualistic elitist approach to transparency” – individuals or groups want to know about 
government working for their own individual interests and benefits. However, because they have 
to pay for the service the system has become elitist since not everybody can afford it. This 
explains the data in Chapter seven where most requests came from business. There is not much 
discussion of transparency as a public value, and not many organizations are dedicated entirely 
to transparency and ATI, because as John Hinds put it, it has become too expensive for most of 
the small organizations.1294  
 
     Looking at the degree of information control, Canada follows what I call “a paternalistic 
model of transparency” - where government chooses what to disclose, and when to do so. This 
has caused the legal framework in Canada (federal) to be wearing out. Because of the double 
standards used to disclose information, which is, at times, dependent on who requests 
information, I visualise the Canadian ATI regime as a process of “Nuanced access” - where 
                                                          
1294 Interview with John Hinds, April 16, 2015.  
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requesters are considered as clients, as opposed to citizens, and therefore do not have equal 
access.  
 
     From a value driven perspective, discussed in the context of human rights, ATD follows a 
“fundamental right’s approach”, based on transparency by design. This type of transparency 
considers citizens as stakeholders in the democratic process. The EU seems to follow, what I call 
“a public ethical approach of transparency” – used as a participatory tool to affect governance, 
and address the democratic deficit. The European model is constitutionally embedded and 
originated in the need to close the disconnection between the EU and its citizens - it is related to 
the right of citizenship and it has some moral grounds.  
 
     From a value driven perspective ATI in Albania follows a “hollow right’s approach” where 
access rights exist in paper, but are not properly enforced and not taken seriously by the public 
institutions. Regarding institutional attitudes, the Albanian case follows, what I call “a 
Mimicking approach of transparency”, which follows what others have done, but not substantiate 
its value in the everyday use of the principle of transparency or access rights. This type of 
transparency is utilized as a tool to achieve other goals and has been pressured by outside 
political actors, mainly the EU. This type of behaviour has brought what I call a “Trophy 
transparency competition” with Albania having an advanced new law on ATI, which is praised 
internationally, but only serves as a facade to cover the troubled practice in transparency and 
ATI. This has caused pressured access in some cases, and a transparency shut-down in others. 
Citizens are considered outsiders in this process, with little to no opportunity to actively 
participate in institutional processes.  This has been the situation, at least until lately. The new 
law may bring changes in the institutional culture because of the high sanctions and the new 
oversight commissioner with order-making powers.  
 
     These differences between models demonstrate how transparency and ATI are perceived and 
practiced in different jurisdictions, even if they are guided by similar rules and laws. Studying 
these models informs a lot about the factors influencing the ATI regimes and especially how the 
political and cultural institutional environment shape the responses to transparency demands. 
Although the EU and Albania have similar legal provisions on transparency and both recognize a 
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constitutional status of access rights, the status of these rights in Albania is much further behind 
than that of the EU. The letters of the law have had little bearing in the Albanian institutions, but 
this situation could be explained with the short experience of these institutions with democratic 
governance in the last twenty years.  
 
     Comparing transparency and ATI in Canada and the EU, despite many differences in the legal 
framework, I noticed one thing in common. There are trends on both jurisdictions towards a 
deterioration in upholding a transparency principle. Because of the pressure on transparency 
requirements in both jurisdictions I call this situation a “transparency depreciation” or a 
“transparency fatigue”. This has been demonstrated on the resistance for law improvement in 
Canada, and the freezing of the review process of Regulation 1049 in the EU. This fatigue speaks 
a lot about the limited level of empathy that transparency enjoys among governments across 
jurisdictions. This is expectable, because as Birkinshaw puts it “FOI laws will always be 
unpopular with governments in power and some of the officials who serve them. That is 
probably the true test of their importance.”1295 As this research has demonstrated transparency 
and access laws in the two jurisdictions have come into life through political struggles, and the 
political influence has accompanied them throughout their life. Political leaders will not be active 
promoters of these laws because it is not in their interest. Hence, it is not surprising that these 
trends exist. However, the success of access laws depends on how the rest of the society reacts to 
the political moves on transparency, how much citizens, media, organizations and other groups 
of civil society engage in protecting their rights against the interests of their governments. I 
would say, that the societal response to political control is the true test of success for 
transparency and access laws.  
 
     Departing from these typologies and models I have come up with new definitions of 
transparency and aATI which I introduce below.   
 
 
 
                                                          
1295Birkinshaw, “FOI and Openness”, supra note 2 at 217. 
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A. Definitions of transparency and ATI  
      As I have explained in the first and second chapter of this research, transparency exists in a 
conceptual muddle. ATI is also affected by the uncertainty that exists in the field. At this point, 
this research gives me enough background information to contribute to the literature with another 
definition on the two terms. These definitions consider the two typologies of information that I 
developed in the previous section and focus on the right of access as a source of knowledge and 
ideas that shape the public space.  
 
     I define transparency as a process through which governments, either proactively or by 
request enable the dissemination of information in the public domain, where it can be picked, 
administered, or utilized by various actors as a means of exercising control over government, and 
expanding knowledge, shaping ideas or exercising rights in the name of private or public 
interests.    
 
     In addition, I define ATI as the public’s legal right to request legally releasable government-
held information in order to enable the realization of other rights or simply as a self-standing 
right which helps protect private or public interests while facilitating the exchange, shape or 
advancement of ideas in the public domain.  
 
11.2 A perspective of Access to information as a human right  
     Generally, the value of rights can be defended from either an instrumental or intrinsic 
approach. On the instrumental account, rights are morally derivative from other values, while on 
the intrinsic account rights represent fundamental values. Below, I provide arguments that ATI 
should be considered a human right from both perspectives.  
 
11.2.1 An instrumental perspective of a right of access to information   
     Many advocates defend access rights on the basis of their instrumental value. Accountability, 
democratic governance and government effectiveness are some of the arguments used for 
considering ATI a human right. Florini argued for a right of access deriving from the recognition 
of democratic rights in instrumentalist terms saying that “a broad right of access to information is 
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fundamental to the functioning of a democratic society. The essence of representative democracy 
is informed consent, which requires that information about political practices and policies be 
disclosed.”1296 Others argue that access rights can assist improve lives in many ways. Susman 
explained: “We need to know about air and water pollution, new drugs and medical technologies, 
floods and storms, tainted meat and faulty tires.”1297 In many occasions, this information could 
only be provided by making use of ATI. NGOs like Access Info Europe, have developed their 
activity based on the philosophy that ATI is an instrumental right which should play a key role in 
modern democracies. They promote ATI in order to defend other human rights, to hold 
governments to account.”1298  
 
     The case for an ATI right is made mostly in correlation with political rights. One of the rights 
that an access right has been more associated with is the freedom of expression, considering an 
access right as an adjunct of this freedom. According to Roberts, this association is more evident 
in some cases. When government agencies have exclusive control over critical information 
required for intelligent discussion of the policy, if no right of access is recognized, the right to 
free expression is hollowed out. Citizens will have the right to say what they think, but what they 
think will not count for much, precisely because it is known to be grossly uninformed.1299 The 
same opinion is shared by the Canadian Journalists for Free Expression which advocates that 
“without ATI, freedom of expression is a hollow freedom.”1300 Other arguments support that 
freedom of speech and press also includes a right of ATI.1301 This is based on the proposition that 
if the purpose of the freedom of speech and press is to have an informed democracy, the purpose 
cannot be fulfilled unless the press, the primary medium of information about government, has 
ATI about government.1302   
 
                                                          
1296 Florini, “Introduction”, supra note 27 at 3. 
1297 Thomas M. Susman, “The good, the bad, and the ugly: E-government and the people’s right to know”. Keynote 
Address to the 2001 Annual Conference of the American Library Association, San Francisco, California, June 16, 
2001. Reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. LXVIII, No. 2; Nov. 1, 2001, at 3-4 [Susman, “The good”]. 
1298 Interview with Helen Darbishire, Executive Director of Access Info Europe, August 10, 2015. 
1299 Roberts, “Structural Pluralism”, supra note 12 at 261. 
1300 Canadian Journalists for Free Expression, “A hollow right: Access to information in crisis,  A submission by 
Canadian Journalists for Free Expression to the Office of the Information Commissioner concerning reform Of 
Canada’s Access to Information Act”, January 2013, at 3.  
1301 Evan B. Smith, “Open Government in the United States and Canada: Public and Press Access to Information”, 
(1985) 9 Can.-U.S. L.J. 113 at 117. 
1302 See Address by Justice William Brennan Jr, (1979) 32 Rutgers Law Review 173. 
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     The jurisprudence of the ECtHR has now recognized a right of ATD as closely associated with 
the freedom of expression. However, an explicit recognition of a positive obligation to disclose 
information within the right to freedom of expression was proposed and rejected by governments 
during the drafting of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.1303 The ECtHR early 
attempts to read a right of ATD into the Convention's guarantee of freedom of expression, could 
only be successful in 2009.   
 
     There is also an association between ATI and the right to life. In the EU, if there is a causal 
relationship between the right to life and the failure of the state to provide information, this could 
result in a breach or article 10 of the Charter. However this link is difficult to establish. In 
Öneryildiz, the European Court of Human Right pointed out that “the positive obligation to take 
all appropriate steps to safeguard life for the purposes of Article 2 entails above all a primary 
duty on the State to put in place a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide 
effective deterrence against threats to the right to life.”1304 The case was about the failure to 
provide the appropriate information to the population of an affected area. The Court found that it 
was a violation of their right to life by not providing the slums inhabitants with information 
enabling them to assess the risks they might run as a result of the choices they had made.1305 
 
     In addition, an ATI right can also be established as a corollary of other basic rights, not just 
political. Indeed, empirical work done by Hazell, Worthy and Glover on the use of FOI n in the 
UK, showed that the UK FOI Act is put to a variety of uses and that it is used “as much a tool for 
‘non-political’ activity or personal activity as it is for political activity.”1306 It would be unusual 
if the case for ATI was not made and the same logic was not applied in the treatment of other 
equally fundamental interests. Barber argued that rules to assure access then become part of the 
institutional arrangements - the “civic architecture”1307- that must be built and maintained by 
government so that individuals have the capacity to fulfil their rights. The rights that may 
                                                          
1303 C.J. Radcliffe, Freedom of Information: A Human Right (Glasgow: Jackson, 1953); See also H. Brucker, 
Freedom of Information (New York: Macmillan, 1949). 
1304 Öneryildiz v. Turkey, ECHR 30 November 2004, Reports 2004-XII, at para 89. 
1305 Ibid, at para 108. 
1306 Hazell, Worthy & Glover, Does FOI work? The Impact of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 upon British 
Central Government (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) at 237. This conclusion was based on the results of a 
survey of requesters. 
1307 B. Barber, A Place for Us (New York: Hill & Wang, 1998) at 37, 67. 
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demand the recognition of a positive obligation to provide ATI include privacy and personal 
data, personal safety, economic security, the right to a fair trial, to a healthy environment, the 
right to health and education, and the right to the security of the person. 
 
     In Guerra and Others1308the ECtHR held that not providing information that would have 
allowed residents to assess the risks of living near a chemical plant was a violation of Article 8 of 
the European Convention, which protects the right to privacy and family life. In addition, the 
Court has ruled in Gaskin that governments have a positive obligation to establish procedures 
allowing reasonable ATI contained in foster care files, arguing that individuals are entitled “to 
know and to understand their childhood and early development.”1309. 
 
     In Ontario, in Doe the court found that the police force was under an obligation to provide 
information regarding threats to public safety under the right to security of the person1310. 
Canada's Federal Court of Appeal has recently ruled in Ruby that constitutional guarantees 
against unjustified invasions of personal privacy imply “a corollary right of access” to personal 
information collected by government, so that citizens can check its accuracy.1311  
 
     The EU Data Protection Directive (Article 12) gives people a right to access their personal 
data and how their data are processed. In Sison the CJEU did not deny the possibility that Sison 
had an individual right of ATI. However, making a request for access based on Regulation 1049 
was not the appropriate way to realize this right. According to the Court, individuals should have 
a right of access to personal information held by public or private organizations because 
individuals have a property right in this information and should consequently be entitled to 
control its use. The same recognition is acknowledged in Canada in relation to personal 
information, according to which “Everyone is the rightful owner of their personal information, 
no matter where it is held, and this right is inalienable.”1312 
                                                          
1308 Guerra and Others v. Italy 14967/89, (1998) 26 EHRR 357, [1998] ECHR 7 [Guerra]. 
1309 Gaskin, supra note 1249.  
1310 Jane Doe v. Board of Commissioners of Police for the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto (1998), 49 O.R. 
(3d) 487, 160 DLR (4th) 697 (Ont Ct Gen Div) [Jane Doe].  
1311 Ruby v. Solicitor General, [1996] 3 F.C. 134, 136 D.L.R. (4th) 74 (F.C.T.D.) at para 165 [Ruby]. 
1312 House of Commons Standing Committee on Human Rights, Privacy: Where Do We Draw the Line? (Ottawa, 
April 1997). See also J. Litman, “Infornmation Privacy/Information Property” (2001) Sun.L.Rev. 
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     Rights of education and health are also facilitated by ATI. If a citizen wishes to know if the 
State is developing policies to counter discrimination in access to education, it is necessary to 
have access to certain information related to those policies. For example, to evaluate the extent to 
which the right to education is realized, it is necessary to have access to literacy rates, enrollment 
rates, commuting times, dropout rates, and budgets, not only in the aggregate but disaggregated 
by gender, social class, geographic centers (urban, rural), religion and ethnicity.1313 In relation to 
health, in order to know if the government is developing a campaign that aims to prevent certain 
illnesses, it is necessary to know how public health policies are being implemented.1314 
Information about pricing policies on drugs, or the nutrition of children is important for the 
enjoyment of a right to health.  
 
    Information is important for learning about the existence and protection of social rights. 
Individuals should know about public policies and measures that the government has taken in 
relation to these rights, in order to control the development of policies. Without information 
about the scope and content of their rights to housing or work (information about wages and 
benefits), social security (right to welfare or other government benefits) citizens are unable to 
determine whether their rights are being respected. They should also be aware of the content of 
said policies, so as to analyse how measures are considered in the budget and how budgetary 
commitments are delivered.1315  
 
     ATI may also assist in the enforcement of equality rights. In Canada, in advocating for 
substantive equality rights for the poor, Bruce Porter, Director of the Social Rights Advocacy 
Centre, stressed that concreteness is critical. If welfare benefits are being cut, activists should 
bring specific evidence demonstrating families’ financial inflow and outflow and how many 
homes will be lost as a result.1316  
 
                                                          
1313 Circle of Rights: Economic, Social & Cultural Rights Activism: A Training Resource. International Human 
Rights Internship Program and Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, (2000) at 309 [Circle of Rights].  
1314 Article 19 and ADC, Access to Information: An instrumental Right for Empowerment, July 2007, at 17.  
1315 Ibid. 
1316 Circle of Rights, supra note 1313 at 74. 
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     All these examples demonstrate that ATI is essential for the realization of both political and 
social rights, and as such, it is important that governments recognize access rights instrumentally. 
However, this recognition should not be limited to the instrumental approach, but stretched to the 
extent that includes an intrinsic approach as well.  
 
11.2.2 An intrinsic perspective of a right of access to information  
     It has been argued many times in this research that ATI is a pre-condition for public 
participation. Arnstein advised that “Informing citizens of their rights, responsibilities, and 
options can be the most important first step toward legitimate citizen participation.”1317 In this 
sense, access allows citizens to get informed, so they can participate on a more equal footing in 
public decision-making.  This democratising function of the right to ATI is recognized by the 
United Nations as “essential for persons to realize their basic right to participate in the governing 
of their country and live under a system built on informed consent of the citizenry.”1318  
 
     It is widely acknowledged that participation depends on information, and there exists an 
information asymmetry in the public domain. Transparency reduces this asymmetry between the 
participants in public debates. Access Info Europe has emphasized that “Assuring the 
fundamental right of all persons to access information is essential to prevent discrimination and 
reduce information disparities.”1319 However, many argue that information benefits some 
dominant actors more than others, which could exacerbate the information asymmetry, instead of 
reducing it. This argument cannot be used as an excuse to limit the exercise of access rights. The 
opposite can be argued instead - the lack of information, like any form of artificially created 
scarcity, gives rise to rents. Public officials have an incentive to create secrets, which earns them 
rents. Secrecy raises the price of information - in effect, it induces more citizens, who may not 
have special interests in particular information, not to participate actively, thus, leaving the field 
more to those with special interests. According to Access Info Europe, it is not only that special 
interests exercise their nefarious activities under the cloak of secrecy, but that the secrecy itself 
                                                          
1317 Arnstein, “A Ladder”, supra note 134 at 219.  
1318 See Articles 19 and 21 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.  
1319 Access Info Europe, “Open Government Standards: Transparency Standards” at 2, online: <http://www.access-
info.org/wp-content/uploads/Transparency_Standards12072013.pdf>. 
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discourages others from providing an effective check on the special interests through informed 
voting.1320 Susman goes even further in his argument by raising the ownership question of 
government information. He considers information produced, gathered, and processed by public 
officials as intellectual property, no less than a patentable innovation would be.1321 These 
property rights belong to citizens, and as such, there is no excuse to protect secrecy and hide 
information.  
 
     Availability of information, which is facilitated by access rights enables people to access 
knowledge on processes of governance. Elias and Alkadry recognized that “The ability of 
citizens to participate is contingent on their access to a participation venue and their knowledge 
of the issues at hand.”1322 Government officials possess knowledge that citizens do not have. As 
such, it is essential that public officials, who are privy to technical knowledge, and citizens, who 
are privy to experiential knowledge of problems at the local level, make sense of shared concerns 
and resolve them as a whole.1323 Dahl has characterized modern democracy as the specialization 
of the technical steering knowledge used in policymaking and administration. Such 
specialization keeps citizens from taking advantage of politically necessary expertise in forming 
their own opinions. This creates a type of paternalism grounded in the monopolization of 
knowledge. Privileged access to the sources of relevant knowledge makes possible an 
inconspicuous domination over the colonized public of citizens cut off from these sources and 
placated with symbolic politics.1324 Possession of knowledge, as I have described in the typology 
of information access, makes citizens more politically and socially conscious about issues of 
public matters, enables to form opinions and exchange ideas in the public space. Public opinion 
that is shaped by information and knowledge in the public domain represents political potentials 
that can be used for influencing parliamentary bodies, administrative agencies, and courts. 
Habermas argued that political influence supported by public opinion is converted into political 
power.1325 Public opinion is often developed from acts of participation. However, Sossin 
                                                          
1320 Ibid, at 13.  
1321 Susman, “The good”, supra note 1297 at 7.  
1322 María Verónica Elías & Mohamad G. Alkadry. Constructive Conflict, Participation, and Shared Governance, 
Administration & Society 2011 43(8) 869–895, at 879 [Elías & Alkadry]. 
1323 Ibid, at 871. 
1324 Dahl, Democracy, supra note 190 at 339.  
1325 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 128 at 363. 
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explained that “the mere act of participation does not assure engagement.”1326 He differentiated 
between the two acts and looked at their potential. According to Sossin, “For there to be the 
capacity to engage, there must be a public sphere in which people can interact, communicate and 
recognize each other as citizens, and additionally as members of diverse….communities.”1327 I 
build on this argument and argue that the “public sphere”, to which Sossin is referring to, is 
informed by ATI and transparency, since both of them are essential to the process of information 
exchange. According to Pasquier and Villeneuve “transparency is a tool that encourages the 
involvement of the people in the development and implementation of public policies.”1328 
Habermas recognized the potential of the political public sphere as it “can fulfill its function of 
perceiving and thematizing encompassing social problems only insofar as it develops out of the 
communication taking place among those who are potentially affected.”1329 
 
     Following this logic, information leads to knowledge, which influences the shaping of ideas, 
which encourages participation, which enables more control on public issues, which, in turn, 
translates into more power over these issues. This chain of reactions validates the old expression 
that information is power. Democracy depends on a knowledgeable citizenry whose access to a 
broad range of information enables them to participate fully in public life.1330 Amartya Sen 
argued that the relationship between information and power is profound, and that inequality in 
ATI is a form of poverty. Without knowledge, you cannot act.1331 For citizens, especially the 
poor, it is a chance to reclaim ground in their struggle for a more just existence [and] greater 
power.1332 Other scholars have emphasized the link between transparency and power. Florini 
looked at transparency as a tool for the empowerment of ordinary citizens.1333 Nagel emphasised 
the need for a recognition of ATI institutionally or conventionally “in order to provide 
                                                          
1326 Sossin, “Redistributing”, supra note 777 at 38.   
1327 Ibid, at 39.   
1328 Pasquier & Villeneuve, “Organizational Barriers”, supra note 30 at 149.  
1329 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 128 at 365. 
1330 The Carter Centre, “Access to Information: A key to democracy”, November 2002, at 5, online: 
<http://www.fesmediaasia.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Access_to_Information/Access_to_Information_manual_Cart
er_Center_09.11.2009.pdf>  
1331 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, (New York: Random House Inc., 1999), at 152.  
1332 The Carter Centre, Access to Information: A key to democracy, November 2002, at 26, online: 
<http://www.fesmedia-
asia.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Access_to_Information/Access_to_Information_manual_Carter_Center_09.11.2009.
pdf>. 
1333 Florini, “Behind Closed Doors”, supra note 71 at 20.  
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individuals with the security and discretion over the conduct of their own lives necessary for 
them to flourish, and in order to protect against the abuse of governmental and collective 
power.”1334 
  
     As argued above, the main argument for an intrinsic value of ATI is based on the idea of 
exercising power which relates to the key normative question on whether transparency 
strengthens or undermines our constitutional democracies. Three core value clusters are pertinent 
in this regard, according to Bovens, Schillemans, and Hart,1335 the democratic perspective, the 
constitutional perspective, and the social learning perspective. In the democratic perspective, a 
key issue is whether transparency arrangements strengthen the informational position of citizens. 
The position of citizens refers to their electoral role but also to their direct engagement in 
political agenda-setting, policy deliberation, and decision making. Information enhances citizens’ 
position and opens up opportunities of engagement. In the constitutional perspective,1336 the key 
issue is whether transparency strengthens or undermines institutional checks and balances. Good 
governance arises from a dynamic equilibrium between the various powers within the state. 
Transparency is needed to curtail the abuse of executive power, and transferring some of that 
power to the citizens. In the social learning perspective, the key issue is whether transparency 
strengthens the quality of public debate and collective problem-solving capacity.1337 This 
perspective is very important for this research. As I have explained above in the typology of 
information ATI enables the acquirement of knowledge which contributes to the shaping of ideas 
and a dynamic public discourse. The enriched public debate makes citizens more aware of the 
problems present in the public space, cultivates skills for solving those problems, and equips 
them with expertise in certain issues.  
 
     The first two of the above perspectives point to the correlation between information and 
power which is enabled through processes of transparency and ATI. Cain, Egan and Fabbrini 
refer to this correlation, as the “information game” arguing that FOI laws introduce citizens as 
                                                          
1334 Thomas Nagel, “Personal Rights and Public Space” (1995) 24(2) Philosophy & Public Affairs 83-107, at 86 
[Nagel, “Personal Rights”]. 
1335 M. Bovens, T. Schillemans &,P. ’t Hart, “Does public accountability work? An assessment tool” (2008) 86 
Public Administration 225-242 [Bovens, Schillemans & Hart] 
1336 Ibid, at 231.  
1337 Ibid.   
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players in this game.1338 From this point of view, citizens are not spectators, but players that can 
influence the outcome of the information game. However, in this game, bureaucracy has an 
“information advantage” which, according to Weber, enables bureaucratic power.1339 If this 
power is not counterbalanced, Birkinshaw argues that it can “easily lead to an abuse of power, as 
in any one-sided relationship.”1340 He explains that power asymmetry leads to inequality, and 
suggests that ATI helps achieve greater equality.1341 This can viewed in two ways: equal 
protection under the law, and the right for equal opportunities.  
 
     The UN Declaration considers the right of ATI as an instrument for discouraging arbitrary 
state action and protecting the basic right to due process and equal protection of the law.1342 
Calland and Tilley push the equality argument even further by arguing that ATI is a pro-active 
right that serves our common pursuit of social, political, and economic equality.1343 Indeed, if 
one looks at the information as a source of power, lack of it will lead to power imbalances. 
Hence, without information, it is nearly impossible to exhort inclusion and equality.  
 
11.2.3 The instrumental vs the intrinsic perspective  
     Different authors have been part of the debate which values access rights either from an 
instrumental or intrinsic perspective. Kamm suggested that intrinsically valuable rights are 
status-based while utilitarian rights are interest-based1344. Bentham justified instrumentalism with 
an utilitarian approach to rights which concentrates on maximising overall happiness.1345 
However, this approach has been criticised as paying insufficient attention to individuals. For 
instance, Rawls argued that “utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between 
                                                          
1338 Cain et al, supra note 377 at 117.  
1339 H.H. Gerth & C.Write Mills, ed. From Max Weber, essays in sociology (London and New York: Routledge, 
2009) at 233-234.  
1340 Birkinshaw, “FOI and Openness”, supra note 2 at 195. 
1341Ibid, at 195. 
1342 See Articles 7, 10, and 12 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. 
1343 Calland & Tilley, The right to Know, supra note 129 
1344 Frances Kamm, ‘Rights’, in Jules L. Coleman & Scott J. Shapiro, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence 
and Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 508 at 508-509. 
1345 Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morality and Legislation (London: T. Payne and Son, 1789); and 
Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (London: Parker, Son and Bourn, 1863) 
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persons.”1346 As such, the instrumental view of rights cannot reasonably account for the strength 
of individual rights.  
  
     One of the opponents of the instrumental view, Nagel, described the instrumental account of 
rights as assuming that rights are morally derivative from other more fundamental values: the 
good of happiness, self-realisation, knowledge, ignorance, repression and cruelty.1347 From this 
perspective, rights are important because they nurture those other goods, but they are not 
themselves fundamental. Nagel contrasts the instrumental and intrinsic accounts of rights arguing 
that in the latter rights are a non-derivative element of morality.1348 He supports the intrinsic 
view of rights, which is associated with individualism.1349 Referring to the freedom of expression 
Nagel favours the intrinsic account of this right on the basis that it confers a form of inviolability 
on everyone, “not as an effect but in itself in virtue of its normative essence.”1350 This approach, 
he suggests, “becomes important if we wish to extend the justification of free expression 
substantially beyond the domain of political advocacy, where its instrumental value is 
clearest.”1351 
 
     Wenar, explained the two perspectives by arguing that they approach rights from opposite 
directions. A status-based (intrinsic) reasoning begins with the nature of the right-holder and 
arrives immediately at the right, without paying much attention to the negative effect that 
respecting the right may have on others’ interests. The instrumental approach starts with the 
desired consequences (like maximum utility) and works backwards to see which right-ascriptions 
will produce those consequences.1352 If we take the freedom of speech as an example, the 
intrinsic approach to rights views freedom of speech as content-neutral. Wenar described Nagel’s 
account of speech rights as flowing immediately from the nature of persons as reasoner beings, 
and not from the interests that people may have in speaking on particular topics or in listening to 
others speak on particular topics.1353 However, an instrumental account of speech rights will not 
                                                          
1346 Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1971), at 27. 
1347 Nagel, “Personal Rights”, supra note 1334 at 86.  
1348 Ibid, at 87. 
1349 Ibid, at 87. 
1350 Ibid, at 96. 
1351 Ibid, at 96. 
1352 Wenar, “The Value of Rights”, in O’Rourke, ed, Law and Social Justice (Boston: MIT, 2005) 179, at 181. 
1353 Ibid, at 183. 
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be content-neutral because “people have very different interests in speaking and in hearing 
speech on different topics.”1354 Despite the shortcomings of the instrumental approach in coming 
to terms with individual rights, Wenar leaned more towards this account explaining the right to 
freedom of expression.  
 
     An instrumental account of ATI is in many cases based on the right to take part in public 
affairs, which is justified with a well-functioning democracy that requires an informed electorate. 
Stiglitz argued that “meaningful participation in democratic processes requires informed 
participants.”1355 Florini supported a right to ATI deriving from the recognition of democratic 
rights in instrumentalist terms when she says that “a broad right of access to information is 
fundamental to the functioning of a democratic society. The essence of representative democracy 
is informed consent, which requires that information about political practices and policies be 
disclosed.”1356 Roberts favoured this rationale for the recognition of a right to ATI over one 
based solely on the right to freedom of expression. He argued that “the logic suggests that access 
right is better understood as a corollary of basic political participation rights, rather than the right 
to freedom of expression alone.”1357 Roberts recognised an instrumentalist basis for a right to 
ATI suggesting that political participation rights “have little meaning if government’s 
information monopoly is not regulated.”1358 Article 19 also supported the idea that “The right to 
access public information about one’s economic, social and cultural rights is not only related to 
these rights, it is a precondition for their realisation.”1359 
 
     Another group of scholars support the intrinsic ground for the recognition of access rights. For 
instance, Florini argued that ATI is not only a necessary concomitant of the realization of all 
other rights but is also a fundamental human right.1360 The idea of control and power to justify 
access rights on an intrinsic ground was highlighted by Curtin who referred to a “general right of 
access for citizens to public documents as facilitating the citizens’ control of the actions and 
                                                          
1354 Ibid, at 184. 
1355 Stiglitz, “The Role of Transparency”, supra note 131 at 30. 
1356 Florini, “Introduction”, supra note 27 at 3. 
1357 Roberts, “Structural Pluralism”, supra note 12 at 262. 
1358 Ibid, at 262. 
1359 Article 19, Access to Information: An Instrumental Right for Empowerment (London: Article 19, 2007), at para 
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inactions of public bodies.”1361 Bovens also acknowledged the role of information rights in 
enhancing social control and linked ATI to a broader conception of citizenship which 
“concern[s] first and foremost the social functioning of citizens, not only in relation to the public 
authorities, but also in their mutual relations and their relations with private legal entities.”1362 In 
this context, Boven introduced a revolutionary idea about a fourth group of citizens’ rights: 
information rights on top of civil, political and social rights to achieve the citizenship ideal. 
According to him, this right should be constitutionalized. However, he refers mainly to the 
digitalization of information which aspires to provide another set of citizenship rights. Boven 
argued that “information rights are not only important because they support the traditional 
process of democratic steering and accountability, but because they can serve as a tool in helping 
to expand the reflexive nature of democracy.”1363 In addition, Boven also argued that information 
plays a role not only between public authorities and citizens, but also between citizens. He 
noticed that “those without access to information …generally wield very little political and 
administrative influence, run the risk of social exclusion, of losing ground on the labour market, 
and of encountering hindrances in their personal development.”1364 Boven calls the current rules 
on open government mainly a question of public hygiene. But I suggest that information rights 
are much more than that – they are an element of citizenship that allows for social functioning of 
citizens. Boven categorized the right of access to government information as “primary 
information rights.”1365  He looked at the citizen as a subject (information is thus necessary to 
establish the legal position of the citizen – knowing the legal rules); as a citoyen (important to 
have knowledge on different public policies); and as a member of society (information can assist 
to bolster the socio-economic position).1366  
 
     Although both the instrumental and the intrinsic approaches on ATI are recognized, I argue 
that an intrinsic approach serves as a better justification for its recognition. An intrinsic approach 
would remove the requirement to link access rights with other existing rights, which can limit the 
                                                          
1361 Curtin, “Citizens”, supra note 393 at 8. 
1362 Bovens, “Information Rights: Citizenship in the Information Society” (2002) 10 The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 317, at 327 [Bovens, “Information rights”]. 
1363 Ibid, at 325. 
1364 Ibid. at 326. 
1365Ibid, at 327. 
1366 Ibid at 328-329. 
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scope of the right to ATI, and can bring possible unforeseen negative consequences. For 
instance, McDonagh anticipated that linking the right to ATI to other rights may stretch the 
scope of those right beyond their appropriate limits.1367 This stretch may cause the distortion of 
all the rights involved, altering their very nature and purpose. Furthermore, focusing on the right 
to ATI intrinsically moves this right away from the failure of the instrumentalist approach to pay 
sufficient attention to individuals who are frequent invokers of the right to ATI for personal 
purposes, and not necessarily for a public interest. Restraining access rights to the realm of 
public interest contexts gives rise to complications. Conceptually, such a limitation does not 
account for one of the basic principles of information access laws: that access rights accrue to 
everyone, regardless of their capacity to establish any particular interest in accessing the 
requested information.1368 This principle is expressly protected in ATO legislation in all 
jurisdictions at study. Requesters may use the right to ATI to get information in situations where 
the broad public interest might not be evident, but it is nonetheless very important to them 
personally, but also to others who may find themselves in a similar position. The use of access 
rights motivated by personal concerns, does not mean that they cannot bring benefits to the wider 
community - for example, through enabling individuals to use the information in a way that sets 
a precedent for the treatment of others with similar concerns in the future. According to statistics 
on the categories of requesters (i.e statistic tables at Chapter seven) reveal that not all requesters 
use ATI in the name of a public good, and less of them qualify as “social watchdogs”. Hence, an 
intrinsic approach would expand the recognition of access rights for public and private interests.  
      
11.2.4 Arguments against the value of access to information  
     There are many arguments that are used against the recognition of a right to ATI. One of the 
main assertions is that people do not make a good use of access rights – indicating that access 
rights are non-effective or have little practical application. Hence, answering the question “why 
people do not make ATI requests?” is of great interest. The answer may include several factors. 
It may be simply because people do not have enough knowledge that such right exists, or they do 
not know the information is there to be requested, or they consider refusal an inevitable 
conclusion, or they consider the risk of official revenge too high, and so on. These problems are 
                                                          
1367 McDonagh, “RTI”, supra note 1247 at 52. 
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acknowledged by both ATI opponents and advocates. The lack of awareness on the existence of 
ATI rights is often a major problem contributing to the low numbers of access requests. Roberts 
argued that “One of the most substantial [barriers to the more frequent use of the right to 
information] is a simple lack of awareness about rights.”1369 In addition, the idea of knowledge 
often surfaces on discussions around access rights’ limited use by the general public. Roberts 
admitted that “making a request requires knowledge about the bureaucratic routine....also 
requires a strong sense of political efficacy and persistence….and may require money.”1370 
Curtin and Meijer observed that as a matter of practice only those citizens with expert knowledge 
of the policy subject make use of the possibility to read information about policy, the process and 
the policy actors. Most people are missing that kind of knowledge.1371 Curtin and Meijer warned 
about the danger that the opportunities created by ATI mechanisms be hijacked by the more 
educated and skilled sectors of society, in detriment of the less well off.  
 
     Other authors argue that the lack of knowledge is exacerbated by the lack of skills or 
capacities to navigate a highly complex legal environment, such as that created by access rights. 
Mooseburger, Tolbert and Stansbury used the notion of “information literacy” to describe one’s 
ability to recognize when information can solve a problem or fill a need and effectively employ 
information resources. According to them, individuals differ in their ability to notice, absorb, 
retain and integrate information.1372 Therefore, to make open government information relevant, it 
is critical to move one step forward from making information available to making information 
understandable and applicable. In addition, Khagram, Fung and De Renzio argued that peoples’ 
access and responses to information may be different according to their cognitive capacities, and 
availability of information means nothing for those who do not have the skills needed to find, 
understand and elaborate it.1373 Fenster went a step further by establishing a link between 
knowledge and social frames. He noted that the public’s pre-existing knowledge and capacity to 
understand information is limited, and the public in turn understands information within existing 
                                                          
1369 Alasdair Roberts, “A Great and Revolutionary Law? The First Four Years of India's Right to Information Act” 
(2010) 70 Public Administration Review 925-933 [Roberts, “A Great Law”].   
1370 Roberts, Blacked Out, supra note 84 at 117.  
1371 Curtin & Meijers, “Does Transparency Strengthen Legitimacy?”, supra note 35109-122. 
1372 K. Mossenburg, C. Tolbert, & M. Stansbury, Virtual Inequality: Beyond the Digital Divide. (Washington: 
George Washington University Press, 2003). 
1373 S. Khagram, A. Fung, & P. De Renzio, eds, Open Budgets: The Political Economy of Transparency, 
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cultural and social frames, meaning that individual social and cognitive structures of 
understanding are in part determined by race, class, gender, educational background, and the 
like.1374 Zaller makes the case that knowledge is influenced by the level of education and the 
higher the level of education, it can be assumed, the stronger the capacity of people both to 
access and process information.1375 While it is true that access rights highly depend on the 
knowledge, capacities, education and social frames of the requesters, this should not be used as 
an argument against a recognition of a fundamental right of ATI. The same argument can be 
used for other human rights that have a recognized fundamental status in the Canadian Charter, 
such as freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly or association.  
 
     Some of the concerns regarding the limited use of access rights can be addressed by 
employing the participatory democratic theory of Pateman which emphasizes the need to 
participate in the democratic process in a repetitive way. The idiom “people learn to participate 
by participating” is a great lesson to be learned by all actors in the public domain. Only by 
participating citizens will learn how to navigate complex information and better participate in 
future discussions. They will gain the knowledge necessary, will acquire the capacities required 
to put that knowledge into practice and overcome the obstacles of social barriers.    
 
     Another argument against the value of access rights is that they are used for private reasons, 
rather than for the public good. Banisar noted that ATI laws are not primarily designed to help 
protect individual rights.1376 Research suggest, however, that most requests are concerned with 
access that has some personal relevance to the applicant rather than with the promotion of 
democracy and accountability.1377 Critics argue that since applicants who require information for 
private purposes do not contribute to the public debate, these requests do not add to the 
realisation of the goals underlying the legislation. In other words, they are a waste of public 
resources.1378 This position is based on an instrumentalist approach, and as I argued above it falls 
                                                          
1374 Fenster, “The Opacity”, supra note 50 at 930.  
1375 See John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).  
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1376  Banisar, FOI around the world, supra note 145. 
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short of explaining a status-based right of ATI. Not always a public interest in ATI should be 
established, and even when it is not, it may ultimately serve to some public interest, because it 
may constitute a precedent to be used for future cases with similar circumstances.  
 
     Another reason against ATI relates to the strain it puts to the government and its resources. 
Maintaining an access rights’ regime is expensive. However, if we consider ATI as a human 
right, then a human rights based approach accepts that the importance of realising human rights 
justifies sometimes significant disadvantages to government. In this regards, sacrifices are made 
in the name of protection of individual rights. Governments are required to respect the 
obligations associated with human rights, despite the fact that might not be advantageous, and at 
times even disastrous for them.  
 
     In the final lines of his book “Blacked out” Roberts asks: “Do we have a right to 
information?” His response is “Certainly. But we also have a responsibility to act on it.”1379 Two 
arguments can be made out of this response. First, access right exists even if no one uses it, so 
that any claim against its value based on its frequency, is weak based on an intrinsic approach of 
rights. The same argument can be made for other human rights as well, people may choose to use 
them or not, but their action does not affect their status. The potential of every right, including 
ATI, is revealed at the moment of their use, otherwise they will be dormant until practically 
applied. Second, access rights need action, they depend on the will of the people to give them life 
in their roles as private individuals or responsible citizens. Florini argued about transparency that 
“does little good if no one cares to do anything with the information.”1380 However, the situation 
is totally different if people do care. In that case, the conception of transparency is performative 
and a source of power. Indeed, information is power, and keeping information secret only serves 
to keep power in the hands of a few.1381 
 
 
 
                                                          
1379 Roberts, Blacked Out, supra note 84 at 238. 
1380 Florini, “Increasing transparency”, 867 at 15. 
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 Should access to information be considered a constitutional human right in Canada? 
 
     A positivist theory cannot respond to such question since neither the Canadian law, nor the 
jurisprudence recognize such right. However, I argue that the importance of ATI rights based on 
its use and its value demand a constitutional recognition. While discussing about ATI in public 
and private sector, Roberts asked a basic question: In what circumstances is it desirable to 
expand recognition of a right to information?1382 He answered this question by referring to the 
harms that may be caused when ATI is denied. I have a similar concern in this research: Why is 
it important to recognize the right of ATI as a constitutional right in Canada? Certainly, a 
constitutional recognition is important since “Constitutional norms are not only higher order 
rules; they are prior organic rules; they constitute a given political community.”1383 The 
importance of having an ATI constitutional right has to be balanced against the consequences of 
not having it. Taking this approach requires a departure from the inflexible grounds of 
positivism.  
 
     In the following paragraphs I will not be looking at the benefits of having access rights 
considered a human right in Canada, but the harm of not having it, particularly the harm to the 
citizen's fundamental interests. Following this logic two questions are important. First, whether 
there is a significant interest at risk of harm if access rights are not guaranteed, and second, 
whether the risk of harm is substantial. In some cases, the connection between access rights and 
the fundamental interests of citizens is obvious. For example, we recognize a fundamental right 
to security of the person and, by implication, a right of ATI about potential threats to personal 
safety. This logic was recently adopted in Doe when the Court ruled that police forces have a 
positive obligation to provide information about threats to safety, an obligation rooted in the 
constitutionally recognized right to security of the person.1384 The ECtHR adopted similar 
reasoning in its Guerra decision. It concluded that the Italian government unjustifiably violated 
                                                          
1382Roberts, “Structural Pluralism”, supra note 12 at 245.  
1383 Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe. (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000) at 20 [Sweet].  
1384 Jane Doe, supra note 1310. 
370 
 
the “physical integrity” of the residents of Manfredonia by withholding information about toxic 
emissions from a chemical factory in their community.1385 
 
     In addition, we guarantee a freedom of expression, as one of the fundamental freedoms that 
enhances the exchange of ideas in the public space. However, this freedom alone is not enough 
to guarantee a fruitful public debate. To engage in a meaningful exchange about public matters, 
there is need for information. Therefore, the right to impart and receive information is widely 
recognized as being part of the right to freedom of expression.1386 The Supreme Court in Canada 
(in Criminal Lawyers’ Association) and the ECtHR1387 have interpreted that freedom of 
expression includes a right of ATI. Since the government holds a significant amount of 
information access rights are necessary for an informed debate about public matters, and as such 
the recognition of these rights gains prominence. Although, the Supreme Court in Canada has 
recognised a right to ATI, its application is limited to certain cases.  
 
    Furthermore, ATI facilitates the realisation of other individual rights. Information helps in 
accomplishing basic rights such as the right to food, health, employments, education, etc. We 
need information in matters of employment (i.e investigations or selection process in hiring), tax 
purposes (i.e tax deductions), health rights (i.e introduction of new drugs), conviction charges 
and prosecution (i.e. prosecution's disclosure obligations in the criminal proceedings), access to 
personal information, etc. The realization of these basic rights through ATI follows an 
instrumental approach to rights. From this perspective, ATI is essential for personal autonomy – 
hence, lack of information hampers one’s ability to pursue goals, whether faced with criminal 
prosecution or life threatening pollution in one’s backyard. Because of the importance that ATI 
has for the realization of other rights, every limitation on access rights, will impinge on a 
significant interest, and hence will pose a risk of harm to the individuals. This harm could 
become substantial if implicates rights such as the right to life and security of the person, right to 
health, employment and so on. As such, ATI is an individual right. The Information 
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Commissioner John Reid has recognized the right as the “Parliament’s gift of power to each and 
every citizen and person in Canada.”1388  
 
     If one wants to draw parallels between an individual and a public perspective to ATI, one can 
say that access contributes to the realization of individual rights in the same way in which it 
contributes to the realization of democracy in general. In both cases, information is needed to 
facilitate decision-making, either by citizens as a collective body or by individuals. In fact, in 
many cases, it is not possible to make a difference between a person as a citizen and as a private 
person or between a special interest and a public interest. A right to ATI is necessary in both 
dimensions of human life, public and private. As explained by Birkinshaw, ATI enables us to 
fulfill our potential as humans.1389As such, a characterization of ATI as a human right derives 
from its human nature, which can be understood as having a private as well as a public 
dimension. According to Weinberger, human liberty can be considered from two sides, first, as 
personal liberty or the freedom to choose the way of life, and second, as political liberty or the 
freedom to choose the way of governing public affairs. The realm of political liberty concerns 
the participation of the citizen in public matters, while personal liberty is an element that 
postulates political liberty.1390 Both of these sides require information to achieve full potential. 
From this perspective, we see two sides in each person, an individual being and a social being. 
Both of these qualities of humans necessitate information to make decisions, either at the 
individual level, or at social/political level.  
 
     Looking at ATI from a public perspective, the need for a recognition of a constitutional status 
of this right becomes necessary, since not doing so extends the risk of harm to a much broader 
platform, that of a public space. ATI proponents argue that this right “produces an informed 
public, a responsive government, and as a result, a functional society.”1391 The lack of 
information, on the other hand, produces an ignorant, passive society and a secretive 
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government, which are premises for authoritarian regimes. For example, the inherited culture of 
secrecy in Albanian governance today is due to the long history of communism in which 
accessing government information was a taboo, and even punishable by law. Keeping 
information secret from the public, gave the government a strong tool to keep society under total 
control for fifty years, and guaranteed political power and ruling for half a century. The secretive 
culture created a passive society and secretive bureaucracy which still considers government 
information its own property, even today, twenty six years after the regime change. Albania is a 
perfect example to demonstrate that not recognizing access rights may cause substantial damage 
and be detrimental to a democratic society. The risk of harm in this scenario multiplies and 
produces not only apathetic individuals, but a lethargic society, which is certainly not the spirit 
of a dynamic vital democracy. For this reason, ATI has been recognized as a fundamental human 
right in the EU, Albania, and many other jurisdictions across the world.  
 
     The ATIA in Canada is recognized to have a quasi-constitutional nature. It receives this 
characterization because it protects values central to the preservation of a free and democratic 
society. Its quasi-constitutional status is also highlighted by the section 4 paramountcy clause of 
the Act which guarantees that the right of access exists “notwithstanding any other acts of 
Parliament.”1392 Section 4 provides that the right to ATI prevails over conflicting legislation.1393 
The quasi-constitutional status is recognized by the Crown1394 and has been repeatedly affirmed 
by the Federal Court, including the Courts below.  
 
     Because the ATIA is quasi-constitutional, the object and purpose of the Act are the principal 
factors that courts consider when interpreting its provisions. As such, the courts should always 
adopt the interpretation of the Act that is most consistent with its objective that “government 
information should be available to the public.”1395 This means that access should be the norm, 
and not the exception when applying the provisions of this Act. Any ambiguity around the access 
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right must be resolved in favour of advancing the aims of the Act. The Supreme Court has 
recognized that ATI is one of the cornerstones of our democratic system, it is essential to 
ensuring information necessary for participation and accountability.1396 The Supreme Court also 
acknowledged the necessity of access to permit meaningful discussion on a matter of public 
importance.1397  
 
     From this perspective, ATI can be considered as a window of participation, or a ticket that 
allows for participation. If one can draw comparisons I would compare ATI with a ticket to a 
sport game. Just like a ticket to a game match, it will only give you the information you need to 
watch the game, the when, where, and what. It also offers an opportunity to enter the facility 
where the game with be played. The ticket will only get you inside the stadium, but how much 
you pay attention and engage with the match, how passionate you are, and how your emotions 
play out - these reactions are subjective and will vary a lot from person to person. The reactions 
will depend on the past experiences, affections, feelings and previous knowledge about the game. 
Some people will cheer loudly when the favourite team scores, some will laugh and some others 
even cry, while others will watch indifferently, without engaging a lot with the environment. 
This is, in fact, the human nature, so diverse and with lots of variations. Just because people do 
not cheer, or laugh, or cry, the stadium cannot deny them the ticket to the game. Only by 
watching a game, people will understand the rules and why players do certain moves. Only if 
they watch the game for several times, they will understand better. The more they watch it, the 
more experts they become, and if they like the game enough, they will be interested to play it. 
Some will even become so interested that they will become professional players. But, it all starts 
with first getting the ticket to the stadium, and then watching and understanding the rules of the 
game. Depending on many factors, from human capacity, to interests and objective factors, some 
people will stop at the first match; some will watch several times, some will become players, and 
some will join sport teams.  
 
     Just like the game, the Pateman participatory democratic theory explains that the more people 
participate in the decision-making process, the more they will be willing to participate. The more 
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people know (either by accessing information available from the governments, or by filing 
access requests) about the decision-making process, the more they understand, and the more they 
will be willing to become active players in this process. As Pateman puts it, people will learn to 
participate by participating. If I were to draw comparisons with the game, the responsibility is 
two folded, on the government to provide venues of participation, and on the people to take 
advantage of opportunities made available to them. In this context Fenster argued that 
transparency does not just occur as a natural consequence of a democratic system: is requires 
championing, support, organization, and imposition.1398 Meijer, Curtin and Hillebrandt described 
this support in terms of “vision and voice”. They conducted an analysis of the relationship 
between vision and voice, and found that “Vision and voice come together in the idea of 
informed debate: participants can voice their opinions on the basis of knowledge about decision-
making processes.”1399 Hence, people first have to get informed, then have a voice in how 
decisions are made. 
 
     The importance of participation stands on the opportunities it creates for introducing, shaping 
and pushing ideas in the public space. Weinberger argued that participation in public affairs is 
not restricted to formal principles of democracy, like voting in elections. The efficiency and 
reasonableness of democratic rule depend essentially on discursive processes institutionalized in 
society.1400 Weinberger links these processes with democracy and human liberty claiming that 
they “can flourish only if the frame for an open society is established. Formal democracy is not 
sufficient. We need a discursive mind, tolerance, and room for free discussion.”1401 What 
Weinberger emphasized is the importance of transparency and information for public discourse. 
 
     Now, let’s turn again to the question of the constitutional recognition of access rights in 
Canada. As I discussed in Chapter ten, the Canadian common law has traditionally not been 
concerned with giving access rights to individuals, except in very special circumstances of 
litigation. Mainly, the common law was concerned with the publication of law and with legal 
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certainty, setting limits to arbitrary actions that undermined individual security.1402 In Canada, 
constitutional arguments for a right of access are based either on the freedom of speech or the 
freedom of the press. The Québec Commission d’Accès à l’Information released an excellent 
report in 2002 entitled “Choosing Transparency” where then-President, Jennifer Stoddart 
recognized the right to know as a basis and a prerequisite for the exercise of other rights in a 
democracy.1403 Around the same time the Supreme Court recognized the right to ATI as quasi-
constitutional. In 2010 this Court acknowledged (in Criminal Lawyers’ Association) a limited 
constitutional right of ATI under the freedom of expression. This trend shows signs of maturity 
of the Canadian law towards the status of ATI. However, this limited constitutional recognition 
is not enough considering that many jurisdictions have gone a long way in this direction.  
 
     As I stated at the beginning of this section positivism cannot be used for advancing a human 
right argument of ATI in Canada. It is a fact that a legislative reform of the ATIA has been 
lingering for so many years in parliamentary committees. This puts into question the validity of a 
legality argument for human rights in the Canadian case. According to the positive theory of law, 
legality is conferred only to formal process of positively enacting law via certain procedures – 
only those are believed to be legitimate in an existing political regime. Following this logic, 
human rights can only gain their legitimacy if they are guaranteed by norms of the positive law, 
meaning that they are transformed into positive law. That is the case if they are taken up as 
binding law into the catalogue of basic rights of a constitution. Referring to the right to ATI, this 
is clearly a difficult case to make in Canada, where this right cannot be directly inserted in the 
Constitution as a stand-alone human right because of complex amendment processes. To address 
this dilemma, I look at the two perspectives on human rights offered by Alexy. In justifying the 
human rights Alexy distinguishes between a problem of form and a problem of substance. The 
problem of substance is concerned with the question of which human rights are necessary. The 
problem of form is concerned with the necessity of transforming this concept into positive 
law.1404 In the Canadian context, I see no problem of substance related to an ATI right – the 
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analysis that I have made in Chapter ten (Jurisprudence) and in this Chapter provides 
considerable explanations for the recognition of the right of ATI as necessary from both a private 
and public perspective. What remains to be established for access rights is a problem of form – 
how can we incorporate this fundamental right into the constitutional fabric of the country?  
 
     It is evident, as I have argued in other chapters, that there is a lack of political will in Canada 
to enhance the status of ATI rights. The ATIA is weak, and the constitutional protection is limited 
or absent, which has caused serious violations of access rights in Canada, as evidenced in 
Chapters seven, eight and nine. Sen has a very compelling argument in this regard. He argued 
that if a government is accused of violating some human rights that accusation cannot really be 
answered simply by pointing out that there are no legally established rules in that country 
guaranteeing those rights. What might be at issue it is not whether the established legal rights 
have been violated, but whether we should not go beyond the scope of the established legal 
rights to encompass the demands in question.1405 So, the question that one might ask is if the law 
is exactly what the political legislator enacts as law. The Habermas’s discursive theory of law 
serves as a good theoretical explanation on why and how to make the move to the transition of 
ATI to a fundamental human right in Canada.  
 
     Habermas challenged the idea that law is what legislator enacts, and argued that the belief in 
legality does not per se legitimize.1406 He rejected any attempt to reduce law to politics and 
advised that “as soon as legitimation is presented as the exclusive achievement of politics, we 
have to abandon our concepts of law and politics.”1407 Instead, Habermas suggested that the 
legitimacy of law ultimately depends on a communicative arrangement: as participants in 
rational discourses, consociates under law must be able to examine whether a contested norm 
meets with, or could meet with, the agreement of all those possibly affected.1408 That is done 
through open informed public discussions that offer many venues of participation.  
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     The most intriguing idea in Habermas’s theory for the purpose of this research is the 
explanation of how human rights become part of the constitutional fabric of a country. He used 
claims of communicative freedom in the form of freedoms of opinion and information which 
make their way to the legal system slowly over time. Habermas extrapolated that the system of 
rights “is not given to the framers of a constitution in advance as a natural law. Only in a 
particular constitutional interpretation do these rights first enter into consciousness at all....every 
constitution is a living project that can endure only as an ongoing interpretation continually 
carried forward at all levels of the production of law.”1409. On the same argument Habermas 
disputed that “the constitutional state does not represent a finished structure but a delicate and 
sensitive-above all fallible and revisable-enterprise, whose purpose is to realize the system of 
rights anew in changing circumstances, that is, to interpret the system of rights better, to 
institutionalize it more appropriately, and to draw out its contents more radically.”1410    
 
     So, if law is not exactly what the legislator enacts as law, and the law should not be reduced to 
politics, which is the opposite of what has happened in the Canadian case (ATI has been reduced 
at what the legislator has enacted, and especially what the government has dictated), we have a 
scenario in which two branches of the government (executive and legislature) are less likely to 
bring changes in the ATI rights. What is left is the Canadian judiciary, which in order to achieve 
true success in recognizing a constitutional status of access rights, should think outside the box, 
and beyond what law and politics offer. According to Habermas, courts should review the 
procedures of constitutional democracy, since it is natural for them to carry out this function. 
First, they have special competencies for maintaining legal coherence among a complex system 
of legal norms while interpreting and applying abstract norms - including constitutional norms 
and rights. Second, the judiciary - precisely because it is not directly accountable democratically 
– is able to police impartially the very procedures of democracy which legitimate laws in the first 
place.1411 According to Zurn, constitutional courts should be concerned to foster democratic 
procedures: namely, the openness, full inclusion, deliberation and wide dialogue and 
communicative exchange that are necessary ingredients of a healthy system of deliberative 
                                                          
1409 Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, supra note 128 at 129. 
1410 Ibid, at 384. 
1411 Christopher F. Zurn, “Habermas’s Discourse Theory of Law”, SSRN, at 214. 
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constitutional democracy.1412 In addition, Kazmierski argued about the role of the courts in 
controlling the discretion of public officials while dealing with ATI requests, stating that 
“ensuring that government officials properly exercise their discretion pursuant to access 
legislation also depends on the role of the judiciary”1413. 
 
     The recognition of a stand-alone fundamental right to ATI in Canada certainly depends on the 
existence of the political will. However, this has not happened for many years, and I doubt it will 
happen any time soon. Birkinshaw advised that “FOI laws will always be unpopular with 
governments in power and some of the officials who serve them. That is probably the true test of 
their importance. FOI deserves constitutional protection”1414. However, to achieve such 
protection, access rights should either be organically added to the Constitution or indirectly 
inserted through judicial interpretation. Amending the Canadian Charter to include a right of ATI 
is unlikely for the foreseeable future because of the tough requirements for such procedure to 
occur. The general amending formula1415 requires the consent of two-thirds of the provinces with 
at least fifty percent of Canada’s population, and an approval of the Parliament and the Senate 
for any changes in the Canadian Constitution. As such, it raises a very high bar that is very 
difficult to meet. Nevertheless, such an unlikelihood should not detract from the hope that 
changes could be made. The common law in Canada has given signs that it is incrementally 
recognizing such rights, and limited success has already been achieved. However, there is need 
for a greater push towards a constitutional recognition. The continuous growing 
acknowledgement of the right to ATI as a constitutional right in the international level should 
render the establishment of such status attractive to the Canadian jurisprudence. The Canadian 
courts should respond to such developments, especially prompted by the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU or the ECtHR.   
 
    The experience in the EU demonstrated that the right of ATD has advanced a long way, from a 
voluntary right left on the hands of bureaucracy, to a fundamental right. The jurisprudence of the 
CJEU and the ECtHR have substantially influenced such advancement with an expansive 
                                                          
1412 Ibid, at 214-215.  
1413 Kazmierski, supra note 655 at 51.  
1414 Birkinshaw, “FOI and Openness”, supra note 2 at 217. 
1415 Constitution Act, 1982, s 38, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.  
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interpretation of the right to ATD found under the freedom of expression, and as a stand-alone 
right. This consideration of access rights may be of value for Canadian courts which may follow 
the same path in the future by accommodating a constitutional right of ATI through an 
interpretative exercise. Hence, the EU legal framework and especially the way it came into 
being, may serve as a good example for Canadian future developments in transparency and ATI. 
Canada could benefit from knowledge on the developments in the EU and incorporating them 
into its own system.   
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CHAPTER 12:  SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
12.1 Summary of the findings   
     This dissertation has examined the nature and value of transparency as a principle of 
governance and ATI as an individual right through a comparative analysis of Canada and the EU. 
It provided some level of comprehensibility to the conceptual and practical use of the two terms, 
and offered a framework for the recognition of ATI as a constitutional right in Canada. It 
addressed the conceptual muddle of the concepts of transparency and information, and offered a 
definition and models of transparency, and a definition and typologies of information.  
     In addition, this dissertation focused on the way transparency and ATI is perceived and 
applied. The research demonstrated that the approach towards transparency and ATI is grounded 
on their perceptions as political, social and cultural constructs. It found that the value assigned to 
ATI socially and politically informed and prescribed its level of legal protection and application. 
To arrive to such conclusion I analyzed how access laws developed historically, how they were 
perceived and valued politically, how they were handled administratively, how they were applied 
practically, how they were supervised institutionally and how they were interpreted judicially.  
     Furthermore, the dissertation examined the protection of the right of ATI in Canada and the 
EU, and argued for a constitutional status of ATI in Canada. In order to do so, I engaged in 
doctrinal research, used a comparative exercise, using the EU legal framework, and employed 
two theories of democracy, the deliberative theory of Habermas and the participation theory of 
Pateman. They provide standards against which the rhetoric of transparency and ATI can be 
measured. The dissertation thus makes a claim for a constitutional right of ATI in Canada by 
looking at the value it upholds in a modern democracy and by drawing a connection between 
information and knowledge. This relationship creates better capacities, opportunities and venues 
for the citizens to exercise their rights, participating in public discussions and ultimately 
exercising control of government decision-making.  
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     This research found that the political and institutional culture of the government and historical 
traditions in Canada and the EU had a major influence in their approaches towards transparency. 
The timing of the ATI legislation was dependent not only on government inspired policies, but 
also on other forces outside the government. The comparison showed that these forces were 
different in the two jurisdictions. Also, the ATI laws were guided by different principles, the EU 
an expansive access regime, and Canada a narrow complementary regime. The study of the legal 
framework of ATI revealed that the bureaucratic practices in all jurisdictions circumvent legal 
requirements by giving life to new rules of access. The questionnaire sent to some of the federal 
agencies in Canada, and some of the EU institutions revealed remarkable trends about how 
institutional culture shapes the rules of an access regime. In Canada, the very low number of 
responses and the way they were handled exposed a centralized system where decisions about 
information requests had to be approved at the upper levels of the government.    
     The data on the users of ATI gathered for Canada and the EU showed that the access rights 
are expansively used by the public in Canada and the EU, but in the EU they were surpassed by 
academia, and in Canada by business. Also, media requests were not significant in both 
jurisdictions. However, research demonstrated that some of the biggest scandals in the Canadian 
history, have been illuminated by journalists. Regarding other actors, this research showed that 
the EU NGOs have been more active and successful in their attempts to affect legislative or 
policy changes. The interviews I had with some of the groups in Canada revealed that media and 
NGOs found the system elitist, time-consuming, frustrating and expensive, which made it 
inaccessible for many small organizations, with little support and resources available.  
     The study of the oversight bodies in Canada and the EU displayed that although both had only 
the power to make recommendation, the European Ombudsman has been more successful 
because of the moral authority it has established and the support from the European Parliament. 
The involvement of Parliament in the investigation process of the Ombudsman is an interesting 
difference compared to the Information Commissioner in Canada, where such support has been 
missing. The authority of the Commissioner has continuously declined over the years, because 
her authority has been taken less seriously by the government. The Commissioner seems to be 
fighting a lonely battle because of the lack of strong allies in the mission for the protection and 
modernization of the access regime in Canada.  
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     This dissertation also examined the jurisprudence of the main courts in Canada and the EU as 
it pertains to ATI cases. On the one side, in Europe, the CJEU has retained a significant role in 
the interpretation of the right of access, and the ECtHRs has made a meaningful contribution to 
the advancements of the access rights and transparency. On the other side, in Canada, the Federal 
Court and the Supreme Court have facilitated some advancements on the right of ATI, raising it 
to the quasi-constitutional status, and providing some limited applicability for a constitutional 
recognition. However, the Canadian judiciary has moved carefully towards an expansive 
interpretation of the ATIA because of the limitations posed in the Act for such interpretation. 
When compared to the European approach of judicial interpretation of the right of ATD, the 
Canadian courts can learn how to accommodate access rights into the Canadian Charter by the 
stretching the existing legal provisions though an expansive interpretation.  
 
12.2 Limitations of the research  
     One of the main concerns in this research has been the recognition of a constitutional right of 
ATI in Canada. The research showed that access rights are surrounded by political controversy. 
Chapter five demonstrated that the administrative practices in the EU and Canada revealed a 
similar trend – there is recently a tendency towards a restriction of the right of ATI. These results 
demonstrate that beside the recognition of a constitutional right of ATI (as it is the case of the 
EU), it still remains a highly contested area which heavily depends on government politics. That 
means that a constitutional recognition would not be a panacea for the problems with the access 
rights’ regime in Canada. Nonetheless, this reasoning should not serve as a deterrent for not 
pushing towards this recognition. Of course, the constitutional status gives the access rights a 
whole new level of protection which will require a careful reasoning for every case when these 
rights will be limited. Constitutional rights get a different level of attention from an institutional 
and judicial perspective which would potentially change how access rights are perceived, 
discussed and applied by all branches of the government, and would alter future trajectories.    
     As explained in Chapter five, it would be best that the ATIA be modernized. This change 
would also allow the Supreme Court to expand the recognition of access rights towards a 
constitutional status. Certainly, better laws make a better start, but they do not guarantee a 
successful access rights regime in and on themselves. Sometimes the gap between law and 
383 
 
practice, as this research demonstrates, is surprisingly much wider than expected, and deeply 
affects law implementation. The practices in all jurisdictions in this study exposed how everyday 
operations of public administration are continuously trying to circumvent legal requirements. 
However, having a good access law in place is the first step to building an effective access 
regime because it institutionalizes both the principle of transparency and the right of ATI. 
     It has been established that the right of ATI is important for many reasons, both from an 
individual interest and a public interest perspective. However, it is also undeniable that they can 
also bring unintended consequences, like the “empty files” phenomenon or constraints for 
government operations. While it is true that access rights might cause some burden to the 
government, this argument could be made for many other human rights, such as the right to 
health or education. The costs they are associated with cannot be a convincible argument when 
compared to their value. One should think beyond the principles of good governance to 
appreciate the importance of transparency and ATI in the public and private sphere. One should 
look at their value from a human rights perspective, which is an approach little explored in the 
literature but hardly contestable from any group of both advocates and academics. This approach 
is appealing and only a rights-based transparency and ATI regime would justify their normative 
value. 
 
12.3 Recommendations for future research  
     While it is undisputed that transparency is better than secrecy and ATI is an important tool to 
ensure government accountability and democratic participation, more research is needed to shed 
light into the relationship between access rights and accountability and participation. There is a 
necessity for a systematic empirical investigation of how these legal principles interact with each 
other, and what the role of access rights in facilitating those principles is.  
     In addition, it has come up in this research that frequent users of ATI rights complain that 
neglect and adversarialism have become more serious problems within the federal government. 
This evidence of deteriorating compliance suggests that a reassessment of the methods used to 
enforce the ATIA is necessary.   
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     Furthermore, this dissertation has argued about a human right approach to ATI departing from 
the value it holds in the private and public sphere. To arrive in such conclusion this study 
engaged in a doctrinal research of ATI. However, a more analytical examination is necessary to 
untangle the real value of information in public sphere in Canada. A further and comprehensive 
study would reveal how ATI is used by individuals or groups for personal interests or public 
interests. This dissertation could not engage in further research for lack of time and resources. 
  
12.4 Conclusions  
     This dissertation, through the study of two jurisdictions, Canada and the EU, has provided 
some basis for the legal conceptualization of the principle of transparency and ATI, and some 
practical understanding on how they work in practice. It also offered some standards against 
which the rhetoric of transparency and access are measured – it did so departing from a value-
based perspective. The dissertation made a case for a recognition of a constitutional right of ATI 
in Canada as time is ripe to move forward towards such recognition. Indeed, we are well beyond 
the point at which it can disputed that a properly defined right of ATI is essential to our system 
of constitutional rights. The time has passed that one could downgrade access rights to a lesser 
status.  
     There are many reasons why governments resist the idea of ATI - power and control are two 
of the most prevailing incentives for such resistance. As Cain et al put it “Controlling 
information, governments have learned, is an effective way to manage public opinion.”1416 
Exactly for this reason access rights should be protected, in order to equalize the balance of 
power between government and citizens. As such, access rights become a powerful tool for 
providing a rich public space which enables individuals to become citizens and to exercise their 
rights in debating, shaping and steering the direction of their government. The ATI use for 
private interests and realization of personal rights will then allow the individuals to use their 
rights for the good of the entire society. According to this logic, a person who has been denied 
his own rights, will not be capable to engage his public rights and duties as a citizen - he will be 
a dormant citizen. The idea of information as knowledge carries the potential to create capacities 
                                                          
1416 Cain et al, supra note 377 at 116.  
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for rational judgment, and thus engagement in public space, and further participation in public 
affairs.  
     However, transparency and ATI do not just occur as a natural consequence of a democratic 
system. As Fenster suggests, it requires championing, support, organization, and imposition.1417 
Hence, democracy has to involve the responsibility of the public to act upon the information it 
apparently has a right to.1418 Pateman advised that “people learn to participate by participating, 
and that feelings of political efficacy are more likely to be developed in a participatory 
environment.”1419  
 
     Considering the evolution of democracy and the system of citizens’ rights in Canada, rights 
are always in evolution. Just like the right to vote which did not belong to all Canadians in the 
60s (like aboriginals) in Canada, but evolved to a constitutional right, access rights could evolve 
to having a constitutional status. The time is ripe that this level of protection is not any more an 
extraordinary idea, but a practical and necessary one. 
 
     Canada has all the potential to establish a strong ATI right, it has a long experience with 
democracy, but it seems to resist the idea. It looks like it is staying true to its Westminster 
traditions of secrecy. However, the situation has changed so much at the international sphere. 
The growing recognition of the right to ATI both domestic and international level should render 
the establishment of a constitutional access right difficult to resist. Ninety eight countries now 
have laws which recognize a right of ATI, and of these over fifty have constitutional provisions 
confirming this right as a fundamental right. Hence, Canada has to revisit its position to the 
approach towards ATI, and re-evaluate its potentials to raise its status to a constitutional one. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1417 Fenster, “The Opacity”, supra note 50 at 895-902. 
1418 Roberts, Blacked Out, supra note 84 at 238. 
1419 Ibid, at 105. 
APPENDIX 1: ATIP QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Confidential  
Questionnaire on Transparency and Access to Information (ATI).  
There are thirteen questions in this questionnaire. Please answer them to the best of your knowledge. Click at the square(s) (to activate them) 
for the answer that applies. You may choose more than one in some occasions. If you have comments for questions, use the comment box at the 
bottom of each question.  
Thank you in advance for completing the questionnaire! 
 
Part I. Government transparency (4 questions) 
1. Proactive disclosure is considered to be important for government transparency. To what extent do you agree or disagree to the 
statements below: 
 Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree Neither disagree or agree Don’t know 
Proactive disclosure ensures that the 
public is more informed about decisions                                                   
that affect them.  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Early proactive disclosure1420 allows and 
encourages public participation in 
decision-making. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Early proactive disclosure sparks                    
fruitful debate in the public sphere. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Early proactive disclosure ensures a 
better understanding of the rationale 
behind decision making. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Early proactive disclosure establishes                   
more public trust to our institution. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
                                                          
1420 Note: Early proactive disclosure refers to the disclosure at the early stages of decision-making, not just the final decisions. 
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Early proactive disclosure leads 
to a public information overload.  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Early proactive disclosure increases the 
workload & expenses of our institution. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Early proactive disclosure doesn`t allow                      
for a space to think for public officials.  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Early proactive disclosure contributes to 
more public confusion about choices in 
decision-making.  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Comment: Click here to enter text. 
2. When providing information proactively my agency/unit: 
 
 Never Sometimes Depending on the issue   Often Always 
Takes into account the public needs when providing information. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Specifically highlights the positive elements in the information to 
facilitate the public’s understanding. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Provides information, even if it is damaging to our organization. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Organizes information in ways that are easy to digest by the general 
public. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Leaves out information details if that information is controversial. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Provides lots of information which is not adequately organized to 
conceal certain issues.  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Frames information in certain ways which are beneficial to the 
institutional interests.   
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Chooses a technical language that needs a certain level of education 
to make sense of. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Comment: Click here to enter text. 
 
3. The following statements refer to the proactive disclosure policies in the agency/department where I work. How do you respond to the 
following statements:  
 
 Strongly disagree  Disagree Agree  Strongly agree  Neither agree or disagree Don’t know 
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My agency's management values making 
information proactively available. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
My agency makes information widely 
available if there are many ATI requests. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
There are regulations & policies in place 
to stimulate proactive disclosure. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
My agency's management invites my unit 
to propose or join in initiatives for 
proactive disclosure. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
There is a sufficient number of people in 
my unit dedicated to transparency  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
There is sufficient funding allocated in my 
agency's budget to transparency.    
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
  Comment: Click here to enter text.                                                                   
 
4. The following statements refer to the proactive disclosure daily activities in the agency/department where I work. How do you respond 
to the following statements:  
 
 Never  Rarely Sometimes Often Very often Always 
We announce information available proactively through the press. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
We proactively place information on the agency's website. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
We make information available proactively through public information 
campaigns. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
We make information available proactively through social media 
e.g. Facebook, Twitter and blogs. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
We make information available proactively through traditional media  
e.g. brochures, radio, televison. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
We make information available proactively through open meetings. ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
We ask feedback from the public about the quality of the information 
provided using the above sources. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Comment: Click here to enter text. 
 
Part II: Access to Information (6 questions) 
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1. It is established that ATI is significant for the functioning of democratic institutions. How to you respond to the following statements 
regarding the value of ATI from your agency/unit’s perspective? 
 
 Strongly disagree  Disagree Agree  Strongly agree  Neither agree or disagree Don’t know 
My agency's management values ATI as 
central to democratic governance.  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
There are regulations & policies in my 
agency for the administration of ATI 
requests. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
My agency/unit provides information in 
a timely fashion. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
ATI requests help us in decision-making 
by providing important public input. 
☐ ☐ ☐  ☐ ☐ 
My agency provides sufficient guidance 
to my unit to deal with ATI requests.  
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
There is a sufficient number of people 
in my unit dedicated to ATI. 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
There is sufficient funding allocated in 
my agency's budget to ATI.     
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
   Comment: Click here to enter text.     
                                                                              
2. How would you categorize the purpose of the ATI requests made to your institution?  
 Never  Rarely  Sometimes Often Very Often  Always 
Journalistic (making headlines in the media)         ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Protecting human rights (Mobility, legal, 
democratic rights, or other Charter Rights)                                      
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Making an institution accountable                   ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Participating in decision making                        ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Stimulating more transparency                           ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Preventing/fighting corruption                            ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Furthering business interests                              ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
390 
 
Furthering political interests                                                                 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Embarrassing government              ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
    Comment:  Click here to enter text. 
3. How would you consider the interaction between your institution and these categories of requesters1421:  
 Adversarial             Brittle        Functional  Friendly     Close Depends on the information requested 
Media ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Academia ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Private sector ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Organizations  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Public ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Comment: Click here to enter text. 
4.  Based on your experience with ATI requesters, what do you think of their knowledge on ATI legal framework? 
 They don’t know 
much 
They have some basic 
knowledge  
They have a strong 
knowledge            
They are experts     Can`t say         
Media ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Academia ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Private Sector  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Organizations  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Public  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Comment: Click here to enter text. 
5. Please indicate, from your experience, to what degree you agree with the following statements regarding ATI requests.  
 Never  Rarely  Sometimes Often Very Often  Always Depends on the 
type of requests 
Responding needs consultation with 
superiors 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
I find myself in trouble when trying to 
respond to sensitive requests 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
                                                          
1421 Note: This categorization is used by the Treasury Board Secretariat in its Annual Reports.  
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Releasing information leads to 
embarrassment of my institution 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Information requested benefits certain 
groups rather than the general public 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Requests lead to making information 
proactively available 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Information helps requesters advance 
some other human rights                       
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Requests keep our institution accountable 
to the public 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Requests help improve our relationship 
with groups of requesters & gain their trust 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
    Comment: Click here to enter text. 
6. Who would you seek advice from when you are in doubt regarding ATI requests? (Choose three that apply the most). 
 
a) Nobody, I use my discretion                                                 ☐ 
b) A colleague in your office                                                      ☐ 
c) The head of your office                                                          ☐ 
d) A colleague in your department                                           ☐ 
e) The head of your department                                               ☐ 
f) Someone in your institution                                                  ☐ 
g) The head of your institution                                                  ☐ 
h) The minister                                                                              ☐ 
i) Another ATIP coordinator outside your institution           ☐ 
Comment: Click here to enter text. 
PART III: General questions (3 questions) 
1. How long have you been working for the current agency: 
a) less than a year           ☐ 
b) 1-3 years                      ☐ 
c) 3-5 years                       ☐ 
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d) 5-10 years                    ☐ 
e) more than 10 years    ☐ 
Comment: Click here to enter text. 
2. How many hours of training do you get on a yearly basis on how to deal with ATI requests? (Consider the last three years) 
 
a) None                     ☐ 
b) 1-5 hours             ☐ 
c) 5-10 hours           ☐ 
d) 11-15 hours         ☐ 
e) 16-20 hours         ☐ 
f) Over 20 hours     ☐ 
Comment: Click here to enter text. 
 
3. How many persons are assigned to deal with ATI requests exclusively in your office? 
 
a) none          ☐ 
b) 1                 ☐ 
c) 2-3             ☐ 
d) 4-5             ☐ 
e) Over 5       ☐ 
Comment: Click here to enter text. 
 
4. Do you have any comments you would like to share pertaining to your experience with the administration of ATI requests at your 
agency? Please feel free to share any information you deem useful and appropriate.  
Comment: Click here to enter text. 
 
APPENDIX 2: TABLES  
 
Table 3: Comparison between the ATIA and Regulation 1049 
 
Elements  Canada  Ontario  EU Albania 
Act was passed 
in 
1982 1988 2001 1999, 2014 
Existence of 
recitals 
no No  Yes (17 recitals) No  
Number of 
articles  
77 70 19 28 
Purpose of the 
act  
to extend the present laws 
of Canada to provide a 
right to ATI in records 
under the control of a 
government institution1422  
- to provide a right of access to 
information under the control 
of institutions 
- to protect the privacy of 
individuals1423 
To give the fullest possible 
effect to the right of public 
ATD1424and ensure the 
widest possible access to 
documents1425 
to guarantee the recognition 
of a public’s right to 
information, in the framework 
of exercising the rights and 
freedoms of individuals in 
practice, and the formation of 
ideas on the state of the 
country and the society”1426. 
Principles  Government information 
should be available to the 
public,..necessary 
exceptions to the right of 
access should be limited 
and specific and decisions 
- information should be 
available 
- necessary exemptions should 
be limited and specific 
Principle of openness to 
create an ever closer union 
among the peoples of 
Europe, in which decisions 
are taken as openly as 
possible and as closely as 
To promote integrity, 
transparency and 
accountability of public 
authorities1430 
                                                          
1422 Article 2(1) of ATIA, RSC, 1985, c.A-1 
1423 Section 1 of the FIPPA 
1424 Recital (4) of Regulation 1049/2001, Official Journal of the European Communities, L.145/43 
1425 Article 1(a) of Regulation 1049/2001 
1426 Article 1 (b) of Law 119/2014 
1430 Article 1(3) of Law 119/2014 
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on the disclosure of 
government information 
should be reviews 
independently of 
government1427  
- decisions should be reviewed 
independently of 
government1428 
possible to the citizen. 
Openness enables citizens to 
participate more closely in 
the decision-making 
process…1429  
Institutions 
covered  
Any department or 
ministry of state of the 
Government of Canada and 
parent Crown corporations  
government ministries, most 
public agencies, boards, 
commissions and advisory 
bodies, colleges and 
universities, some publicly 
funded organizations  
The EP, the Council, the 
Commission, CJEU1431 & 
ECB1432 when acting in their 
administrative capacities, 
and all EU agencies 
any administrative body 
provided for in the current 
legislation on administrative 
procedures, legislative bodies, 
legislative, judicial and 
prosecution bodies at any 
level, local government units 
at any level, state authorities 
and public entities, created by 
the Constitution or by law 
Meaning of 
documents 
“record” –any 
documentary material 
regardless of medium or 
form1433 
any record of information 
however recorded, whether in 
printed form, on film, by 
electronic means or 
otherwise1434 
“document”- any content 
whatever its medium(written 
in paper or stored in 
electronic form or as a 
sound, visual or audiovisual 
recording)1435  
“public information”-any data 
recorded in any form or 
format, during discharge of 
the public function, whether 
or not prepared by a public 
authority1436. 
                                                          
1427 Article 2(1) in ATIA  
1428 Section 1 of the FIPPA  
1429 Recitals (1) &(2) of the Regulation 1049/2001 
1431 Court of Justice of the European Union 
1432 European Central Bank 
1433 Article 3 of ATIA “Definitions” 
1434 Section 2 of FIPPA 
1435 Article 3(a) of Regulation 1049/2001 “Definitions” 
1436 Article 2.2 of Law 119/2014 
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Subjects  Every person who is a 
Canadian citizen or 
permanent resident1437 
every person has a right of 
access to a record1438 
Any citizen of the Union, 
and any natural or legal 
person residing or having its 
registered office in a 
Member State1439 
any natural or legal person, 
local or foreign, as well as any 
stateless persons1440. 
Times for 
handling 
requests 
30 days after the request is 
received1441  
30 days after the request is 
received1442 
15 working days from 
registration1443 
10 working days from the day 
of submission1444 
Extensions of 
time limits  
Not limited (reasonable 
period of time1445  
for a period of time that is 
reasonable1446 
15 working days1447  5 working days1448 
Exemptions  Laid down in Articles 13-
24;  
Cabinet confidences (s.69) 
court records, 
intergovernmental 
relations, personal 
information,  third party 
information,  
 
 
Listed in section 12-22 of the 
Act 
-excludes Cabinet confidences 
(s.12) 
court records, certain law 
enforcement information, 
intergovernmental relations, 
personal information,  third 
party information, most labour 
relations records 
 
Clearly listed in Article 4. 
Paragraphs 2,3,4 of Article 4 
are assessed against an 
overriding public interest 
(balance test required) 
Restrictions all laid out in 
Article 17, all tested against a 
public interest override 
                                                          
1437 Article 4(1) of ATIA “Access to government records” 
1438 Section 10(1) of FIPPA 
1439 Article 2 of the Regulation 1049/2001 “Beneficiaries and scope” 
1440 Article 2.3 of Law 119/2014 
1441 Article 7 of ATIA  
1442 Section 26 of FIPPA 
1443 Article 7(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001 
1444 Article 15.1 
1445 Article 9(1) of ATIA  
1446 Section 27(1) of FIPPA 
1447 Article 7(3) of the Regulation 1049/2001 
1448 Article 15.3 
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Overview 
bodies  
Information 
Commissioner, exclusively 
to ATIA (power of 
recommendations)  
Information and Privacy 
Commissioner 
Ombudsman, broadly 
responsible for good 
administration in the EU 
(power of recommendations) 
Commissioner for the FOI 
and Protection of Personal 
Data 
Costs for 
requests  
Application fee not 
exceeding $25. Currently 
$5 application fee set by 
regulations+ payment for 
every hour in excess of 5 
hours of searching1449  
$5 application fee set by 
regulations +several costs1450  
No application fee; Copies of 
less than 20 pg A4 are free of 
charge (over that costs of 
producing and sending 
documents may be 
charged)1451 
No application fee 
-cost for the reproduction of 
the information request and, 
where appropriate, the cost of 
delivery1452 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1449 Article 11 (1) & (2) of ATIA  
1450 Section 57 (1) and (3) of FIPPA 
1451 Article 10(1) of the Regulation 1049/2001 
1452 Article 13.1 of Law 119/2014 
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Table 6: Source of ATI requests received  
 2013-2014 2012-2013 2011-2012 2010-2011 2009-2010 2008-2009 2007-2008 2006-2007 2005-2006 2004-2005 
Total requests  60,105 55,145 43,194 41,641 35,154 34,041 31,487 29,182 27,269 25,207 
Business 23,129 21,242 18,648 18,477 
(44.4%) 
17,047 
(48.5%) 
14,958 
(43.9%) 
13,202 
(41.9%) 
12,868 
(44.1%) 
13,360 
(49%) 
11,910 
(47.2%) 
Public 23,723 22,274 16,893 15,673 
(37.6%) 
12,387 
(35.2%) 
11,656 
(34.2%) 
10,762 
(34.2%) 
9,461 
(32.4%) 
9,108 
(33.4%) 
8,213 
(47.2%) 
Media 8,421 
(14%) 
8, 321 
(13%) 
5,133  
(9%) 
5, 234 
(12.6%) 
3, 693 
(10.5%) 
4,804 
(14.1%) 
4,411 
(14%) 
3,617 
(12.4%) 
2,451  
(9%) 
2,680 
(10.6%) 
Organization 2,898 
(4.8%) 
2, 415 
(3.8%) 
1, 946 
(3.7%) 
1, 706 
(4.1%) 
1, 559 
(4.4%) 
2,097 
(6.2%) 
2, 850 
(9.1%) 
2,932 
(10%) 
1,980 
(7.3%) 
2,107 
(8.4%) 
Academia 1,934 893 574 551 (1.3%) 468 (1.3%) 526 (1.6%) 262 (0.8%) 304 (1%) 370 (1.4%) 297 (1.2%) 
Source: Table drawn by author using data of the Government of Canada at InfoSource. Available at http://www.infosource.gc.ca/index-eng.asp 
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Table 7: Number of ATI requests processed 
 2013-2014 2012-2013 2011-2012 2010-2011 2009-2010 2008-2009 2007-2008 2006-2007 2005-2006 2004-2005 
Requests 
received   
60,105 55,145 43,194 41,641 35,154 34,041 31,487 29,182 27,269 25,207 
Requests closed 58,475 53,993 43,6641453 40,616 35,427 33,284 30,530 29,473 26,621 24,709 
All disclosed 15,684 
(26.8) 
11,681 
(21.6) 
9,272 
(21.2%) 
7,955 
(19.6%) 
5,597 
(15.8%) 
5,976 
(18%) 
5,430 
(17.8%) 
6,808 
(23.1%) 
7,569 
(28.4%) 
6,696 
(27.1%) 
Disclosed in part 29,250 
(50%) 
25,534 
(52.8%) 
23,468 
(53.7%) 
22,848 
(56.3%) 
21,810 
(61.6%) 
18,726 
(56.2%) 
16,915 
(55.4%) 
14,650 
(49.7%) 
12,311 
(46.2%) 
10,667 
(43.2%) 
All exempted 679 (1.2%) 602 (1.1%) 636 (1.5%) 589 (1.4%) 570 (1.6%) 640 (1.9%) 633 (2.1%) 395 (1.3%) 435 (1.6%) 612 (2.5%) 
All excluded 521 (0.9%) 278 (0.5%) 346 (0.8%) 311 (0.8%) 263 (0.7%) 307 (0.9%) 264 (0.9%) 151 (0.5%) 184 (0.7%) 154 (0.6%) 
 
 
                                                          
1453 Note that the number reflects requests received in the given year and outstanding requests from previous reporting period. Every time that the number of 
requests completed is bigger than those received, it reflects outstanding requests being processed.  
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14
Number of ATI requests processed in Canada 2005-2014
Closed All disclosed Disclosed in part All exempted All excluded Total
399 
 
Table 8: Time of reply 
 2013-2014 2012-2013 2011-2012 2010-2011 2009-2010 2008-2009 2007-2008 2006-2007 2005-2006 2004-2005 
Replied on time 
(30 days) 
35,653 
(61%) 
34,997 
(64.8%) 
24,128 
(55.3%) 
23,107 
(56.9%) 
19,874 
(56.1%) 
18,991 
(57.1%) 
17,476 
57.2% 
17,028 
(57.8%) 
15,877 
(59.6%) 
15,254 
(61.7%) 
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Table 9: Exemptions applied under the ATIA 
Exemptions  2013-2014 2012-2013 2011-2012 2010-2011 2009-2010 2008-2009 2007-2008 2006-2007 2005-2006 2004-2005 
Information 
obtained in 
confidence 
(sec.13) 
2,474 1,945 1,687 1,875 
(3.7%) 
1,744 
(3.6%) 
1,733 
(3.9%) 
1,686 
(4.1%) 
1,582 
(4.4%) 
1,455 
(4.9%) 
1,193 
(4.5%) 
Federal-
Provincial 
Affairs (sec.14) 
991 687 657 715 
(1.4%) 
487  
(1%) 
820 
(1.8%) 
1,063 
(2.6%) 
921 
(2.6%) 
593 
(1.9%) 
543 
(2.1%) 
International 
Affairs and 
Defence (sec.15) 
11,136 10,669 8,722 7,773 
(15.4%) 
10,724 
(22%) 
9,080 
(20.2%) 
8,365 
(20.4%) 
5,158 
(14.5%) 
3,563 
(11.9%) 
2,020 
(7.6%) 
Law 
Enforcement 
and 
Investigations 
(sec.16) 
7,946 7,079 6,490 6,752 
(13.4%) 
5,896 
(12.1%) 
5,720 
(12.8%) 
4,924 
(12%) 
4,160 
(11.7%) 
3,729 
(12.5%) 
3,351 
(12.7%) 
Safety of 
Individuals 
(sec.17) 
169 176 109 143 
(0.3%) 
140  
(0.3%) 
119 
(0.3%) 
96 
(0.2%) 
79 
(0.2%) 
108 
(0.4%) 
79 
(0.3%) 
Economic 
Interests of 
Canada (sec.18) 
1,327 1,248 852 820 
(1.6%) 
842 
(1.7%) 
900 
(2%) 
619 
(1.5%) 
657 
(1.8%) 
535 
(1.8%) 
540 
(2%) 
Personal 
Information 
(sec.19) 
20,702 20,797 18,665 18,392 
(36.5%) 
16,544 
(34%) 
13,985 
(31.2%) 
12,119 
(29.5%) 
10,755 
(30.2%) 
9,098 
(30.5%) 
8,499 
(32.1%) 
Third Party 
information 
(sec.20) 
5,308 4,914 3,862 3,934 
(7.8%) 
3,961 
(8.1%) 
3,786 
(8.4%) 
3,790 
(9.2%) 
4,374 
(12.3%) 
3,962 
(13.3%) 
4,099 
(15.5%) 
Operations of 
government 
(sec.21) 
9,991 8,157 6,556 6,465 
(12.8%) 
5,740 
(11.7%) 
6,062 
(13.5%) 
5,685 
(13.8%) 
5,297 
(14.9%) 
4,682 
(15.7%) 
4,259 
(16.1%) 
Testing 
Procedures, tests 
& Audits (sec.22) 
364 388 347 318 
(0.6%) 
250 
(0.5%) 
283 
(0.6%) 
221 
(0.5%) 
171 
(0.5%) 
141 
(0.5%) 
140 
(0.5%) 
Solicitor-Client 
Privilege (sec.23) 
2,248 2,082 1,822 1,811 
(3.6%) 
1,464 
(3%) 
1,465 
(3.3%) 
1,381 
(3.4%) 
1,398 
(3.9%) 
1,271 
(4.3%) 
1,111 
(4.2%) 
401 
 
Statutory 
prohibitions 
(sec.24) 
2,019 1,963 1,592 1,275 
(2.5%) 
877 
(1.8%) 
820 
(1.8%) 
1,005 
(2.5%) 
1,009 
(2.8%) 
634 
(2.1%) 
568 
(2.1%) 
Information to 
be published 
(sec.26) 
128 123 81 98 
(0.2%) 
84  
(0.2%) 
95 
(0.2%) 
97 
(0.2%) 
97 
(0.3%) 
81 
(0.3%) 
69 
(0.3%) 
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Table 10: Exclusions applied under ATIA 
Exclusions 2013-2014 2012-2013 2011-2012 2010-2011 2009-2010 2008-2009 2007-2008 2006-2007 2005-2006 2004-2005 
Non-application 
to certain 
materials 
(sec.68) 
769 484 378 626 376 398 269 222 230 211 
Cabinet 
confidences 
(sec.69) 
3,168 2,158 1,842 1,575 1,719 2,237 2,115 2,063 1,661 1,405 
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Table 11: Institutions that received most ATI requests  
Most 
requests  
2013-2014 2012-2013 2011-2012 2010-2011 2009-2010 2008-2009 2007-2008 2006-2007 2005-2006 2004-2005 
Total 
requests  
60,105 55,145 51,332 41,641 35,154 34,041 31,487 29,182 27,269 25,207 
1. Citizenship and 
Immigration (CI) 
29,281 (48.8%) 
CI 
25,010 
(45.3%) 
CI 
20,575 
(47.6%) 
CI  
18,862 
(45.3%) 
CI  
16,647 
(47.3%) 
CI 
14,034 
(41.2%) 
CI 
11,434 
(36.9%) 
CI  
10,497 
(35.9%) 
CI 
10,309 
(37.8%) 
CI 
9,034 
(35.8%) 
2. Canada Border 
Services Agency 
(CBSA) 
4,671 (7.8%) 
CBSA 
3,147  
(6%) 
CRA 
2,237  
(5.2) 
CRA  
2,589 
(6.2%) 
CRA 
1,798 
(5.1) 
RCMP 
2,009 
(5.9%) 
CRA 
1,903 
(6.1%) 
ND 
1,808 
(6.2%) 
HC 
1,842 
(6.8%) 
CRA 
1,861 
(7.4%) 
3. Canada Revenue 
Agency (CRA) 
2,751 (4.6%) 
CRA 
3,137 
(5.6%) 
CBSA 
1,866 
(4.3%) 
RCMP 
1,657  
(4%) 
RCMP 
1,547 
(4.4%) 
CRA  
1,770 
(5.2%) 
ND 
1,779 
(5.7%) 
CRA 
1,604 
(5.5%) 
CRA 
1,772 
(6.5%) 
HC 
1,363 
(5.4%) 
4. National Defence 
(ND) 
2,231 (3.7%) 
TC 
197  
(4%) 
HC 
1,763 
(4.1%) 
CBSA 
1,607 
(3.9%) 
HC 
1,481 
(4.2%) 
ND 
1,669 
(4.9%) 
RCMP 
1,662 
(5.4%) 
HC 
1,442 
(4.9%) 
ND 
1,131 
(4.2%) 
ND 
1,284 
(5.1%) 
5. Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police 
(RCMP) 
1,730 (2.9%) 
ND 
2,044 
(3.7%) 
ND 
1,645 
(3.8%) 
HC 
1,602 
(3.8%) 
CBSA 
1,292 
(3.7%) 
HC 
1,158 
(3.4%) 
TC 
1,217 
(3.9%) 
TC 
1,298 
(4.5%) 
RCMP 
924 
(3.4%) 
RCMP 
1,085 
(4.3%) 
6. Health Canada 
(HC) 1,563 (2.6%) 
 
EC 
1,827 
(3.3%) 
RCMP 
1,434 
(3.3%) 
ND 
1,483 
(3.6%) 
ND 
1,142 
(3.3%) 
CBSA 
1,155 
(3.4%) 
HC 
1,147 
(3.7%) 
CBSA 
945 
(3.2%) 
TC 
901 
(3.3%) 
PWGS 
876 
(3.5%) 
7. Environment 
Canada (EC) 
1,459 (2.4%) 
HC  
1,765 
(3.2%) 
EC  
1,421 
(3.3%) 
 
EC 
1,128 
(2.7%) 
EC 
890 
(2.5%) 
TC 
1,069 
(3.1%) 
CBSA 
1,030 
3.3%) 
RCMP 
911 
(3.1%) 
PWGS 
832 
(3.1%) 
TC 
779 
(3.1%) 
8. Transport Canada 
(TC) 
1,091 (1.8%) 
RCMP 
1.218 
(2.2%) 
FAIT 
892  
(2.1%) 
LAC 
907  
(2.2%) 
LAC 
761  
(2.2%) 
EC 
892 
(2.6%) 
FAIT 
736 
(2.4%) 
PWGS 
869 
(3%) 
LAC 
745 
(2.7%) 
EC 
653 
(2.6%) 
9. Privy Council 
Office (PCO) 
907 (1.5%) 
FAIT 
1,148 
(2.1%) 
LAC 
821  
(1.9%) 
PWGS 
798  
(2.1%) 
PWGS 
724 
(2.1%) 
FAIT 
665 
(2%) 
PCO 
688 
(2.2%) 
EC 
851 
(2.9%) 
EC 
728 
(2.7%) 
LAC 
629 
(2.5%) 
404 
 
10 FATDC1454  
904  
(1.5%) 
LAC1455 
900  
(1.6%) 
PWGS1456 
736  
(1.7%) 
FAITC1457 
798  
(1.9%) 
FAIT 
638 
(1.8%) 
Industry 
Canada 
(IC) 660 
1.9%) 
EC 
659 
(2.1%) 
LAC 
744 
(2.6) 
CBSA 
670 
(2.5%) 
CSC1458 
613 
(2.4%) 
 
Table 12: Fees and costs of operations of the ATIA 
 2013-2014 2012-2013 2011-2012 2010-2011 2009-2010 2008-2009 2007-2008 2006-2007 2005-2006 2004-2005 
Cost of 
Operations 
62,585,847 58,658,040 58,929,246 52,633,834 47,196,030 48,891,400 43,910,746 33,947,815 32,305,312 26,365,457 
Fees Collected  331,782 314,205 319,000 326,869 286,996 305,684 404,209 296,827 305,155 265,382 
 
 
 
                                                          
1454 Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada 
1455 Library and Archives Canada 
1456 Public Works and Government Services Canada 
 
1458 Correctional Services Canada 
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Table 13:  
 
Source: Treasury Board Secretariat, Info Source Bulletin Number 36B – Statistical Reporting. Online:  
<http://www.infosource.gc.ca/bulletin/2013/b/bulletin36b02-eng.asp#s2>. 
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Table 14: Responses to ATI requests 1983-2014 
 
Source: Treasury Board Secretariat, Info Source Bulletin Number 37B – Statistical Reporting, online: 
<http://www.infosource.gc.ca/bulletin/2014/b/bulletin37b02-eng.asp#aia>. 
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Table 15: Requests to the European Commission according to the social and occupational profile of requesters (%) 
Years  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Total  6227 6,525 6,014 6,477 6,361 5,055 5,197 4,196 3,841 3,396 
Academic 19.80 22.08 22.70 25.73 23.24 21.29 31.03 31.85 32.08 10.49 
Lawyers 18.30 14.46 13.58 11.30 10.69 10.24 11.01 9.69 10.43 11 
Journal. 6 4.58 4.81 3.25 3.35 2.02 2.46 2.90 1.14 1.07 
Civil 
Society1459  
16.04 16.62 10.32 8.59 8.18 9.85 18.26 17.77 17.27 29.44 
Public 
authority 
8.23 8.24 7.12 8.20 13.56 7.33 14.19 15.69 15.67 12.32 
Other EU 
institute. 
12.80 8.76 7.64 8.15 8.32 3.77 6.3 6.75 6.85 3.78 
Not 
specified 
18.83 25.26 33.83 34.78 32.68 45.5 16.75 15.33 16.55 31.89 
Source: Chart drawn by the author using data from the European Commission, Access to Documents. Online: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/access_documents/reports_en.htm>. 
 
                                                          
1459 Civil Society here includes: Interest groups, industry, NGOs, etc. online: <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/access_documents/docs/rapport_2013/com-2014-
619_en.pdf>. 
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Table 16: EU Commission requests processed (%) 
 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Access refused  11.87 14.45 16.91 12.18 12.47 11.65 13.99 23.40 23.22 31.92 
Partial access 15.36 10.68 8.61 7.62 5.37 4.11 3.33 3.88 2.94 3.65 
Full Access 72.77 73.43 74.48 80.20 82.16 84.23 82.68 72.71 73.83 64.43 
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Table 17: EU Commission refusals by exceptions applied (%) 
Exceptions 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Public security  0 0.92 1.31 1.33 2.67 2.55 0.42 1.19 1.53 0.28 
Defence and 
security 
2.84 3.69 0.65 2 0 0 0.42 2.23 0.60 0.21 
International 
relations 
0.71 0 7.19 4.67 6.67 4.38 5.91 10.98 7.06 4.17 
Financial, ec and 
monetary policy 
4.61 7.37 0 3.34 3.33 3.28 0.84 1.26 1.19 2.55 
Privacy and 
integrity of  
Individuals  
18.09 16.13 10.46 20.67 9.33 14.23 5.06 5.04 4.85 3.68 
Commercial 
Interests  
15.96 11.98 11.76 14.66 16.67 17.52 24.89 10.79 8.94 7.78 
Court 
proceeding and 
legal advice  
10.28 6.91 7.84 1.33 10 5.47 3.8 6.08 7.49 8.63 
Inspection, 
investigations 
and audits 
32.98 36.87 45.10 32.68 32 25.91 27.85 23.48 30.72 41.80 
Decision-making 
process (no dec 
taken) 
11.35 10.60 6.54 15.33 11.33 12.77 17.3 12.02 14.30 12.73 
Decision-making 
process (dec 
taken, opinions) 
3.19 5.53 9.15 4 8 13.87 12.24 19.29 19.06 14.36 
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Table 18: EU Council personal profile of the requesters (%) 
Years  2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Total1460  10,839 7,565 6,166 9,641 8188 8,444 10,732 7,809 11,353 9,457 
Civil Society 28.5 29.4 25.8 25.8 27.9 17.2 18.3 14.2 17.6 17.2 
Journalists  4.5 1.8 2.8 3.3 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.3 2.3 
Lawyers 10.3 10 9.8 10 10.1 11.4 9.5 8.8 9.1 10.2 
Academics 31.7 29.2 33.4 37.6 33.7 33.7 33.7 40 34.5 32.3 
Public 
Authorities 
3.8 4.4 4 5.4 5.6 4.1 7.6 6.1 6.9 6.2 
MEP 0.4 0.6 1 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.8 1.3 1.5 2.4 
Others 6 5.8 6.6 5.3 9.4 15.9 14.7 13.3 14.5 12.6 
Undeclared 14.8 18.8 16.5 13.5 13.3 12.6 10.9 13.2 13.6 16.8 
Source: Table drawn by author using data from the Council of European Union, Access to Documents Annual Reports. Available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/search/?q=access+to+documents+annual+reports 
 
 
                                                          
1460 Note that the total number is not expressed in percentage.  
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
EU Council profile of requesters 2005-2015 
Civil Society Journalists Lawyers Academics
Public authorities MEP Other Undeclared
412 
 
 
Table 19: EU Council requests access 
 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Requests 
received   
          
Access refused  1,875 1,613 1,308 1,135 1,341 1,991 1,607 1,686 1,747 1.922 
Partial access 776 867 998 1,103 1,369 1,117 1,540 945 1,105 1,254 
Full Access 8,188 5,084 3,860 7,403 6,478 5,336 7,675 5,178 8,451 6,281 
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Table 20: EU Council refusals by exceptions applied (%) 
Exceptions 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Public security  2 3.8 5.8 8.9 7 5.6 6.4 13.3 17.1 15.8 
Defence and 
military 
0.2 0.6 1.6 1.4 1.9 3.5 2.4 2.3 4.5 6.4 
International 
relations 
25.8 24.7 20.5 21.2 24.2 22.9 27.7 15.1 12.3 20.6 
Financial, ec and 
monetary policy 
0 0.3 0 1.1 0.5 0 0 0 0.1 0.8 
Privacy and 
integrity of  
Individuals  
0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Commercial 
Interests  
0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 
Court 
proceeding and 
legal advice  
0.7 0.5 0.6 1 0.8 0.4 1.5 0.5 2 1.8 
Inspection, 
investigations 
and audits 
0 0 0 0 0.3 0 0.1 0 0.3 0 
Decision-making 
process  
21.5 36.7 41.3 40.9 33.1 39.1 35.9 38 43.2 48.3 
Other reasons 49.4 33.2 30 25.3 31.7 28.2 25.4 30.2 20.2 6.1 
Not held by 
Council 
0.2 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0 
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Table 21: EP professional profile of applicants (%) 
Years 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Total 532 610 777 1,161 1,139 1,260 1,300 1,865 1,917 1,814 
Civil 
society 
-1461 18 16.95 10.36 20.47 21.75 54.06 21.95 21.39 20.59 
Journal. - 5 3 5.84 7.12 3.35 0.11 2.86 2.88 6.47 
Lawyers - 9 11.16 9.60 15.93 13.11 0.43 6.49 6.48 4.04 
University 
research 
- 43 33.48 45.39 38.47 41.36 27.41 36.69 39.39 34.60 
Library 
research 
- 2 2.36 1.69 2.33 1.42 2.28 4.03 3.49 2.79 
Public 
authority 
- 7 6.44 1.13 8.81 13.62 8.88 4.61 5.10 4.27 
MEP - 1 0 2.07 1.55 1.52 1.41 1.30 1.33 1.84 
Others - 15 26.61 23.16 5.31 3.86 5.42 22.08 19.94 25.40 
Source: Table Drawn by the author using data from European Parliament, Register of Documents: Annual Report. Online: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegistreWeb/information/report.htm>. 
                                                          
1461 Numbers here are not available in the Annual Report.  
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Table 22: EP refusals by exceptions applied (%) 
Exceptions 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Public security  6 0 15.8 25.4 12.5 5.26 2.08 6.25 - - 
Privacy  39 50 31.6 16.3 25 26.31 21.88 39.58 24.44 77.78 
Commercial 
Interests  
17 0 10.5 3.6 8.3 2.63 1.04 10.42 8.88 1.85 
Legal advice  6 0 10.5 14.5 12.5 10.52 2.08 8.33 24.44 12.96 
Audits 6 0 10.5 5.4 4 15.78 15.63 2.08 - 1.85 
Decision-making 28 50 21 34.5 37.5 39.47 57.29 33.33 40 5.56 
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